


BRILL'S COMPANION TO
ALEXANDER
THE GREAT



Edited by
Joseph Roisman

BRILL

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

BRILL'S COMPANION TO
ALEXANDER THE GREAT

BRILL'S COMPANION TO ALEXANDER THE GREAT

EDITED BY

JOSEPH ROISMAN



BRILL
LEIDEN • BOSTON
2003

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is also available.

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Brill's companion to Alexander the Great / ed. by Joseph Roisman.

– Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2003

ISBN 90-04-12463-2

ISBN 90 04 12463 2

© Copyright 2003 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands

Cover design: Robert Nix

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

*Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers, 01923, USA.
Fees are subject to change.*

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

CONTENTS

List of Contributors	ix
Lists of Maps and Illustrations	xi
Preface	xiii
Abbreviations	xvii
A Map of Greece and the Aegean	xix
A Map of Alexander's Campaigns	xx

PART ONE

ALEXANDER THE GREAT: THE ANCIENT EVIDENCE

1. The Ancient Evidence for Alexander the Great	3
<i>Elizabeth Baynham</i>	
2. Alexander in Greek and Roman Art	31
<i>Andrew Stewart</i>	

PART TWO

ALEXANDER, MACEDONIA AND THE GREEKS

3. Alexander, Philip, and the Macedonian Background	69
<i>Ian Worthington</i>	
4. Alexander and the Greeks	99
<i>Michele Faraguna</i>	

PART THREE
CONQUEROR AND CONQUERED

5. Alexander: The Military Campaign 133
Barry S. Strauss
6. The Indian Campaigns, 327–325 BC 159
A. Brian Bosworth
7. Alexander and the Persians 169
Maria Brosius

PART FOUR
ALEXANDER'S REIGN: POLITICAL AND
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES

8. King and “Companions:” Observations on the
Nature of Power in the Reign of Alexander 197
Waldemar Heckel
9. Women in Alexander's Court 227
Elizabeth D. Carney
10. Alexander's Religion and Divinity 253
Ernst Fredricksmeyer
11. Honor in Alexander's Campaign 279
Joseph Roisman

PART FIVE
ALEXANDER'S LEGACY

12. The legacy of Alexander in Ancient Philosophy 325
Richard Stoneman
13. Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Conflict 347
Loring M. Danforth

CONTENTS

vii

Bibliography	365
Index	389

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

ELIZABETH BAYNHAM is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Liberal Arts, University of Newcastle, Australia.

A. BRIAN BOSWORTH is a Professor and holds a Personal Chair of Classics and Ancient History in the School of Humanities, University of Western Australia.

MARIA BROSIUS is a Lecturer in Ancient History at the University of New Castle upon Tyne, UK.

ELIZABETH D. CARNEY is a Professor in the Department of History at Clemson University.

LORING M. DANFORTH is a Professor of Anthropology and Chair of the Department of Anthropology at Bates College.

MICHELE FARAGUNA is a Lecturer in the Department of Classical Studies at the University of Trieste, Italy.

ERNST FREDRICKSMEYER is a Professor Emeritus in the Department of Classics at the University of Colorado at Boulder.

WALDEMAR HECKEL is a Professor of Ancient History in the Department of Greek and Roman Studies at the University of Calgary.

JOSEPH ROISMAN is a Professor of Classics at Colby College.

ANDREW STEWART is the Chancellor's Professor of Ancient Mediterranean Art and Archaeology in Department of History of Art at University of California at Berkeley.

RICHARD STONEMAN is a Publisher for Classics and Archaeology at Routledge, and an Honorary Fellow of the University of Exeter.

BARRY S. STRAUSS is a Professor of History and Classics at Cornell University.

IAN WORTHINGTON is a Professor of Greek History in the Department of History at the University of Missouri-Columbia.

LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Maps

Greece and the Aegean	xix
Alexander's Campaigns	xx
The Kabul Valley	160
The Punjab	163

Illustrations

Figure 1–19 can be found between the pages 44 and 45:

1. Head of Alexander. Bronze, perhaps from the Sebasteion at Bubon; ca. AD 200–250. Basel.
2. The “Nelidow” Alexander. Bronze; Hellenistic or Roman version of a portrait of ca. 325 BC. Cambridge (Mass.).
3. The “Schwarzenberg” Alexander. Marble; Roman copy of a portrait of ca. 330 BC. Munich.
4. Alexander with thunderbolt and aegis. Red carnelian gemstone signed by Neisos (cast); ca. 300–250 BC. St. Petersburg.
5. Alexander with Ammon-Ra Khamutef (left); Monthu introduces Alexander to Ammon (right). Sandstone relief from the Shrine of the Bark at Luxor; ca. 330–325 BC. Luxor, in situ.
6. Alexander and Roxane. Fresco from the Insula Occidentalis at Pompeii; Roman copy or version of a painting of ca. 325–300 BC. Pompeii.
7. Alexander fighting Darius. Mosaic from the Casa del Fauno at Pompeii; Roman version of a painting of ca. 325–300 BC. Naples.
8. Alexander with elephant-skin headdress, Ammon's horns, *mitra*, and aegis. Silver tetradrachm of Ptolemy I Soter of Egypt, ca. 305 BC. Formerly on the Swiss Market.
9. Alexander fighting at Issos. Marble relief from the so-called Alexander Sarcophagus from Sidon; ca. 320–310 BC. Istanbul.

10. Alexander with horned helmet, wearing Macedonian-Persian dress and riding Bucephalas. Silver tetradrachm of Seleucus I of Syria; ca. 295–290 BC. Formerly on the Swiss Market.
11. Alexander with diadem and Ammon's horns. Silver tetradrachm of Lysimachus of Thrace; ca. 297–281 BC. London.
12. Alexander-Helios. Alabaster bust from Egypt; ca. 150 BC–AD 100. Brooklyn.
13. Alexander with lionskin cap. Silver tetradrachm of Agathocles of Baktria; ca. 190–170 BC. London.
14. Europe and Asia at an altar, holding a shield depicting the Battle of Arbela (Gaugamela). Marble relief from Porcigliano; ca. AD 50? Rome.
15. Caracalla-Alexander with aegis and Palladion. Cameo, set into a medieval cross; AD 211–216. Formerly in Cammin, destroyed or stolen in World War II.
16. Alexander with shield and breastplate bearing astral symbols. Gold medallion from Aboukir in Egypt, ca. AD 230–250. Baltimore.
17. Alexander taking Sagalassos, with Zeus and a fleeing barbarian. Bronze coin of Sagalassos, minted under Claudius II Gothicus; ca. AD 268–70. London.
18. Busts of (from the left) Pythagoras, Socrates, Alcibiades, Pindar, Alexander, and a nameless philosopher. Marble; ca. AD 400–450. Aphrodisias.

Fig. on page 164:

19. Designs from five-shekel coins struck by Alexander in Babylon.

PREFACE

Brill's series *The Classical Tradition* has established itself as an important contribution to the field of classical studies and literature through a number of Companions to ancient authors. It is hoped that the present volume will continue this tradition, even though it is somewhat different from the volumes which preceded it. Rather than dealing with a classical author in his cultural context, this volume focuses on the reign of Alexander the Great, who, regardless of what one may think of him and the nature of his campaign, undeniably stood at the center of one of the most decisive chapters in ancient history. His conquest of western and central Asia and its consequences changed the history of the ancient Mediterranean and affected to various degrees the political and cultural life of people from the Balkans to the Indus river. And Alexander has never ceased to be relevant, whether as the focus of political discourses, of scholarly attention, of philosophical, popular and artistic interest, or even of modern controversies about ethnicity and nationalism. This volume strives to explore aspects of Alexander's story that are at the roots of people's interest in him, as well as the nature of the interest itself.

Intended as an informative and scholarly companion for advanced students, scholars, and nonspecialists who are interested in Alexander the Great, the book aims to acquaint the reader with central issues in Alexander studies, with scholarly trends in the discussion and the interpretations of these issues, and, where possible, to open up new directions of investigation or suggest fresh perspectives on the ancient evidence. It is not our goal to cover everything that has been, or can be, said about Alexander, but to take a thematic approach to the subject in the form of papers focusing on specific topics. It is in the nature of such a collection of articles that some points will be examined by more than one author, and that authors may differ in their interpretations of the evidence.¹ Yet differences of opinions enrich rather than impede our understanding of the history of Alexander and prevent any monolithic view of him from

¹ Different transliterations of Greek terms and words were retained as well. References to discussions of similar or related points have been made by the authors or added by the editor.

dominating, which, as historians of the king can attest, is highly desirable.

Articles in this book were contributed by both veteran and fairly recent students of Alexander, residents of three continents, who thus illustrate the vitality of interest in the king as well his universal scholarly appeal. Part I deals with the ancient evidence for Alexander. Elizabeth Baynham investigates the nature of the extant, and lost, literary accounts of Alexander's career, their relations to each other, as well as literary and other considerations that influenced their depictions of the king. Andrew Stewart's paper considers the artistic history of Alexander images, from the time of his campaign to the period of imperial Rome, and how representations of the king served often to convey political or moral messages that patrons, artists and viewers associated with him.

Part II discusses Alexander in Macedonian and Greek contexts. Ian Worthington deals with the political and social history of Macedonia prior to Alexander, and especially with the accomplishments of Philip II, as well as with Alexander's relationship with his formidable father and the early stages of his career. Michele Faraguna analyzes how Alexander and the Greeks, whether on the mainland or in Asia Minor, viewed each other and investigates the complex relationships that regulated their dealings with one another.

The military, administrative and cultural aspects of Alexander's conquest are explored in Part III. Barry Strauss examines the nature and quality of Alexander's generalship and finds him excelling the standards which a military commander was expected to meet. A. Brian Bosworth, in a narrative originally published in the *Cambridge Ancient History* (2nd edition, vol. 6, 1994: 826–834), describes Alexander's campaign in India, which marked the end of his ambition to expand eastward, as well as showing him to be more a destroyer and sheer conqueror than founder of a stable empire. Maria Brosius considers Alexander's treatment of the Persians, who had ruled the empire he overthrew for many generations prior to his invasion, and finds the king lacking in understanding or appreciation of their customs and ideology, including those he appropriated for himself.

Part IV includes studies which use political, sociological and cultural perspectives to examine life in the Macedonian court and camp. Waldemar Heckel looks at the persons who constituted the Macedonian elite and discusses their relationship with the king, especially through the prism of conspiracies which were hatched against his life, but

not, as the author maintains, by the king against his men. Elizabeth Carney discusses the roles, the significance and the extent of influence exerted by both Macedonian and Asian women in the masculine world of Alexander and his contemporaries. Ernst Fredricksmeier looks at Alexander's religious practices and beliefs and how they evolved in the course of the campaign and of Alexander's rise in stature and power. Joseph Roisman studies the role of honor in Alexander's campaign and how Alexander used this symbolic resource to regulate the stature and position of his subordinates, while at the same time he was himself constrained by considerations of honor.


Alexander's legacy, or what might be termed his objectification, forms the subject of Part V. Richard Stoneman discusses the way in which Greek and Roman philosophers used Alexander primarily as a moral example in their teachings and writings. Lastly, Loring Danforth looks at how recent controversies over who "owns" Alexander and Macedonian antiquity are integrated into conflicts between modern nations and communities over identity and territory.

For a variety of reasons, the completion of this project took longer than expected. I wish to thank all the contributors for their patience and friendly cooperation. The editors, Julian Deahl and Michiel Klein Swormink, were most helpful in overcoming obstacles on the editorial way, and Alexis Detwiler extended her help in assembling the collective bibliography. It gives me immense pleasure to dedicate this volume to my wife Hanna and my children Elad and Shalev.

A LIST OF COMMON ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS VOLUME

Arr.	Arrian, <i>Anabasis</i>
Athen.	Athenaeus, <i>Deipnosophistae</i>
Curt.	Q. Curtius Rufus, <i>History of Alexander</i>
Dem.	Demosthenes
Diod.	Diodorus of Sicily, <i>Bibliothēke</i>
FGrH	F. Jacoby. 1993. <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> . Leiden and New York.
Isoc.	Isocrates <i>Orations</i>
Just.	Justin, <i>Abridgement of Pompeius Trogus' Historiae Philippicae</i>
Plut. <i>Moral.</i>	Plutarch, <i>Moralia</i>
Plut. <i>Alex.</i>	Plutarch, <i>Life of Alexander</i>
RE	<i>Realencyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>

For all other abbreviations of ancient sources see *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. Abbreviations of journals' titles can be found in *L'Année philologique; bibliographie critique et analytique de l'antiquité gréco-latine*.



PART ONE

ALEXANDER THE GREAT: THE ANCIENT EVIDENCE

CHAPTER ONE

THE ANCIENT EVIDENCE FOR ALEXANDER THE GREAT

Elizabeth Baynham

i. *The Lost Histories*

Alexander III of Macedon, who arguably inspired more writing than any other historical figure in the ancient Graeco-Roman world, also remains one of the most elusive and mysterious, obscured and distorted by the very complexity of the literary tradition that surrounds him. Before we can even begin to understand something of the man, his reign, his excesses and his achievement, it seems that there is a great, noisy crowd of ancient authors in the way. The loudest and clearest voices belong to the historians whose accounts we have (Diodorus, Curtius, Plutarch, Arrian and Justin) none of whom was contemporary with Alexander, and of these, Arrian of Nicomedia has in modern times proved the most influential—which, one suspects, given that writer's stated confidence in his own talent, would have afforded him no small degree of satisfaction.¹

The extant historians based their works upon earlier sources. They mention names and occasionally offer direct quotations or paraphrase, but usually there is little acknowledgement of a particular authority, and it is rare that large sections of an earlier historian's work are reproduced without contamination from other sources, or extensive re-writing or intrusion on the part of the historian who is doing the extracting. One possible exception is Nearchus (*FGrH* 133), Alexander's admiral, who wrote an account of his voyage from India.² His work was the basis of the latter part of Arrian's *Indike*, and because Nearchus was also used extensively by the geographer, Strabo,

¹ Arrian (all references hence are to the *Anabasis* unless otherwise stated) *Praef.* 3; 1.12.5 with Stadter 1980: 61–66 and Bosworth 1980: 104–07.

² On Nearchus, see Badian 1975: 147–70; see also Bosworth, in Will 1988: 541–67.

cross-comparison enables identification and analysis of portions of the original material.³

However in general, the utterances of the first generation historians are more muted and difficult to identify. These writers included members of Alexander's military and general staff, such as Callisthenes of Olynthus (*FGrH* 124), Ptolemy, son of Lagus (*FGrH* 138), Aristobulus of Cassandria (*FGrH* 139), Onesicritus of Astypalaea (*FGrH* 134), Medius of Larissa (*FGrH* 129), Polyclitus of Larissa (*FGrH* 128) and Chares of Mitylene (*FGrH* 125),⁴ and contemporary but probable non-eyewitness historians, like Cleitarchus of Alexandria (*FGrH* 137), Marsyas of Pella (*FGrH* 135) and pamphleteers like Ephippus of Olynthus (*FGrH* 126) and Nicobule (*FGrH* 127). Alexander's entourage also contained technical experts, the bematists ("striders"), surveyors and engineers. These men did record detailed figures for distances in the empire (see particularly Baeton, *FGrH* 119 F 2–3), but the information coexisted with romantic and sensational ethnographical information about the countries Alexander passed through, and it is virtually impossible to gain any sense of the nature of these obscure works.⁵ And as with many of the other contemporary accounts, we have little idea of the scope of the technical treatises; whether they were merely intended for specialists, or whether they were full scale histories.

There are also scattered references to Alexander's correspondence and other documents in the extant traditions; for instance, Alexander calls on his satraps to provide copies of official papers which were destroyed by a fire in his secretary's tent;⁶ Plutarch claims to have based his account of the battle of the Hydaspes on Alexander's own

³ Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 1988: 3.

⁴ A comprehensive exposition of what we know of each of these authors is beyond the scope of this chapter. An English translation of the collected fragments (based on Jacoby) is provided by Robinson vol. i 1953. The classic study is Pearson 1960; see more recently, Pédech 1988, which examines Callisthenes, Onesicritus, Nearchus, Ptolemy and Aristobulus, the historians who had taken part in Alexander's expedition. Meister's study (see Meister 1990) on Greek historiography offers summaries of the lost histories; other useful surveys are found in Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 1988: 1–15, and *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 295–300. For two specialised monographs on Callisthenes and Cleitarchus see Prandi 1985 and Prandi 1996. On Onesicritus, see Brown 1949; on Aristobulus, see Brunt 1974: 65–9, and on Chares, see Brunt 1980: 485–6. For Ptolemy's history, see below, nn. 38–39.

⁵ For the bematists, Baeton et al., see *FGrH* 119–123; see also Pfister 1961: 30–67.

⁶ Plut. *Eum.* 2.

letter and mentions the king's correspondence in several other contexts. But it is highly unlikely that this material was genuine—at least not all of it.⁷

However, one intriguing, primary official document which warrants mentioning is the *Ephemerides* or royal journal. This was a daily record kept by the Macedonian kings of all the day's transactions, activities, appointments and business. We know that at the time of Alexander's death the archive was in the hands of his chief secretary, Eumenes of Cardia, and both Arrian and Plutarch refer to it for a description of the king's last illness. In modern times, it has been commonly and perhaps erroneously assumed that this archive in turn had provided Arrian's main source, Ptolemy, with much of his information. It has even been alleged that when a Macedonian king died, his journal and weapons were supposedly kept at Aegae, and a new journal commenced with the accession of his successor.⁸

While Alexander's body was en route to Aegae (the burial place of Macedonian kings)⁹ Ptolemy hi-jacked it at Damascus and took it to Egypt, thus gaining possession of all of Alexander's royal paraphernalia. But to deduce Ptolemy's access to official material from the *Ephemerides* is pure speculation. We do not know if Arrhidaeus, acting on Perdiccas' (the regent in Babylon) orders, had actually packed the archive on the funeral cortège. One could imagine that if the journal contained important and sensitive material, the last thing Perdiccas would have done was to allow any hands but his own on it. In short, such an account would be too useful a record of past business to relinquish easily, particularly for somebody whose own position was precarious. We also do not know whether there was only one copy of it, or even if Ptolemy had it, whether he used it. He might have relied on his memory, possible notes, the recollections of others, or a combination of all these things.

One problematic factor is that apart from the detailed descriptions of Alexander's last illness, there are very few references to the

⁷ See Plut. *Alex.* 60. 1; 11; on the authenticity of Alexander's correspondence, see Pearson 1954–55: 429–55; Hamilton 1953: 151–7; see also 1961: 9–20.

⁸ Hammond 1989: 189; cf. "Royal Journals" 1988: 129–50; also "A Note" 1991: 382–4.

⁹ According to the majority of the sources the body of Alexander was originally intended to be buried at Siwah (so Diod. 18.3.5; Curt. 10.5.4; Just. 12.15.7; 13.4.6). But Pausanias (1.6.3) claims that Perdiccas' agent, Arrhidaeus was instructed to take the body to the Macedonian capital of Aegae; on the political significance of this tradition, see Bosworth 2002: Chap. 1, n. 31.

journal, which has led to suggestions that the sections of it which are cited may have been a forgery, probably composed by Eumenes and circulated shortly after Alexander's death to counter-act rumours that he had been poisoned by his senior marshals.¹⁰ However, regardless of whether Ptolemy had access to a genuine journal or not, one point needs re-emphasising; official material is often limited, and not necessarily a guarantee of the truth, or at least the whole truth.¹¹ One need only recall the great inscription and superb sculptures at Behistun proclaiming the victory of Darius I over his enemies to his god, Ahura-Mazda, and the elements; if one believes the official statement, the initiative, triumph, and divine favour belong to the King of Kings alone; there is only a bare mention of his supporters (and fellow conspirators) at the very end of the document.¹²

We should also be aware that there were many other authors—historians, poets and philosophers from the Hellenistic period through to the fall of the Roman Republic and the advent of the Imperial era, who also wrote on the Macedonian king, but again, as with the primary tradition, we only know of them (and sometimes that is all we know) from later writers who mention them.

Not one of the early histories has survived, and given the overall paucity of the quotations that are preserved by later writers, it is difficult to make judgements about the scale, content and nature of the original works, or the motives of the historian for writing them. The number of references to early histories by different authors and the amount of material cited varies enormously. For instance there are apparently only three certain quotations from the Macedonian historian, Marsyas of Pella (and all by the one author),¹³ but Callisthenes' various works are cited by over twenty writers from different

¹⁰ See Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander*, 1988: 158 with nn. 4–7.

¹¹ The widespread and influential idea that Ptolemy's reliability as a historian derived from his use of official material was originally elaborated by Wilcken and Droysen (see Bosworth 1996: 33–34) and consistently supported by Hammond (see above, n. 9, with Hammond 1983: 1–11), but see Badian's incisive critique of Hammond, as well as his discussion of the *Ephemerides* (Badian in Will 1988: 605–25).

¹² There is a considerable body of modern discussion of this topic; in general, see Bickerman and Tadmor 1978: 239–61, Balcer 1987 and Dandamaev 1989: 83–135.

¹³ One needs to distinguish between Marsyas of Pella and Marsyas the Younger (of Philippi), but this is problematic: we do not always know which historian is being quoted, and the distribution of the fragments is far from certain. The fragments credited to Marsyas of Pella in Jacoby are all preserved by Harpocration, who wrote extensive notes on the Attic orators. See also Heckel 1980: 444–62.

periods in antiquity. This in itself is not surprising. Callisthenes was related to the famous Aristotle and he was celebrated as a historian in his own right before he joined the king's expedition. In addition to the *Praxeis Alexandrou* (Exploits of Alexander) Callisthenes was famous for a *Hellenica* (which according to one tradition was deemed better than his history on Alexander)¹⁴ and his work on the Delphic table, allegedly in collaboration with Aristotle. Indeed Callisthenes' reputation undoubtedly contributed to his invitation to be Alexander's official publicist, and his opposition to the king and subsequent execution was one of the most notorious episodes of Alexander's reign. Callisthenes was a figure who would generate considerable interest.¹⁵

Yet one would think that Marsyas' histories would have also been attractive. He was a younger brother of Antigonos—who later became one of the most powerful of Alexander's Successors—and apparently educated with Alexander. Marsyas wrote a first-hand account of Alexander's training, and a history of Macedonia in ten books down to the foundation of Alexandria in 331 BC. It is highly likely that Marsyas was in a prime position for "inside" knowledge, because although Antigonos was satrap of Phrygia from 333 and at a considerable distance from Alexander's court and army, he would have had his informants, both before and after the king's death. But Marsyas' lack of popularity could well have been determined by his choice of subject matter.¹⁶ Both of the historian's works might have been too limited in their content on Alexander, may not have been easy to get hold of, or were possibly felt to have been too eulogistic, uninformative, inelegantly written, or just plain dull. One could speculate endlessly. The fact remains that of all our extant Alexander historians, only Arrian explicitly names his main sources (Ptolemy and Aristobulus) at the start of his history, together with his reasons for choosing them; they were both eye-witnesses and they both wrote after Alexander's death, which in Arrian's view enhanced the likelihood of their historical veracity. Moreover, as Ptolemy was a king,

¹⁴ See *Gnomol. Vatic.* 367 = *FGrH* 124 T 26.

¹⁵ But see Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 1988: 4–6, who notes that there are only about a dozen identifiable references to Callisthenes' history of Alexander, and that these tend to focus on the atypical or what is inaccurate and sensational. As a result, the bulk of Callisthenes' work is ultimately unknowable.

¹⁶ Heckel 1980: 459 is sceptical that Marsyas wrote a separate history of Alexander's education and suggests (462) that Marsyas' history of Macedonia was probably more concerned with Philip's reign and the unification of the Macedonian state.

lying was all the more disgraceful.¹⁷ On the one hand, the high esteem in which Arrian has been held in modern times rests partly on his decision to use contemporary traditions, but on the other, not only did the histories of Ptolemy and Aristobulus receive negative comments in antiquity, but Arrian's apparent desire to follow such obviously pro-Alexander accounts, has also rendered the reliability of his own history vulnerable.

Factors like availability, style and content, as well as the interests and criteria of a later writer, undoubtedly affected why one primary tradition may have been preferred over another. As noted above, later authors also make critical judgements about earlier ones, which can affect the way the earlier tradition is perceived in modern times, and which can be both revealing and potentially misleading. Cicero calls Callisthenes "to be sure a common (*vulgaris*) and well known commodity;"¹⁸ Cleitarchus is described by an unknown writer as "frivolous;"¹⁹ according to Strabo, Onesicritus, the pilot of the king's fleet, "surpassed all of Alexander's followers in the telling of marvels;"²⁰ Aristobulus was a "flatterer;"²¹ while for Curtius, Ptolemy, one of Alexander's most successful generals and later king of Egypt, was a blatant self-publicist.²²

One needs to exercise caution. Such comments are not necessarily the result of direct consultation; ancient authors often pass on the statements of others without reading a work for themselves, or critical opinions can be set around a standard *topos*, such as demonstrating one's own historical knowledge and accuracy at the expense of somebody else's blunder.²³ There is also a tendency among later writers to quote what may be considered as titillating or sensational, which likewise can distort an impression of the original work.²⁴

¹⁷ Arrian *Praef.* 2 with Bosworth 1980: 43; more recently, Simon Hornblower's observations, 1994: 40, with n. 93.

¹⁸ Cic. *Ad Q. fr.* 2.11.4 = *FGrH* 124. T 31.

¹⁹ *FGrH* 137. T 9.

²⁰ Strabo 15.1.28 C 698 = *FGrH* 134. T 10.

²¹ Anon. *Epit. Rhet.* 3.610.18 = *FGrH* 139. T 9. Cf. an anecdote from Lucian (*Quom. hist. conscr.* 12 = *FGrH* 139. T 4); Aristobulus was supposedly reading Alexander part of his history in which he described a hand to hand duel between Alexander and Porus. Alexander was so outraged by this blatant fabrication that he threw the book overboard and abused Aristobulus; on the possible development of this tradition, see Baynham "Who Put" 1995: 11–13.

²² Curt. 9.5.21 = *FGrH* 138. F 26b; see Baynham 1998: 84.

²³ See Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 1988: 75–83; see also below, n. 71.

²⁴ See Brunt 1980: 477–94 at 485.

We also need to keep in mind that our own corpus of extant ancient literature is hardly extensive, at least in relation to what must have been produced. The Roman author Quintus Curtius was very popular in the Medieval period and Renaissance,²⁵ yet no writer in antiquity connects a Curtius with a history of Alexander. One might surmise from this that Curtius was therefore unknown and unread, and it is quite freakish that his text survived at all. But such a conclusion is dangerous; linguistic analyses have demonstrated the affinity of Curtius' Latinity with several Roman authors from Livy to Tacitus, and although it is difficult to prove that Tacitus knew Curtius' work (or vice-versa), there are some striking examples of the two authors using vocabulary or phraseology which is rare elsewhere.²⁶ Most of the earliest Alexander traditions were still extant as late as the second century AD, but after that it is impossible to trace what happened to them, and short of some major new find, we cannot progress much beyond what we already have.

Not only is the content and nature of the lost Alexander histories uncertain, but also for the most part, are the dates for the composition of their works. Again, although one cannot make much progress here, pinning likely dates down might cast light on historians' motives as well as clarifying their historical contexts. Presumably Callisthenes was writing his history between the start of the expedition and his death in 327, although how his narrative was preserved and transmitted is unknown, and likewise, the degree of influence his history might have had upon the other primary accounts. Aristobulus, who was possibly some kind of technical expert on Alexander's staff,²⁷ seems to have written sometime after the battle of Ipsus in 301 (so Arrian 7.18.5) and in advanced old age.²⁸

²⁵ See Baynham, 1998: 3–4.

²⁶ See Atkinson 1980: 48–50; see also Baynham 1998: 201 with n. 3; in particular, see the comprehensive linguistic analysis of Rodríguez 1975 which supports a Vespasianic date for the history. On parallels between Curtius and Tacitus see Lund 1987: 50–56.

²⁷ Aristobulus' possible role as an architect or decorator on Alexander's staff has derived largely from his account of the restoration of Cyrus' tomb which he directed; so Arrian 6.29; cf. Strabo 15.3.7 [730] = *FGrH* 139. F 51b. Modern assumption of his technical skills has been "well-nigh universal" (so Bosworth 1980: 27 with n. 42); more sceptical are Bosworth, *ibid.*, and Stadter 1980: 69.

²⁸ Ps. Lucian *Macrobian* 22 = *FGrH* 139. T 3: Aristobulus began composing his history when he was 84 years old and allegedly lived beyond ninety.

Some have suggested that Nearchus was working on his history around the time of Alexander's death in 323 BC because of a tradition (Plut. *Alex.* 76.3) which describes the sea commander relating his experiences to his ailing king. However, such an oral exposition could mean that Nearchus was merely spinning yarns, as opposed to reading from a history, report, or any other written work. If he was writing a formal history at the time, we do not know when he finished it.

Onesicritus may have also written his history relatively early. A fictitious tradition of Alexander's death preserved in the *Metz Epitome* indicates that Onesicritus' work was already known: he supposedly knew the names of those involved in a conspiracy to murder Alexander, but had refrained to mention them. A persuasive argument has recently been made for assigning a precise date and context for this fictitious tradition to 308 BC, but we cannot be certain.²⁹

A more convincing case can be made for Cleitarchus' date. Along with Callisthenes and Aristobulus, Cleitarchus' history seems to have been widely known and used in antiquity. More importantly, he was probably the major source used by three of our extant historians, Diodorus, Justin and Curtius. Traditionally, Cleitarchus is associated with Alexandria, in which case he composed his history under the Ptolemaic regime. Some scholars, including Tarn and Pearson, argued that he was among the latest of the first generation histories, writing well into the third century BC.³⁰ But Pliny gives Cleitarchus' floruit as immediately after Theopompus and before Theophrastus, in which case he was writing sometime around 312–310 BC.³¹ At all events, there are several indications that he published his history before Ptolemy. Firstly, both Curtius (9.5.21) and Arrian (6.11.8) note the same glaring inaccuracy transmitted by their sources; namely that Ptolemy was at the Malli fortress in India where Alexander received a near-fatal wound, when in fact, Ptolemy himself had said he was elsewhere. Curtius names Cleitarchus as one of the author-

²⁹ *Metz. Epit.* 97 = *FGrH* 134 F 37; see Bosworth "The Death" 1971: 116, Heckel 1988: 2. On the 308 BC date see Bosworth in Bosworth and Baynham 2000: 207–41.

³⁰ See Tarn ii 1948: 16–29, Pearson 1960: 242.

³¹ Pliny *NH* 3.57–8 = *FGrH* 137 F 31; see Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 1988: 85–91. On the date of ca. 310 BC. for Cleitarchus' history, see Badian 1965 5–11; Schachermeyr 1970: 211–24; Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 1988: 87–93; Prandi, 1996: 66–71; see Bosworth 2002: Ch. 2, with n. 51.

ities responsible for the error. It is unlikely that Cleitarchus would have noted the presence of his king, if there was a pre-existing royal account that explicitly contradicted him. Secondly Cleitarchus highlights³² the role of an Athenian hetaira, Thais, Ptolemy's mistress, in one of the most famous (or infamous) acts of arson in history—the burning of the royal palace of Persepolis. She was responsible for urging Alexander at a banquet to set fire to the building complex, and long after the event she remained a woman of considerable standing at Ptolemy's court.³³ It would have been extremely dangerous for Cleitarchus to have fabricated her part, regardless of whether Alexander and the Macedonians later regretted their action. However, if the party which the historian describes had taken place and Alexander *had* acted on provocative remarks, Cleitarchus could well have dressed Thais' role with Dionysiac trappings (much in the same way that Dionysus was brought into the murder of Cleitus)³⁴ and added some Panhellenic colour.³⁵ We do not know what Ptolemy's account of the conflagration was, since Arrian's version is not only very brief, but loaded with his own opinion, and he seems uncomfortable with the whole affair.³⁶ It may well have been Ptolemy's decision to omit his mistress's share in the arson in his own history, but Cleitarchus, far from burying the episode, could actually make her glamorous. It is interesting that the suggested date for Cleitarchus' history in 310 also coincides with Ptolemy's attempt to promote himself as a champion of Greek liberty in order to detach mainland Greek poleis from Cassander.³⁷ A Panhellenic flavour—and a pointed reminder of Alexander's grand vengeance on the Mede (and by association, Ptolemy's own part in that) may have been particularly timely.

Opinions on the possible nature of Ptolemy's history have oscillated considerably over the last fifty years. Lionel Pearson's classic

³² Athen. 13.576d = Cleitarchus, *FGH* 137 F 11; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 38.2; Diod. 17.72; Curt. 5.7.2–11.

³³ See Bosworth in Bosworth and Baynham 2000: 13, n. 40: Thais' children by Ptolemy seem to have enjoyed prosperous and distinguished careers.

³⁴ Cf. Diod. 17.72.4–6: Alexander and the revellers at the banquet form a Dionysiac *komos*; Cleitus' death was ascribed to Dionysus' wrath following a neglected sacrifice; see Arrian 4.8.1, 9.5; Curt. 8.2.6 and Bosworth 1995: 52, 64.

³⁵ On Panhellenism as an incentive in the burning of the royal palace, see most recently Flower in Bosworth and Baynham 2000: 114–15.

³⁶ See Arrian 3.18.11–12, with Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 330–33; on Arrian's tone, see also Baynham 1998: 98.

³⁷ See Bosworth in Bosworth and Baynham 2000: 215–17.

work, *The Lost Histories of Alexander*, followed Tarn in portraying Ptolemy's history as the dry, militarily centred memoirs of an old soldier. That picture was revised by R. M. Errington who suggested that Ptolemy's history was written fairly early after Alexander's death in an attempt to justify his seizure of Egypt and denigrate the achievements of his rivals. Errington's interpretation was challenged by J. Roisman, but Ptolemy's political motives for composing his history have since remained a central part in modern discussions.³⁸ As far as we can tell, the history was not without colour or literary allusion, and it is probably fair to say that Ptolemy exaggerated his own role.³⁹ Whether he actually fabricated details or not is another matter.

However, one point needs to be emphasised, and that is Ptolemy's overall influence in shaping the major part of extant Alexander historiography. In some ways, Ptolemy was arguably the most successful of the Diadochoi, particularly in terms of personal longevity and the span of his reign. He died in his bed, leaving his kingdom intact and secure. He also seems to have been acutely aware of the propaganda potential offered by literature, coinage, building programmes, sculpture and the visual arts. As noted earlier, Cleitarchus' history was likely the basis for three of our extant historians, who offer alternative accounts to the heavily pro-Alexander history of Arrian. It is true that one finds a more tyrannical Alexander in the pages of Diodorus, Justin and Curtius—which may have ultimately derived from Cleitarchus' own portrayal. But apart from a sole, sarcastic jibe by Curtius (9.5.21), not one Alexander historian has anything bad to say about Ptolemy. It seems worthwhile to conclude this sub-section of the chapter with a pertinent example of Ptolemy's domination of the Alexander tradition. In 330 BC one of Alexander's most powerful generals, Philotas, was convicted of conspiracy to assassinate the king and executed.⁴⁰ What also emerges from the evidence

³⁸ See Pearson 1960: 188–211; Errington 1969: 233–42; Roisman 1984: 373–85; see also Baynham 1998: 71, n. 50.

³⁹ On the possible characteristics of Ptolemy's history, see Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 23–26; also Bosworth 1996: 42–7; 62–5.

⁴⁰ See Arrian, 3.26–27.1, with Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 359–67; Plut. *Alex.* 48–49.12 with Hamilton 1969: 132–37; Diod. 17.79–80; Curt. 6.7–11 with Atkinson 1994: 212–46; Just. 12.5.1–8 with Yardley and Heckel 1997: 210–14. Justin's account, although hostile to Alexander, is heavily abbreviated and offers nothing on a conspiracy among the king's followers or its revelation. I am also grateful to Professor Bosworth for allowing me access to some of his unpublished material on this episode. Cf. Heckel in this volume.

is that Philotas' rivals seized the chance to ruin him and did so at either Alexander's open behest or passive complicity. Arrian's account, which he attributes directly to Ptolemy is notoriously brief; Philotas was executed for failing to reveal to the king news of a plot of which he had been informed. But Arrian does state a short while later in his text (3.27.5) that Ptolemy was promoted to the bodyguard as a further result of Philotas' fall, which suggests that it may have been in Ptolemy's interests to say as little as possible. For the details of the persons involved in the conspiracy, as well as those marshals who urged Alexander to arrest Philotas, we need Curtius' expansive narrative and to a lesser extent, Diodorus'. However despite the additional information, the latter accounts, as with Arrian's, place Philotas in a compromising position, even though Curtius himself appears to be ambivalent on Philotas' guilt or innocence. The point is that in Arrian (3.26.2) Curtius (6.7.18) and Diodorus (17.79.3) Philotas is *told* of a conspiracy and given names. But an alternative, and more disturbing report is offered by Plutarch, who not only paints a picture of Alexander's long term suspicion and surveillance of Philotas, but more importantly suggests that the hipparch was not actually given intelligence of a plot (*Alex.* 49.4–5). Cebalinus and Nicomachus merely said they had urgent business to discuss with the king. In such circumstances, Philotas' scepticism and failure to act is more understandable; for all he knew, the informers may have gained Alexander's attention on a trivial pretext—for which he, Philotas would later take the blame.

Historically, both the truth of Philotas' involvement in any plot and the circumstances will remain unclear. However, it is evident that Ptolemy and Cleitarchus promoted the official line; moreover, it is also interesting that despite his elevation, Ptolemy is not named as one of the marshals who help bring Philotas down. That role is ascribed to Craterus, Hephaestion and Coenus—men who were safely dead when Cleitarchus wrote his history. He could keep silence on his royal master's part; yet another example of history written by the victors.

ii. *Extant literary works and other sources of information on Alexander*

It seems appropriate to commence this section by chronologically listing the extant written histories of Alexander's reign. Polybius, perhaps

our earliest surviving historian, while not concerned with the Macedonian conqueror per se, offers a substantial and surprisingly revealing amount of comment and information.⁴¹ We have considerable sections of two universal histories; Book 17 of Diodorus Siculus' *Bibliothēke* (which is solely devoted to Alexander), and Books 11–12 of Justin's *Epitome* of Pompeius Trogus. Diodorus was writing in the latter part of the first century BC and his encyclopedic history preceded that of Trogus, who seems to have composed his Philippic histories (in forty-four books) during the reign of Augustus. Both histories are not without their problems, which is partly the inevitable result of a need for brevity. We find compression or conflation of events, confusion of names and places, and often faulty chronology.⁴² In Justin's case his selectivity is presumably driven by a stated aim of only including material which offered pleasurable reading, or served to provide a moral (Just. *Praef.* 4). However, although modern criticism of both these authors remains endemic, we would do well to remember that we would be a lot poorer without either of them (especially Diodorus) and it is only fair to approach both of them in terms of what they themselves were trying to achieve. Diodorus' professed objective in his Preface was a useful and handy compilation of world history from mythological beginnings to the present day; for Justin, an instructive, elegant and enjoyable anthology excerpted from a much admired earlier writer.⁴³ They are not to blame because their works survived, when so much of what we would have considered to be more specialised and valuable, was lost.

Another writer from the early Julio-Claudian period is Strabo, who seems to have accessed the same contemporary or near contemporary sources that our mainstream authors did. Large sections of his geographical work abound in information pertinent to Alexander, especially in relation to India, which was still an exotic and little known place, and hence appealing for Strabo's audience. Of course in general, Alexander was a perennial source of fascination for the

⁴¹ Billows in Bosworth and Baynham 2000: 289.

⁴² On Diodorus' methodology, see Hornblower, 1981: 20ff.; more recently Kenneth Sacks 1990 and 1994 has made a persuasive case for Diodorus' independent and creative use of his sources. For a comprehensive discussion of Pompeius Trogus' Justin's *Epitome*, purpose and methodology, see Yardley and Heckel 1997: 1–19.

⁴³ Justin *Praef.* 4 says "I have extracted (*excerpsi*) a little bunch of flowers" (*florum corpusculum*); on the interpretation and significance of this term, see Yardley and Heckel 1997: 15–19.

Romans, providing both inspiration and repulsion, and offering abundant material for declamation and other rhetorical exercises (which were the mainstay of a Roman education), or moral *exempla* (Valerius Maximus' extensive writings) or philosophical exposition (as with much of Seneca the Younger's observations). In such works, Alexander tends to be used as an *exemplum* (example) of virtue or vice, and hence a mere foil for the author's main purpose, rather than a subject in his own right (Stoneman ch. 12). Even Livy's famous digression (9.17–19) on how the Romans would have annihilated Alexander had he ventured westward, only serves to highlight Rome's greatness.

However, the early Roman Imperial period (1st–2nd cent. AD.) also produced three specialised studies. Two are continuous, full historical narratives, one in Latin (Quintus Curtius Rufus)⁴⁴ the other Greek (Arrian), while the remaining study is biographical; a *Life* by Plutarch (paired with Julius Caesar). Several of Plutarch's other *Lives* (*Demosthenes*, *Phocion*, *Eumenes* and *Demetrius*) also contain information relevant to Alexander. Plutarch also wrote two highly rhetorical essays (*De Fortuna aut Virtute Alexandri* I and II), which presuppose an existing body of literature on Alexander's *Tyche* (personal destiny). From the time of the second Sophistic (i.e. from the mid 2nd century AD onwards) there is also a substantial body of anecdotes, mostly relating to Alexander's dress, appearance, personal habits and behaviour, preserved by writers like Athenaeus, Lucian and Philostratos.

Finally one should also mention the *Metz Epitome*, a very late text (i.e. ca. 4th–5th cent. AD) which contained (all within the same manuscript) part of a history, or more likely an epitome, of Alexander's reign from the death of Darius to the Macedonian king's voyage down the Indus, and part of an account of the Alexander's last days and his testament. The historical section clearly has affinities with a tradition used by Curtius, Diodorus and Plutarch, but is also heavily abbreviated, omitting much of the detail pertinent to Alexander's campaigns in the Eastern satrapies and northern India, and completely silent on expressions of resentment and opposition from the king's marshals and staff which marked the latter part of his reign.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ The date and identity of Curtius remain elusive. For recent discussions, see Fugmann 1995: 233–43; Atkinson 1998: xi–xix; Baynham 1998: 201–19 and for a comprehensive bibliography (1899–1999) see Koch 2000: 13–16.

⁴⁵ See Baynham 1995: 60–77.

It has long been recognised that the concluding section of the document, often termed the *Liber de Morte Testamentumque Alexandri* (the Book about the death of Alexander and his testament) forms a completely separate tradition. The original date, context and purpose of the work's composition are unknown,⁴⁶ but it intersects with the earliest version of a fictitious history, termed the Alexander Romance, by an unknown writer, who is usually named as Pseudo-Callisthenes. It is perhaps something of an irony—or more likely, an indication of public taste—that this sprawling, messy, frequently absurd (on his travels Alexander encounters fleas as big as tortoises, lobsters the size of ships, men without heads and various other marvels)⁴⁷ but hugely entertaining account spawned a vast body of derivative literature across several continents and cultures, and had an impact greatly exceeding that of any formal history.

The earliest extant literature which can offer historical evidence is oratory. The Athenian orators like Hyperides, Dinarchus, Lycurgus, Aeschines and Demosthenes offer occasional revealing comments about Alexander's relations with Athens, matters of finance, other Greek city states, or leading Athenian politicians (Alexander was as energetic as his father, Philip II, in cultivating foreign contacts and guest-friends), as well some flavour of contemporary Athenian attitudes to the Macedonians.⁴⁸ For certain issues, like the difficult question of whether Alexander ever demanded recognition as a god by the Greeks, the orators are the only direct literary sources we have.⁴⁹ But the speeches are often fragmentary, especially in the case of Hyperides, and apart from the intrinsic problems one encounters

⁴⁶ See Heckel 1998: 1–18; Bosworth in Bosworth and Baynham 2000: 207–214.

⁴⁷ Ps.-Call 209. (Wolohojian 1969: 113–15). On the formation and transmission of the Alexander Romance, see Richard Stoneman's excellent introduction in Stoneman 1991: 1–23.

⁴⁸ For a useful introduction to this topic, particularly in relation to the part the orators played in creating contemporary stories about Alexander and the effect this had on subsequent tradition, see Gunderson in Dell 1981: 183–91.

⁴⁹ See Din. 1.94 with Worthington 1992: 263; Hyper. *Epitaph.* 21; Dem. *col.* 33; on the latter see now Whitehead 2000 455–57. The tradition in Aelian (*VH* 5.12; cf. Athen. 251 B) that Demades put forward a proposal in the Athenian Assembly declaring Alexander a thirteenth god is considered late and unreliable; see Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 289. According to Plutarch (*Mor.* 842 D) the Athenian statesman Lycurgus exclaimed that the new god's worshippers would have to purify themselves after every act of worship; elsewhere at Sparta, tradition credits a certain Damis with the laconic remark, "If Alexander wishes to be a god, let him be a god" (Ael. *VH* 11.19; Plut. *Mor.* 219 E).

when using the orators for historical information (such as exaggeration, distortion, conflation of time and events and good old fashioned mendacity) the main limitation is one of focus and content. The orators' information is largely confined to issues pertinent to their own concerns and those of their audience; they simply do not tell us enough about Alexander.

Contemporary or near contemporary papyrological material relating to Alexander's reign is sparse and adds very little to the extant body of derivative literature. One recently published example might serve as an illustration of the problems which often occur, even with new discoveries. Part of what appeared to be a lost, historical account of Alexander's campaign in Thrace in 335 BC on a papyrus was published in 1985. Although it appeared to have been from a detailed history of Alexander's invasion of the Triballian territory, offering familiar names and events, the papyrus itself was too defective and incomplete to provide a continuous narrative, much less replace Arrian's exposition, compressed as it is, of the same material. All the papyrus offers is detail, without any context to make sense of it.⁵⁰ There is also a corpus of contemporary inscriptions which shed valuable light on the king's relations with the Greek poleis of the mainland and coast of Asia-Minor,⁵¹ as well as the Macedonian homeland, but again the record is fragmentary and controversial.⁵²

Many difficulties also apply to the field of Alexander numismatics.⁵³ There is a prolific range of coins, with some of the most beautiful and striking images to be found in the ancient world, such as the great tetradrachms of Lysimachus and their exquisite portraits of a youthful and divine Alexander. The identification and attribution of coins is based upon mint marks (particularly upon correlation with known coin types), the types of die, the context of coin hoards and other stylistic and historical aspects. Nevertheless, these methods are not always reliable and dating coins is often uncertain.

⁵⁰ The papyrus was published by Clarysse and Schepens in 1985; on interpretation, see Hammond 1987: 331–47; also *Sources* 1993: 201–2. He suggested that the work may have been part of Strattis' lost commentary on the *Ephemerides*, but see Bosworth in Bosworth and Baynham 2000: 3 with n. 4.

⁵¹ See Heisserer, 1980; more recently, Bosworth in *I Greci* 1998: 57–60.

⁵² See Hatzopoulos 1996: 25–8, no. 6; 84–5, no. 62; Hatzopoulos, 1997: 41–52. See also Errington 1998: 77–90.

⁵³ The fundamental study is Price 1991; see also Bellinger 1963: esp. 73–80 and Oikonomides 1981. I am also grateful to Dr. Pat Wheatley, University of Queensland, for his helpful advice on Alexander and Successor numismatics.

New discoveries in architectural and art historical monuments continue to offer suggestions about late fourth century Macedonian culture, patronage and propaganda,⁵⁴ but unfortunately progress is usually slow and hampered by limited funding or other logistical problems. Besides, as with epigraphy and numismatics, archaeological and art-historical evidence often raises as many problems as it solves.

We return, as always, to our historical, literary texts. Within the last ten years, the study of Alexander historiography has produced several substantial monographs. There has been some suggestion that such an output is excessive, because any historical commentator on one source might be perceived as covering much the same ground as another.⁵⁵ Yet such criticism is unjustified. Despite their similarities, the Alexander historians differ from each other in content and methodology in substantial ways. Even the *Metz Epitome* contains historically credible information not found elsewhere.⁵⁶ The five main existing ancient histories alone have resulted in the second volume of A. B. Bosworth's commentary on Arrian, Yardley and Heckel's translation and commentary on the Alexander books of Justin, a reprint of J. R. Hamilton's classic commentary on Plutarch's *Life of Alexander* with a new Introduction by P. A. Stadter, volume ii of J. E. Atkinson's commentary on Quintus Curtius, and his edition of the full text with notes for the Mondadori series, P. Moore's doctoral dissertation on literary aspects of Curtius, and my own monograph on the same historian. Interest in connected historiographical fields remains high with L. Prandi's study on Cleitarchus and D. Spencer's forthcoming interpretation of selected Roman views on Alexander from Cicero to Tacitus. In particular Spencer demonstrates not only how pervasive Alexander was as a model in almost all Roman political thinking, but how he could be used as a shortcut to many important ideological issues—in which case the Romans reveal as much about themselves as they do about "Alexander". He becomes important not so much as a man and general, as a literary and social

⁵⁴ See a forthcoming volume (edited by O. Palagia and S. Tracy: 2003) on the Macedonians and Athens in the immediate post Alexander period and third century BC. Stewart's excellent study (see Stewart: 1993) on Alexander iconography has become a standard reference; see also his chapter within this volume.

⁵⁵ Fears 2001: 448; cf. Davidson 2001: 9.

⁵⁶ Baynham "An Introduction" 1995: 70; cf. Bosworth, in Bosworth and Baynham 2000: 11–12.

concept. This approach can invariably lead us a long way from the historical king, but it has become a commonplace that Alexander becomes the creation of a particular writer, whether ancient or modern.

iii. *Quellenforschung and Alexander historiography*

As noted earlier, the overwhelming bulk of information we have is literary, late and derivative. Yet regardless of what, or when all these people wrote they all had their own spin. Each one interpreted Alexander according to his or her own ideals, aspirations and purpose—purposes which might range from propaganda, aggrandisement, philosophical discourse, the audience's moral instruction (for what to avoid as well as what to imitate), rivalry with literary predecessors,⁵⁷ rhetorical display and sheer entertainment. All this would appear to offer rich opportunities for the literary and social specialist—as rich as for any student of the historical Alexander.

However, *Quellenkritik* and *Quellenforschung* (which at their most basic level of definition, simply mean investigation and evaluation of our literary sources and the traditions used by them) are considered by some scholars these days as old fashioned areas of research. One critic recently drew an analogy of its practitioners inhabiting a type of lost world, geographically isolated and frozen in time, that might have sprung from the pages of Conan Doyle.⁵⁸ There are it would seem, fresher, more verdant pastures to browse in than the over-grazed and tired fields of the existing literary traditions on the Macedonian conqueror.

It always salutary to ask new questions, or explore different issues, and such is the range and wealth of the Alexander sources as to provide at least some evidence for almost any enquiry, from Alexander's sexuality to matters of demographics. However, it is also necessary

⁵⁷ A writer's desire to compete with earlier works in his field either in style or new information was a topos in antiquity (cf. Livy *Praef.* 3, Josephus *Bj* 1.3, 6–16; recapitulated at *Bj* 7.454–5, Arrian *Praef.* 3), but this does not mean that such self-promotion was not genuine. Thucydides (1.22.4) proudly declared that his history was meant as a “possession for all time” and Polybius’ tone of superiority to his predecessors permeates his history. On Arrian’s rivalry with other writers on Alexander, see below, n. 73.

⁵⁸ Davidson 2001: 7–10.

to know a little about the data upon which any research will be based, and hence the various contexts and methodologies of the ancient writers. It is helpful to explore not only an ancient author's own time, or the political and social influences and issues of his day, but also the criteria for literary composition, and the earlier sources, the building blocks from which he drew his information.

Unfortunately, these principles are sometimes distorted. *Quellenforschung* has been overused (or abused) in the past. It can and has resulted in an obsessive search for, and overly confident identification of, obscure, lost sources (as with authors like Timagenes or Diyllus in Alexander historiography) or a misleading readiness to label chunks of an existing history "Source X" or "Source Y," as if the historian were merely transposing largely unaltered paragraphs from his source in scissors and paste fashion. For instance, Arrian's method of naming his sources in his Preface and intermittently through his history, encourages the notion that he is continually directly quoting or paraphrasing them. And, prior to World War II modern scholarship tended to see Arrian as more or less a mirror of Ptolemy, to the extent that one scholar even tried to recover his history from Arrian⁵⁹—a little like recent scientific proposals to clone a live woolly mammoth from frozen mammoth gonad tissue and elephant DNA. But Arrian used other sources besides Ptolemy and Aristobulus. He also drew extensively upon Nearchus, particularly for Bks 6–7 (possibly earlier), as well as a considerable body of alternative accounts which he describes at the start of his history as *logoi* (stories). The problem is that he usually does not name his source for a *logos*, and it is hard to tell whether he is using material from this supplementary tradition, or even from his main authorities.⁶⁰

Given the sophisticated way secondary ancient historians appear to have adapted and shaped their material (as recent analyses have shown), detecting an earlier "voice" is very difficult, particularly if we do not have a parallel account to compare it with. In the case of the Alexander traditions, there is an abundance of material covering much the same ground. Careful cross-comparison of all our sources enables us to detect patterns of common information, which might indicate an original shared tradition. Here, the frequent mod-

⁵⁹ See Kornemann 1935.

⁶⁰ Baynham 1998: 67, with n. 34.

ern term "Alexander Vulgate" offers a pertinent example. In its usual application it refers to the works of four historians, Diodorus Siculus, Quintus Curtius Rufus, Justin's *Epitome* of Pompeius Trogus and the historical section of the *Metz Epitome*. As noted earlier, all these authors are thought to have drawn upon a common source for large sections of their work, and this source, often recognised as Cleitarchus,⁶¹ differed from the traditions used by Arrian, and to a lesser degree, Plutarch. But it is erroneous to see the Vulgate as more or less equating Cleitarchus, or that he was the only source used by the extant four writers named above. In a similar fashion, it is erroneous to believe that there is always a clear-cut division between Arrian, Plutarch and the Vulgate. In addition to Cleitarchus, Curtius appears to have known, and made use of Arrian's main authorities, Ptolemy and Aristobulus. Identifying common material is one thing, but ultimately it is how a historian uses that material which is important, as well as what he includes and leaves out. Detail that is conveyed by one writer but omitted by another is revealing. Sometimes outright omission, or else compression of events are dictated by necessity—for instance, as noted earlier in the cases of Diodorus and Justin.

But omission can also cast light upon a particular author's interests, approach and aims. In turn, this opens up a door to broader issues in historiography. To give an example: when the island fortress of Tyre fell to Alexander in 332 BC after a hard siege of six or seven months, Quintus Curtius tells us (4.4.16–17) that 6,000 Tyrians were killed during the final assault, and that a further 2,000 who were captured alive, were crucified along the adjacent Syrian shore.⁶² Arrian omits the latter detail of Alexander's reprisal (which has led some modern scholars to simply ignore it, or claim that it never happened); yet he gives the total figure of Tyrian casualties as 8,000—the same as the combined total in Curtius.⁶³ The common figure for the Tyrian dead, particularly when casualty figures tend to vary enormously in ancient accounts, suggests some degree of homogeneity in this instance, although the sources diverge again on the number of Tyrians who were sold into slavery. So Arrian (or his sources)

⁶¹ The identification of Cleitarchus as the most likely source of the Vulgate is a long standing and controversial issue; see Baynham 1998: 57, n. 2.

⁶² Cf. Diod. 17.46.4 who says 7,000 were killed in the final assault but concurs 2,000 were crucified.

⁶³ Arrian 2.24.4.

would seem to have edited out the crucifixion, and we might well ask why. Was it considered unnecessary information, or “unworthy” of the type of Alexander Arrian and/or Ptolemy/Aristobulus wished to create? Of course without texts of the latter it is impossible to be certain, but in view of Arrian’s overall literary structure and techniques, it seems more likely that the omission was his own, rather than his sources’. Another notorious incident that Arrian fails to mention which also occurred shortly after Tyre, is Alexander’s horrific treatment of Betis, the defeated governor of Gaza, whom he ordered bound and then dragged alive behind his (Alexander’s) chariot, apparently in imitation of his ancestor Achilles’ treatment of Hector’s corpse. Again, it is possible that this episode was not in either of Arrian’s authorities, yet it was preserved in at least two traditions current in the Roman Imperial period,⁶⁴ and it seems hard to believe that Arrian would never have heard of it at all. Arrian also leaves out the sack of the lower city of Persepolis, an act resulting in widespread destruction, pillage and slaughter. In fact, Arrian does not bring in Alexander’s atrocities until after the execution of Bessus, much later in the history. Such a decision was undoubtedly his own, and likely connected to literary propriety; the punishment of Bessus, which the historian considered an Oriental self-indulgence on Alexander’s part (Arrian 4.7.4), provides a cue for him to address in a carefully presented and integrated unit those well-known episodes, standard themes in rhetorical and philosophical discourses, where Alexander acted like a despot.⁶⁵

One last revealing example of Arrian’s selectivity is his apparent suppression of Alexander’s claim to be the son of Ammon. Historically, Alexander seems to have openly proclaimed his divine paternity after the visit to Siwah in 331 BC.⁶⁶ The Macedonians’ resentment of his action at the time is explicitly stated in Curtius (4.7.30–31), and in his history becomes a powerful, rhetorical expression of the theme of *contumacia* (surly resistance, as opposed to Alexander’s increasing

⁶⁴ See Curtius 4.6.25–29; the tradition of Betis’ treatment is also recorded by Hegesias via Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*De comp. verb.*, 18 = *FGrH* 142 F 5). There may have been other versions of the story; see Hammond 1983: 127–28; also Perrin 1895: 56–68.

⁶⁵ See Stadter 1980: 103–114; Bosworth 1995: 45–51.

⁶⁶ Cf. Just. 11.11.8; 12.5.2; Val. Max. 9.5 ext I; see Yardley and Heckel 1997: 155, but see Brunt i. 1976: App. V. 8: 475–77. On Alexander and Ammon, see Bosworth in Kinzl 1977: 51–75; Kienast in Will 1988: 309–33.

arrogance or *superbia*), surfacing in the trial of Philotas (6.10.26–28), Cleitus' outburst at the Macaracanda banquet (8.1.42), and the speech of Hermolaus (8.7.13). The rank and file of the Macedonian army also evidently shared the attitude of some of Alexander's marshals, and according to Diodorus (17.108.3) were unruly in assemblies and frequently jeered at Alexander's proclamation. Their mockery was especially strident at the Opis mutiny, yet it is only here that Arrian mentions it in isolation (7.8.3).⁶⁷ It seems unlikely that Ptolemy himself was averse to the idea of Alexander's divine paternity. According to Ptolemy, Alexander's expedition to the oracle at Siwah was guided by two hissing snakes (Arrian 3.3.5), animals which were directly associated with Ammon,⁶⁸ implying that the god himself was guiding Alexander to his source of revelation. As there is an alternative tradition, ultimately deriving from Callisthenes (*FGrH* 138 F 14) which claims that ravens acted as escorts, it seems highly likely that Ptolemy was deliberately favouring Ammon's cult. We can conclude that both the Vulgate and at least one of Arrian's authorities agreed that Alexander actively promoted himself as the son of Ammon, and that this important step was recognised and developed as a literary theme by Curtius. But as Bosworth suggests, Arrian himself chose to bury it, perhaps out of distaste or embarrassment.

One other issue needs to be discussed briefly here. So far I have been assuming that our main extant accounts predominantly based their histories on the primary tradition, or other earlier, if derivative, sources. We should also consider whether they used each other; for instance, Curtius drawing from Diodorus, or from Arrian, or conversely, Arrian on Curtius, or Plutarch. The idea of Curtius' possible use of Arrian has recently re-surfaced, with at least one enthusiastic advocate.⁶⁹ Yet it seems extremely difficult to substantiate, pre-supposing as it has to, that Curtius wrote after Arrian. The date for Curtius' composition of his history is controversial and elusive, but linguistic analysis of the Roman historian's Latinity and style puts him in the so-called Silver Age, and hence sometime between the reigns of Tiberius and Hadrian. Attempts to argue that Curtius was third century AD or later, who adopted an "archaising style"

⁶⁷ I am grateful to Professor Bosworth for allowing me access to the MS of vol. iii of his commentary on Arrian, *ad. loc.*; also his forthcoming monograph, *The Legacy of Alexander* and for his helpful comments on this chapter.

⁶⁸ *Anth. Pal.* 9.24.1; Hesych. s.v. [*Ammon*]; see Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 272–3.

⁶⁹ See Fears 2001: 451.

are not convincing.⁷⁰ Moreover even when Curtius and Arrian overlap, careful cross comparison reveals variations and there is no evidence which indicates a direct link, such as one historian echoing a comment of the other. A prime opportunity is offered by the siege of the Malli town, where Alexander receives a near fatal wound and where Arrian and Curtius both note that earlier traditions had made a mistake in recording that Ptolemy was present at the siege, when in fact he had been sent on another mission. Of the sources Curtius mentions (9.5.21), two were contemporary with Alexander (Ptolemy and Cleitarchus) and the other (Timagenes), a much later, derivative writer. Moreover, Arrian draws attention to the additional erroneous connection between Ptolemy's alleged activity at the Malli fortress and how he won the title of Soter (Saviour)—a story which appears to have been popular by the second century AD, but which is entirely omitted by Curtius. Thus rather than Curtius using Arrian or vice-versa, it seems clear that each picked up the same error from the rhetorical tradition by independent research.⁷¹ More of a case could be made for Curtius' possible use of Diodorus or Trogus⁷²—but even here there are usually variations in detail, and it is more likely that when the accounts run parallel, that they are using the same tradition.

However, in his Preface (*Praef.* 3), Arrian acknowledges that there are already many other histories on Alexander and justifies his own attempt at yet another. It is tempting to think that he is issuing a specific challenge—perhaps to Curtius, or any of the extant histories—because these are the ones we know ourselves. Arrian's challenge is probably general. We cannot be certain that he knew any of the histories we possess. Yet in Arrian's day, Plutarch and Trogus were probably the best known of our mainstream authors, and although he does not refer explicitly to Plutarch in any of his surviving work, it is highly likely that Plutarch provided a stimulus for rivalry on Arrian's part, and that the latter was influenced by some of his predecessor's compositional arrangement.⁷³

⁷⁰ For discussions of Curtius' Latinity see above, n. 26.

⁷¹ See Bosworth *From Arrian to Alexander* 1988: 76–77; Baynham 1998: 74–78.

⁷² On Curtius' possible use of Diodorus, see Tarn ii 1948: 116–22; on Curtius' use of Trogus, see Atkinson 1980: 59–61; for additional bibliography, see Koch 2000: 52–3.

⁷³ Bosworth 1980: 12, allows Arrian's sense of rivalry, but is sceptical about Plutarch's influence on the former's literary structure.

A test case might be helpful. Both Plutarch (*Alex.* 60.14) and Arrian (5.19.2) preserve the famous anecdote of Porus' proud response to Alexander, "Treat me as a king" (after the Indian rajah's defeat at the Hydaspes in 326 BC). But both the preceding contexts and accompanying details in the respective narratives vary. Plutarch was just as interested in Porus' noble elephant as the noble Porus, and his account of the Indian king's reply to Alexander follows on from the elephant's attempts to safeguard his master. In Arrian, Porus fights on in the face of Alexander's decisive victory and the Macedonian king is eager to preserve Porus' life as a brave opponent (and social equal) who had fought hard for his kingdom. He sends firstly Taxiles, another Indian ruler to negotiate with Porus, and when this proves to be a diplomatic mistake (Taxiles was an enemy of Porus and the latter promptly aimed a javelin at him) he finally sends Meroes, an old Indian friend of Porus, who escorts the rajah to Alexander. Quintus Curtius (8.14.38–40) offers a useful comparison here. Interestingly he also has the story about Porus' protective elephant, except that the animal is dispatched (in true Roman style) by the Macedonians before Porus can be brought to Alexander. Yet, as in Arrian, Curtius includes the episode about the initial negotiation which is unsuccessful, except that it is the brother of Taxiles who attempts to persuade Porus. Again, as in Arrian, Porus reacts violently—but this time with spectacular results. His javelin throw (described in graphic detail by Curtius: 8.14.36) passes completely through his adversary's body and protrudes from his back. All three writers agree that Alexander not only restored Porus to his kingdom, but increased his territory. But where Curtius differs quite significantly from Arrian and Plutarch, is in the romantic anecdote of Porus' answer. The two rulers meet and Alexander does indeed ask Porus what he should do with him—and instead of replying "Treat me like a king," Porus offers some salutary advice about the mutability of *Fortuna* (Curt. 8.14.46).

What conclusions can we draw from this analysis? As *Fortuna* is a major literary theme of Curtius', one explanation is that the Roman historian altered the traditional response to suit his own ends. Diodorus' account of the battle with Porus has been lost, and because he is thought to have been probably closest to the Vulgate's shared tradition, it is difficult to know what Curtius has faithfully reproduced from his source, and what he has changed or embellished. Likewise, any attempt to identify the sources of all three writers can only be

speculative. Plutarch claims (*Alex.* 60.1; 11) to have used Alexander's own letters for his account of the actual battle, but he probably switched to other sources for the meeting between the two kings, sources also known to Arrian and Curtius. We do not know whether Arrian's tradition also included the story of Porus' faithful elephant, which Arrian might have considered inappropriate (the only animal he gives any notice to is Bucephalas, Alexander's beloved horse, and then only for Alexander's sake);⁷⁴ or whether (as seems more likely) that Arrian's source did not record the tale, and that Plutarch was putting together his account from Curtius' source, as well as Arrian's. Curtius might also have blended sources, or his tradition may have simply given a different version of who was first sent to negotiate with Porus. We cannot really probe any further, and in a sense it does not matter. What is clear is that each of these authors went back to earlier sources. There are variant details, and that the emphasis of each extant writer was dictated by individual interest, but they have more or less reproduced the gist of the same story.

As David Potter noted, *Quellenforschung* heightens the link between an ancient author's research and his own techniques of composition,⁷⁵ and once we begin to understand that, we are on the road to accessing that historian and through him, his subject. On the other hand, if we simply use our sources as supermarkets, so to speak, to plunder whatever anecdote or detail which might suit our purpose, if we ignore *Quellenkritik* and fail to see our sources as literary productions, their works as integral units, or lack awareness of what traditions they might have used, we run the risk of misrepresentation, faulty understanding of the material, and superficiality. Far from being outmoded, or a "dirty word" in Potter's apt description⁷⁶ *Quellenforschung*, properly used, is extremely helpful and necessary. It may not be able to resurrect lost histories, but it does tell us a lot about the histories we have.

⁷⁴ Arrian 5.19.5–6; see Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, I: 315–16.

⁷⁵ See Potter 1999: 91.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*: 90.

iv. *Conclusion: "Truth vs. noble fiction"—the reliability of our literary evidence*

However, Professor Andrew Stewart once remarked to me in relation to the study of art: "The image doesn't speak—we speak for it." Paradoxically, such an aphorism highlights an interesting similarity between iconographical and literary evidence. On one level the ancient texts would seem to speak *to us*. Of course, establishing what these authors originally wrote is not always straightforward. Quintus Curtius and the *Metz Epitome* offer prime examples of lacunose and often corrupt texts. There are also substantial gaps in Arrian and Diodorus, while elsewhere Alexander historiography is as respectably served with textual cruces as any other branch of ancient literature. Yet it is also evident that understanding what an author *meant*, or broader questions like how and why he or she shaped the particular work the way they did, open up paths whereby modern scholars can "speak" for the texts, or at least offer their own interpretations of what they believe an ancient author was doing.

This raises a question which has gained increasing prominence in critical analysis of ancient historiography, particularly where it depends on earlier sources; namely historical veracity as opposed to "noble fiction".⁷⁷ What one chooses to believe at any time has always been problematic; one of Jane Austen's characters in *Northanger Abbey* remarks that she finds it odd that history should be so dull, when so much of it must be invention. But it has been argued very strongly in recent years that ancient authors had a different perspective on the writing of history from us, and very different criteria as to what was considered appropriate, especially in relation to the embellishment of a framework of fact. "Telling the truth," although a principle repeatedly and emphatically endorsed by ancient historians and critics themselves⁷⁸ was in practice fuzzy and ambiguous, embracing

⁷⁷ Most recently, Fears 2001: 449. The idea that ancient historiography was closer to forensic speeches has been fully elaborated by Woodman 1988: 70–116; cf. Kraus and Woodman 1997: 5–6. For two other related important studies on ancient historical veracity, see Gill and Wiseman 1993 and Bowersock 1994.

⁷⁸ Cf. Arrian *Praef.* 1; Cic. *De Orat.* 2.62–3, analysed at length by Woodman 1988: 78–62. Critics in antiquity were also well aware of carelessness, credulity, mendacity or distortion in historiography; see Wiseman's discussion in Gill and Wiseman 1993: 122–46; see also Moles' chapter in the same volume: 88–121.

merely freedom from bias or at best different “kinds” of truth. Thus the distinction between fact and fiction was very easily blurred. According to some critics, ancient historians could and did make things up if it suited their particular moral or literary purpose. In terms of Alexander historiography, one recent extreme exposition of this view is worth mentioning here; Paul McKechnie’s analysis of Curtius Rufus’ narrative in Book 10, where he concludes that such is Curtius’ partiality to invention (especially in the interests of rhetorical entertainment) that we should believe “nothing in his history unless the detail appears in another source,” or at least (in an echo of Tarn) adopt a sceptical frame of mind, as we “go through the pigswill looking for pearls”.⁷⁹

If one accepts such positions, the value of one of our major histories is apparently immediately (and seriously) undermined. But McKechnie’s stance is hazardous, particularly when one considers that not only is Book 10 one of the most lacunose and corrupt of all of the surviving books, there is very little alternative detailed narrative to compare it with, particularly on the Babylon settlement. Diodorus’ account and Justin’s are both heavily abbreviated, and the histories of Arrian and Dexippus survive only in the extremely condensed excerpts of Photius. In such circumstances, it is very difficult to identify what the common tradition is, let alone what Curtius might have fabricated.

Besides, it is pointless to take scepticism too far. One might not believe everything one reads in Herodotus (as at times, he clearly did not in the telling of it), but if one rejects his principles of veracity in general, virtually most of Greek “history” for the Archaic and early Classical periods disappears—because although Herodotus is not the only ancient literary source we have for these eras, he is the earliest and most detailed. The same principle surely applies to the extant Alexander historians. They are derivative, problematic texts, but they are all we have.

However, having noted the above, it also has to be stressed that scepticism has always been alive and well in modern Alexander studies. Some (light-hearted) observations on a few twentieth century, great scholars’ approaches to Alexander historiography—and hence

⁷⁹ See McKechnie 1999: 60; but see Carney 2001: 68–9; also Bosworth’s forthcoming analysis of the Babylon Settlement in Bosworth 2002: Chap. 2.

fact and fiction—might offer a pertinent message. Tarn considered Arrian as the only worthwhile ancient source, largely based upon the flawed assumption that his history (via Ptolemy) was ultimately based upon the *Ephemerides*. In much of Tarn's specialist analyses (*Alexander the Great* vol ii) he rejects the greater corpus of our extant traditions through some of the most difficult and over-elaborate arguments in print. Schachermeyr was far more willing to accept the vulgate traditions, and so was the most swashbucklingly romantic. Badian, who has undoubtedly done more than any modern historian to revolutionise Alexander historiography, seems prepared to accept all traditions after sceptical examination and cross-comparison (which tends to exclude most). Finally Hammond, although in theory open-minded about any tradition, in practice when controversies arise, tends to follow the Orwellian principle that Arrian is always right. The texts of Diyllus and Cleitarchus are lost; but where the vulgate is concerned, Hammond seems to abide by the precept that if a particular author was using Diyllus, the tradition is good, but if he were following Cleitarchus, it is bad.⁸⁰

In short, one turns the barrel of a kaleidoscope one way and the glittering pieces form a particular, attractive pattern. But turn the barrel again and they fall another way. So it is with the Alexander sources. To return to an earlier analogy; the individual will always tune into the harmony of voices that he or she finds plausible and pleasing.

⁸⁰ This approach is particularly true of Hammond's 1983 study, *Three Historians of Alexander the Great*. While there is much of value in this work, one of the main concerns is the author's apparent confidence in identifying sources like Diyllus and Cleitarchus (when so little is known about them) in Diodorus, Curtius and Justin.

My thanks to Professor Roisman for his thoughtful editorial comments on my contribution.

CHAPTER TWO

ALEXANDER IN GREEK AND ROMAN ART

Andrew Stewart

1. *Image and Reality*

Alexander's face (fig. 1) never quite launched a thousand ships, but thanks to his myriad portraits it did become the best-known visage of the Greco-Roman world.¹ The Roman essayist Apuleius attempts to explain why:

So that his image would come down to posterity as faithfully as possible, Alexander refused to have it vulgarized by a mob of artists. So he published an edict throughout his empire—the whole world—that none of them should presume to make his likeness in bronze, paint, or engraving. Only Polyclitus could cast it in bronze; only Apelles could paint it; and only Pyrgoteles could engrave it. Besides these three—the most illustrious in their fields—if anyone else at all was found putting his hand to the sacrosanct image of the king, he would be punished as if he had committed sacrilege. Thanks to the fear that this inspired in everyone, only Alexander looks the same in all his images. In all his statues, pictures, and engraved gems he appears with the same energy of a most intrepid warrior, the same disposition of a mighty king, the same look of youthful freshness, the same noble expansion of forehead. If only such an edict could work for philosophy!²

All this is based on a fiction (the edict) and contains several tendentious assertions and at least one gross error of fact. Yet it comes from a lecture that Apuleius gave at Carthage around AD 165 and later selected for publication. So it probably presents a fair synopsis of what the average inhabitant of the Roman Empire knew or

¹ Synopses of Alexander's portraiture are: Bernoulli 1905; Bieber 1964; and Stewart 1993. See also Queyrel 1990: 126–34 for a critical bibliography; Carlsen et al. (eds.) 1993; and two recent exhibition catalogues: Andronicos, Rhomiopoulou, and Yalouris 1980; and di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995. In general, I cite the most recent, readily accessible sources in English wherever possible.

² Ap. *Flor.* 7. For all ancient sources on Alexander's personal appearance and on his portraits down to 30 BC, see Stewart 1993: Appendices 1 and 2.

thought he knew about Alexander's image. As such it helps us to understand what the king's portraitists were trying to do; how their work was received; and why it resonated so long.

The edict is certainly fiction. Although Alexander apparently *preferred* Lysippus of Sicyon (*not* Polyclitus, who lived a full century earlier), Apelles of Cos, and Pyrgoteles, many others cast, carved, engraved, and painted the living king's portrait at no risk at all to life and limb. Since we first hear of the edict in 12 BC it was either invented at one of the Hellenistic courts or in Augustan Rome. So was it the product of a longing for a truly Orwellian degree of image-control amid the relentless infighting that followed Alexander's death, or of Augustus's newly-centralized regime? We may never know. But by Apuleius's time its resonance would have been even greater, for generations of Caesars had turned these dreams of unlimited power into hard fact. Their portraits, designed in Rome, were disseminated throughout their vast empire by means of casts, encouraging a physiognomic and iconographic uniformity that would have made Alexander's successors gasp with envy.

For portraits of emperors, kings, and their present-day equivalents—presidents, dictators, party chairmen, and the rest—are 'about' power. The ruler wants to affirm, consolidate, and extend his power; his subjects to acknowledge, suborn, or subvert it; his enemies to diminish or destroy it; his successors to exploit it; and so on. Since a ruler's power is never so absolute as in his portrait,³ crafting it is inevitably a matter of some delicacy, even anxiety, for all involved.

Apuleius hints at Alexander's solution—or at least, at the solution that his three artists eventually arrived at. What made this trio so special? Arguably it was their ability to (re)present the king who desired, like his hero and ancestor Achilles, 'ever to excel and to be best in all things,' as the political and social signifier *par excellence*. Through them he came to symbolize every privileged existential category in the Greco-Roman world: the source of all human power.⁴

The keyword here is *aretê*. In Homer it means 'prowess' but by Alexander's time it could signify personal excellence, moral virtue, almost the modern notion of genius. And like Homer's Achilles,

³ Marin 1988: 7–8.

⁴ Cf. Ameling 1988; Stewart 1993: 78–86; the quotation is from Hom. *Il.* 6.208 and 11.783.

Alexander too had to be Best of the Achaeans: the best fighter, ruler, looker, and thinker of them all. He had to personify every attribute of an increasingly diverse and strained metaphysic of masculinity.⁵ Here his own pedigree, age, and achievements were a decided bonus. Directly descended from Heracles and Achilles, he had been educated by none other than Aristotle. He became King of Macedonia at age 20; conquered Egypt, Persia, and the Near East at 25; and India at 30. He was fearless in battle; an expert warrior; and the military and political genius of his age.

So these men could credibly present him as the new broom that swept away an empire grown old, ruled by a middle-aged man. Yet despite Apuleius's flattering "portrait" of his physical appearance it actually left much to be desired. His voice was harsh, his eyes 'melting' (a trait he shared with, among others, the goddess Aphrodite),⁶ his neck somewhat crooked, his skin fair, and his chest ruddy. His height was average; he would not or could not grow a beard; his hair was quite long and styled in a kind of a cowlick or *anastole*; and he looked altogether 'somewhat scary.' And by the end of his life he was scarred by many wounds. An uncanny mixture of male and female, adult and adolescent, and aggression and allure, this boyish androgyne with his electrifying charisma galvanized his Macedonians to conquer the world.⁷

Fortunately, ancient Greek portraitists could sidestep some of these peculiarities and clever ones could turn the rest to decided advantage. Voice, height, and complexion were no problem, since bronzes, marbles, paintings, and engravings were dumb; their scale and proportions could easily be manipulated; and their coloring was conventional—a burnished tan for men, and ivory-white for women. As to Alexander's lack of facial hair, Greek artists had long 'youthened' their gods and heroes. His ancestors Heracles and Achilles had long shed their beards and in real life a few radicals had followed suit. So the avant-garde probably thought the king's smooth chin quite

⁵ Cf. Plut. *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute* 2.2 (*Mor.* 335A–B); and for a 'metaphysic of masculinity,' Stewart 1997: 67.

⁶ Plut. *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute* 2.2 (*Mor.* 335A–B); *Alex.* 4.1–7; *Pyr.* 8.1; and *Pomp.* 2.1; also Ael. *VH* 12.14; for the 'melting eyes' of Praxiteles' Knidia, see Lucian, *Im.* 6 and D. Chr. 4.112. Sources, Stewart 1993: 72–78 and Appendix 1.

⁷ Cf. Stewart 1993: 60–64 and 73–76.

chic. Furthermore, a clever artist could make his hair resemble the swept-back mane of the lion—king of beasts and paradigm of heroes—and turn his crooked neck into a badge of heroic defiance. Even his melting gaze could signal a longing or *pothos* for conquests new.⁸ Plutarch describes the outcome (fictitious edict and all) as follows:

So Alexander ordered that only Lysippus should make his statue. For he alone, it seemed, brought out his real character in the bronze and caught his essential genius (*arete*). For the others, in their eagerness to represent his crooked neck and melting, limpid eyes, were unable to preserve his virile and leonine demeanor.⁹

Unfortunately, all this seriously impedes our recovery of Alexander's portraiture. For not only did it mutate as this "metaphysic of masculinity"—particularly leadership styles—changed. It also often served as the model for others: men (generals, kings, and emperors), heroes (Heracles, Achilles, and the Dioscuri), and gods (Dionysus/Bacchus, Ares/Mars, Helios/Sol, even Zeus/Jupiter). So when—as often—only a head survives, physiognomy alone is no secure guide. Even attributes can be ambiguous. Is a head fitted for solar rays (fig. 13) Alexander the Sun-King, or is it the god Helios/Sol himself?¹⁰ With these cautions in mind, let us turn to the images.

2. *Alexander's Lifetime* (ca. 340–323 BC)

Other ancient authors report a softer version of the 'edict' than Apuleius. Alexander, they assert, merely 'preferred' Lysippus, Apelles, and Pyrgoteles.¹¹ This preference, which seems to be historical, is striking. For fourth-century Macedonian material culture is Attic to the core; the sources record portraits of the king by the Athenian-trained artists Euphranor, Philoxenus, Nicias, and Leochares (a favorite of the pro-Macedonian faction at Athens);¹² and this portrait tradition eventually won out. So Alexander was swimming against the

⁸ Cf. Stewart 1993: 78–86.

⁹ Plut. *De Alexandri Magni fortune aut virtute* 2.2 (*Mor.* 335A–B).

¹⁰ For a skeptical view, see Ridgway 1990: 108–113; cf. Stewart 1993: 42–44.

¹¹ See, e.g., Cic. *Fam.* 5.12.7 (preference) versus Hor. *Ep.* 2.1.232–44 (edict); cf. Stewart 1993: 3–4, 25–30, and 360–62; Moreno in di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: 117–43; Ridgway 1990: 113.

¹² Plin. *NH* 34.78; 35.110 and 132; Paus. 5.17.4 and 20.9–10.

tide. Indeed, Pliny even claims that he sat for Lysippus 'from boyhood.' Yet it is dangerous to take this statement literally. For in Rome one's 'boyhood' ended only at eighteen, and Pliny's source could easily have been responding to the evident youthfulness of many of his portraits.¹³

Leochares, in particular, had been employed by Philip II to make gold and ivory images of the royal family (Alexander included) for the Philippeum at Olympia—Philip's lavish votive to Zeus after his great victory at Chaeronea in 338.¹⁴ Two years later Philip capped this extraordinary choice of materials hitherto exclusive to the gods by parading a 'godlike' portrait of himself in this same medium behind the twelve Olympians. They responded in kind: minutes later he fell victim to an assassin's dagger. Nothing of these statues survives, but some propose a fine, youthful marble head of Alexander from the Athenian Acropolis as a contemporary version of the Olympia portrait. The case is inconclusive, and its somewhat rigid poise could suggest breakage from a herm and thus a Hellenistic or even Roman date.¹⁵

Since the young king's preferences broke decisively with tradition, they were surely determined by something that Lysippus, Apelles, and Pyrgoteles alone could supply.

Lysippus already had thirty years' experience in producing bronzes of divinities, heroes, athletes, portraits, and even animals. He was renowned for his superior command of coiffure, physiognomy, anatomy, movement, and proportions. His works seemed both alive and larger than life. For his novel system of proportions made the body slimmer and the head slightly smaller, increasing the figure's apparent height.¹⁶

Alexander surely found these innovations highly congenial. But in particular, he apparently felt that only Lysippus could capture his real character and genius (*arete*) in bronze.¹⁷ Deftly avoiding the extremes of either naïve realism or *a priori* (categorical) idealization,

¹³ Plin. *NH* 34.63; cf. Stewart 1993: 105–6.

¹⁴ Paus. 5.17.4 and 20.9–10; see now Lapatin 2001: 115–19 for a thorough discussion.

¹⁵ Cf. Stewart 1993: 106–12, color pl. 1 and figs. 5–6; more skeptically, Ridgway 1990: 135; di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: no. 6; Lapatin 2001: 118–19; as a herm, E. B. Harrison, *Hesperia* 29 (1960): 387 n. 73.

¹⁶ Plin. *NH* 34.65; cf. Stewart 1990: 186–91 and 289–94.

¹⁷ Plut. *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute* 2.2 (*Mor.* 335A–B).

Lysippus aimed for the best of both worlds. He developed a kind of *phenomenal* idealism that sought (in this case) to unmask the 'real' Alexander by judiciously balancing the two.

Unfortunately, his Alexanders remain enigmatic. Writers describe them as over lifesize, looking up to the sky, and carrying a spear (*doru*); they represented the king both young and mature, alone, fighting in battle, and hunting. Yet the locations and patrons of most of them remain unknown, and nothing survives in the original.¹⁸ As to Roman copies, a Lysippic youthful Alexander has been recognized in one marble head type (the Dresden type), and the mature, spear-bearing king in three series of bronze statuettes (the Fouquet, Nelidow [fig. 2], and Stanford) and two marble head types (the Schwarzenberg [fig. 3] and Azara). The Azara portrait alone is inscribed, on the shaft of the herm below: 'Alexander, son of Philip, the Macedonian.' Sadly, its face was recut upon discovery, making it problematic as a likeness.¹⁹

The statuettes (see fig. 2) have been recognized as Alexander because they are unbearded, moderately long-haired, and often sport an *anastole*; because their modeling, proportions, and movement look late classical; and because their poses were endlessly recycled for Hellenistic kings and Roman emperors. They represented the paradigm of the charismatic warrior-prince for the rest of antiquity. They show a slim, naked or almost naked figure striding vigorously forward in what the ancient world would recognize as a 'leonine' gait, his head cocked alertly to one side. One arm always thrusts sideways with forearm vertical and hand (where preserved) curled around a now-lost cylindrical object, presumably either a spear-shaft or scepter. The other arm hangs down by the figure's side (Fouquet); rests imperiously on his hip (Nelidow: fig. 2)—a posture previously reserved for the gods, particularly Zeus; or carries a long cloak and presents a sheathed sword with hilt pointed forward in a so-called parade grip (Stanford).

¹⁸ *Anth. Gr.* 16.119–23; *Plin. NH* 34.63–64; *Stat. Silv.* 1.1.84–90; *Plut. De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute* 2.2 (*Mor.* 335A–B); *Plut. De Iside et Osiride* 24 (*Mor.* 360D); *Plut. Alex.* 4.1; 16.15–17 (Granicus group at Dion); and 40.4–5 (Craterus group at Delphi); *Arr. An.* 1.16.4–5 (Granicus); Choricus of Gaza, *Dialexeis* 34.1–3; 37.3.

¹⁹ Cf. Andronicos et al. 1980: nos. 2–3, 38, 41; Stewart 1993: 112–13, fig. 9 (Dresden); 161–71, figs. 32–49 (the others); contra, Ridgway 1990: 113–16 and 123.

This long woolen cloak was the Macedonian national garment, but when dyed purple it became the raiment of kings. Only after 330 did Alexander add the white fillet or *diadem*, borrowed from the now dead Darius, but this item is curiously rare in the bronze and marble portraits. As for the object(s) once held in the upraised hand, the scepter was a royal emblem, bestowed upon mortal kings by Zeus himself; and the spear was an age-old symbol of heroic prowess. Achilles' ashen spear had been the mightiest weapon at Troy, but in Macedonia this weapon had acquired a special meaning. Crossing the Hellespont to Asia in the spring of 334, Alexander had thrown his spear from ship to shore and then leapt onto the beach, declaring it 'spear-won land.' By so doing, he claimed the entire continent as his personal property.²⁰

What of the heads (fig. 3)? These share the same vertical build, tight flesh, wide, almost sulky mouth, high cheekbones, slightly hooded eyes, alert expression, broad forehead, and longish hair characterized by an *anastole* that develops from a simple cowlick into a near-fountain. Based upon contemporary athletes and heroes, subtly modeled, and discreetly unconventional in feature, they convey a strong impression of individuality. Comparison with contemporary sculptures and coins show that the *anastole* of the Schwarzenberg type (fig. 3) is leonine while the Azara's is modeled on Zeus himself. Suggestively, an early Hellenistic writer supposedly glossed one of Lysippus' bronzes with the following boastful couplet:

This statue seems to look at Zeus and say:
'Take thou Olympus; me let earth obey!'²¹

Though often cryptic, this potpourri of evidence is nevertheless collectively compelling. Lysippus apparently hit upon a brilliant solution to the problem of representing the young, demanding warrior-king. Discreetly idealizing Alexander's striking but flawed physiognomy, he simply merged the genres of portrait and warrior-hero and when appropriate blended the mixture with the expansive postures and characteristic coiffures of the gods. Yet by confining himself to metaphor and allusion he never explicitly transgressed the boundary between human and divine.

²⁰ Diod. 17.17.2; cf. Hammond 1986 and "The King" 1988.

²¹ *Anth. Gr.* 16.120.

For he still showed the spear-bearing Alexander as 'simply' the best of men. To borrow Homer's ancient soubriquet for Achilles and the other heroes, his Alexanders were 'godlike.' So by definition they did not show him as a god. Lysippus broke with Apelles on precisely this point. For when Apelles exhibited his painting of the thunderbolt-bearing Alexander (see fig. 4) in the Artemision at Ephesus, the sculptor huffed that 'he himself had given the king a spear, his true and proper weapon, whose glory Time could never take away.'²²

Lysippus also made at least two bronze groups featuring Alexander; both are now lost and echoes are elusive. The king himself commissioned the first of them as a war-memorial for his victory at the Granicus in 334, to stand in the Macedonian national shrine to Zeus at Dium under Mt. Olympus.²³ A lavish and enormously expensive equestrian monument, it showed Alexander leading the thirty-four Companions who had died in the first shock of battle. The entire scene was idealized, since Alexander had *not* led this particular charge, which was essentially a suicide mission. Yet those on the home front—the families of the dead and those thousands still waiting to serve—would have got the point. King and army were indivisible, and Alexander cared. The second group, at Delphi, was commissioned by his general Craterus; since it probably postdated Alexander's death, it will be discussed in the next section.

Apelles is harder to assess since even less survives, even in copy. Some of what is said about him, however, curiously parallels the tradition about Lysippus. Pliny in particular singles out the grace of his figures and his austere but warm four-color palette (reds, yellows, black, and white). He praises his meticulous technique and finish, and particularly his characteristic use of 'luster,' which enabled him to capture phenomena like the sparkle of sunlight on water, the glitter of gold, and the flash of fire.²⁴

His paintings included an Alexander Thunderbolt-Bearer in the temple of Artemis at Ephesus; another at Ephesus of him on horseback; two panels of him in a chariot with Triumph, the bound figures of War and Fury, and (also in a chariot?) Nike and the Dioscuri;

²² Plut. *De Iside et Osiride* 24 (*Mor.* 360D).

²³ Aristobulus ap. Plut. *Alex.* 16.15–17; Vell. 1.11.3–4; Plin. *NH* 34.64; Arr. 1.16.4–5; Just. 11.6.12–13; Calcani 1989; Stewart 1993: 123–30; update, Calcani in di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: 145–47.

²⁴ Plin. *NH* 35.30, 35, 79–97; cf. Robertson 1975: 492–94.

and numerous studies of him with his father Philip.²⁵ Many were later taken to Rome, all are lost, and putative replicas survive only of the Ephesian picture. These include a single engraved gemstone (fig. 4); the Porus decadrachms (see below); and a fresco from the House of the Vettii at Pompeii that from its context (a room featuring the loves of Jupiter) probably shows the king of the gods in his youth, not Alexander.²⁶

Yet even so, Apelles' Alexanders were certainly bolder and far more controversial than Lysippus's. By unabashedly equipping a mortal king with a divine attribute, he simultaneously invented a new type of ruler portrait and provoked a storm of criticism. Both took off within Alexander's lifetime. The so-called Porus decadrachms, which bear the only surviving portrait of the king that definitely predates his death, show him standing in full armor holding a spear and thunderbolt while a flying Nike crowns him; and Lysippus's sarcasm, noted above, inaugurated the opposition. The critics had their field day at Athens early in 323, when, apparently at Alexander's request, the Assembly heatedly debated and eventually authorized a statue to him as 'God Invincible' (*theos aniktos*). There is no evidence, however, that it was ever erected, and a year later the orator Demades was severely punished for proposing it. The controversy simmered through the Roman Empire.²⁷

Less contentiously, Apelles' Alexanders with gods, heroes, and personifications also established the royal allegory as a leading pictorial genre. His trademark luster would have given all these pictures an extra fillip, particularly the Thunderbolt-Bearer, whose mimetic vividness is much praised by the ancient critics. And vividness, a strong sense of royal presence, is precisely what every ruler wants from his portrait.

Pyrgoteles is even more shadowy, since he is only mentioned in connection with the notorious 'edict' and none of his engraved gems is

²⁵ Plin. *NH* 35.27, 92, 93–94; Plut. *De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut virtute* 2.2 (Mor. 335A); id. *De Iside et Osiride* 24 (Mor. 360D); id. *Alex.* 4.1; Ael. *VH* 2.3; Serv. in Verg. *Aen.* 1.294.

²⁶ Stewart 1993: 99, 191–209, color pl. 8a, figs. 64–69; perhaps echoing Alexander's court historian, Callisthenes: Polyb. 12.12b3 (*FGH* 124 F20); cf. Svenson 1995: no. 34, pl. 6; Plantzos 1996: 67 and pl. 29 no. 164, erroneously linking the Neisos gem with Lysippus; Bergmann 1998: 19, 23, pls. 1, 2.

²⁷ Hyp. in *Dem.* fr. 7.31–32; Ath. 6.251B; Stewart 1993: 99–102, 201–09, figs. 68–69 (Porus coins); Bergmann 1998.

anywhere described.²⁸ Predictably, scholars have rushed to fill the lacuna by attributing to him several forceful-looking Alexander heads on Hellenistic and Roman gems, cameos, and glass-paste replicas of these. The simplest are bareheaded and have a huge *anastole*; others wear the diadem and occasionally a chlamys; and still others give him the ram's horn of Ammon too. The first type, widely disseminated in cheap, glass-paste copies, presumably echoes a famous model made early in Alexander's career, and is often given to Pyrgoteles. The second postdates the king's assumption of the diadem in 330 and could even be posthumous. The last echoes the well-known tetradrachms of Lysimachus, minted from 297 (fig. 11).²⁹

One or two real optimists even have given Pyrgoteles the so-called 'Porus' decadrachms themselves, with their thunderbolt-toting Alexander on the obverse and the king on his horse Bucephalus pursuing Porus, mahout, and elephant on the reverse. Yet their engraving is poor, their distribution is limited (mostly to southern Iran), and they omit Alexander's name for the enigmatic monograms AB and X. So they were probably minted by provincial governors, perhaps Abulites and Xenophilus of Susa, to celebrate his Indian victory of 326. Alexander's own coins carry the head of his ancestor Heracles on the obverse, not his own as often believed. The confusion goes back to the decades after his death, when this Heracles was increasingly taken for him. Though numismatists have long understood the difference, this mistake still crops up in popular biographies of Alexander, and even in the writings of scholars who should know better.³⁰

Yet others also represented Alexander during his lifetime—*not* (as Apuleius alleges) risking life and limb in the process. Many surviving or attested portraits perhaps predate 323, though only a handful certainly do so. Among the latter two stand out: the reliefs of the Shrine of the Bark at Luxor (fig. 5), and Aetion's picture of Alexander and his bride Roxane.

²⁸ Plin. *NH* 7.125; 37.8; App. *Flor.* 7.

²⁹ Cf. Stewart 1993: 51–52, 436–37, figs. 117–18; Plantzos 1996: 60–62, pls. 25–27, who gives Type I to Pyrgoteles. Thomas 1995 conjectures a Pyrgotelean origin for the aegis-bearing ruler seen in back view.

³⁰ Andronicos et al. 1980: nos. 21 and 27; Stewart 1993: 201–06, figs. 68–69 (Porus coins; Abulites and Xenophilus); 158–61, figs. 29–31 (Alexander's coins). Cf. Price 1991 and di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: no. 33 (Porus coin); Svenson 1995: no. 53, pl. 6; and especially Lane Fox 1996, opting also for Abulites and Xenophilus, on Alexander's orders; Bergmann 1998: 19, 23, 68, pl. 1, 1.

The reliefs in the Luxor temple (fig. 5) give us a completely new perspective—that of the conquered. Commissioned by the local priesthood in the early 320s to house the sacred boat used for Ammon's yearly voyage on the Nile, the shrine still stands. The temple was dedicated to the royal *ka*—the vital force transmitted, in an arcane and complex theology, from Pharaoh to Pharaoh via the ithyphallic Ammon-Ra Khamutef. Accordingly, on the shrine's walls Alexander (now Pharaoh *de facto*) appears over forty times: entering the temple; meeting Ammon-Ra Khamutef, Mut, Khonsu, and other divinities (fig. 5); and leading the *nomes* or districts of Upper and Lower Egypt in sacrifice. The rendering is purely Egyptian and rigorously canonical, as befits an art dedicated to the maintenance of *ma'at* or divine order, now re-established with Alexander's conquest. It shows how much the Egyptian elite bought into Alexander's brave new world—at least in public.³¹

Action's picture, auctioned at the Olympics of 324, is lost. Fortunately an extended description by the humorist Lucian survives, prompting several Renaissance and Baroque painters to try their own reconstructions of it. A witty parody, it showed Alexander gazing down at Roxane, who was seated on a bridal bed, with Hephaestion and Hymenaeus (the god of marriage) in attendance. The narrative proper, however, was carried by a host of Erotes or putti. Some were preparing Roxane for bed; one was tugging Alexander toward her (his preference for Hephaestion was well known); and others were playing with the king's armor, carting it out of the picture. Thus (Action implied) does Love conquer War, even in Alexander's case.³²

A fragmentary, second century BC painting on Delos shows a similar scene and a well-preserved *précis* of it has also appeared at Pompeii (fig. 6). The groom, accompanied by an oriental attendant, looks decidedly ambivalent. He wears a purple cloak but no diadem and no *anastole*; is posed and equipped like the Stanford Alexander type discussed earlier; and holds his spear with its point down to emphasize his conversion from War to Love. A very self-possessed queen stands opposite them, fingering a scepter. A Cupid has already laid the man's helmet at her feet and now brings her his shield. A pendant on the opposite wall shows a lounging Dionysus coolly

³¹ Abd el-Raziq 1984; Stewart 1993: 174–78, figs. 53–54; di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: 264–67.

³² Lucian, *Herod.* 4–7; Stewart 1993: 181–86.

appraising an almost completely naked Ariadne, and a trophy-bearing Nike flies across the vault above. In this Pompeian household, it seems, love really did conquer all.³³

Of the portraits of Alexander that might predate his death but cannot be proven to do so, the most important appears on the spectacular Alexander Mosaic from Pompeii (fig. 7). This monumental work was laid down around 100 BC, damaged in the earthquake of AD 62, and buried in the eruption of Vesuvius in AD 79. Since, however, it uses the classical Greek 'four-color' technique (red, yellow, black, white, and their compounds), and its theme reappears on late Etruscan reliefs and a mid-Italic (Umbrian) molded bowl, it is often thought to copy a painting brought to Italy as plunder from Macedonia in 146. Yet Apelles, this technique's acknowledged master, is not recorded to have painted an Alexander battle. So it is often given to one Philoxenus of Eretria who, Pliny tells us, painted a Battle of Alexander and Darius for 'King Cassander' (ruler of Macedonia, 317–297) that was full of "shortcuts" or abbreviated figures just like many of those in the Mosaic. But Philoxenus is not recorded to have worked in four colors—though his master, Nicomachus, certainly did so.³⁴

Although the Mosaic is often touted as a realistic masterpiece, several compositional and iconographic blunders indicate that the mosaicist radically abbreviated and partially misunderstood his pictorial model. According to a recent suggestion, this painting drew upon

³³ Stewart 1993: 186–90, color pls. 6–7, figs. 57–61; P. Moreno in di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: no. 66 (Alexander and Stateira—forgetting that he was never in love with her). In *Gnomon* 68 (1996): 695–96, E. Will identifies the couple in the Alexander picture as Dido and Aeneas. Yet scenes from Roman history are rare at Pompeii and its pendant, the Dionysus picture, contradicts the identification. For Aeneas *jilted* Dido. Furthermore, the Alexander picture contains no obvious anachronisms and unlike the other does not look like a Roman pastiche.

³⁴ Stewart 1993: 130–50, color pls. 4–6; Calcani in di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: 147–51 and nos. 30 and 32 (relief and bowl); Cohen 1997, cf. Stewart, *American Journal of Archaeology* 102 (1998): 447–48; Pfrommer 1998; Badian 1999 (I thank Erich Gruen for this reference); Dunbabin 1999: 41–43 (technique). On four-color painting see Cic. *Brut.* 70; Plin. *NH* 35.50, and on Philoxenus *ibid.* 110. Andreae 1977 publishes the best pictures of the Mosaic; Badian 1999: 88 n. 2 calls my own 'rather poor,' yet they are almost as good as Andreae's, and his own is bright pink. For four Apulian vasepaintings of the 320s that independently show the same subject as the Mosaic see Stewart 1993: 150–57, text figs. 4–5 and figs. 25–28; di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: 150 and no. 31; Pfrommer 1998: 174–80, fig. 27.

the early Hellenistic Alexander historians, and anachronisms in armor, weapons, and other *realia* should down-date it by at least a century, to ca. 200. Items like the anchors—a Seleucid symbol—on the saddlecloth of Alexander's doomed opponent could suggest an anti-Seleucid allegory, presumably produced at the Ptolemaic court.³⁵

Several objections spring to mind. The four-color technique was already obsolete by 300 and is never heard of again; most of the equipment is authentically fourth-century and downdating on this basis can be invalidated by new finds at any moment; the anchors are too small and sketchy to bear the strain placed on them; Alexander's sharply characterized, brutal physiognomy has nothing in common with the bland image of him favored by the Ptolemies (cf. fig. 8); and how did a painting sitting in far-off Alexandria (which was not plundered by the Romans till 30 BC) generate a burst of replicas in late second-century BC Italy? But the problems are real; the alarm has sounded; and the battle has probably barely begun.

The Mosaic cleverly explores three different aspects of Alexander's unique *arete*: his ferocity in battle; his charisma; and his military genius. His ferocity is amply conveyed by his demonic appearance, particularly by his low-set, sulky mouth; razor-sharp nose; staring eyes; and mane of black hair. Although his spear has spitted the hapless Persian before him, he has eyes only for Darius, who gestures to him helplessly as his charioteer whisks him away. This motif comes from popular Macedonian rape scenes like those of Persephone and Helen at Vergina and Pella. It covertly feminizes the Persian king before the onslaught of his hypermasculine, thrusting opponent.

As to charisma, for proof of this one naturally looks to a man's followers. Here their concerted action and steely gazes leave no room for doubt. Alexander's charismatic leadership has welded them into an invincible fighting force. Nothing can stand against them—certainly not the undisciplined Persians, led by a panicky, wild-eyed king in a chauffeur-driven chariot that crushes two of them like beetles.

Finally, Alexander's military genius—his mastery of the art of war—is signaled by the entire composition, especially if the spears in the background are Macedonian. It tells us that his success is based not only upon personal bravery and dashing leadership, but

³⁵ Pfrommer 1998.

also upon control of disparate and dispersed masses of men in maneuver. His tactical mastery has allowed him to penetrate the Persian line; to seek out Darius with an elite cavalry squadron; and to ensure that reinforcements arrive on time to clinch his success. Only Chance (Tyche) can frustrate his plans, flinging a Persian in his way to immobilize his all-conquering spear and letting Darius escape by the skin of his teeth.

The original painting was clearly a relentlessly didactic work. A bible of the vocabulary of power, it would have been a perfect tool for teaching its audience (Cassander and friends?) the essential ingredients of Alexander's art of war.

To summarize: In little over a decade Alexander's court artists and others had established the dominating themes of western royal imagery for the next two millennia.³⁶ In addition to producing portraits of the king in every major medium they had explored at least six basic royal scenarios: battles, hunts, rituals, marriages, family groups, and allegories. And finally, even before his death on June 10, 323, they had effectively turned him into a god.

3. *The Successors (323–ca. 280 BC)*

The chaos that followed Alexander's death spawned an array of commemorative portraits of him, as competing claimants to his legacy sought to capitalize upon his image and the conquered struggled for elbow-room. To take them one by one:

Perdiccas

Chief marshal and *de facto* ruler of the empire, but never firmly in control of it, Perdiccas was responsible *inter alia* for Alexander's body and his hearse. He promptly had the body mummified and it immediately became an icon in its own right. Whoever owned it possessed a formidable talisman: *the* symbol of the unified empire.

³⁶ Egyptian, Assyrian, and Persian court artists had invented some of these themes centuries earlier, but the Assyrian examples were long buried, and Alexander's artists were probably unaware of or uninterested in the others. Surviving Hellenistic and Roman examples show no obvious traces of eastern influence.

The hearse, begun shortly after Alexander's death, took two years to complete. It was a gold-encrusted, open-sided Ionic temple on wheels, loaded with images of imperial glory, and drawn by sixty-four mules. Inside it, the king's body lay behind a golden net in a golden, probably anthropoid sarcophagus. Around the net hung four panel paintings. The three at the sides and back depicted the cavalry, elephant corps, and fleet; the front one showed an enthroned, sceptered, and chariot-borne Alexander presiding serenely over the new universal empire, surrounded by his Macedonian and Persian bodyguards. Yet this empire's latent instability and Perdikkas' own weakness were dramatically revealed when in late 321 two of his lieutenants took advantage of his absence on campaign to set off with the hearse from Babylon; met Ptolemy at Damascus; and promptly decamped with him to Egypt. The humiliated Perdikkas was murdered a mere six months later, trying to recapture the body and to bring Ptolemy to heel.³⁷

Craterus

In 324 Alexander had deputized Craterus, among his most trusted marshals, to lead his demobilized veterans home. Told en route of the king's death, when he reached Macedonia he teamed up with its governor, Antipater, to suppress the revolt that had erupted in the interim. Hostile to Perdikkas and eager to return to Asia, he then began to raise an army and commissioned a great bronze group at Delphi—a major recruitment center for mercenaries—to advertise his credentials. Made by Lysippus and Leochares, it showed Craterus himself boldly risking life and limb to rescue Alexander from a lion during a hunt 'in furthest Asia.' No information exists as to whether they finished it in time to boost his recruiting drive, but by April 320 he had gathered enough support to invade Asia. Yet there he was promptly and most unexpectedly defeated and killed by Perdikkas's lieutenant and Alexander's former secretary, Eumenes. His orphaned son, also called Craterus, was left to dedicate the monument many years later.³⁸

³⁷ Diod. 18.4 and 26–29; Strab. 17.1.8, 974; Curt. 10.10.13 and 20; etc.; Stewart 1993: 214–25, text fig. 9 and fig. 75 (reconstructions).

³⁸ *Fouilles de Delphes* 3.4.2, no. 137 (inscription); Plin. *NH* 34.64; Plut. *Alex.* 40.4–5; Stewart 1993: 270–77, figs. 89–94; Palagia 2000: 184–85 and 202–6.

Philip III Arrhidaeus

In 323, Perdiccas had elevated the weak-minded Arrhidaeus, Alexander's half-brother, to the throne and named him Philip for dynastic continuity. He would reign alongside Roxane's still-unborn child if it turned out to be a boy. The new king and his handlers were of course heavily invested in the continuation of the unified empire. Under him, Alexander's imperial money and its familiar Heracles head—now increasingly recognized as Alexander himself—continued unchanged, except that on its reverse it now bore the legend 'Of King Philip.' Numismatists call these coins 'posthumous Alexanders' in recognition of their dual status as both imitations of Alexander's own coins and, increasingly, posthumous portraits of him. Accepted everywhere, they were struck in vast numbers by all parties and soon by many Greek cities. The \$100 bills of the Hellenistic world, they constitute over 90% of all third-century hoarded silver.³⁹

Never more than a figurehead, Philip fell victim to the vicious infighting that followed Antipater's death in Macedonia in 319. He and his Amazonian wife Eurydice, murdered by Olympias in 317/16 and buried with honors by Cassander, may be the occupants of the miraculously unlooted Tomb II in the Great Tumulus at Vergina, discovered by Manolis Andronicos in 1977. If so, it is suggestive that the youth at the center of the hunt fresco on its façade is probably not him but Alexander. Was the tomb built originally for Alexander himself? Laurel-wreathed, clad in a light purple tunic, and fiercely brandishing his spear, the hero gallops in splendid isolation while others attack a lion at right. A miniature ivory Alexander head has also been recognized among the debris of the tomb-furniture but unfortunately it both lacks hair and is virtually identical to several other heads from the tomb. Another discovered in 1990 at Pydna, however, comes complete with *anastole* so is indeed probably Alexander.⁴⁰

³⁹ See esp. Price 1991; cf. Andronicos et al. 1980: no. 28.

⁴⁰ See Andronicos et al. 1980: nos. 170–71; Andronicos 1984: 106–119, figs. 65–66 and 70 (fresco; Alexander); and 123–36, figs. 76–78 (ivory head); Stewart 1993: 45–46 and 274; di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: 194–99 (Vergina) and 200 no. 1 (Pydna); Palagia 2000: 194–95 (fresco); though Badian 1999: 87–88 identifies this figure as 'an idealized Arrhidaeus' it conflicts with our most likely portrait of him: the powerful, bearded, diademed man on the 'murder' pediment of the Alexander sarcophagus (von Graeve 1970: pls. 67.1 and 68.1); see also Palagia 2000: 195–96 for the bearded Arrhidaeus in the fresco.

Cassander

As mentioned earlier, Pliny remarks that Philoxenus of Eretria produced a Battle of Alexander and Darius—a painting often equated with the original of the Alexander Mosaic (fig. 7)—for ‘King Cassander.’ Although Cassander, who ruled Macedonia and much of Greece with an iron fist from 317 to his death in 297, hated Alexander after the king beat him up in 324 and threatened his life, it has been rightly noted that his private feelings by no means dictated his public behavior.⁴¹ He called one of his sons Alexander, minted coins bearing the dead king’s name, and dubbed one of the districts of Thessalonica ‘Boucephalia’ after Alexander’s favorite horse. It would be fascinating to know the exact circumstances of Cassander’s commission, but Pliny is silent.

What of the cities of mainland Greece, now pawns in a Macedonian chess game? Since they had little cause to love Alexander, images of him from this quarter are rare. The most important is a late fourth-century Attic-style Alexander head in the Getty Museum. It was found at Megara with a whole group of fragments including a youth who may be Hephaestion, a fluteplayer, a woman, and several individuals engaged in a sacrifice. Unfortunately the find-context was probably a lime-kiln and the excavation clandestine, so we will probably never know if they all originally belonged together. Far less compelling are several heads wearing a lion-skin cap. Although often identified as Alexander, their provenances (where known) argue instead for a young Heracles.⁴²

Ptolemy

The canniest of Alexander’s marshals and from 323 satrap of Egypt, Ptolemy became the first to break with Perdikkas, the unified empire,

⁴¹ Plin. *NH* 35.110; on the date see Cohen 1997: 115 and Pfrommer 1998: 15–16, against, e.g., Stewart 1993: 149–50 (before 324) and Badian 1999: 84 (after 317, vengefully depicting Alexander with ‘ruthless ugliness’). Yet Badian misreads both portrait and genre: this Alexander is a study in royal *deinotes* or ‘ferocity,’ a positive quality in Hellenistic kingship theory (Plut. *Dem.* 2–4; Diotogenes ap. Stob. 8.62; cf. Smith 1988: 51–53 and 60; Stewart 1993: 141). Ancient battle pictures were commissioned to glorify victors, not to vilify them.

⁴² Getty group: Andronicos et al. 1980: nos. 6 and 13; Stewart 1993: 116–21, 209–14, 438–52, color pl. 3, figs. 16 and 146–91. Heracles heads: Andronicos et al. 1980: nos. 4 and 5; Stewart 1993: 282–83, fig. 71; di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: no. 105.

and Alexander's imperial money. By late 321 he had secured Alexander's body and was bracing himself for the inevitable assault. To recruit mercenaries he designed a new tetradrachm bearing a ferocious-looking Alexander head wearing an elephant-skin headdress, Ammon's horns, and scaly aegis. These were potent emblems of universal, god given power, and Ptolemy struck huge numbers of them. The ploy worked. By spring 320 he had amassed enough troops to defeat Perdiccas, who was promptly murdered by his own men. Thereafter Ptolemy went from strength to strength. By 304, when he finally abandoned even the fiction of the unified empire and proclaimed himself king, he had added Dionysus's *mitra* to this image (fig. 8); smoothed out its features to suggest divine calm rather than heroic ferocity; substituted for the enthroned Zeus of the reverse an armed, striding Athena holding her shield over his own personal emblem, the eagle; and minted a gold issue showing Alexander riding in an elephant-drawn chariot. All this decisively recast Alexander and Athena as his and his territories' divine protectors.⁴³

This special relationship between god-king and kingdom became particularly close in Ptolemy's capital, Alexandria—the first of many foundations to which the conqueror had given his name. The city already boasted a magnificent bronze equestrian statue of Alexander Founder, but soon he was also buried there in a specially constructed tomb: the Sema. Between 311 and 285 Ptolemy cemented this relationship by giving Alexander a cult, a priest, and a cult-image. Popular with the Ptolemaic army as a talisman and thus preserved in many small-scale replicas, the statue was attired like Zeus in a long aegis (shaped like the city itself) and carried in its hands a scepter and a small, armed Athena (see fig. 15). Numerous small marble and terracotta Alexanders also affirm his widespread popularity in the kingdom, perhaps as a focus of civilian, domestic cult. And even though after ca. 300 Ptolemy made sure that it was his own face, not Alexander's, that stamped every monetary transaction within his realm, other honors were soon to follow.⁴⁴

⁴³ Andronicos et al. 1980: nos. 18 and 31; Stewart 1993: 229–43, figs. 76–79; di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: no. 64; Svenson 1995: no. 46, pl. 54; Bergmann 1998: 26–27, pls. 2, 6.

⁴⁴ [Lib.] *Descr.* 27 (equestrian Alexander Founder); Stewart 1990: 172–73, 243–52, colorpl. 8c, and figs. 52, 82–85; Svenson 1995: nos. 1–15, pls. 1–4; Bergmann 1998: 20, 23, 67, 75, pl. 1, 3–4; Grimm 1998: 18–24 (statues), 66–70 (the Sema), figs.

Ptolemy's main rival to the north was Antigonus One-Eye, satrap of Anatolia and later of Syria too. The contrast was striking: Antigonus apparently made no capital out of Alexander's image beyond minting the now familiar posthumous Alexanders. Indeed, in his final battle at Ipsus in 301, he even chose 'Zeus and Victory' not 'Alexander and Victory' as his watchword. His enemies put it about that Alexander deserted him for this, costing him the battle and his life.⁴⁵ One of Antigonus' and Ptolemy's sometime subjects, though, managed his publicity somewhat better.

Abdalonymus of Sidon

A Phoenician whom Hephaestion had elevated to the Sidonian throne after Issus (333), Abdalonymus reigned till the last decade of the century. He adroitly survived several changes of master as Ptolemy and Antigonus vied for control of the Lebanese coast. By process of elimination, the massive 'Alexander' sarcophagus from Sidon (fig. 9) is almost certainly his. Carved shortly after 320 if the bloody scene on one of its pediments is rightly identified as Perdikkas' murder, it offers a unique view of the reactions of the conquered to Macedonian rule.⁴⁶

One long side (fig. 9) shows Issus, Abdalonymus' lucky day. At left Alexander, in cloak, tunic, and fantastic lion's head helmet, spears a Persian in a scene that echoes the original of the Alexander Mosaic (fig. 7) or another picture like it. Yet Darius and his chariot have been replaced by a *melée*. Two Macedonian officers, perhaps Hephaestion and either Antigonus or Ptolemy, dominate the scene. A lion-hunt on the other side features Abdalonymus, dressed in Persian garb (which the Sidonian court had adopted two centuries earlier), and followed dutifully by a diademed, short-haired Macedonian prince who looks nothing like Alexander but might be Antigonus' son Demetrius. The rest of the casket's imagery is equally two-faced, proclaiming homage to the conquerors while discreetly emphasizing the military prowess of the east.

11–20, 26, 32, and 136. Svenson, Bergmann, and Grimm all wrongly identify the aegis-bearer as the Founder. For the miniature heads see Gebauer 1938–39: 1–106; di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: no. 60; Grimm 1998: figs. 18, 19, and 26.

⁴⁵ Plut. *Demetr.* 29.2.

⁴⁶ Von Graeve 1970; Stewart 1993: 294–306, figs. 101–6; Pasinli 1997; Palagia 2000: 186–89.

Seleucus

Assigned Babylonia after Perdiccas' death but expelled in 315, Seleucus returned to the area in 311 and soon cemented his position. In 305 he recovered Alexander's Iranian and Bactrian conquests and promptly declared himself king. Yet pressing on to the Indus he was outfought by the formidable Chandragupta, king of northern India, and had to parley and retreat. In connection with these events, he minted two sets of Alexander victory-coins. One imitated Ptolemy's elephant-skin type and the second showed the king with a panther-skin around his neck, wearing a helmet covered in a panther-skin and embellished with bull's horns and ears.⁴⁷

This striking image of Alexander as a latter-day conquering Dionysus Taurus has recently gained a body. A newly discovered Seleucid tetradrachm (fig. 10) shows a man similarly caped and helmeted, clad in mixed Macedonian-Persian costume, carrying a Macedonian cavalry lance, and riding a horned horse. Both probably copied a Seleucid version of the Alexandrian statue of Alexander Founder, mounted on Bucephalus (whose name means "Oxhead"). Yet with its horned helmet (an ancient Iranian symbol of divinity) and mixed attire, this new Seleucid Alexander was designed to appeal to the native population as well. Where it stood is unknown, though the coins' manufacture, distribution, and date point to Susa or Ecbatana between 312 and 306.⁴⁸

Lysimachus

Appointed in 323 to rule Thrace, this thuggish ex-bodyguard of Alexander spent the next two decades attempting to subdue it. Only after he helped Seleucus defeat and kill Antigonus in 301 was he able to expand into Asia, and from 297 he minted huge quantities of a new Alexander tetradrachm to advertise his success and ambitions (fig. 11). In contrast to the overdetermined images of Ptolemy and Seleucus, his was arrestingly simple: a thrusting, visionary Alexander with a mop of tousled hair and exuberant anastole, wearing a diadem and sprouting an Ammon's horn behind his ear. Widely

⁴⁷ Andronicos et al. 1980: no. 23; Stewart 1993: 313–18, figs. 114–16; Svenson 1995: nos. 72 and 260, pls. 52 and 56.

⁴⁸ Houghton and Stewart 1999.

circulated, it was imitated by gem-engravers as far afield as India.⁴⁹ Yet his fantasy of divinely sanctioned world conquest was not to materialize. In 281, the seventy-four year old Lysimachus met the seventy-seven year old Seleucus in battle, and lost both the contest and his life. Seleucus himself fell to an assassin's dagger six months later, at last bringing the Age of the Successors to a close.

4. *The Hellenistic World (ca. 280–30 BC)*

Interest in Alexander inevitably waned once the last of his marshals had died and soberer men commanded the stage. Abandoning the dream of reuniting the empire and unwilling to stake everything on a single throw, they now strove only for a limited, regional hegemony. Yet Alexander's name and deeds still inspired awe and emulation;⁵⁰ his many cults still functioned; and his face still guaranteed most important financial transactions outside Egypt. And he soon found much new employment in this novel political mosaic of dueling dynasties and sprawling, heterogeneous kingdoms.

Though Ptolemaic coins now carried the reigning monarch's head, not Alexander's, the best evidence for the latter's portrait still comes from Alexandria. Ptolemy I had founded its Library and Museum—the world's first research institute—in the 290s, and at some time thereafter a shrine to Fortune (Tyche) was added to it. A late Roman description is all that survives of it.⁵¹

The shrine was square. A door on one side, embellished or flanked by statues of the Ptolemies, connected it to the Museum; on the opposite wall was a huge laurel crown held aloft by two philosophers; and along each side stood more Ptolemies accompanied by gods and personifications. At the room's center stood a T-shaped group of five statues: in the middle was Tyche, flanked by two Nikai;

⁴⁹ Andronicos et al. 1980: no. 17 (coin); Stewart 1993: 318–23, 437, color pl. 8b, and fig. 117–19 (coins and gems); di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: nos. 12 (Oxford gem: ignoring its dependence on the Lysimachus coins, fig. 11), 104, and 119; Svenson 1995: nos. 310–20, pls. 7–8 (coins and gems); Plantzos 1996: 61 and pl. 25 no. 142 (Oxford gem, emphasizing this dependence, with variant readings of the inscription).

⁵⁰ See esp. Bohm 1989.

⁵¹ [Lib.] *Descr.* 25; Stewart 1993: 243–46; Grimm 1998: 70, with 45–51 on the Museum and Library.

she was crowning Earth (Ge), who in her turn was crowning Alexander. A pedantic ensemble with a transparent message: Tyche, all-conquering, bestows Good Fortune on Earth, who in turn recognizes Alexander's universal power. Because of him the world's wealth now lies at the Ptolemies' feet, funding both Museum and Library; so he is the true presiding genius of these institutions and their members. Because of him the world is their oyster.

A similar process of institutionalization can be glimpsed from Callixeinus's famous account of Ptolemy II's Great Procession.³² This sumptuous parade probably took place at the festival of the Ptolemaea in winter 275/74, just before the First Syrian War with the Seleucids. Its carnivalesque displays of Dionysiac excess and endless succession of floats included two celebrations of Alexander and his achievements.

One float, in the Dionysiac procession, bore Alexander, Ptolemy I, Arete, Priapus, Corinth, and big, golden wine-jars. After it came women representing the Greek cities of Asia and the islands formerly subject to Persia, then a 135-foot long golden thyrsus, a 90-foot long silver spear, and a 180-foot long golden phallus (!). A second float dedicated to Alexander himself followed the Olympians. At its head four elephants pulled a chariot containing his colossal golden image, flanked by Athena and Nike. Behind them came gold and ivory thrones carrying gold crowns and cornucopiae; altars and sundry golden ritual objects; and miscellaneous other victory—and power—symbols. These included a 60-foot gilded thunderbolt, numerous colossal golden eagles, 3200 gold crowns, a golden aegis, colossal gold and silver breastplates embossed with thunderbolts, gold suits of armor, and piles of gold and silver plate. A vast army marched behind.

Contemporaries would have found these displays perfectly transparent. The first promoted Alexander as the Ptolemies' progenitor (an officially inspired rumor made Ptolemy I his illegitimate son) and liberator of Asia. Arete personified his virtues and the ithyphallic Priapus—the Greek equivalent of Luxor's ithyphallic Ammon-Ra Khamutef (fig. 5)—his potency. Corinth evoked the League of Corinth (founded by Philip II), which had elected Alexander its Leader (*hege-*

³² Athen. 5. 197C–203B, esp. 201D–E and 202A (Alexanders); Rice 1983; Stewart 1993: 252–60; Grimm 1998: 51–57; Stewart 1998: 281–82 (personified cities).

mon) in 336, and which Ptolemy himself now dreamed of leading. The golden wine-jars represented the fruits of his expedition. The feminized cities, phallus, spear, and thyrsus echoed and amplified all this. Of course, Alexander was widely believed to have been all but impotent; his own dynasty was extinct; and he had treated Asia, Greeks and all, as his personal, "spear-won" property, but amid the merrymaking probably few noticed or cared.

The second display was even blunter. Athena and Nike had been the two patrons of Alexander's expedition, appearing as such on his coins; the paraphernalia that followed represented the venture's other divine patrons and the wealth it had garnered. Ptolemy was announcing that he would soon march in Alexander's footsteps, and that with the Conqueror at his side the die was already cast. By parading Alexander and his legacy in this way—the lucky citizens of the Queen of the Mediterranean—he was announcing that they would soon be luckier still.

Suitably updated, these displays were no doubt recycled for subsequent celebrations of the Ptolemaea; soldiers continued to dedicate their little replicas of the aegis-bearing Alexander; and households continued to honor their little Alexanders too. One or two new types were even invented, such as an Alexander with cloak and solar crown, best represented by a fine statuette in Brooklyn (fig. 12) and a carnelian gemstone recently discovered in a grave in the Fayyum. This type recalls the conceit that the sun shone only on those lands that he had conquered, and makes him into a Sun-King, shedding civilization's light on all he met.⁵³ Right at the dynasty's end Queen Cleopatra even gave her son by Mark Antony the name of Alexander Helios, making him the living image of the divine world-ruler or *kosmokrator* whose deeds now lay three centuries in the past.

Alexander's afterlife in the other Hellenistic kingdoms is harder to trace, because the evidence consists mostly of decontextualized, disembodied heads. Cast in the leadership styles of their times, these are sometimes updated versions of earlier images such as the Schwarzenberg (fig. 3) or Azara Alexanders, but often look strikingly novel.

⁵³ Stewart 1993: 334, fig. 132 (Brooklyn statuette); Svenson 1995: no. 340 (ditto), pl. 12; cf. no. 267, pl. 58; Bergmann 1998: 74–75, pls. 12, 5 and 13, 1 (with other examples); Grimm 1998: fig. 13 (gemstone); cf. Plut. *de Alexandri Magni fort. aut virt.* 8 (*Moralia* 330D).

They span the entire emotional spectrum, according to whether the patron wanted an image of divine tranquillity; heroic ferocity; romantic longing; or even stoic fortitude. A few are pierced for solar rays. Provenance and style occasionally suggest associations with individual kings and their programs, though because Hellenistic stylistic chronology is uncertain, attributions are almost always conjectural.⁵⁴

A set of Indo-Bactrian coins and the Hierothesion of Antiochus I of Commagene at Nemrud Dag offer other perspectives. The coins, minted by the self-styled King Agathocles the Just in what is now eastern Afghanistan around 190–170, present a veritable galaxy of stars: Alexander (fig. 13), Antiochus Nicator of Syria, Agathocles' four immediate predecessors, and his elder brother Pantaleon. His reasons for striking them are obscure. No extant text mentions him or his brother, and the location of their territory has to be conjectured from the coins' findspots. The usual explanation is that Agathocles was asserting his own legitimacy over the claims of rivals or usurpers, but this is not incompatible with the old idea that he was alleging a (fictitious) blood-line or 'pedigree' back to Alexander. His Alexander-portrait (fig. 13) simply borrows the traditional Heracles type of that king's own tetradrachms and the 'posthumous Alexanders'.⁵⁵

The Hierothesion or 'Sacred Seat' of Antiochus I on the summit of Nemrud Dag, the highest mountain in southeastern Turkey, is the only Hellenistic royal sepulchre after that at Vergina to survive intact. Built around 40 BC, it was the center of a tentacular ruler-cult devised by Antiochus himself in order to unify his kingdom around his own person; to advertise his own piety; and to secure divine favor in an increasingly unstable world.⁵⁶

Antiochus was a religious zealot who traced his ancestry back to the ancient Persian kings and the now equally extinct Seleucids. Selecting the 7000-ft. summit of Nemrud Dag so that he could be as high as possible above his subjects and as close as possible to his gods, he buried his (still-unlocated) tomb beneath a 300-foot high tumulus of stones. He then built two huge terraces to east and west of it. Overlooking each terrace, backed up against the tumulus, sat

⁵⁴ Stewart 1993: 325–40, figs. 124–40.

⁵⁵ Holt 1984; Stewart 1993: 326, fig. 121; Holt *Thundering Zeus* 1999: 67–69, 78–79, 98, pls. 3–6.

⁵⁶ Sanders (ed.) 1996: 322–26, figs. 292 and 494–95; cf. Stewart 1993: 330.

a row of thirty-foot high statues of himself and his gods, and flanking the terraces themselves stood a series of enormous stone reliefs.

Carefully duplicated on each terrace, these reliefs showed him conversing with these gods and proudly paraded his Persian and Seleucid ancestors. At the head of the latter array stood Alexander, but only an inscription and his right hand carrying a drinking-horn now survive. This ensemble is a remote descendant of fourth-century dynastic monuments like the Philippeum at Olympia, discussed above. By a quirk of preservation it is also the sole extant Hellenistic example of the genre that certainly included Alexander.

5. *The Roman Republic (ca. 150–30 BC)*

As Rome's shadow began to reach across the Hellenistic world, Alexander's unfulfilled dream of marching West into Africa, Spain, and Italy inspired a lively debate between Greeks and Romans as to whether he could have conquered Rome or not.⁵⁷ Advertising his power and charisma, Alexander's portraits were both concrete reminders of this—to Romans—unnerving possibility and magnets for Greek pride and resistance.

So when Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus crushed the last pretender to the Macedonian throne, Andriscus, in 146, he promptly targeted the country's foremost war memorial and symbol of Alexander's youthful success: Lysippus' imposing Granicus group at Dion. He had it removed from its base; shipped to Rome; and re-erected in a specially designed portico.⁵⁸ This portico surrounded two pre-existing temples of Juno Regina and Jupiter Stator, before which the bronzes were set up. Their transfer from Zeus's Macedonian sanctuary to his Roman one thus paralleled Andriscus' own far less glorious journey from Zeus's deputy as King of Macedonia to helpless captive in Metellus's Roman triumph, which as usual was dedicated to Jupiter Capitolinus.

⁵⁷ Liv. 9.17–19; Plut. *Mor.* 326A–C; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 19.1–2. On Alexander and Rome see Wirth 1976; Green 1978 (reprinted in Green 1989: 193–209); Isager 1993; Gruen 1998; survey of monuments, Poulsen 1993.

⁵⁸ See fn. 23, above. For Luigi Canina's old but splendidly evocative reconstruction, see Calcani 1989: figs. 4–5; di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: 147. Perhaps imitated by L. Licinius Murena at Lanuvium shortly after 67: Calcani 1989: 38–39, with bibliography; fragments are in Leeds and London.

Another item of Metellan booty may have been the original of the spectacular Alexander Mosaic from the House of the Faun at Pompeii (fig. 7). It was in place by 100 BC, and echoes of its composition appear on contemporary Etruscan ash-urns and clay relief bowls. Yet it is unclear why the house's Oscan owners, the Satrii, wanted this unique and costly work. Did one of them perhaps serve with Metellus' victorious army? Compounding the problem, a nineteenth-century watercolor shows a Centauromachy painted on the wall above. The juxtaposition was hardly flattering to Darius, for some of the Centaurs' gestures echo his own.⁵⁹

Republican Alexander portraits are rare, for the Roman elite had little incentive to commission them. (The exception, a mass of tetradrachms struck by the Roman quaestor Aesillas in Macedonia in the 70s, actually proves the rule, for he probably issued these to pay Macedonians to fight northern barbarians.)⁶⁰ To be compared with Alexander was a two-edged compliment, for his drunkenness, irascibility, cruelty, and megalomania had gained him a bad reputation. A culture that prized dignity, sobriety, seriousness, firmness, experience, and maturity (summed up by the key word *gravitas*) would at best feel ambivalent about him. Yet even so, any successful Roman general could still ask himself, *Alexander potuit, ego non potero?* 'Alexander could do it; so why can't I?'

So when Romans invoked Alexander they normally did so in order to assert their own superiority. This habit might explain, for example, a curiously remote portrait of him in the temple of Melkart (the Phoenician Herakles) at Gades (Cadiz). The Roman general Fabius Aemilianus had finally reached this Land's End of Europe in 145; so did he erect it as an act of one-upmanship, for Alexander had *never* reached Furthest Asia? Perhaps, too, Fabius was attempting to kill two birds with one stone. For his rival Metellus Macedonicus had brought the Granicus group to Rome the previous year, but had only suppressed a purely local rebellion in order to get it.⁶¹

⁵⁹ On the Mosaic's Roman context see Cohen 1997: 175–99; Donderer 1990 (looted from the east); Pfrommer 1998: 159–61 (critique of Donderer) and 209–14, with 146–59 and pls. 10–14 for the other replicas. Centauromachy: Pugliese Carratelli (ed.) 1994: 125 fig. 59; kindly brought to my attention by Elizabeth Marlowe.

⁶⁰ Stewart 1993: 328–30, fig. 123.

⁶¹ Suet. *Caes.* 7; DC 37.52.2; for an alternative connection with the Spanish and other embassies to Alexander in 323 (Arr. *Anab.* 7.15.4; Just. *Epit.* 12.13.2), see Stewart 1993: 181. Alexander-imitatio by the great men of the late republic has

Pompey the Great's cognomen 'Magnus' can also be read in this way. The Senate bestowed it upon him after victories in Italy, Sicily, and North Africa—lands Alexander had never trod—gained him a precocious triumph in 81, when he was only 25. He perhaps began his vainglorious cultivation of an Alexander-style *anastole* either then or a little later, when he smashed the armies of Alexander's latter-day, half-Iranian avatar, Mithradates VI of Pontus, and conquered Asia Minor, Syria, and Judea for Rome. His few surviving portraits show it clearly. In his triumph of 61 he wore Alexander's cloak, and some optimistically interpret a remark of Pliny's that his exploits surpassed those of Alexander, Hercules, and Dionysus (a cliché) to indicate that paintings making the comparison were actually carried in the procession. His tame historian Theophanes dutifully wrote all this up, and an Alexander painted by the great Athenian artist Nicias still hung in his theater complex a century later.⁶²

Julius Caesar apparently felt a similar sense of rivalry with Alexander. At age 31 he reportedly encountered the king's aforesaid portrait at Cadiz and wept because he had done nothing noteworthy at an age when the Macedonian had already conquered the world. Later Caesar was much compared to Alexander and at least one eastern city took the hint. Celebrating him as its second founder after the Macedonian, around AD 50 the little Syrian town of Aegae minted some bronze coins featuring the two of them on the obverse and reverse, respectively. Caesar himself firmly put the whole issue in perspective by dedicating a splendid bronze equestrian Alexander by Lysippus in his new forum with his own head substituted for the Macedonian's; and a portrait of himself as 'God Invincible' (Alexander's own soubriquet) in the temple of Quirinus.⁶³

prompted elaborate speculations by Michel 1967; Hannestad 1993; and others; rebuttals, Green 1978; Green 1989: 193–209; Gruen 1998.

⁶² Plut. *Pomp.* 2.1 (*anastole*); App. *Mith.* 17, 577 (cloak); Plin. *NH* 7.95 (comparison); Plin. *NH* 35.114 (Nicias); cf. Michel 1967: 35–66; contra, Gruen 1998.

⁶³ Suet. *Caes.* 7; DC 37.52.2 (Cadiz—but Plut. *Caes.* 11.3 has him consult an Alexander *history*, and the entire anecdote may be fictitious). Aegae (the namesake of the location of the Macedonian royal palace and necropolis): Burnett 1992: no. 4036 (Caligula or Claudius); cf. also nos. 4065 (Hierapolis) and 4075 (Alexandria-ad-Issum). Statues: Stat. *Sib.* 1.1.84–90 (Lysippus); DC 43.45.3 (God Invincible); cf. Michel 1967: 67–108; rebuttals, Green 1978; Green 1989: 193–209; Gruen 1998: 187–88.

6. *The Principate (30 BC–AD 180)*

When Octavian took Alexandria in 30, he at once made for Alexander's tomb, the Sema. After viewing the body, placing flowers and a gold crown on it, and accidentally breaking off a bit of its nose, he was asked whether he wanted to see the Ptolemies too. Typically, he shot back: 'I came to see a king not corpses!' This quip was aimed more at Greeks and other easterners than at his fellow-Romans, announcing that the Ptolemies were extinct and Alexander's legacy was his and his alone. He even switched his personal seal from a sphinx to an Alexander, though later changed it again to his own likeness.⁶⁴

His booty from Egypt, dedicated to Mars Ultor, included Apelles' two paintings of Alexander with Triumph and the trussed-up figures of War and Fury, and with Nike and the Dioscuri. Because he wanted them to inaugurate a display of portraits of great Roman generals, he left them intact. Sixty years later, however, the emperor Claudius followed Caesar's philistine example. He had Alexander's head repainted as Augustus, to general disapproval.

Other Alexanders by painters born or domiciled in Egypt are recorded in Rome, and may have been part of these spoils too. One, an Alexander at Issos by the Greco-Egyptian painter Helena, was supposedly dedicated by Vespasian in his Temple of Peace. Yet the source is a novelist, making this probably the first of many such fictions in imperial literature. As to bronzes, a typically hostile anecdote connects Nero with a boy-Alexander by Lysippos. He allegedly loved it so much that he had it gilded, scoring the face to anchor the gold. After his murder in AD 68 the gilding was removed, permanently scarring the statue but paradoxically increasing its value to connoisseurs.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Sema visit: DC 51.16. Seals: Plin. *NH* 37.10; Suet. *Aug.* 50; probably not by Pyrgoteles, *pace* Instinsky 1962 and Thomas 1995, since a gem signed by him would surely have caught Pliny's attention. Cf. also the Arretine molds and molded bowls with an Alexanderlike Augustus and Armenia: Stewart 1993: 189–90 and text fig. 8, figs. 62–63. On Augustus and Alexander see Thomas 1995 (cameo-portraits with aegis); Gruen 1998: 190–91.

⁶⁵ Plin. *NH* 35.27, 93–94; Serv. in Verg. *Aen.* 1.294 (Apelles); Plin. *NH* 35.114 (Antiphilos); Ptolemaeus Chennus *ap.* Phot. 190, p. 149b29–33 Bekker (Helena); Plin. *NH* 34.63 (Nero; the tale may be scurrilous). For the fictitious and probably fictitious Alexanders, see e.g. *Historia Alexandri Magni* (*Pseudo-Callisthenes*) 2.28, 3.19,

Nero's interest in Alexander was the exception. Being officially just 'first citizens' (*principes*) most of the early Caesars had little use for him except when fighting in the east. In AD 116, for example, Trajan sacrificed to him at Babylon; sailed down the Euphrates to the Persian Gulf; and told the Senate in dispatches that he had out-marched him. None of this marks any advance over republican practice, and to celebrate his feat he set up his own portrait on the shores of the Gulf, not Alexander's.⁶⁶

Yet Plutarch produced his largely favorable biography of Alexander under Trajan, and one of Trajan's provincial governors, L. Flavius Arrianus (Arrian) both compared him directly to Alexander and produced the most sympathetic account of the king's campaigns to date. This idealizing trend gathered momentum over the next few decades if Apuleius's thumbnail sketch, quoted in Section One, is typical.

Privately commissioned Alexanders are almost as rare, chiefly because the Stoicized early imperial elite preferred culture-heroes like philosophers, poets, orators, and historians to decorate their estates. Alexander and his ilk were all but anathema to their priggish morality and dedication to cultivated leisure or *otium*. The only extant first-century AD account of Alexander's campaigns, by Quintus Curtius Rufus, is openly conflicted, portraying him as a kind of evil genius—a raging, almost diabolical overachiever. So one is not surprised to find that when a gallery of kings and generals has appeared, as at the Villa dei Papiri at Herculaneum, Alexander is conspicuously absent. Yet since this ensemble features great contemporaries of the philosopher Epicurus (341–270 BC), why omit him? The lacuna may simply be a matter of chance.

The Azara and Schwarzenberg Alexanders (fig. 3) from near Tivoli and a superb bronze equestrian statuette of Alexander from Herculaneum are probably from private contexts. The Azara herm bears the square letters and distinctive labeling of other herms found in Tiburtine villas; the Herculaneum statuette goes with an Amazon and a riderless horse, recalling Alexander's legendary tryst with the Queen of the Amazons. In a tale found in the earliest of his historians, Cleitarchus, and canonized in the increasingly popular *Alexander Romance*, she visited him, slept with him, and even lent him a

3.22, and 3.133 Kroll; Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* 2.20, 24, and 42; Aelian, *VH* 12.64.

⁶⁶ Dio Cassius 68.29.1 and 30.1; Jordanes, *Romana* 268 (statue).

detachment of her warriors for a year. Scattered marble and bronze Alexanders from the provinces also attest to continuing interest in him there, though dates are uncertain and contexts rare.⁶⁷

As to reliefs and paintings, the early imperial Chigi plaque (fig. 14), found near Rome, may be from a villa or private house. It shows two women representing Europe and a submissive Asia, both wearing turreted crowns, pouring libations on an altar embellished with a relief of three Muses. The shield that they hold bears a confused relief of the Battle of Gaugamela (wrongly labelled Arbela). An epigram at top and bottom praises Alexander's spear-won conquests and traces his pedigree back to Heracles. The Greek inscriptions presume an educated audience, but beyond that we are in the dark.⁶⁸

Another relief in stucco from a mausoleum near Rome features a youth holding a thunderbolt and scepter, enthroned on a globe, and flanked by a seated Neptune and Hercules; a pendant showed Aphrodite and Adonis, a popular funerary theme. The youth has been identified as the local god Veiovis, but there are difficulties, and a conflation with the Alexander allegories of Apelles (on display in Rome) is possible. It would thus show the king as world-ruler or *kosmokrator*. The House of the Vettii's young, seated Jupiter presiding over his own amorous exploits, mentioned in Section 2, is a parallel case. Alexander imagery may have influenced the Roman artist on both occasions—which by no means certifies that these works actually *copy* bona fide Hellenistic Alexanders, as often asserted. The Pompeian wedding scene (fig. 6), also discussed in Section 2, is more secure, though its elaborate pairing with Dionysus, Ariadne, and Nike is purely Roman. Aetion's own wedding-picture was certainly in Italy by the late second century AD, and could well have been there much earlier.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Herculaneum bronzes: Stewart 1993: 127–28, figs. 21–23; cf. Ridgway 1990: 119–20; update, di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: nos. 27–28; cf. Cleitarchus ap. Plut. *Alex.* 46; *Historia Alexandri Magni* (*Pseudo-Callisthenes*) 3.25–27 Kroll. For the provinces, see e.g. Queyrel 1990: 132 nos. 241–42 (Nîmes), etc.

⁶⁸ Cohen 1997: 190, fig. 80 (with full bibliography).

⁶⁹ Stucco relief: LIMC s.v. "Poseidon/Neptunus" no. 82, pl. 385; di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: no. 108.

7. *The Dominate (AD 180–410)*

A decisive shift in Roman attitudes to Alexander comes with Caracalla (r., AD 211–217), who apparently succumbed to a kind of Alexander-mania on his march eastwards through Macedonia and Asia in AD 214–15. Raising a Macedonian phalanx, he adopted Macedonian dress and even ordered his officers to take the names of Alexander's marshals. At Troy he restaged Alexander's visit and sacrifice to Achilles and supposedly ordered the king's statues and pictures to be set up throughout the empire. The historian Herodian tells us that he had even seen 'some ludicrous pictures with two half-heads in profile sprouting from a single body, one of Alexander, one of Antoninus [*i.e.*, Caracalla].'

This Siamese-twin arrangement is less fantastic than it seems, since 'janiform' herms (with two heads joined back-to-back) had long been a staple of Roman art, and imperial coins and cameos sometimes bear "jugate" busts with two heads conjoined *en face*. Though no Alexander-Caracalla duo has survived, a famous cameo once in Poland but lost in World War II showed the emperor masquerading as the Alexander Aigiochos of Alexandria (fig. 15).⁷⁰ This is ironical in the extreme, since when the Alexandrian mob ridiculed his pretensions to be an Alexander *redivivus*, he promptly had them massacred. Caracalla's portraits in the round also clearly cast him as a latter-day Alexander, turning the Macedonian's outward gaze into a sideways glare of startling brutality.⁷¹

Many of these images were destroyed when Caracalla was murdered in 217. Yet one of his successors, Severus Alexander (r., AD 222–235), was no less an enthusiast. Honoring the Macedonian in every way, he installed his statue among those of the deified emperors and 'worthies' in his private chapel (*lararium*) and echoed his portrait-types on his coins.⁷² Unfortunately our main source, the *Historia Augusta*, is often fanciful. Yet since Severus was the first Caesar to

⁷⁰ *Historia Augusta, Aurelius Antoninus* 2.1–3; DC 78.7–8 and 15; 79.19.1; Herodian 4.7–8. Cf. Wirth 1976: 197; Castritius 1988; Hannestad 1993: 66–70; Baharal 1994 (purely personal, not political). On the cameos see Megow 1988: pls. 29, 31, 48, and 49, 1 (Cammin); Stewart 1990: 246, fig. 82; Bastien 1993: 649–72; Bergmann 1998: 75, pls. 1, 4 (Cammin: emperor uncertain).

⁷¹ Stewart 1993: fig. 3.

⁷² *Historia Augusta, Severus Alexander* 5.1–2; 25.9; 30–31; 35; and 50.4; cf. Rösger 1988.

adopt Alexander's name and campaigned successfully against a revived Persian Empire, these stories may have some truth in them.

A widespread Alexander revival followed: for with the emperor now accepted as an absolute ruler (*dominus*), the great Macedonian could become respectable again. Roman cavalry parade helmets now often bear his distinctive *anastole* and facial features, and numerous gems bearing his head (or perhaps that of Mars) have been identified as soldiers' talismans.⁷³

The civic evidence from Greece and the East is even more extensive. When Severus Alexander restored the ancient privileges of the Macedonian community or *koinon* in AD 231, it minted no fewer than eight Alexander types in response, advertising the revival of his cult and its associated games. They show him taming his horse Bucephalus, standing alongside him, and in a variety of head and bust types. The heads are diademed and sometimes horned; or wear an Attic helmet embossed with a griffin; or a lionskin cap. The busts are diademed and equipped with a cuirass and sometimes a chlamys.⁷⁴ Another type shows his mother Olympias on a couch, feeding a snake from a dish. This scene obviously refers to the legend of Alexander's birth where Zeus visited her at night in the form of a snake and night and seduced her.⁷⁵

Two superb sets of Roman gold medallions from Tarsus in Syria and Aboukir in Egypt (fig. 16) are contemporary with and technically similar to the coins. They have been variously linked with Caracalla (r., AD 211–17), whose bust actually appears on one of them; with Severus Alexander's Macedonian restoration of AD 231; and with Gordian III's Olympian festival at Beroea in Macedonia in AD 242–43.⁷⁶

⁷³ Helmets: Robinson 1975: figs. 331–32, 334–36, overlooking the connection; Rolley 1999: 360–67, fig. 377. Gems: Henig 1970: 264–65; Henig 1974: 103 and nos. 466–70 (though some probably portray a young Mars).

⁷⁴ Gaebler 1935: 9–15 nos. 7–9, 24, 25, 39–61; 47 nos. 1–4; selection, Bieber 1964: 77–78, figs. 109–13.

⁷⁵ Plut. *Alex.* 2; cf. Arr. *An.* 4.10.2; cf. *Historia Alexandri Magni* (*Pseudo-Callisthenes*) 1.10 Kroll (Nectanebo). Cf. Ross 1963: 1–23; Alföldi 1976 and 1990: nos. 1, 3, 4, and 10, pls. 1 and 4, 3; a labeled fourth-century AD contorniate secures Olympias's identity.

⁷⁶ Synopsis, Göbl 1978: pls. 1–2. Discussions: Vermeule 1982; Ridgway 1990: 118–19; Stewart 1993: 50–51, fig. 130; selections, Bieber 1964: 79–80, figs. 1–2, and 114–16; Andronicos 1980: nos. 10, 11, 33; di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: no. 4.

If all the identifications are correct, they show Alexander's father Philip and his mother Olympias; mythological figures like Thetis (the mother of his hero and ancestor Achilles); and Caracalla and Severus Alexander. The king himself rides a chariot and is escorted by Nike and Ares; sits on a bench while Nike brings him his armor; spears a fallen enemy; hunts a lion and a boar; wears diadem and Ammon's horn; and carries various combinations of lionskin, helmet, cuirass, shield, and spear. On fig. 16, his head copies a superb but enigmatic Hellenistic portrait from Pergamum and his shield is covered with astrological symbols that identify him as world-ruler or *kosmokrator*.⁷⁷

Moving further east, several Asian cities even minted coins that claimed Alexander (falsely) as their founder; this revived civic interest continued into the turbulent years of the mid third century. The impostors include Apollonia Mordiaion in Pisidia and Gerasa (Jerash) in Jordan under Caracalla (r., AD 211–217) and Elagabalus (r., AD 218–222). The Apollonian coins blatantly copy Alexander's own Heracles coins and even misspell his name!

A generation later, Smyrna, which boasted a cult of Alexander, produced an elaborate coin under Philip the Arab (r., AD 244–49) showing the dream that had led him to re-found the city in 334. Sleeping under a tree, he is visited by two figures of Nemesis, who tell him to resettle the city with the descendants of those Smyrniots expelled by the Lydians three centuries earlier. The type evidently reproduces a sculptural group or painting and was perhaps a response to the celebration in AD 247 of the thousandth anniversary of the founding of Rome. Sagalassos, too, struck a superb coin series under Claudius II Gothicus (a cavalry general who reigned between AD 268 and 270) that showed a mounted Alexander, aided by Zeus (fig. 17), capturing the city while one of its then-barbarian inhabitants runs away at right. The image was perhaps inspired by Claudius's expulsion of the hated Goths from the Balkans in 269.⁷⁸

Unfortunately, few Roman marble and bronze Alexanders can be linked precisely with this revival and many long-accepted ones are probably divinities (the Dioscuri, Helios/Sol, Mars, and so on) infected

⁷⁷ Cf. Stewart 1993: 332–33, figs. 128–30.

⁷⁸ Stewart 1993: 50, 307–12, figs. 109–11; cf. Harl 1987: 14, pls. 5.1, 9.2, and 33.7.

by the Macedonian's supercharged iconography.⁷⁹ Of the more secure examples, the most spectacular are two colossi from southern Turkey. One, a superb bronze head illegally excavated in the 1960s, allegedly in the chapel of the imperial cult or Sebasteion at Bubon (fig. 1), looks Severan in date and is heavily romanticized in the manner described by Apuleius (see Section One). Not surprisingly, it strongly recalls Roman imperial images of the king's ancestor, Achilles. The other, a roughly contemporary but fragmentary marble over 3 meters in height, was found in the 1980s in the theater at Perge. Dressed in *chitoniskos* and long cloak, Alexander stands with his foot on a pile of arms and raises his left arm to hold a spear or scepter. Yet no cult of him is known at Perge and the figure's function within the theater's decor is still unclear.⁸⁰

Another discovery of the 1980s at Aphrodisias in Caria shows how Alexander maintained his grip upon the east's imagination well into the fifth century. On the walls of a large mansion, perhaps a school run by the city's leading philosopher, were hung at least eleven marble tondo busts (fig. 18). They include Alexander, Pythagoras, Socrates, Alcibiades, Pindar, Aristotle, and Apollonius of Tyana (all inscribed), and several now-nameless philosophers and youths.⁸¹ Since Alexander had been tutored by Aristotle, and Alcibiades (none too successfully) by Socrates, the theme was presumably 'philosophers and their pupils.' If so, one hopes that the city's youth appreciated these edifying *exempla* linking the *vita contemplativa* and the *vita activa*.

The 'trickle-down' effect of this late Roman Alexander-mania is chronicled with some exaggeration in the fourth-century AD *Historia Augusta*. The subject is the superstitious family of Titus Macrianus, an officer in the army of Valerian (r., AD 253–60) in the east:

The men always had representations of Alexander the Great of Macedon carved in relief on rings and on silverware. The women had them on their tiaras, bracelets, rings, and on every kind of ornament, so that even today there are tunics and borders of garments and matrons' travelling cloaks which have images of Alexander woven into them

⁷⁹ E.g. Bieber 1964: pls. 45–58; also L'Orange 1982: 19–38; Hannestad 1993: 66–68, figs. 9–10; for a skeptical view, see *LMC* s.v. "Dioskouroi/Castores" no. 29; "Helios/Sol" nos. 169–76; "Ares/Mars" nos. 51–85.

⁸⁰ Bubon: Berger 1971; Vermeule 1980; Andronikos et al. 1980: no. 9; cf. Price 1984: 159–61, 263–64; Inan 1994, the latest study, omits the head. Perge: di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: 207–8 and figs.

⁸¹ Smith 1991.

with a variety of threads. We've recently seen Cornelius Macer, a man of the same family, when giving a dinner in the temple of Hercules, drink a toast to the priest from an electrum bowl with Alexander's face carved in the middle. The king's whole history was represented by simplified, minute figures enircling it. Macer ordered this bowl passed around to all those who were most ardent in their admiration for that great man's life. I point this out because it's said that whoever wears Alexander's image in either gold or silver relief is aided in his every action.⁸²

Numerous cameos (fig. 15), gems, pendants, glass vessels, statuettes (fig. 2), and even Coptic textiles document this late-antique obsession with Alexander. Some imitate types invented over half a millennium previously and others conflate them with new forms and new attributes.⁸³

Finally, the contorniates. These fourth-century bronze medallions, made in Rome and labelled in Latin, have been explained as emblems of pagan resistance to Christianity or more prosaically as admission-tickets to the Roman circus. They are replete with Alexander imagery, perhaps because many of the best circus charioteers were Macedonians; the regime, too, was still battling his old enemies, the Persians.⁸⁴

In addition to the familiar portrait types, they show him slaughtering barbarians and admiring his own armor. One has his lion-skin-clad head on one side and his mother Olympias and the snake on the other, echoing the Macedonian coins of a century earlier. Although none of them is exactly dateable, AD 344 was the 700th

⁸² *Historia Augusta, Thirty Tyrants* 14.4–6; see also Ioh. Chrys. *Ad Illuminandos cat-achesis* 2.5 for Alexander coins worn as good luck charms.

⁸³ Cameos and gems: see, e.g., di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: nos. 115 and 117–18; Weitzmann 1979: no. 71; cf. Henig 1970: 264–65; Henig 1974: 103 and nos. 466–70. Gold pendants: Andronicos et al. 1980, Boston, San Francisco, and Toronto supplements nos. 6, 12, and 52, respectively; Grimm 1998: fig. 15. Gold-glass plate: Weitzmann 1979: no. 79 (invoking Alexander, not actually representing him). Textiles: Shepherd 1971; Weitzmann 1979: no. 81; Friedman (ed.) 1989: no. 70; Rosenthal-Heginbottom 1999: 163–64, fig. 9; proposed dates vary widely, from the 3rd to the 7th centuries AD. Stern and Sharon 1995: 35–36, fig. 8 identify a lead figurine of a horseman in Macedonian dress, found in the author's excavation area (F) at Dor in Israel, as a Roman military votive of Alexander; but Stern 2000: 311 and color pl. 6.3 is more cautious. A twin appeared in Dor's area D2 in 1999. Yet as Rosenthal-Heginbottom 1999: 158 and 163–66 points out, he is bearded (cf. her fig. 1), so is presumably an emperor *in forma Alexandri*. Since Dor was abandoned around AD 235, and the warrior's head is squarish and his beard full, Caracalla is the obvious candidate.

⁸⁴ Alföldi 1976 and 1990: nos. 1–62, pls. 1–22; selections, Bieber 1964: figs. 118–20; Andronicos et al. 1984: nos. 34–37.

anniversary of Alexander's birth, and the *Alexander Romance's* heterodox account of his serpentiform sire was now sweeping the Greco-Roman world. Far from being Zeus in disguise this snake was actually the last of the Pharaohs, Nectanebo! Obviously invented in Egypt, the tale first appears in art on some badly damaged but copiously inscribed late fourth-century mosaics at Baalbek in Syria.⁸⁵

This Syrian Alexander-cycle brings us to the threshold of the Middle Ages. Manuscript illustrations of the *Alexander Romance* begin at about this time, and Byzantine, Islamic, and Western artists soon enriched this late antique tradition immeasurably, adopting quite extreme positions for and against the divine Alexander. But all this belongs to the story of medieval art, and so lies beyond the frontiers of this chapter.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ *Historia Alexandri Magni (Pseudo-Callisthenes)* 1.10 Kroll; Vermeule, in Andronicos et al. 1980: no. 34 posits a hypothetical, posthumous cult of Olympias, but overlooks the *Romance* and Ross 1963.

⁸⁶ See, most recently, Weitzmann 1979: no. 81; Andronicos et al. 1980: 14–20 and San Francisco Supplement nos. 21–36; di Vita and Alfano (eds.) 1995: 153–91 and nos. 120–44; Bridges and Bürgel (eds.) 1996.

My thanks to Erich Gruen and Joseph Roisman for commenting on earlier drafts of this chapter and for suggesting a number of improvements and additions; and to Minor Markle for discussing the realia of the Alexander Mosaic with me; naturally, all omissions, mistakes, and misjudgments are my own.

PART TWO

ALEXANDER, MACEDONIA AND THE GREEKS

CHAPTER THREE

ALEXANDER, PHILIP, AND THE MACEDONIAN BACKGROUND

Ian Worthington

“Demades urged [the Athenians] to pay no heed to the report [of Alexander’s death], since, had it been true, the whole world would long ago have been filled with the smell of the body” (Plut. *Phocion* 22.3). Demades may well have said this in 323 when news of Alexander’s death reached Greece, but regardless of the veracity of this remark, any suspicions that the Athenians may have had that the Macedonian king was dead were understandable. When Alexander assumed the throne in 336 at the age of 20 he inherited a Macedonian empire that was united and apparently economically prosperous, a powerful and well-trained army, the subservience of the Greeks, and plans to invade Persia, all the achievements, and legacy, of his father Philip II. By the time of Alexander’s death, the Macedonian empire stretched from Greece in the west to India in the far east; the Persian empire was defeated, Egypt had submitted, India was his (so he thought), Greek culture and education were promoted everywhere (so we are supposed to think), and he was even worshipped as a god by many of his subjects. Alexander became a legend in his own lifetime,¹ and on the surface it is perhaps no surprise that he came to be called “Great”.²

The details of Alexander’s reign and of his achievements and failures will be dealt with in the following chapters. The purpose of this chapter is to set the scene for his reign: to consider his background and youth, the nature of the Macedonian state and people, and in

¹ On this, see for example Gunderson 1981: 183–192.

² When Alexander received this title is unknown. Plautus, *Mostellaria* 775 is the first attested reference to him as great (*magnum*), but this would not have been the first time he was described as great in order for the joke at that point of the play to work. Perhaps the epithet was coined by Ptolemy, who had kidnapped the funeral cortege of Alexander to help consolidate his power. See the conclusion to this chapter (Section 5) for how appropriate an epithet it is.

particular the reign of Philip, which primarily enabled Alexander to succeed as he did.³

1. *Macedon before Philip*

Much has been written on the “ethnicity” of the Macedonians.⁴ The Greeks called the Macedonians “barbarians”, a term of abuse pointed against them as late as the last quarter of the fourth century (Dinarchus 1.24), and perhaps an indication that they did not see them as Greek. The proper term for these people was “Makedones”, a name that is Greek in root and ethnic terminations, and may have meant “highlanders”. Whilst Herodotus and Thucydides considered the Makedones to be non-Greek, the Persians believed they were speakers of Greek. Some of their words were Greek and others not, but this is unsurprising given the closeness of Illyria, Paeonia, Thrace, and Epirus, which must have affected the language. The gods whom the Makedones worshipped and the names of their months were Greek, as were the toponyms of the Macedonian homeland. Moreover, noble Macedonians participated in the Olympic Games, which were open only to Greeks. Nevertheless, there was a clear distinction between those who lived south of Mount Olympus and those who lived to its north, a distinction not lost on either side.

Before Philip II, Macedon was weak, economically backward, and unstable. The state was rugged and mountainous, travel and communication were difficult, and there was a clear line of division between Upper and Lower Macedon. The royal capital was situated in Lower Macedon (originally at Aegae, then after 399 at Pella), but

³ I do not consider Macedonian institutions (such as the army, assembly, and court) in any detail, which are to be dealt with by Heckel in Chapter 8, and see in detail Hammond 1989. Nor is this chapter meant to be a detailed narrative of Philip's reign, for which see Ellis 1976, Hammond and Griffith 1979: 203–698, and Hammond 1994; for shorter accounts of Philip's reign see, for example, Borza 1990: 200–230, Errington 1990: 37–90, Hammond 1997: 15–26, and Ellis 1994: 723–790. See also the articles in Hatzopoulos and Loukopoulos 1981, and cf. the succinct survey by Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 5–19. (To avoid an excessive number (and length) of foot notes, I will not cite the relevant pages of these works for the events of Philip's reign with which I deal; readers will be available to locate these easily enough.) See too Griffith 1965.

⁴ For example, see Badian 1982, Borza 1990: 77–97; cf. Hammond and Griffith 1979: 39–54 and Hammond 1989: 12–15 (on language).

the tribes of Upper Macedon, by the Pindus mountain range, owed it and the king little allegiance, for they had kings of their own and maintained their independence. The resultant tension often led to warfare between the king in Lower Macedon and the tribes to his north, hence there was never any real unity in the state.⁵ Macedon was rich in natural resources, such as silver, gold, copper, and iron, and especially timber, but these were not fully exploited until the time of Philip II. Lower Macedon was also rich in its soil, which, in contrast to most of Greece, was very fertile and well-watered. Grain and vegetables were grown there, and its climate allowed the centuries-old practice of transhumance, for in the bitter winters those living in Upper Macedon would move their flocks of sheep, goats, and cattle to the lowlands.⁶

The Macedonian throne was subject to dynastic upheaval on the death of virtually every king; unity and economic progress were impossible. To make matters worse, the state was prone to foraging invasions from neighbouring tribes to the north such as the Illyrians and Paeonians as well as from incursions by the Greeks south of Mount Olympus. The army was largely a conscript one, composed of citizen landowners who presumably had little formal training and who could only be mustered with difficulty because of their farming commitments. With no organized and trained army to repel invaders, Macedon suffered even more. To the east, relations with the powerful kings of Thrace and Greek cities of the Chalcidice region were precarious, as they were with the kingdom of Epirus to its immediate west. South of the border, the Greeks viewed the Macedonian kings with distrust—not just because of their history of medising.

One king who did attempt to impose some stability with various administrative measures, as well as introducing much-needed economic and military reforms, was Archelaus (413–399), during whose reign the capital was moved from Aegae to Pella as part of an attempt at increased centralization. However, his good work was largely undone by Amyntas III (393–369), who, though keeping Macedon itself stable, was faced with serious threats from the Illyrians, the Chalcidian League, and the Athenians. So too were his two sons,

⁵ Cf. Ellis 1976: 36–40.

⁶ On geography and natural resources, see Borza 1982: 1–20, Borza 1990: 25–57, and Ellis 1976: 28–34.

Alexander II (369–366) and Perdiccas III (365–360), and the final nail was hammered into the coffin when Perdiccas and 4,000 men died in battle against the Illyrians in 360 (Diod. 16.2.4–5), leaving only a minor as heir to the throne.⁷ Macedon, then, was in isolation, one that was far from splendid. Those who lived there eked an existence while distrusting not only their neighbors but also their own kind thanks to the dissension between Lower and Upper Macedon. Security and prosperity, let alone any feeling of national identity, did not exist, nor did a stable monarchy and undisputed succession. It is hardly a surprise that when Macedon found itself without a king in 360, the Greeks to the south believed that nothing would change and that Macedon would continue to be as weak, divided, and insignificant as before. They could not have been more wrong.

The man who changed the course of Macedonian history was Philip II. He became king in 360 by default, for on the death of his brother Perdiccas III the legitimate heir, Perdiccas' son Amyntas, was a mere boy, and at that time Macedon was faced by four major threats to its security (see below).⁸ The Macedonian Assembly, in a clear example of its desire to salvage the situation and of its power, acclaimed Amyntas' uncle, Philip, as king.⁹ The king was already a powerful official: as one half of the government of Macedon he had semi-divine power, performed certain state sacrifices, sat as final judge in any cases of appeal, and his person was protected at all times. While he had an advisory council of Companions (cf. Arr. 1.25.4, Curt. 6.8.1, 8.15, 11.9–11), he did not have to follow its counsel—just as he did not need to listen to the other half of the Macedonian government, the Assembly. It was composed of Macedonian citizens, and met to acclaim a king and to judge cases of treason—although the king's presence probably ensured a vote his way (cf. Curt. 6.8.25).¹⁰

⁷ On the above kings, see, for example, Ellis 1976: 40–44, Hammond and Griffith 1979: 137–150 and 167–188, Errington 1990: 24–37, and Borza 1990: 161–197.

⁸ Inscriptional evidence would seem to date the start of the reign to 360, not to 359: Hatzopoulos "The Oleveni Inscription" 1982: 21–42 and Hatzopoulos 1995: 163–185.

⁹ Justin 7.5.9–10 says that Philip was merely regent to the young Amyntas at first, but Ellis 1976: 46–47, Cawkwell 1978: 27–28, and Hammond and Griffith 1979: 208–209 and especially 702–704, for example, are correct to discount this. Someone was needed to exercise power as sole ruler from the outset, and that ruler was Philip.

¹⁰ See further, Errington 1978: 86–90; cf. O'Neil 1999: 28–47.

It was convened by the king or his representative if he was overseas or a minor, and although it was clearly powerful it was the monarch who had the final say in all matters.¹¹ However, the king was not king of *all* Macedon, always a weakness in regal power and in keeping the state in check. Philip recognized this; once he was undisputed king, he would act as he saw fit for his own power and that of his state, as Alexander did after him—and as the Greek states never could (cf. Dem. 1.4, 8.11, 18.235).

Into these hard times and even harder society Alexander was born in 356 (see below). As he grew up, he was influenced by the distrustful atmosphere of the people to their neighbors and even to each other (at least in his early years), the attitude of the other Greeks to the Macedonians, the autocratic nature of the monarchy, the power of the army, the nagging of his mother Olympias—and last but by no means least Philip himself.¹² It is now time to turn to the reign of his father and to consider what Philip achieved and what he was able to bequeath to his son.

2. *The Reign of Philip*

The first year of Philip's reign set the pattern for the rest. From about 369 to 367 (thus from when he was about age 13 or 14 to 15 or 16), Philip was a hostage in Thebes, sent there by his brother Alexander II when he was defeated by the Thebans.¹³ This was during the period of the Theban hegemony, when the Thebans had defeated the Spartans at the battle of Leuctra in 371 and were masters of Greece until 362.¹⁴ Thus, Philip experienced at first hand what military prowess can do for a state no matter its size and the power of its opponents, and he had learned much about military strategy from the brilliant Epaminondas (Plut. *Pelopidas* 26.5).¹⁵ Although it may be queried how much a young teenager might learn,

¹¹ On this, see Hammond 1989: 21–24 and 62–70; cf. 166–170, Ellis 1976: 21–26, and Borza 1990: 236–241.

¹² Cf. Hamilton 1965: 117–124.

¹³ Diod. 15.67.4, 16.2.2–3; Plut. *Pelopidas* 26.4–5; Justin 6.9.7, 7.5.2–3; cf. Ellis 1976: 43–44, Hammond and Griffith 1979: 205–206 and 424–425.

¹⁴ On this period, see Buckler 1980.

¹⁵ For his victory at Leuctra, Epaminondas was seen by Cawkwell, for example (1978: 155–157), as the supreme master of warfare before Philip; cf. the recent reappraisal by Hanson 1988: 190–207.

it must be remembered that Macedonian princes learned by example. They were trained to fight, to hunt, to learn about warfare, to admire courage, to aspire to self-excellence, and they were schooled on Homer and the great battles portrayed in the *Iliad*—all from an early age. Alexander, by the time he was 14 when Aristotle arrived to tutor him, was a tough Macedonian youth, schooled on Homer, and a typical product of his society. He was just 16 in 340 when Philip left him as regent of Macedon, and during that time Alexander was faced with a revolt by the Maedians, a Paconian tribe on the upper Strymon, which he put down and founded a city there, Alexandropolis (Plut. *Alex.* 9.1). Two years later, at age 18, he commanded the left flank of the Macedonian army at Chaeronea, and more than proved himself. There seems little doubt that Philip, also raised in the same tradition as his son, would not have been profoundly affected by his stay in Thebes, when he too was in his early to mid teens. This may be seen not only in his military strategy and reforms learnt from Epaminondas (Diod. 16.2.3, and see below), but also in his anchoring of Macedonian power firmly on military power. More than that, he realised that to maintain rule simple conquest in battle was not enough, but continued fighting, consolidation, and then absolute control.

Any plans that Philip had for Macedonian expansion would never be realized until he had secured his kingdom and made himself undisputed king. Thus, in 360 it was necessary to stave off by any means the threats that faced the throne. These came from the Illyrians and the Paeonians, a Thracian-backed pretender by the name of Pausanias, and an Athenian-backed pretender, Argaeus, who had landed at Methone with a force of 3,000 men and ships. While Diodorus records no campaign against the Illyrians until 358, Philip must have concluded some sort of treaty or at least an armistice with them, for he married an Illyrian wife, Audata. As for the Paeonians and the Thracians, Diodorus (16.3.4–5) says that Philip simply bribed them not to invade Macedon. This left the Athenians, and with them we see the first of many brilliantly deceitful, diplomatic moves on his part.¹⁶ Philip withdrew the Macedonian garrison from the former Athenian colony Amphipolis, and in the hope of seeing its return they withdrew their support of Argaeus (Diod.

¹⁶ On Philip's diplomacy, see in detail Ryder 1994: 228–257.

16.3.3–6). Philip then quickly defeated the latter. At this point Diodorus says that Philip sent envoys to Athens to conclude a treaty, and this is perhaps the “secret agreement” alluded to by Demosthenes (2.7), by which Philip would return Amphipolis to the Athenians in return for their giving him Pydna.¹⁷

Within a year, then, Philip had countered the very real threats to Macedon and his position, and in doing so a pattern of deceit, diplomacy, political marriages, bribery, and speed was set which characterized the rest of his reign. It was now time to turn to expansion. For that, he needed to unite his state and to create a larger and more professional army than the untrained and ill-equipped one of the peasant levies that had existed for so long. He also had to replenish manpower, for the 4,00 men lost under Perdiccas in 360 must have affected fighting strength significantly. It is unknown exactly when Philip began and ended his army reforms.¹⁸ What we can say with certainty is that within a year of coming to the throne he was ready to trial a very different army in battle against the Illyrians, and that by the end of his reign he had built up a huge force. In 359 Diodorus tells us that the army numbered 10,000 infantry and 600 cavalry (16.4.3); in 334, as Alexander prepared to invade Persia, the Macedonian army numbered 27,000 infantry and at least 3,000 cavalry.¹⁹

Philip was quick to introduce new tactics and weaponry, such as switching the main attacking arm from the infantry to the cavalry, which was thus supported by the infantry, in contrast to standard Greek practice. Rather than engaging the enemy in a set battle Philip preferred deception, pretending that he was in retreat so that the opposing force would come after him in some disarray, and then wheeling for a counter-attack (a strategy which outfoxed the Greeks at Chaeronea). He also incorporated specialist and other troops, such as archers, javelin men, and slingers, from conquered areas such as Thrace, together with more cavalry from Thessaly. The depth of the phalanx infantry formation was often increased to meet a particular situation, and ranged from eight to 32 ranks, each man armed

¹⁷ Demosthenes is guilty of falsehood here since secret treaties cannot exist in the Athenian democracy: de Ste. Croix 1963: 110–119.

¹⁸ On the army reforms see especially Hammond and Griffith 1979: 405–449.

¹⁹ Diod. 17.17.1–5; in all, the army numbered 48,100 soldiers and 6,100 cavalry: Engels 1978: 146–147 (Table 4).

with the new sarissa, a 14.5-foot pike with a pointed iron head. Speed and "self-sufficiency" were also factors: Philip trained his men to carry their own arms, equipment, and food, and he forbade wagons and women accompanying them. This would allow his men to march quickly and without hindrance, especially through narrow mountain passes and over rugged terrain, while allowing the oxen or mules normally used to pull wagons to stay in Macedon and help to work the land.

The men in the first five ranks of the phalanx carried their sarissas horizontal (hence pointing forward) and the remaining ranks carried theirs vertical, and would lower them in battle. Thus, the phalanx, with its massive array of deadly weapons protruding at some length in front of the soldiers, must have been a terrifying sight to see.²⁰ Against this sort of formation, supported by lighter-armed auxiliaries and archers, and with the cavalry bearing hard down, the Greek hoplite faced a formidable and more often than not impossible challenge. Even if opposing soldiers managed to kill soldiers in the first line of the Macedonian phalanx, they were likely to be impaled by the sarissas of the second, third, fourth, and remaining lines. The drilling that Philip's men must have undertaken to ensure they could march and run as and when needed with these long, heavy weapons at the ready, must have been arduous, for it would have taken only one man to stumble and thus throw the entire phalanx into a deadly disarray.

For most of his campaigning Philip did not use his entire army in full array but mixed up infantry and cavalry and made sallies more than large-scale and lengthy invasions (cf. Dem. 9.49–50). He himself always led the attack and was to be found in the thick of fighting, disregarding the injuries to his body and ready for more if need be,²¹ and thus binding his army together by the personal example that he set—an example followed by Alexander, often at his own peril too.

Philip's stay in Thebes had paid off as far as realizing the need of having a powerful and loyal army, but the short-lived Theban hegemony (371–362) had ended with its defeat at the battle of

²⁰ There are excellent drawings of a phalanx formation and of a sarissa in Hammond 1994: 20.

²¹ Cf. Dem. 18.67, and see further below, on how Philip's courage in battle affected Alexander.

Mantineia. Philip did not intend his Macedonian army to meet with a similar fate. At the same time, it was crucial that his army fought and won, for through military victories would come an increase not only in Macedon's power but also in the people's loyalty to him as undisputed king and a nationalistic pride to Macedon as their state. This helps to explain why Philip led his new army into battle so soon after settling the threats that faced him on his accession, and why he kept the army constantly on campaign. It was the Assembly that had made him king owing to force of circumstances (see above), but what the Assembly made it could, in theory, un-make. We can see from his diplomatic exchanges with the Assembly shortly after his accession that Philip realized the need to convince the people that he was fit to be king (Diod. 16.3.1), but words did not count as much as actions. While Philip was winning battles and his aggressive imperialistic policy was successful his position and, more importantly, the loyalty of his people were assured. However, his dependence on the army was also a weakness, as we shall see.²²

In about spring 358 Philip attacked the Paeonians and reduced them to submission. An invasion of Illyria and massive defeat of the Illyrians followed, leaving 7,000 of their number dead (Diod. 16.4). This victory not only freed Upper Macedon from Illyrian influence and so expanded his state (Diod. 16.8.1), but also allowed Philip to unite Upper and Lower Macedon, thereby giving the state a unity it had hitherto unknown. The significance of this area for his state's security is seen in Philip's measures to consolidate it: perhaps now his "transpopulation" policy began, whereby Macedonians proper were encouraged to move to live in areas where previously there had been a mixed stock,²³ and perhaps even another marriage-alliance (to Phila, of the Elimiotte royal house).

In the same year, intervention in Thessaly, where the king helped Larissa (the principal *polis* of the Thessalian League) against Pherae, led to his third marriage to a woman from Larissa named Philinna. Thessaly was a fertile area and had fine horses, which Philip would use for his cavalry, but more significantly is that the moves in Thessaly meant that he had not merely secured his southern border but had

²² See below, Section 5. The need to keep the army on campaign is seen as one of Philip's strategies by Ellis 1976: cf. 231-234.

²³ Although there could be confusion here with the later transpopulation policy in 345, if we may believe Justin (8.5.7-6.2). See Ellis 1969.

extended it. Even more important was the alliance struck the next year with the king of Epirus, which included Philip's fourth marriage, this to the princess Olympias. Thus, Philip's northern, western, eastern, and southern borders were now secure (for the present), and his army had more than proved itself. Further expansion could now follow, as is indicated by his capture of Amphipolis by siege (Diod. 16.8.2). Despite the previous agreement that he had with the Athenians, who were again a power with which to be reckoned after they formed the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy in 378,²⁴ he retained Amphipolis. They declared war on him,²⁵ a reaction Philip must have known they would make. The scene was thus set for his involvement in affairs in Greece.

The following years saw the power of the Greeks diminish as Philip steadily pushed into central and then southern Greece. It was in this period, July 356 in fact, that Olympias, gave birth to a son, Alexander (Plut. *Alex.* 3.5, Arr. 7.28.1), an event that was part of a winning trifecta for Philip in that year.²⁶ In 354 Philip's seizure of Methone (Diod. 16.34.4–5) meant that all of his coastline, apart from the Chalcidic peninsula, was now Macedonian, but instead of dealing with the Chalcidice then he campaigned in Thrace and Thessaly for the rest of the year and again in 353. The Greeks in the meantime were occupied with the third Sacred War, which broke out in 355 and lasted until 346. It was waged by the Amphicytonic League, which looked after the Delphic oracle, on the urging of Thebes against Phocis.²⁷ Despite losing many of its commanders and suffering several reversals in battle, Phocis, which had defiantly seized Delphi and used the temple treasuries to hire mercenaries (Diod. 16.30.1–2), resisted stoutly. This Sacred War afforded Philip the means to intervene legitimately in central Greek affairs, for in 353 and in 352 further disputes between Larissa and Pherae in Thessaly led to a Larissan appeal to Philip for help (Diod. 16.35.1). At that time, Thessaly stood aloof from the Sacred War, hence in desperation Pherae sought,

²⁴ *IG* ii² 43 = Tod 1948: no. 123. On the establishment and nature of the Second Athenian Confederacy, see most conveniently Sealey 1993: 50–73; cf. Griffith 1978: 127–144; in detail, see Cargill 1981.

²⁵ *IG* ii² 127, Isoc. 5.2, Aes. 2.21, 70, 3.54. On Philip's relations with the Athenians, and Greeks generally, see Ryder 1994: 228–257.

²⁶ Cf. Hegesias, *FGrH* 142 F 3 = Plut. *Alex.* 3.5–9: Philip had just taken Potidaea when he received three simultaneous pieces of news: Parmenion had defeated the Illyrians, his race-horse had won at the Olympic Games, and his son was born.

²⁷ On this war, see in detail Buckler 1989.

and obtained, help from Phocis. In the showdown between the Macedonian and Phocian armies, the Phocian commander Onomarchus twice defeated Philip, forcing his withdrawal north (Diod. 16.35.2). He was back within a matter of weeks, probably this time with all his army for it was essential to regain confidence after the earlier defeats and to maintain the confidence of Thessaly. With the support of the Thessalian cavalry, he defeated the Phocian force and killed its commander Onomarchus at the battle of the Crocus Field (Diod. 16.35.4–6, Justin 8.2.1–7). Phocis itself was next, and two months or so after the battle Philip marched to Thermopylae.

Philip's victory at Crocus Field and his march to Thermopylae had three important results. First, it won him control of all Thessaly (for a time), for the state elected him its archon, or leader, for life, a constitutional position with command of its military forces. Second, as archon he had an input into the Thessalian place on the Amphictyonic Council, an essentially religious body which nonetheless wielded great political power in Greek affairs. Third, it motivated the Athenians, who were still at war with him over Amphipolis, to do something quickly for once; they mobilized a force in August 352, and supported by other states they prevented Philip from securing Thermopylae.

Although Philip turned back home, it was only for a short while. Demosthenes tells us that Philip suffered an illness at this time (1.13), but by late 349 his campaign against the Chalcidice began, and a year later when its chief city Olynthus fell to him, the entire Chalcidice was his (Diodorus 16.52.9ff.). Athenian forces sent in support were ineffectual. In Greece the Sacred war rumbled on, for the most part centred on clashes between Phocis and Boeotia, given that Phocis still held control of several towns in Boeotia. A financially exhausted Thebes knew that it could not fight indefinitely, and so in 346 it appealed for help from Philip (Diod. 16.58.2–3). The timing could not have been better for him. Diodorus (16.58.3) makes it clear that Philip was not favourably disposed to the Thebans, who still appeared to be swollen-headed over their victory at Leuctra back in 371. Hence, his support was for his own ends, for by now he was anxious to consolidate his position in central Greece (and to be known as the saviour of Delphi), and especially to bring the war with Athens to an end (Aes. 2.12). Thus, the politics behind the final months of the Sacred War and the moves towards peace between Philip and the Athenians are intimately meshed together.

Faced with the might of the Macedonian army joining ranks with the Amphictyonic League, the Phocians appealed for help to Sparta and to Philip's enemy Athens. Both sides sent help, but when it arrived the Phocian commander, Phalaecus, surprisingly dismissed it and then took over control of Thermopylae himself. His action can only be explained by some tacit agreement reached with Philip (perhaps to help moderate the punishment which would befall Phocis for its sacrilegious act) for after Philip arrived at Thermopylae, with peace and alliance with Athens by then within his grasp (see below), Phalaecus handed control of the pass to Philip. He and his army were allowed to leave untouched, the state of Phocis surrendered to Macedon, and so the Sacred War ended (Diod. 16.59). At a later Amphictyonic Council meeting called to discuss the Phocian punishment, Philip was able to persuade the Council not to impose the legal penalty for sacrilege of mass execution by being thrown from the top of Mount Parnassus (Diod. 16.60). Thus, without a final battle the power of the Macedonian king in Greece was now shown: he had ended the Sacred War, and afterwards he was granted a seat on the powerful Amphictyonic Council and was elected President of the Pythian Games for that year (Diod. 16.60.2).

The death throes of the Sacred War brought with them the end of Philip's war with Athens. After the fall of Olynthus in 348, the Athenians had sent an embassy to the Greek states with a call to arms against Philip (Dem. 19.10–11, 303–307), but had met with no success. They still had at their disposal a powerful fleet, and if they happened to ally with a state having a powerful army, such as Thebes (as happened in 339), then Philip faced trouble. If he wanted to expand further after the end of the Sacred War, it was necessary to end the war with Athens and have it as his ally. The Athenians also wanted to end the war in order to prevent Philip taking any more places before any peace treaty, to which he and the Greek states were clearly heading, was concluded. Again, they sent an embassy to the Greek states, this time calling for what recourse was better, war with Philip or peace—a significant difference from the call of 348. As in that year, this embassy was unsuccessful.

After various diplomatic exchanges between Philip and the Athenians, during which the king campaigned aggressively in Thrace while the second Athenian embassy to him was forced to wait for his return at Pella to secure his oath, the war ended with the Peace of Philocrates in 346. This was a bilateral peace agreement between

Philip and the Athenians, each side swearing on behalf of its allies. Antipater, Eurylochus, and Parmenion travelled to Athens as Philip's envoys for the final validation.²⁸ The year culminated in Philip's presidency of the Pythian games held in September at Delphi, attendance at an Amphictyonic Council meeting in October/November, and his return home. With Macedonian influence thus firmly extended into central Greece as well as in one of its hallowed institutions, the new empire was growing fast. Alexander was now ten years old.

The Peace of Philocrates did not last long. It was in trouble by 344, especially as Philip's greatest opponent in Athens, Demosthenes, grew so influential in politics,²⁹ and in 343 its architect Philocrates was impeached, fled into exile before the trial, and was condemned to death *in absentia*.³⁰ However, the Peace struggled on, largely because Philip was occupied with other matters for the next few years (see below). Again, the astonishing speed at which he made decisions and operated must have had no small effect on Alexander, given how he acted.

It was probably in 345 that Philip again resorted to population transfers in his kingdom, about which Justin tells us (8.5.7–6.2), and perhaps it was then that Macedonians moved to the conquered Chalcidice, a prelude also to Philip's further expansion east. In the same year, he was involved in battle in Illyria, for what reason we do not know. More serious was his intervention in Thessaly in 344, where trouble again had brewed between Pherae and Larissa. As archon in 352 (see above), Philip had held a constitutional office, but there was no time for constitutional niceties now given the strategic location and importance of Thessaly. An oligarchy of ten men supported by a Macedonian garrison was imposed on belligerent Pherae, and Philip now made the governors of the four main areas of Thessaly (tetrarchies) directly subservient to him.³¹ Then in 343 he invaded Epirus, expelling its king, Arybbas, and setting up Olympias' brother, Alexander, as king (Diod. 16.72.1; Justin 8.6). This was quickly followed in 342/1 by a campaign in Thrace, which led to the expulsion of the central Thracian kings Cersebleptes and Teres,

²⁸ Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 164; cf. Dem. 19.69, Aes. 3.72.

²⁹ On Demosthenes, see Buckler 2000, Ryder 2000, and Worthington 2000, all citing relevant bibliography.

³⁰ Dem. 19.114–115; Aes. 2.6, 3.79; cf. Hyp. 4.29–30; Hyp. fr. A.16 [Loeb Classical Library].

³¹ Theopompus, *FGH* 115 F 208; Dem. 6.22, 9.12; Diod. 16.69.8.

and the tribute paid to them now flowing into Macedonian coffers (Diod. 16.71.1–2; [Dem.] 12.8–10). Thrace, which had been valued for its economic resources and power for over a century,³² was now his, kept in check by native princes who ruled over local areas and were thus vassals of the Macedonian king. However, open conflict was brewing with the Athenians.

During this time, Philip did not neglect the Athenians; his policy was both covert and overt: he was, after all, a master of diplomacy, intrigue, and deceit, and one cannot help but admire him. Covertly, for example, at some point before 343, one Antiphon was supposed to have tried to burn the Piraeus dockyards for Philip, but had been caught by Demosthenes.³³ Also, it is not hard to imagine Philip at work inciting the revolt of Euboea in 343. Overtly, as an indication of his apparent goodwill towards the Athenians, in the summer of 344 Philip sent Python of Byzantium to propose changes to the Peace of Philocrates. He proposed to extend the Peace from the present bilateral arrangement, by which each hegemon had sworn on behalf of itself and its allies, into a Common Peace, based on the grounds that the Athenians had wanted this type of arrangement in 346. Anti-Macedonians such as Demosthenes, suspecting Philip's intentions, blocked this move. Philip tried to modify the peace terms again in 343, shortly before his intervention in Epirus, but again he was rebuffed. He was less friendly in 342 when he demanded the recall of an Athenian force from the Chersonese in 342/1, and Demosthenes easily dissuaded the Athenians from so doing in his brilliantly fiery *On The Chersonese* and third *Philippic* speeches.

So far, any conflict remained on the diplomatic level, but Philip's move eastward was to change that. This he must have anticipated. The expansion of Philip's power in eastern Thrace worried his now closest Greek neighbors there, Byzantium, Selymbria, and Perinthus. They were right to feel this way, for in spring 340 Philip besieged Perinthus. The Athenians did not send help, for Philip had written a strongly-worded protest letter to them ([Dem.] 12) and so for the moment they remained aloof. Thwarted in his siege by the topography of Perinthus and its support from Persia, he besieged Byzantium, and when the Athenians agreed to support Byzantium he seized the

³² See Hdt. 5.3 and Thuc. 2.97.5 for fifth century Thrace.

³³ Dem. 18.132–134; Din. 1.63; cf. Plut. *Dem.* 14.5.

great Athenian corn fleet in late summer 340. Demosthenes had no trouble in persuading the Athenians to destroy the *stèle* recording the Peace of Philocrates and to declare war on Philip in July or August 340.³⁴ Alexander was now sixteen years old.

The second war lasted two years and the result was predictable, although in 339 on his way back to Macedon Philip had suffered a defeat at the hands of the Thracian tribe of the Triballi, which must have given the Greeks some cause for hope.³⁵ In the same year, Demosthenes scored a major diplomatic success when he secured an alliance with Athens' longstanding foe, Thebes—all the more remarkable given the traditional enmity between the two *poleis* and the fact that Philip was making overtures to the Thebans to become his allies.³⁶ After some initial setbacks Philip met the Greek force of Athens and Thebes, supported by Achaea, Megara, Corinth, and several islands (Dem. 18.237), at Chaeronea in Boeotia on 1 September 338 and decisively defeated it (Diod. 16.85.5–86.6; Plut. *Alex.* 9.2–3). The Athenians alone had 1,000 killed and 2,000 taken prisoner (Diod. 16.88.2), and Alexander, now 18, proved his battle prowess by commanding the left flank and also annihilating the crack 300-strong Theban Sacred Band (Plut. *Alex.* 9.2; cf. Diod. 16.86.3–4). Philip was now master of Greece, for Greek autonomy ended at Chaeronea.³⁷ It was therefore one of the world's decisive battles.

Philip treated the majority of his Greek opponents harshly, especially the Thebans who were forced to live under a Macedonian-backed oligarchy and garrison in the city (Diod. 16.87.3; Justin 9.4.6–9).³⁸ However, despite the expected fear in Athens and panic measures by some of the politicians³⁹ Philip did not besiege the city. Unlike Thebes, for example, Philip needed Athens' cooperation, and

³⁴ Philochorus, *FGH* 328 F 55, 162; Dem. 18.87–94, 139; Diod. 16.77.2–3; cf. Plut. *Phocion* 16.2.

³⁵ Apparently no small defeat, as a result of which Philip lost the booty captured from his recent campaign against Atheas of Scythia: Justin 9.2.1–3.4.

³⁶ Philochorus, *FGH* 328 F 56; Dem. 18.174–188, 211–215; Aes. 3.140–141; Diod. 16.84.5–85.1; Plut. *Dem.* 18.1–2.

³⁷ See Cawkwell 1996: 98–121.

³⁸ See in detail Roebuck 1948: 73–92.

³⁹ Dem. 18.248; Lyc. 1.16, 39–45; [Dem.] 26.11; [Plut.] *Mor.* 849a. For example, Demosthenes proposed the fortification of the city and the repair of the Piraeus fortifications. Hyperides proposed to enfranchise the *atimoi* and metics and to manumit the slaves, so that they could fight, and to send the women, children, and sacred objects to the Piraeus.

fleet, for his next big venture. The Second Athenian Naval Confederacy was disbanded, but he left the democratic organs untouched and even returned the Athenian prisoners captured at the battle of Chaeronea unransomed (Diod. 16.87.3). A grateful Athenian *demos* awarded citizenship to Philip and Alexander—this was but a token gesture, for Demosthenes was chosen to deliver the *epitaphios* to honor the dead at Chaeronea (Dem. 18.285; Plut. *Dem.* 21.2),⁴⁰ and citizenship was also bestowed on those Theban refugees who fled to Athens in the wake of Philip's purge in their home *polis*. Philip must have smiled at both actions.

That winter, Philip summoned deputations from the Greek states to meet at Corinth (only Sparta declined), where he announced a Common Peace, headed by himself as leader, with each state swearing an oath of loyalty to Philip and his descendants.⁴¹ The Macedonian hegemony of Greece was thus formalized in what has become to be called the League of Corinth. Soon after, probably spring 337, a second meeting was held, at which Philip presented his next (and what would turn out to be his final) plan: the invasion of Persia in revenge for their looting of Greece in the war of 480–478.⁴² An advance force under Parmenion crossed the Hellespont in spring 336.

Quite when Philip had set his eyes on Persia is unknown: Diodorus has the earliest mention of this at the time of the Peace of Philocrates (16.60.4–5), but Philip may not have considered invading Persia until as late as 341 or so.⁴³ Why Persia? Several reasons come to the fore: the thirst for more personal glory,⁴⁴ the need to keep the army on campaign (see below), even the need to increase state revenue (see below)—all were Macedonian reasons, and had nothing to do with the Greeks. Why should the latter support an invasion that was going to profit their conqueror? Since Greek security and unity were fundamental to the success of this endeavor, Philip cunningly announced

⁴⁰ This speech survives as Number 60 in the Demosthenic corpus, and is probably authentic: see further, Ian Worthington, *Demosthenes, The Final Works* (forthcoming).

⁴¹ Diod. 16.89.1–3; Justin 9.5.1–6; cf. [Dem.] 17.1. For the decree, see *IG* ii² 236 = Tod 1948: no. 177. See further Ryder 1965: 102–105, 150–162; Roebuck 1948: 73–92; Perlman 1985; Perlman 1986.

⁴² Diod. 16.89.2; Arr. 2.14.4; 3.18.12; Polyb. 3.6.13.

⁴³ Errington 1990: 88–89.

⁴⁴ For differing views on Philip's intentions in invading Persia see Brunt: 1965 and Fredricksmeyer 1982, with note 46 below.

that this was to be a war of liberation and revenge on behalf of the Greeks. This was, as Polybius tells us (3.6.12–13), merely a pretext for the real purpose of invasion. The Greek cities of Asia Minor were to be freed from Persian influence and the Persians themselves were to be punished for their sacrilegious acts, especially the sacking of Athens, during the Persian war of 480–478. In his *To Philip* (5) of 346, Isocrates had proposed a panhellenic invasion of Persia to liberate the cities of Asia Minor and conquer the Persians, whereby Philip would unite Athens, Sparta, Thebes, and, of all places, Argos. That was pie in the sky then, given the military impotency of the Greek *poleis*,⁴⁵ as would only be confirmed by Chaeronea. Now, Philip varied that theme: Persia would be invaded, but under his command and not for overt Macedonian reasons but on behalf of the Greeks. This was the plan that Alexander, now about 20, would inherit, and which the League had to uphold.⁴⁶ Macedon was now an international player.

It is one thing to make a state great by conquest, and another to ensure its stability and prosperity. Philip's military reforms more than revolutionized the army; they revolutionized the state. The continued success of the army and the subsequent expansion of Macedonian power created a feeling of national unity and nationalistic pride, which had never been felt before. Security was enhanced by a policy of transferring people not only from one part of the state to another but also to conquered lands. Philip exploited the natural resources of Macedon to a far greater extent than any other king, and in doing so gave it a strong and stable economy on which was anchored future expansion.⁴⁷ This was seen in his stimulation of agriculture (especially in the rich lands of Upper Macedon) and trade, and his exploitation of mining resources and impetus to coinage,

⁴⁵ Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 12–15 has good comments on the weakness of the *poleis*; cf. the criticisms of Hammond 1994: 64–78.

⁴⁶ See above, note 43. Brunt: 1965 argues that Alexander's invasion of Persia was simply his inheritance from Philip and his advance to India as something of a natural extension of Alexander's military campaigning and the product of his own growing religiosity. Fredrickmeyer: 1982, more controversially, argues that Philip had more ambitious plans, which included the establishment of an absolute monarchy in a new empire, and his own deification. If so, then Alexander's inheritance was not a simple invasion of Persia, and his aims were different from what is commonly believed.

⁴⁷ See Montgomery 1985; Hammond 1989: 177–187; Hammond "Philip's Innovations" 1995.

especially the production of gold coinage. Macedon's currency became the strongest in Europe by the end of his reign. In 356, the occupation of Crenides (renamed Philippi) in the Mount Pangaeum region followed by the exploitation of the gold and silver mines there gave Philip a vast income—1,000 talents per annum came from that region alone (Diod. 16.8.6–8).⁴⁸ As Philip expanded eastward, especially into the Chalcidice, further exploitation of mining resources followed. Indeed, the mines of this region were the most heavily exploited in Macedon, and generated huge revenues. So too did the imposition of dues and property taxes (the evidence of Arr. 1.16.5). With this economic base Philip ensured that his army was regularly paid and that he could hire mercenaries when need be.

Alexander inherited his father's realization of the need to ensure economic stability and development in Macedon proper. He sent large sums of money back home and encouraged trade and commerce, especially by breaking down previously existing frontiers. And he too was generous with pay for his existing army and monetary incentives to encourage those at home to join him in Asia (Arr. 7.8.1; cf. 7.12.1–2)—although here it can be said that normal pay was not enough to persuade those at home to follow his *pothos*.⁴⁹

However, Philip's sources of revenues were not infinite. Throughout his reign, he frittered away vast sums of money⁵⁰ in maintaining his army and keeping a cultured and brilliant court at Pella as well as in bribes to influential statesmen in the various *poleis*, or to ensure the betrayal of cities to him.⁵¹ One reason for the projected invasion of Persia may well have been the need for more funds, given the vast resources of the Persian empire (especially if the Mount Pangaeum mines were starting to run dry), for when Alexander was set for the invasion of Persia in 334 there was little in the form of money in the treasury.⁵² Of course, little actual liquid assets cannot be taken as an indication that there was no economic prosperity,

⁴⁸ Cf. Borza 1982: 10–11; Ellis 1976: 32–35.

⁴⁹ See Worthington "How 'Great' was Alexander?" 1999: 43–44.

⁵⁰ Theopompus, *FGH* 115 F 224: he threw money away; cf. Diod. 16.53.3: Philip used gold more than arms to enlarge his kingdom.

⁵¹ At least Torone, Micyberna, and Olynthus fell by treachery: Dem. 19.265–7; Diod. 16.53.2.

⁵² It is said that only 60 talents were in the treasury, that Philip owed 500, and that Alexander had to borrow 800 (Arr. 7.9.6; Curt. 10.2.24; Plut. *Alex.* 15.1–4; [Plut.] *Mor.* 327d); cf. Griffith 1965: 127.

but had Philip found success in Persia—as he surely would have—we would surely be less critical of the effects of his spending.

Philip himself never invaded Persia, for in probably October 336 he was assassinated by one of his bodyguards, Pausanias, the day after the wedding of his daughter Cleopatra to Alexander, king of Epirus, in the theatre of Aegae.⁵³ The king who made Macedon a superpower in the ancient world deserved a better fate. The motives for the assassination are varied, and we shall probably never know the real story. Some sources say that Pausanias acted from private reasons (Arist. *Politics* 1411b2–4) and alone (Diod. 16.94.1), but the assassination could have been political, a conspiracy of certain Macedonian nobles or even Alexander and Olympias (Plut. *Alex.* 10.6–7; see below), either of whom could have used Pausanias as a pawn.⁵⁴

At least some of the nobles must not have wanted Alexander king. Attalus, who had scorned Alexander as illegitimate when Philip married his niece Cleopatra in 337 (see below), clearly hoped that a full-blood Macedonian grandson would be the next king and thus also serve his own interests. The three sons of Aeropus of the house of Lyncestis had their eyes on the throne ([Plut.] *Mor.* 327c), and may even have been involved in Philip's assassination⁵⁵ because he had exiled their father (Polyaen. 4.2.3). The chaos surrounding Philip's assassination was shown by Arrian, who tells us that Alexander's friends armed themselves and were ready for trouble (1.25.2). However, no trouble came. The nobles and the army acclaimed him, in normal Macedonian practice, king, and at an Assembly a few days later he stressed that he would continue what his father had started (Diod. 17.2.1–2; Justin 11.1.7–10). Thus, the Argead line of kings continued in the hands of the 20 year old Alexander III.

3. *The New King*

Alexander may not have been the eldest son, for he had a brother, Arrhidaeus, whose mother Philinna had married Philip a year or more before Olympias. However, Arrhidaeus was mentally deficient,

⁵³ Diod. 16.91.1–94.4; Arr. 1.1.1; Plut. *Alex.* 10.6.

⁵⁴ On the death of Philip, see especially Badian 1963; Fears 1975, Ellis 1981, and Carney in this volume.

⁵⁵ Arr. 1.25.1–2; Curt. 7.1.6; Justin 11.2.1–2, and see Heckel in this volume.

and so Philip had recognized Alexander as his heir from an early age. As he grew up, Alexander had performed what duties were expected of him as heir apparent well: at age 16 he acted as regent and successfully campaigned against the Paeonian tribe of the Maedians on the upper Strymon (Plut. *Alex.* 9.1). He had proved himself in battle at Chaeronea when aged 18 (Plut. *Alex.* 9.2–3), and now at about 20 he was king of Macedon.

Anyone who doubted Alexander's mettle when he succeeded to the throne did not do so for long.⁵⁶ In a blaze of purges, Alexander secured his position. Several of those suspected of complicity in his father's murder were put to death at Philip's funeral (Diod. 17.2.1), including two sons of Aeropus (the third was spared), and Amyntas, the true heir to the throne when Philip was acclaimed king and by now a full-grown man, was also put to death (Curt. 6.9.17, 10.24; cf. Justin 12.6.14). Attalus, who had been sent to Asia with Parmenion by Philip, saw the writing on the wall and tried to make amends, but to no avail. Alexander's agent Hecataeus killed him, with the help of Parmenion (Diod. 17.2.4–6, 5.1–2; Curt. 7.1.3), and his family suffered the same fate soon after (Justin 11.5.1). One final set of murders may be mentioned, and that was Philip's last wife Cleopatra and her young son, who were done to death in horrific fashion by the hateful Olympias (Paus. 8.7.5; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 10.8), who had returned to Macedon when Philip was killed.⁵⁷ Surrounded by Philip's ablest generals who were now loyal to him, such as Antipater and Parmenion, as well as his boyhood friends who would soon find themselves in positions of power, Alexander was secure as king in Macedon.

When news of Philip's death reached the Greeks they immediately revolted from the League of Corinth. Alexander marched south at speed (Diod. 17.4.4), and it took him only a few months to subdue the Greeks and to reimpose the League of Corinth (Diod. 17.3–4, Arr. 1.1.1–3).⁵⁸ Campaigns in the north, especially against the Triballi (Arr. 1.1.4–3.8) and Illyrians (Arr. 1.5.1) were successfully waged soon after. In all these campaigns, we may note how quickly Alexander, like his father, moved; he had learned well. When the Thebans

⁵⁶ See also Ellis 1982.

⁵⁷ Hammond and Griffith 1979: 685–686; cf. Carney 2000: 66.

⁵⁸ On Alexander's dealing with the Greeks before he left for Persia, see in detail Faraguna, Chapter 4.

defied him in 335, Alexander besieged the city with such speed that they did not believe he was truly before their gates.⁵⁹ He gave them one chance to capitulate; when they did not, he showed no mercy. Anxious to invade Persia, Alexander needed to set an example to the other Greeks of how resistance to Macedon would be punished, and so he had the city razed to the ground and the population either killed or enslaved.⁶⁰ The next year, in accordance with the mandate of the League of Corinth, Alexander, now 22, invaded Persia, leaving Antipater behind as guardian (*epitropos*) of Greece and Macedon (Arr. 1.11.3) and to act as deputy leader in the League of Corinth. His adventures after his departure lie beyond the scope of this chapter.

4. *The Young(er) Alexander*

Alexander's exploits as a boy are what we should expect from his exploits as a man. As a member of the Argead line, Alexander's education and training were directed to the day he would become king. What Alexander may have lacked in looks and demeanor⁶¹ he made up for in physical prowess and stamina, thanks to the training of Leonidas, a relative of Olympias. Indeed, his relationship with this man was so intimate that Leonidas was called his foster father (Plut. *Alex.* 5.7). A Macedonian youth would hunt boar, foxes, lion and birds, and Alexander enjoyed to hunt even when on campaign (Curt. 8.1.14–16).⁶² He was also without fear and very astute. Bucephalus is a good example of this. If Plutarch may be believed, Bucephalus, a large Thessalian horse, was brought before Philip who refused to buy him because he was headstrong and could not be ridden. Alexander, although only a boy of about 15, noticed that Bucephalus was startled by his own shadow in front of him and so

⁵⁹ He marched 250 miles in thirteen days (Arr. 1.7.5).

⁶⁰ Diod. 17.8.3–14; Arr. 1.7.1–8.8; Plut. *Dem.* 23.1–3; Justin 11.3.8.

⁶¹ He did not have the looks of a model: his neck inclined to the left so his face appeared lop-sided and his eyes were watery (Plut. *Alex.* 4.2; [Plut.] *Mor.* 335b); he had a round chin, a long, thin nose, and his forehead bulged above the eyes (Plut. *Pompey* 2.1; Aelian, *VH* 12.14, cf. Bieber 1964: 50–55 with Plates 21–22). His skin was marred by patches of red on his face and chest (Plut. *Alex.* 4.3), no doubt due to his excessive consumption of alcohol. In demeanor, he had a fierce expression and a loud voice ([Plut.] *Mor.* 53d), and was prone to emotional outbursts.

⁶² Cf. *Ephemerides*, *FGrH* 117 F 1 (= Plut. *Alex.* 23.4); cf. Roisman Chapter 11.

turned him to face the sun. This had a calming effect, and Alexander was soon able to mount the horse and ride him. The adult males, including Philip, who were watching the event in great consternation were taken aback at Alexander's courage and mental acuteness, and a tearful Philip prophesied great things of him (Plut. *Alex.* 6). Bucephalus served Alexander well, dying shortly after the battle of the Hydaspes river against the Indian prince Porus in 326.⁶³

Alexander's intellectual development was principally handled by Aristotle, who was hired by Philip as his son's tutor when he became fourteen in 342 (Plut. *Alex.* 7.2–3). Alexander was already an avid reader; Homer, as we might expect, was his bible, and we are told that he slept with Aristotle's copy of the *Iliad* (called the *Iliad of the Casket*) and a dagger under his pillow, and that he ordered Harpalus to send him more books when he ran out of them in Asia (Onesicritus, *FGrH* 134 F 38 = Plut. *Alex.* 8.2).⁶⁴ He read much Greek tragedy,⁶⁵ as well as the dithyrambic poems of Telestes and Philoxenus, and Philistus' histories (Plut. *Alex.* 8.3), and he also enjoyed the company of poets and actors—Thessalus, a tragic actor, was sent by Alexander to Pixodarus when the latter made overtures to marry his daughter into the Macedonian royal family (Plut. *Alex.* 10.2; see below). Aristotle built on Alexander's literary accomplishments by probably introducing him to philosophy, rhetoric, zoology, and geometry.⁶⁶ While Alexander's relationship with Aristotle later cooled (Plut. *Alex.* 8.4), his military prowess and thirst for conquest proved how successful the military side of his education had been.

Alexander was brought up to believe in the Homeric notion of personal success (*arete*) for the sake of honour (*time*) and glory (*kudos*); his two heroes were Heracles and Achilles, whom he strove to emulate—and Heracles was an ancestor on his father's side⁶⁷ and Achilles and Andromache ancestors of his mother (cf. Plut. *Alex.* 2.1). His greatest role model though had to be his father Philip, the warrior king and diplomat *par excellence*, who fought without any regard to

⁶³ Chares, *FGrH* 125 F 18 (= Gellius 5.2.1–5); Onesicritus, *FGrH* 134 F 20 (= Plut. *Alex.* 61.1); Arr. 5.19.4–5; see too Anderson 1930, Fraser 1953.

⁶⁴ See Brown 1967.

⁶⁵ He knew all of Euripides' works according to Nicobule, *FGH* 127 F 2.

⁶⁶ Plut. *Alex.* 7.5–9; cf. Isoc. *Epistle* 5 (if the letter is genuine). Exactly what Aristotle taught Alexander is unknown, but see Hamilton 1969: 17–19.

⁶⁷ The Argead clan traced its ancestry back to Heracles via Temenus, a hero of Argos (Hdt. 5.20, 22; Thuc. 2.99.3, 5.80.2).

his own safety and in the process lost his right eye at the siege of Methone in 354 (Diod. 16.34.5), maimed a leg and a hand in battle against the Triballi in 339 (see above), and was "ready to sacrifice to the fortune of war any and every part of his body" (Dem. 18.67).⁶⁸ However, Philip was on campaign almost every year of his reign, and Alexander spent little time with his father when he was growing up at Pella. The bonding that normally takes place between father and son does not seem to have done so in their case.

Thus, the young Alexander had the most contact with his mother Olympias, who seems to have disliked Philip intensely and according to Plutarch (*Alex.* 9.5) she incited Alexander against him. Alexander's relationship with Philip as father/son and with Olympias is significantly shown by her relative Leonidas, one of Alexander's tutors, who was called his foster father (Plut. *Alex.* 5.7). As the mother of the acknowledged heir to the Macedonian throne, Olympias probably enjoyed a superior position in Philip's collection of wives, for at no time does any of Philip's other wives, not even his last, who was a Macedonian proper (see below), challenge her.⁶⁹ Moreover, she was not afraid of making her opinion known or meddling in political affairs.

When Philip married Cleopatra, the adopted niece of the influential Attalus in 337/6, Olympias seems to have been concerned about Alexander's succession although his position as heir was unchallenged.⁷⁰ At the marriage feast there was a drunken brawl between Alexander and Attalus after the latter had prayed that Macedon might at last have a legitimate heir, given that Cleopatra was a full-blood Macedonian (Athen. 13.557d-e, Plut. *Alex.* 9.7). Alexander and Olympias fled the court, although Alexander probably returned not long after (Plut. *Alex.* 9.11-14). Whether this was merely a drunken taunt on the part of Attalus or an indication that he (and other Macedonian nobles) was against Alexander's accession is unknown. When Philip was assassinated, the official reason for the incident (see above) might well have been to cover a conspiracy against Philip, which may even have involved Olympias and Alexander (Plut. *Alex.*

⁶⁸ In his apparent speech to the mutinous army at Opis in 324, Alexander takes pains to describe the injuries and scars he has received: Arr. 7.10.1-2.

⁶⁹ On Macedonian royal women in general see Hammond 1989: 31-36 (pp. 33-34 on Olympias), on women in the reign of Philip, see Carney 2000: 51-81, and in this volume.

⁷⁰ Athenaeus 13.557d says that Philip intended to supplant Olympias by Cleopatra, but this seems highly unlikely.

10.6–7). If so, then perhaps we can trace Olympias' resentment back to the time of Philip's seventh marriage of Philip to Cleopatra, for Olympias seems to have resented the new queen.⁷¹

Whether it was Olympias' criticisms of his father, or his own desire for regal power, or both, Alexander seems to have grown to resent his father's continued successes, believing that he would never be able to surpass them if Philip lived to a ripe old age (Plut. *Alex.* 5.4–6). His attitude towards his father turned from admiration to resentment, especially as he grew into his teens.⁷² Such an attitude is understandable: at only 16 Alexander had acted as regent of Macedon and at 18 had fought in the battle that ended centuries of Greek autonomy. He was ready for more, eager for glory himself, but while Philip was king Alexander would always be the heir. Perhaps if more of Alexander's childhood had been spent in the more intimate relationship of father and son rather than the formal king and heir, matters would have been different.

The distance between the two men is seen in Alexander's flight after his father's seventh marriage, first to Epirus and then to Illyria, Macedon's enemies (Plut. *Alex.* 9.11; Athen. 13.557e; Justin 9.7.5–7). Although Philip recalled him to the court within a year and there was a reconciliation (Plut. *Alex.* 9.12–14), bad blood still existed, for Attalus had not been punished for his remark—indeed, he was appointed one of three commanders of the advance force to Persia in 336. Probably before his father's seventh marriage, perhaps in the winter of 337/6, Pixodarus, the Carian satrap, desired a marriage tie with Macedon to support his plan to break with Persia.⁷³ Philip's other son Arrhidaeus, who played little if any role in affairs during the reigns of Philip and of Alexander, was named as the potential husband for Pixodarus' daughter. Then Alexander put himself forward. Philip refused, and in the process several of Alexander's closest friends were exiled, including Ptolemy and Harpalus (Arr. 3.6.5, Plut. *Alex.* 10.5). That, on top of Attalus' taunts at Philip's seventh marriage, proved too much. Perhaps this explains why Alexander could not handle praise of Philip, as the reaction to Cleitus' taunts

⁷¹ Arr. 3.6.5; Plut. *Alex.* 9.6; Athen. 13.557d; Justin 9.7.2.3 and Carney Chapter 9.

⁷² On this, see the arguments of Fredricksmeyer 1990: 300–315.

⁷³ Plut. *Alex.* 10.1–5; the Pixodarus incident is disbelieved by Ellis 1981: 135–136 and Hatzopoulos "A reconsideration" 1982: 59–66, but this scepticism seems excessive, and Arrian (3.6.5) says that some of Alexander's friends were exiled.

about Philip proves. In 328 as Alexander's men belittled Philip's achievements in order to ingratiate themselves with Alexander, one of his generals, Cleitus, praised Philip and downplayed Alexander's exploits. A furious Alexander, now also very drunk by this stage, ran Cleitus through with a spear (Arr. 4.8).

Thus, Alexander was out to distance himself from his father's exploits, stirred on by his own passion for glory and perhaps the taunts about his legitimacy ringing in his ears. However, military conquest was not enough—Philip had done that. Alexander needed something else, and where he promotes himself over his father is in his belief in his own divinity. Philip may well have been deified on his death,⁷⁴ but Alexander wanted deification for himself while alive.⁷⁵ We can see a pattern to this aim, which began in winter 332 with his visit to the oracle of Zeus Ammon at Siwah,⁷⁶ continued with his attempt to adopt the Persian (or Asian) custom of *proskynesis* at his court in Bactra in 327,⁷⁷ and was ongoing in 324, for during the Opis mutiny Arrian indicates that his men mocked their king's association with Zeus Ammon (Arr. 7.8.3). In the same year, we know that the Greeks of the mainland were debating his deification,⁷⁸ and that there was widespread resistance to it.⁷⁹ There may also have been resistance back in Macedon, for when the Macedonians in Asia refused to bestow on Alexander the divine honors which had been granted to Philip II (Curt. 4.7.31), the Macedonians at home may well have followed suit. Certainly, they do not seem to have lauded Alexander's victories as much as those of his father.⁸⁰

⁷⁴ See Fredricksmeyer 1981 (arguing for divine honours on Philip II), and Badian 1981 (arguing against).

⁷⁵ Fredricksmeyer 1982: 85–98, argued that Philip wanted to make himself divine hence his planned invasion of Persia, and thus Alexander was not distancing himself from his father but merely following in his foot steps. On Alexander and religion in detail, see Fredricksmeyer, Chapter 10.

⁷⁶ Callisthenes, *apud* Strabo 17.1.43; Arr. 3.3–4; Plut. *Alex.* 27.8–10; cf. Diod. 17.51; Curt. 4.7.25 Justin 11.11.2–12.

⁷⁷ Arr. 4.10.5–7; Plut. *Alex.* 54.3–6; Curt. 8.5.9–12. On *proskynesis* being an Asian as opposed to just a Persian custom, see Fredricksmeyer 2000: 156–157. Alexander may have been attempting to create a form of social protocol common to Macedonians, Greeks and Persians, but if so he must have been aware of the religious connotations associated with the act and hence it would be resisted by his men.

⁷⁸ Hyp. 5.31–32; Curt. 10.2.5–7; Justin 13.5.1–6. On the episode, see now Cawkwell 1994 and Badian 1996.

⁷⁹ Polyb. 12.12b3; [Plut.] *Mor.* 219e, 804b, 842, and Aelian, *VH* 5.12. Demades, who proposed Alexander's deification in Athens, was later fined ten talents.

⁸⁰ See further, Worthington "How 'Great' was Alexander?" 1999: 41–55.

Given Alexander's successes, it is easy to understand how delusions of self-grandeur changed to megalomania, and how his attempts to be recognized as a god while alive are the key to so many of his actions, actions that are meant to outdo those of his father, the product of his influence on Alexander during the latter's childhood.

5. *Philip, Alexander, and the Army*

Philip's legacies were diverse and many: a large, powerful, and well-drilled army, a stable throne, an empire, nationalistic pride, the reduction of Greece: the list continues. Without all this, especially the army, it is hard to imagine that Alexander would have achieved what he did. Alexander's empire is not only the product of that king but also of Philip. Yet while Alexander inherited the plan to invade Persia, he soon outgrew it. While this is normally attributed to his own personal desire for glory (*pothos*), we must also consider another factor, one whose origins may again be traced to Philip's reign and having an influence on Alexander: the need to keep the army on campaign.

We have already noted that Philip was almost always on campaign with his army and that as he grew up Alexander saw relatively little of his father. Such constant campaigning was not only to maintain Macedon's power and expand its borders, but also to unite Macedon and to secure the loyalty of his men to him as king. It was essential that the army remained on the move; even when Philip was not fighting wars, he kept his army and people occupied. While in 345, a year after the Peace of Philocrates ended warfare between Macedon and Athens, Philip's activities in Greece were limited to two meetings of the Amphictyonic Council, but back in Macedon he was busy with the wholesale transfer of populations in his empire, if we can believe Justin (8.5.7–6.2), and especially a campaign on the north-west frontier of Macedon and Illyria. While the army was victorious Philip's position was secure, and the Macedonian people enjoyed the prosperity and power that came from his victories. As time continued, and the army remained spectacularly successful, there was less need for Philip to prove himself of course. However, for his first few years Alexander lived in a Macedon where there was tension between Upper and Lower, with neighboring tribes ready

to invade, and saw his father fighting for his throne and the loyalty of the entire state. He also saw what happened when the army lost.

In 352, as was noted above, Philip faced large-scale desertion when twice the Phocian general Onomarchus defeated him (Diod. 16.35.2). This was seven years after Philip had come to power; his "honeymoon period" was well and truly over, and he had proved himself. Yet, as a result of unexpected defeats at the hands of a general inferior to Philip, defeats that did not annihilate the army, the Macedonian army panicked and Philip was faced with desertion. Moreover, perhaps as a consequence of this defeat, his diplomatic overtures to the Thracian king Cersebleptes were rejected thanks to Athenian intervention, the first major diplomatic rebuff for Philip, and Olynthus, despite its alliance with Philip in 357/6, appealed for help to Athens, fearing (rightly) that it would soon become one of Philip's target (see above). There may also have been incursions into Macedon from the Paeonians and Illyrians. The whole fabric of Philip's power was starting to tear. Philip reacted to the defeats quickly: he regrouped his men and shortly after marched back south and soundly defeated Onomarchus at the battle of the Crocus Field. From that time, his army's loyalty was never again questioned (even when defeated by the Triballi in 339). However, it does seem that army morale in 352 was shaken, and, while we can understand a lack of morale as a natural consequence of defeat, actual desertion is significant.

Philip knew that the unity of Macedon was based on the army and a successful imperialistic policy. This explains why, when Greece was finally subdued and the League of Corinth established in 337, it was essential for him—and it—to seek fresh challenges. A combination of factors lay at the heart of the planned invasion of Persia; the economic motive was probably the most important, but the deployment of the Macedonian army must be seen as one. However, it must be said that such a heavy reliance on the army as a source of power was also a weakness. Alexander learned this lesson too. As he grew up and saw his father fighting to prevent Macedon from returning to the era of economic weakness and promoting unity based on the army, he too came to see the army as more than a fighting machine. Long after the Persian empire was destroyed Alexander kept the army on the move. There are various factors at work here, as has been said: the need to outdo Philip (and even previous mythical conquerors), the desire to expand the empire, the love of

battle, and even the fact that as a boy Alexander was interested in the geography of other lands (Plut. *Alex.* 5.1–2), but at the heart lies the need to keep the army on the move. The battles and sieges were endless, the casualties incalculable, yet the army fought on with the king until finally enough was enough and it mutinied in India. Although by the time of Alexander's accession Philip's dynasty was firmly established at no time did both kings' reliance on the army weaken. Its power was seen in the two mutinies against Alexander, the first⁸¹ forcing him to start the long journey back to Greece, and the second⁸² clear testimony of the unpopularity of his policy. The sheer force of these two kings' personalities and their need for military success contributed more to nationalistic pride on the part of the Macedonians than pride in the state of Macedon as an imperial power in the Greek world; this may well have been hammered into the young Alexander as he grew up, and so he had no choice but to follow the program that he did.

6. Conclusion

Scholars are rightly unanimous in their praise of Philip for turning Macedon from a near-feudal tribal type of society into a united and powerful empire, with a centralized monarchy, and in the process developing its mining, agriculture, and trade; for establishing a dynasty which, contrary to previous history, allowed his son to succeed him without problem; for creating unity where previously there was disunity; for a single-handed policy which combined diplomacy and military prowess in order to achieve his goals.

Alexander's legacy was far different. At the end of his reign, when Macedonian power was at its zenith, nationalistic pride back home was probably at its lowest.⁸³ While it is certainly true that Alexander vastly increased the size of the Macedonian empire, worked to improve the economy of his state, and encouraged trade and commerce,⁸⁴

⁸¹ At the Hyphasis river in 326: Diod. 17.94.3ff.; Arr. 5.25.2ff.; Curt. 9.3.3–5.

⁸² At Opis in 324: Arr. 7.8.1–12.3; Diod. 17.109.2–3; Plut. *Alexander* 71.2–9; Curt. 10.2.3ff.; Justin 12.11.

⁸³ See Worthington "How 'Great' was Alexander?" 1999.

⁸⁴ On Alexander's greatness and the impact he made see, for example, Bradford Welles 1965; Hammond "The Macedonian Imprint" 1993; Hammond 1997.

the cost was the collapse of the dynasty at home and of a unified Macedonian empire.⁸⁵ The definition of success is not merely defeating the enemy in battles but also establishing a unity of empire, maintaining the loyalty of the army, and ensuring that conquered territories remain conquered—on Alexander's death, he had faced two mutinies, numerous conspiracies against his life, and almost everything that Philip had fought for lay in ruins. The Greek states revolted (albeit briefly) in what is commonly called the Lamian War,⁸⁶ but worse was that with no adult heir to succeed Alexander the dynasty fell apart and the Macedonian throne became the crown in the power struggles waged by Alexander's successors for several decades. Alexander perhaps misunderstood the need to produce a legitimate heir as soon as possible and, unlike his father, failed to grasp the very real advantages of political marriages to consolidate and maintain power. At the same time, Alexander had to recognize what his father had achieved, and, if we can believe the supposed eulogy to Philip contained in Alexander's speech to his mutinous army at Opis (Arr. 7.9.2–5), that he was vocal about his father's exploits. It is significant, however, that after his eulogy Alexander continued with a long harangue that Philip's deeds and services were small compared to his own (Arr. 7.9.6–10.7). While Bosworth has argued against the authenticity of this speech,⁸⁷ it seems hard to believe that Alexander did not exhort his men with tales of Macedon's greatness thanks to Philip and himself given the situation that faced him at Opis. However, his true attitude to his father was revealed in his earlier, irrational murder of Cleitus in 328 for praising Philip too much.⁸⁸

"Great" is an epithet better applied to Philip when we consider the overall "package" of a king, commander, and statesman.⁸⁹ While Alexander strove to emulate his father in all matters and prove himself a worthy heir, he crossed the line where emulation was replaced by a desire and then a personal need to outdo Philip regardless of

⁸⁵ Note that contemporary sources were also sharply critical of Alexander, especially of his drinking habits; cf. *Ephemerides*, *FGrH* 117 F 2a, Ephippus, *FGrH* 126 F 5 on Alexander's disregard for human life, violence, and melancholy.

⁸⁶ On the historical background, see Hammond and Walbank 1988: 107–115 and Worthington *Greek Orators* 1999: 12–18.

⁸⁷ Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 1988: 101–113.

⁸⁸ Arr. 4.8.1–9; Curt. 8.19–51; Plut. *Alex.* 50–52.

⁸⁹ See further, Worthington "How 'Great' was Alexander?" 1999: 39–55; replied to by Holt 1999.

the cost to the empire and the dynasty. Olympias may have played a role in this, Philip too (given the time he was away from his son), as did the Macedonian background against which Alexander grew up. "The greatest of the kings in Europe," says Diodorus (16.95.1) of Philip; he was right.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ I thank Professor Joseph Roisman both for his detailed comments on this chapter and for his flattering invitation to write it.

CHAPTER FOUR

ALEXANDER AND THE GREEKS

Michele Faraguna

The reign of Alexander the Great marks a turning point in the development of Greek history. The extent and direction of this development has, however, been the subject of endless debate among scholars. The complexity of the problem lies in the broad and multi-faceted nature of the topic itself: Alexander's relations with the Greeks were shaped by a variety of political and cultural factors. Propaganda and political reality above all are difficult to disentangle. And since our sources almost invariably reflect the Greek point of view, there is the constant risk of overestimating the importance of Greek interests in Alexander's mind. This essay will show that the encounter between Alexander (and, before him, his father Philip II) and the Greek world can best be understood as the clash between two alien political traditions¹ and the failure of the city-state system to adequately respond to the new challenge of the Macedonian monarchy.

Philip, Alexander, and the League of Corinth

The battle of Chaeronea, fought in the summer of 338 between Philip II of Macedon and a coalition of Greek cities led by Athens and Thebes, was quickly perceived as an epoch-making event.² Eight years later, the Athenian orator Lycurgus remarked that along with the bodies of those who had died on the battlefield 'was buried the freedom of every other Greek' (1.50). The same pessimistic tone can be found in the funeral oration attributed to Demosthenes that was given for the Athenians who died fighting Philip. Here the defeat is

¹ On Greeks and Macedonians as representing distinct ethnic entities and cultures see, most recently, Borza 1996.

² Carlier 1996; Cawkwell 1996. For a useful treatment of the battle see Hammond and Griffith 1979: 596–603.

blamed on 'fortune' (*tukhe*) and the will of the god; the future holds little reason for hope (Dem. 60.19–24).³

Philip exploited his crushing military victory by imposing an extensive settlement of political affairs in Greece. The settlement was largely modelled on long-established Hellenic diplomatic practices but its main aim was to ensure stability and Macedonian hegemony. The first step taken was a number of separate treaties with the members of the alliance that had fought against him (Ael. *VH* 6.1). These followed no pre-determined pattern but rather were arranged on an *ad hoc* basis according to the stance of each state during the war. Settlements were generally mild, especially in the case of Athens whose still intact naval power made the prospect of a prolonged siege hardly desirable to the Macedonian king. Philip concluded a treaty of 'friendship and alliance' (Diod. 16.87.3; *P.Ryl.* III.490, ll. 60–63) and did not attempt to interfere in Athens' internal affairs. Athens no doubt lost its naval confederacy but retained all its vital territorial possessions.⁴ Elsewhere, constitutional changes were enforced, or pro-Macedonian governments established, yet it still remains unclear whether they were the products of Macedonian pressure or of internal struggles. Philip's military intervention in the Peloponnese led to the settlement of a number of long-standing territorial disputes between Sparta, which, it must be stressed, had not taken any hostile action against Macedonia, and its bordering states (Argos, Arcadia, Messene) invariably to Sparta's disadvantage, thus weakening its resources and serving the overt aim of creating political balance in southern Greece. Philip furthermore increased his political and military control over Greece by placing Macedonian garrisons in Thebes, Corinth, Ambracia and, possibly, in Chalcis, which were later to be known as the 'fetters of Greece' (Pol. 18.11.5).⁵

³ Loraux 1981: 125–127. The same idea often recurs in Dem. 18 (see esp. 18.200, 270–271 and 303). For the authenticity of the funerary oration see Clavaud 1974: 25–35.

⁴ Whether Athens received on this occasion the territory of Oropus, as it has been traditionally held, has now come under dispute. See Knoepfler 1993: 295 and n. 50, anticipating his still unpublished argument in favor of attributing the 'gift' of Oropus to Alexander and downgrading it to 335.

⁵ Roebuck 1948; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 604–623; Jehne 1994: 141–151; Harris 1995: 134–135. On Philip's settlements in the Peloponnese see also Magnetto 1994. For the case of Aetolia cf. Bosworth "Early Relations" 1976; Grainger 1999: 46–50.

By the time delegates from all Greek states (*poleis* and *ethne*) arrived in Corinth for a peace conference in late 338, Philip could rely on the support of a number of sympathetic regimes. The formal constitutional aspects of the political system created at Corinth remain a matter of controversy but its most significant mechanisms are sufficiently well understood. The new organization, known as the 'League of Corinth', established a *koine eirene*, a state of general peace guaranteeing freedom (*eleutheria*) and autonomy (*autonomia*) to all its members ([Dem.] 17.8). All major states of mainland Greece joined in the peace with the notable exception of Sparta. *Eleutheria* and *autonomia* had been keywords of Greek inter-state relations throughout the fourth century⁶ and this clearly indicated Philip's willingness to adhere to Greek diplomatic practice. At the same time, the agreement introduced some original elements that were designed to safeguard the settlement and to 'freeze' the political situation which Philip himself had, directly or indirectly, created.⁷ The first was a provision against the subversion of the existing forms of government (*politeiai*) and any revolutionary act within the member states ([Dem.] 17.10 and 15–16; Tod 177, ll. 11–14). The second was the creation of a council (*sunedrion*), composed of delegates appointed by the cities in proportion to their size and military strength.⁸ This functioned as the governing body for the peace and had the power to enact decrees in response to breaches of the treaty. On one occasion the *sunedrion* also acted as a court of arbitration in a territorial dispute (Tod 177; Magnetto 1997: 1–8 [no. 1]). The third was the office of the *hegemon*, the executive power and military commander of the League, who was to enforce the decisions of the council. The position of the Macedonian king within this context remains to some extent difficult to pin down. To no one's surprise, Philip was 'elected' *hegemon*—as well as commander-in-chief (*strategos autokrator*) to lead the war against the Persians (Diod. 16.89.3; cf. 17.4.9)—but it is disputed whether he was in actual fact also a party in the treaty and whether he was thus represented in the *sunedrion*. He must, however, have retained some power of initiative and supervision because we twice hear of a body of 'those in charge of the common defense' acting, on behalf

⁶ Perlman 1985; Bosworth 1992.

⁷ All the sources illuminating the provisions of the 'Peace of Corinth' are collected and discussed by Schmitt 1969: 3–14 (no. 403).

⁸ Larsen 1955: 56. For a different view cf. Jehne 1994: 187–190.

of the Macedonian king, alongside the *sunedrion*, and entrusted with the keeping of internal peace within the cities ([Dem.] 17.15; Heisserer 1980: 3–24).⁹

The first official act of the newly constituted League was to declare war on Persia (Diod. 16.89.2–3; Just. 9.5.1–6).¹⁰ Some scholars have inferred that, together with the ‘Common Peace’, Philip also bound the Greeks to a treaty of alliance (*summachia*), involving mutual military assistance.¹¹ Attractive though this view may appear, it does not find support in the terminology of contemporary sources.¹² It is more likely that the autonomy-clause of the peace treaty could itself provide the legal ground for Greek participation in the campaign in Asia. Both Diodorus (16.91.2; 17.24.1) and Arrian (1.18.1–2) seem to warrant such an assumption by stating that the campaign was designed to free the Greek cities of Asia from Persian authority and political control.¹³

After Philip’s murder in the fall of 336, Alexander, then aged twenty, succeeded him as *hegemon* of the League and as supreme commander of the war in Asia. The transition was, however, far from smooth. Alexander might claim that such a position was his by right of inheritance (Diod. 17.4.1) but in actual fact his formal appointment by the *sunedrion* in Corinth was preceded by widespread unrest in Athens, Thebes and in other parts of Greece (Argos, Elis, Arcadia, Aetolia) and had to be backed by swift military action (Diod. 17.3.1–4.9). Moreover, before moving to Corinth, Alexander had skilfully secured endorsement for his hegemony from the Thessalian League (Diod. 17.4.1; Just. 11.3.1–2) and from the council of the

⁹ Jehne 1994: 185–187, discussing earlier literature.

¹⁰ Since Wilcken 1917: 20–25, the consensus is that the establishment of the League of Corinth was a lengthy process involving at least two meetings and possibly extending from the end of 338 to spring or summer 337. Bosworth ‘Early Relations’ 1976: 180 n. 77 accepts Diodorus’ chronology dating Philip’s appointment as general of the Persian war to 337/6. See also Jehne 1994: 152 n. 1.

¹¹ Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 46–48; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 571–579; most recently, with new arguments, Magnetto 1994: 296–307. *Contra* Ryder 1965: 102–109 and 150–162; Jehne 1994: 152–197, esp. 157–165.

¹² In an inscription from Chios of 332 BC (Tod 192) a clause is concerned with those who were banned from ‘all the cities who share in the peace’ and similar expressions occur in [Dem.] 17, where ‘the peace’ or ‘the Common Peace’ are insistently referred to, while there is no mention of an alliance. Arr. 3.24.5 may not use technical language.

¹³ Seager 1981: 106–107; Jehne 1994: 157–163.

Delphic Amphictyony, where he could make his influence more readily felt.¹⁴

This is all eloquent testimony of a considerable degree of disaffection with Macedonian hegemony right from the beginning and points to the tension between form and reality of the 'Common Peace'—a distinctive feature of the political history of 338–323 BC. Alexander's control over the League did not ease the situation as was revealed, merely one year later, by the episode of the rebellion and subsequent destruction of Thebes. Philip had installed an oligarchic government in Thebes, exiled his political opponents, and placed a garrison on the Cadmea.¹⁵ The revolt broke out during Alexander's prolonged operations in Illyria when rumors spread that the king had died in battle. The exiles returned into the city, overthrew the oligarchy, contrary to the charter of the League, replacing it with a democratic regime, and laid siege to the Macedonian garrison on the citadel. The uprising proved to be a serious threat to Alexander's power in Greece, because it again won the support of Argos, Elis and the Arcadians and it nearly drew Athens into the conflict. The Athenian people went so far as to vote an alliance and military assistance (Aeschin. 3.238–239; Diod. 17.8.6), even though no forces were actually sent. Several years later, Demosthenes, who had undoubtedly received ample funds from the Persian king to support the insurrection (Aeschin. 3.239; Din. 1.10 and 18–21), came under fire from his political enemies for embezzling the money and was blamed for the failure of the revolt (Aeschin. 3.239–240; Hyp. 1.17; Din. 1.21). Serious as the situation was, Alexander's reaction was, as usual, harsh and immediate. After a swift march, Thebes was stormed and with much bloodshed was razed to the ground, and its territory was divided among the neighboring states. In other words, Thebes ceased to exist as an autonomous *polis*.¹⁶

Alexander's ruthless destruction of the city set the tone for his future relations with the Greeks. The episode is instructive in many respects. First, it showed that he was in principle prepared to respect *autonomia* and *eleutheria* only as long as the Greeks were willing to cooperate and to accept quietly the Macedonian yoke. The revolt

¹⁴ Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 189; Harris 1995: 175–176; Lefèvre 1998: 95–97.

¹⁵ Gullath 1982: 7–12.

¹⁶ Gullath 1982: 20–24, 60–82.

of the Thebans must have been particularly damaging to Alexander's image and propaganda, because the insurgents had appealed to those willing to join them and the Persian king in 'freeing the Greeks and destroying the tyrant of Greece' (Diod. 17.9.5; cf. also Arr. 1.7.2). This was equal to outright rejection of the political system established at Corinth as well as the Panhellenic ideology underlying the planned campaign in Asia.¹⁷

Secondly, it demonstrated to the Greeks that the League could become, if necessary, a convenient instrument of domination. Technically speaking, the decision to raze Thebes was not taken by Alexander himself but by the members of the *sunedrion* present at Alexander's camp (Diod. 17.14.1; cf. Arr. 1.1.9; Just. 11.3.8). Avoiding direct responsibility for the act, the king could thus exploit Greek political disunity to his own advantage. The sources, above all, stress the leading role of the Phocians and of the other Boeotians in the harsh repression of the revolt. It is therefore not surprising that still in 323, when nearly the whole of central Greece was involved in the Lamian war, local (and anti-Theban) interests were such a potent driving force that Boeotia remained compact and loyal to Macedonia (Diod. 18.11.3–4; Paus. 1.25.4).

By contrast, Alexander treated the Athenians with unexpected leniency and showed his willingness to compromise. First, he angrily demanded the surrender of the politicians—among whom Demosthenes and Lycurgus were prominent—who had been heavily involved in anti-Macedonian activities, but then yielded to the Athenian counter-proposal that they should be judged by the Athenian lawcourts.¹⁸ All the same, Alexander's determination must have made an enormous impression on contemporaries and the repression of the Theban revolt no doubt proved a powerful deterrent against further uprising in the following years.

The only major challenge to Macedonian rule in Greece during Alexander's reign came from the Peloponnese. A fascinating speech from the Demosthenic *corpus* (XVII) alleges that the Macedonians

¹⁷ Dobesch 1975: 80–83; Jehne 1994: 194–195 n. 170, 200–206.

¹⁸ The tradition concerning this episode is complex and even the names and the number of the politicians involved is uncertain: see Plut. *Dem.* 23.4; Arr. 1.10.4–5; Just. 11.4.9–12; Suid. s.v. *Antipatros*, and the discussions of Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 93–95; Engels 1989: 155–171; Landucci Gattinoni 1994: 39 n. 32 and 42–43. According to Arrian (1.10.6), Alexander only insisted on the exile of the general Charidemus (cf. *Dem. Ep.* 3.31).

had repeatedly interfered in the Peloponnese provoking constitutional changes in a number of cities, and thereby violating the League charter.¹⁹ This enabled Sparta to take the lead of the anti-Macedonian movement. Sparta had chosen to remain outside the League of Corinth and had been severely weakened by Philip's territorial settlements, but in 333 king Agis III managed to establish contacts with the Persian commanders in the Aegean, who at that time were engaged in the attempt to sever Alexander's communications at the rear and to hinder his further advance into Asia.²⁰ With the aid of Persian military and financial support Agis was able first to secure Crete as a base of operations and as a center for recruiting mercenaries and then, before a large Macedonian fleet could regain control of the Aegean (Arr. 3.6.3; Curt. 4.8.15), transfer his army to the Greek mainland. The outbreak of the revolt in the Peloponnese, probably in the summer of 331,²¹ was well-timed: it coincided with Antipater's absence in Thrace, where unrest had been reported (Diod. 17.62.4–6), and with the depletion of Macedonian military control in Greece after ample reinforcements had been despatched to Alexander in Asia (Diod. 17.49.1; 65.1; Curt. 4.6.30–31; 5.1.40–42; 7.1.37–40). The Spartans and their mercenaries were thus able to inflict a heavy defeat on the Macedonian Corrhagus, who was probably the commander of the garrison in Corinth (Aeschin. 3.165).

In spite of Agis' appeal for support in his struggle to defend Greek freedom (Diod. 17.62.6), Sparta's last effort to recover hegemony met with limited enthusiasm and the movement remained essentially confined to the Peloponnese. Sparta's traditional allies, Elis, the Achaean League (with the exception of Pallene) and nearly all the Arcadian cities, joined the coalition—and this was no small success on Agis' part—but her life-long enemies (Argos, Messenia and Arcadian Megalopolis, on this occasion supported by Corinth) remained

¹⁹ For the most fully documented case, that of the establishment in power of the tyrant Chaeron at Pallene in Achaia, see [Dem.] 17.10; Paus. 7.27.7; Athen. 11.509a–b; Hermipp. fr. 89 Wehrli. The date of [Dem.] 17 is disputed: cf. Will 1982 (333 BC), Cawkwell 1961 (331 BC); see also Culasso Gastaldi 1984.

²⁰ On Persian strategy in the years 333–331 and on the war in the Aegean see Ruzicka 1988 and Strauss Chapter 5.

²¹ The chronology of Agis' war is controversial. I here follow the 'low chronology' (summer [or spring] 331–spring 330), which, though disputed, is, with some variation, gradually gaining consensus: see Bosworth 1975; Jehne 1994: 227–231; Badian 1994: 268–277. The 'high chronology' (spring–autumn 331) (Badian 1967) has recently been reaffirmed by Bloedow 1995: 23–25.

steadfast in their loyalty to Alexander.²² The military operations therefore came to a standstill with the siege of Megalopolis, which the assailants were not able to storm. When Antipater eventually made his appearance in front of the city with a large army, Agis' troops were greatly outnumbered by the Macedonian army, which included contingents sent by the other Greeks, ostensibly acting in defence of the 'Common Peace' (Diod. 17.63.1).

The decisive battle took place at Megalopolis in the spring of 330: it was a massive confrontation with 40,000 soldiers fighting on Antipater's side and over 30,000 on Agis' side. It ended with a crushing defeat for Sparta, which suffered heavy losses and was thus condemned to irreversible political and demographic decline.²³ The outcome of the revolt failed because Agis did not succeed in obtaining widespread support and was unable to overcome suspicions about his intentions: the prolonged siege of Megalopolis must in particular have aroused fears about a revival of Spartan imperialism. Another key factor was, however, Athenian neutrality. At this point, Athens had a fleet of nearly 400 ships, most of which were apparently fully equipped and ready to sail, and her military and financial power was still intact. It is not clear on what grounds the people opted against intervention. There is nonetheless ample evidence that the issue was passionately debated²⁴ and that those who opposed supporting the Spartans and their allies pointed out the costs of military intervention making it clear that it would be necessary to draw on money from the theoric fund therefore stopping distributions. It is interesting to note that the sources single out Demades (Plut. *Mor.* 818e-f) and Demosthenes (Aeschin. 3.165-167; Din. 1.34-35; Plut. *Dem.* 24.1) as the most prominent opponents of the war. As will be seen below, this typically reflected the prevailing mood at Athens under the financial administration of Lycurgus.

In more general terms, a close scrutiny of the episode allows us to conclude that Greek impotence against Macedonia was not only a matter of demographic and financial inferiority—a factor not to be underestimated—but was above all a *political* fact. The inability

²² McQueen 1978.

²³ On Agis' war see Badian 1967 and 1994; Cartledge and Spawforth 1989: 16-25; Jehne 1994: 226-241.

²⁴ According to some scholars, [Dem.] 17 should be considered part of this debate (see above n. 19).

of the Greeks to overcome division and to develop new constructive policies is a clear indication that, in spite of its internal vitality, the *polis*-model had proved incapable, in terms of inter-state relations, of adapting and effectively responding to the new situation.²⁵ The role of the *sunedrion* in the Agis crisis is telling in this respect. Though the war was patently in breach of the 'Common Peace', we do not have any evidence of it being active before Antipater's arrival at Megalopolis. We know, however, that, after the battle, the council was entrusted with the decision on the fate of the insurgents. It imposed an indemnity on Elis and Achaea and provided for the punishment of the ringleaders in Tegea but it more cautiously referred the most delicate case of Sparta to Alexander himself (Diod. 17.73.5–6; Curt. 6.1.20).²⁶ If, then, the destruction of Thebes had sufficiently proved Alexander's instrumental use of the League of Corinth, it was now the Greeks' turn to realistically acknowledge the political failure of the 'Common Peace' and its *sunedrion* as no more than a formal construction with no life or identity of its own.²⁷ Even considering the prevailing interest of the sources for Alexander and his deeds, it is therefore not surprising that after 330 the *sunedrion* is mentioned only on one more occasion—and again as a punishing body (Plut. *Alex.* 55.9).

Panhellenic Propaganda and the Campaign in Asia

Although there can be little doubt that the real aim of the planned campaign in Asia was territorial conquest for Macedonia,²⁸ Philip's avowed intention in declaring war against the Achaemenid Empire was, according to Diodorus, to exact retribution for the profanation of the temples during Xerxes' invasion of Greece (16.89.2).²⁹ The Panhellenic ideal as a political concept goes back to the time of the Persian Wars, but it is only from early in the fourth century that

²⁵ On Greek incapability to transcend the narrow framework of the *polis* see Walbank 1951; Perlman 1976; and, with some important qualifications, Davies 1995.

²⁶ McQueen 1978: 52–64.

²⁷ Dobesch 1973: 101–102; Jehne 1994: 239–241.

²⁸ For an assessment of the sources and of modern scholarship see, most recently, Seibert 1998. What remains disputed is *when* Philip started conceiving such plan: cf. Errington 1981.

²⁹ Bellen 1974.

we see it becoming less elusive and more concretely defined (Gorg. 82 A 1.4 D.-K. = Philostr. *V.S.* 1.9 [§ 493–494]; Lys. 33.4–9).³⁰ The keystones of the Panhellenic idea, as we find it expressed in its most developed form in Isocrates' *Philippus*, were an appeal to ever-quarreling Greek states to act in unity and collaboration (*homonoia*) with a view to a renewed crusade against their natural common enemy, the Persians, and the prospect of the land to be conquered as the solution for all social problems threatening the established order in the *poleis* (Isocr. 5. esp. 16, 30–31, 39–40, 83, 120–126). It is interesting to observe that, as it emerges from his justification for the war, Philip's concept of Panhellenism was, however, quite different. While the idea of vengeance is absent from Isocrates' *Philippus*, in Philip's propaganda the benefits to be reaped from the expedition by the Greeks far from being material had become essentially moral.³¹ Above all, when Philip's generals actually crossed the Hellespont, their 'liberation' of the Greek cities was more than once achieved through violent methods and not without resistance from the Greeks themselves.³² We are thus confronted with the same contradiction between fact and ideology as noted above.

As *hegemon* of the League of Corinth, Alexander inherited his father's mission to invade Persia and, along with it, the Panhellenic theme as the justifying motif for the expedition (Arr. 2.14.4). When he launched his invasion of Asia in the spring of 334, Alexander's propaganda apparatus, however, took on a more elaborate symbolic form. On crossing to Asia, Alexander, with much pomp and circumstance, performed several rituals that were primarily intended to reconnect his crusade to the Trojan War and to portray his mission as revenge for Xerxes' invasion of Greece.³³ Athena, whose temple in Athens had been burned by the Persians in 480, was the main focus of attention. Having had altars dedicated to Zeus, Athena and Herakles on both sides of the Hellespont, Alexander visited the sanctuary of Athena Ilias at Ilium to obtain her blessing for his expedition. Moreover, after his first victory over the Persians at the Granicus he dedicated 300 Persian panoplies to Athena on the acropolis of Athens with the inscription: "Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks,

³⁰ Perlman 1976; Green 1996; Flower 2000: 97–107.

³¹ Wilcken 1929: 307–313; *contra* Bellen 1974: 12–17.

³² Badian 1966: 39–41.

³³ For a recent illuminating analysis of the sources see Zahrnt 1996.

except the Lacedaemonians, set up these from the barbarians dwelling in Asia" (Arr. 1.16.7). It is therefore hardly surprising that, whatever the exact chronology of the issues, Athena is prominent in the gold coinage of Alexander's first regnal years.³⁴ All this points to an elaborate attempt, skilfully orchestrated within Alexander's entourage, to present the expedition in terms acceptable to the Greeks³⁵, an operation which had become all the more necessary after the destruction of Thebes.

Alexander's 'liberation' of the Greek cities after his victory over the Persian satraps at the Granicus reflected the tension between Panhellenic propaganda and Macedonian imperialism. Earlier scholars attempted to view Alexander's settlements with the Greeks of Asia in terms of a consistent policy,³⁶ but there is now a consensus that the king proceeded on an *ad hoc* basis and that the position of each city therefore needs to be analysed as an individual case.³⁷ No doubt, we are confronted with a pattern: according to Arrian, after taking control of Ephesus, Alexander gave orders that all Aeolian and Ionian cities should be freed from Persian political interference with democracies replacing the existing oligarchic regimes, have their autonomy restored and be exempted from tribute (1.18.2; cf. Diod. 17.24.1; *I.v.Erythrai* 31, ll. 22–23; Meritt 1935: 361, ll. 6–7). The actual contents of 'freedom and autonomy' could still, however, vary to a great extent as a result of political and military considerations.

Alexander's general approach is evident in his ruling about the *polis* of Priene, which he most probably visited in 334 during his siege of Miletus (Tod 185). The document belonged to a set of royal edicts and letters, the so-called 'archive', inscribed on the south *anta* of the temple of Athena Polias at Priene during the reign of Lysimachus, and together with the other texts of the collection was primarily meant to legitimate the city's claims concerning its privileged status and the extent of its territory.³⁸ The preserved inscription may therefore be only an extract from a longer document rather than a complete record of Alexander's regulations for Priene. Nonetheless,

³⁴ Price 1991: 29–30; Zahrnt 1996: 145–146.

³⁵ Zahrnt 1996: 146–147.

³⁶ Wilcken 1922: 104–109; Tarn 1948: 199–232.

³⁷ Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 250–258; cf. also Bickermann 1934; Ehrenberg 1938: 1–51.

³⁸ Sherwin-White 1985.

the text is of great significance because it introduces us to the basic principles of Alexander's administration.

The opening lines of the edict concern the small port of Naulochum and state that henceforth the Prienians settled in Naulochum should be autonomous and free and have possession of the land and houses of the town. Since there is evidence that Naulochum had earlier in the century been an independent community, this sounds like a punishment providing for its annexation to the territory of Priene. The circumstances are obscure but it can be surmised that Naulochum had been loyal to the Persians during the blockade of Miletus. Only fragments of the second part of the document are preserved but the general sense of its provisions can still be made out: it makes a distinction between the status of the neighboring royal land, inhabited by a non-Greek population, which Alexander claimed as *his* and which was therefore subject to tribute (*phoros*), and the status of the *polis* of Priene which, together with freedom and autonomy, was granted exemption not only from the payment of tribute but also from any other extraordinary war contribution (*suntaxis*).³⁹ What Alexander meant by 'freedom and autonomy' was, however, not complete independence. First, the release from *suntaxis* appears to indicate that the levy of such contributions must have been the rule in the Greek cities of Asia. More significantly, the last preserved words of the regulation make it clear that Priene had received a garrison and that some sort of royal interference was to be expected also in the administration of justice.⁴⁰ Above all, the fact that the orders were delivered in the form of an edict rather than a treaty meant that the privileges of Priene, as unilaterally granted, could also be revoked at any time. Finally, the provisions of the text do not appear to include Priene in the League of Corinth: Alexander was obviously not prepared to extend the political system established in Corinth to the Greeks of Asia.

The freedom of the Greek cities thus turned out to be to a large extent a political catchword devoid of factual content once the liberation from Persian authority had been achieved.⁴¹ The closest par-

³⁹ Heisserer 1980: 142–168; Higgins 1980: 135–138. On the meaning of *suntaxis* see Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 253–254.

⁴⁰ The traditional view that *I. Priene* 8, a Prienian decree honoring foreign judges, belongs in this context has been convincingly challenged by Crowther 1996.

⁴¹ Seager 1981: 106–107, but see Flower 2000, generally taking a more positive view of Alexander's Panhellenism.

allel for the legal position of Priene (and by extension of all Greek cities in Asia) is probably to be found in a recently published inscription, again possibly an edict, from Philippi in Thrace.⁴² Philippi had been founded as a Greek city by Alexander's father on the site of the pre-existing Thasian colony of Crenides in 356. In comparison to the cities of Macedonia it benefited from a much higher degree of autonomy until at least the middle of the third century BC, among other things minting gold and silver in its own name.⁴³

The inscription, consisting of nine fragments, is poorly preserved; many of the restorations are merely conjectures. It is even uncertain whether the two columns identified belong to the same text or to two separate documents bearing on similar matters. What is clear, however, is that the Philippians had sent an embassy to Alexander, possibly when he was in Persia (A, l. 1), to request his intervention on a number of long-standing territorial disputes. These involved the neighboring Thracian population which had encroached on a stretch of uncultivated land apportioned to Philippi by its founder and were a constant threat to the integrity of the city's *khora*. The name of Alexander occurs repeatedly in the inscription but what strikes us is that he is consistently mentioned in the third person. This would appear to indicate that Alexander was not the authority that issued the document. If Antipater, Alexander's deputy in Macedonia and Greece, was responsible for the decree (as some have plausibly suggested), the inscription would shed some light on the way Macedonia was administered while Alexander was in Asia. Although Antipater may have implemented the terms of the edict, it appears that the king retained tight control on Macedonian affairs and that even matters of detail needed to be referred to him first. We must then imagine Antipater often acting upon precise instructions from Alexander.⁴⁴

Whatever the circumstances surrounding the 'publication' of the edict, it appears that, despite Philippi's formal autonomy, all decisions on vital issues such as those regarding the boundaries and the

⁴² *SEG* 34.664; Hatzopoulos 1996: II, 25–28 (no. 6); to the bibliography there listed add Faraguna 1998: 369–378; Errington 1998: 82–86.

⁴³ On the foundation of Philippi see Diod. 16.8.6–7; cf. *SEG* 38.658, with reference to the sale of two enigmatic *temene* of Philip. On Philippi as a Greek city with Greek (and not Macedonian) institutions see Hatzopoulos 1996: I, 157–165. Coinage: Le Rider 1977: 438–439.

⁴⁴ Errington 1998: 84–85. On Antipater's position and title see Bengtson 1937: 15–63; cf. also Carney's essay in this volume.

use of the land of the *polis* were left to the will of Alexander. The king adjudicated the disputed fallow land to the city and made two Macedonians responsible for marking it out and imposing some additional tax levy; he made a distinction between land belonging to the Philippians and land, most probably royal land, they were only entitled to cultivate, and even imposed a temporary ban on the exploitation of some woodland.⁴⁵ In terms of administrative procedures, there are therefore striking similarities between our documents from Priene and Philippi. Everything we know about Priene seems then to indicate that also in this case the king held supreme power over the city.

A privileged status could be generously awarded but also revoked at any moment. The case of Aspendus, a wealthy Greek city of Pamphylia with a strong native component,⁴⁶ shows how quickly a *polis* could fall from favor. The city rebelled in the winter of 334/3 and received a harsh punishment from Alexander. The citizens of Aspendus had initially submitted of their own will to the king petitioning for a fair settlement. But when Alexander ordered them to both provide the horses they were breeding as tribute to the Persian king and to pay 50 talents as a war contribution, they refused to comply and prepared to resist. When Alexander then laid siege to the city, they again surrendered on the old terms. This time, the king considerably hardened his demands: Aspendus still had to furnish the horses but their contribution was now doubled and, in addition, they were ordered to provide hostages and were made subject to an annual tribute and to the authority of the satrap (Arr. 1.26.2–3 and 5; 27.1–4). What satrapal control implied can only be guessed at, but it clearly must have entailed some reduction of the city's autonomy.

Priene and Aspendus thus represent the two extremes of a wide spectrum of possibilities with ample scope for variation. Zeleia was spared punishment even though it had sided with the Persians (Arr. 1.17.2). In Ephesus, which had suffered from prolonged civil strife, Alexander overthrew the pro-Persian oligarchy replacing it with a democratic government and directed that the tribute which the citizens had paid to the Persians should henceforth be given to the

⁴⁵ Badian 1993: 133–134; Faraguna 1998: 376–377. On the restoration of B, ll. 10–11 see now Hammond 1997: 44–45.

⁴⁶ Brixhe 1976: 147–150, 191–194; Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 254.

temple of Artemis (Arr. 1.17.9–12).⁴⁷ Miletus was captured after a siege; the citizens were, nonetheless, granted ‘freedom’ as a reward for surrendering at the last moment (Arr. 1.19.1–6; Diod. 17.22.1–5). In this case our sources do not state that tribute was demanded, but we can safely assume that it was, just as we can assume that garrisons were fairly common, even when our sources do not mention them. In a similar fashion, Alexander had, however, bestowed freedom on Sardis and the rest of Lydia and allowed the Lydians to live by their ancient laws, while ordering them to pay tribute and placing them under direct satrapal control.⁴⁸

Alexander’s relations with the Greeks of Asia were thus fundamentally inspired by pragmatic considerations and were thoroughly consistent with the prevailing pattern of preserving the existing administrative system. Rather than aiming at destroying the Persian Empire, as implied by Panhellenic ideology, Alexander from the beginning of his campaign acted as the heir of the Achaemenid king. The Greek cities therefore came under his authority in the same way as they had been under Darius. The Persian tribute remained the basic fiscal imposition, which could be exacted or remitted according to the circumstances. Democratic governments generally replaced the existing pro-Persian oligarchies, but again this did not result from a political principle. On the Greek mainland the Macedonian kings as a rule supported oligarchic regimes. ‘Freedom and autonomy’ were always bestowed by the king as a personal gift and could acquire different meanings in different contexts. The inescapable conclusion is that Panhellenism played little part in Alexander’s conquest and reorganization of Asia Minor.

The only apparent exception to this pattern is Alexander’s treatment of the Eastern Aegean islands. In contrast to the cities of Asia Minor, these islands, however, had never been under Persian authority and had been explicitly recognized as autonomous by the King’s Peace of 387/6 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31). We are reasonably well informed on the events in Chios: here an inscription was found, almost complete, recording Alexander’s settlement of the political situation on the island (Tod 192; Heisserer 1980: 79–95). Some of the details escape us, but it is a safe assumption that Chios had at some stage

⁴⁷ Gehrke 1985: 59–60; and, with opposing assessments of Alexander’s attitude, Badian 1966: 41–45; and Higgins 1980: 132–133.

⁴⁸ Briant “Alexandre à Sardes” 1993.

joined the League of Corinth, possibly upon its foundation or, at the latest, in 334 after the battle at the Granicus. Chios also appears to have been under a moderate regime until 333,⁴⁹ when the oligarchs seized power and betrayed the island to the Persians who soon had a garrison installed in the city. The Macedonian admirals were thus not able to recapture Chios before the spring of 332. This is the context to which the stone undoubtedly belongs (Arr. 2.1.1; 13.4–5; 3.2.3–7; Curt. 3.1.19–20; 4.1.36–37; 5.14–21; Diod. 17.29.2).⁵⁰

Alexander's regulations called for the repatriation of the exiles, the establishment of a democracy and the election of a board of legislators (*nomographoi*) who were to revise the existing laws so as to remove anything which conflicted with the new constitution. The draft of the new legislation was to be submitted to the authority of Alexander for ratification. The longest section of the document deals with the oligarchs guilty of medism and makes a distinction between those who had escaped and were banned from the territory of the League of Corinth, and those who had stayed and were captured, who were to be referred to the *sunedrion* for trial. Finally, a Macedonian garrison was to 'supervise' the reconciliation process within the city.

This remarkably well preserved stone clearly reveals the ambiguity of the position of Alexander who acted at the same time as the *hegemon* of the League and commander-in-chief of the campaign against the Persians. The tone of the regulations is decidedly authoritarian. Were it not for the mention of the council, we would have never guessed that Chios had actually become a member of the League of Corinth. Moreover, when some of the medizing oligarchs were eventually arrested, they were not referred to the Greeks but to Alexander, who had them deported to Elephantine in Egypt (Arr. 3.2.7). There is perhaps no need to assume that Alexander grew more despotic as time went on; he may have genuinely intended to promote reconciliation in a *polis* torn by severe party strife and also strategically important.⁵¹ What is undisputable, however, is that the

⁴⁹ Gehrke 1985: 47–48; cf. Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 178.

⁵⁰ Heisserer 1980: 83–95 argued in favor of 334 but his redating of the inscription has encountered general scepticism; see Jehne 1994: 193–194 n. 165.

⁵¹ See the contrasting views of Ehrenberg 1938: 28–29; Prandi 1983: 29–30; Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 193–194. Alexander was later to deal with the case of the Chian pro-Persian oligarchs on another occasion: cf. SEG 22.506; Heisserer 1980: 96–111; Piejko 1985.

king bypassed the League of Corinth by imposing a solution without consulting the *sunedrion*. In this regard, the position of Chios did not differ from that of the Greeks in Asia Minor.

As Alexander advanced towards the heart of the Persian Empire and left the Aegean behind, there were still many times when he raised the banner of Panhellenism.⁵² The most dramatic example was undoubtedly the burning of the royal palace at Persepolis in early 330. Alexander's real motives in setting fire to the complex remain unclear. The conflicting nature of the ancient accounts and unsolvable chronological problems have given rise to a passionate debate among scholars. Recent attempts to reconsider the problem in the light of the reports of the Persepolis excavations have also led to contrasting results.⁵³ Once more, we are confronted with the problem of separating fact from propaganda. The most likely explanation for the destruction of the palace is Alexander's need to break the political and military resistance which he had encountered in Persia by destroying the center of the power structure in the region.⁵⁴ The connection between the burning of the palace and Panhellenism is less clear. All our sources either state or imply that Alexander's act was the long awaited retribution for Xerxes' invasion of Greece of 150 years before. Whether Alexander was primarily concerned with the unrest in Greece stirred up by Agis⁵⁵ or whether, more generally, he was simply fulfilling a promise imposed on him by his own Panhellenic propaganda is difficult to know. Whatever the correct explanation, the destruction of Persepolis symbolically marked the end of the Panhellenic war. Some time later, Alexander sent instructions to Ecbatana to discharge the troops supplied by the cities of the League of Corinth. Thereafter the Greeks were entitled to follow him only as mercenaries.

⁵² On Alexander's letter to Darius (Arr. 2.14.4–9; Curt. 4.1.10–14) (early 332) and the problem of its authenticity see Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 227–233; Atkinson 1980: 271–278. For the king's favorable reception of a number of embassies from Greek cities in Tyre in 331 cf. Arr. 3.6.2; Curt. 4.8.12–14; and Bosworth 1980: 278. On his acts immediately before and after the battle of Gaugamela see Plut. *Alex.* 34.1–4 with Dobesch 1975: 95–97. See also Flower 2000: 112–115.

⁵³ Hammond 1992; Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1993.

⁵⁴ Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1993; Briant *Histoire* 1996: 869–871.

⁵⁵ Thus, recently, Hammond 1992; Badian 1994; *contra* Bloedow 1995.

Alexander and the Greek Intellectuals

The destruction of Thebes and, possibly, Alexander's policies in the first years of his expedition may have caused the Greeks to question the sincerity of his commitment to the cause of Panhellenism. The decision of the *sunedrion* in 330 to refer the case of Sparta to the king himself may have been a sign of further disenchantment. Alexander's relations with Greek intellectuals attest to the same increasing estrangement.

As is well known, Aristotle was invited in 343/2 to become Alexander's tutor. Although his teaching took place in the idyllic isolation of Mieza, he must have become thoroughly acquainted with life at the Macedonian court.⁵⁶ Yet, the influence of Macedonian politics on Aristotle's political thinking was very limited indeed. Despite his assertion to the effect that the Greeks had the capacity for ruling all men 'if they should unite in a single regime' (*Pol.* 1327b32–33), Aristotle's analysis in his *Politics* focuses on the government of the city-state; the Macedonian monarchy goes almost unmentioned.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, we may still be in the position to trace the development of Aristotle's ideas in the face of the creation of Alexander's empire. Along with the treatise titles *On Kingship* and *On the Colonies* (or *On the Colonists*) both addressed to Alexander,⁵⁸ the Peripatetic tradition has also preserved the memory of four letters written by the philosopher to his former pupil (Diog. Laert. 5.22 and 27) and Cicero was apparently still able to use one of these writings as a model for a 'letter of advice' to Caesar (*ad Att.* 12.40.2). Of these works only two short, albeit important, quotations were preserved (fr. 658 Rose) until the text of the Arabic translation of a *Letter of Aristotle to Alexander on the Policy towards the Cities* first became available to scholars in 1891.⁵⁹ The authenticity of the letter has long been disputed but after the re-edition of Bielawski and Plezia the

⁵⁶ The ancient sources are collected and analyzed by Düring 1957: 249–258, 284–299.

⁵⁷ Ehrenberg 1938: 62–102. On *Pol.* 1327b32–33 see also Weil 1960: 404–415. On Aristotle's scanty references to the Macedonian monarchy in the *Politics* cf. Faraguna 1998: 364–365 and n. 48.

⁵⁸ On these works see Weil 1960: 154–159; cf. also Ober 1998: 347–351.

⁵⁹ The standard edition of the letter is now that of Bielawski and Plezia 1970, which supersedes the shorter and more tormented text published by J. Lippert in 1891; cf. Carlier 1980: 277–279.

prevailing view is that, for all uncertainties and inevitable misunderstandings of a translation elaborated in a different historical context over 1000 years after the composition of the original text, this short piece of writing need not be apocryphal and in all likelihood is a direct reflection of Aristotle's thinking.⁶⁰ The letter thus becomes a document of capital importance for the study of Alexander's relations with the Greeks.

The aim of the author is to propose a program of government following which the king will obtain respect and admiration from his subjects. Among the numerous topics dealt with, two seem to recur insistently and deserve brief consideration. The first is a warning against the lure of autocratic power. Alexander must be wary of flatterers and ill-advisers and act upon the principle that justice is not the embodiment of the king's will but rather it is the king's duty to always behave according to justice (§5–7, 12). The second topic is closely connected to the theme of revenge as justification for the new crusade (§9): Alexander's conquests have placed him in the position of more than one king. As a result, different methods of government were necessary according to the nature and character of his subjects (§8–10 and 13.6–9). Thus the concepts formulated in the letter seem to correspond perfectly with the famous advice contained in the above-mentioned fragment of Aristotle (as quoted by Plut. *Mor.* 329b), to the effect that Alexander was to deal with the Greeks as their *hegemon* (*hegemonikos*) and with the barbarians as their master (*despotikos*).⁶¹

It is worth noting that these were precisely the topics being discussed at the court of Alexander in the years 330–327 and that other Greek intellectuals had a prominent role in the debate. The question of Alexander's autocratic power came dramatically to the fore after the murder of Cleitus at Maracanda late in 328, when Anaxarchus of Abdera tried to console the king by equating regal power with justice and holding the view that the acts of the king should be the law for the ruler and for his subjects (Plut. *Alex.* 50.1–6; Arr. 4.9.7–8)⁶². We have seen that the author of the letter explicitly

⁶⁰ Goukowsky 1978: 49–55; Sordi 1984; Prandi 1984; *contra* Carlier 1980.

⁶¹ Sordi 1984: 4–6. Cf. Isocr. 5.154: "I assert that it is incumbent upon you to be a benefactor (*euergetein*) for the Greeks, to reign as king (*basileuein*) over the Macedonians, and to rule (*arkhein*) over the greatest possible number of barbarians."

⁶² On Anaxarchus of Abdera see Borza 1981; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 66–68.

reacted against such stance. Likewise, in the following year Callisthenes—Aristotle's relative and the author of a historical work aiming to present Alexander's deeds in terms acceptable to the Greeks⁶³—in the context of the *proskunesis* debate pointed out to the king the need to treat his subjects in different ways and 'receive from the Greeks and Macedonians honours of a human and Greek style, and barbarian honours only from barbarians' (Arr. 4.11.8; trans. P. A. Brunt).

These discussions form the background for Aristotle's letter to Alexander. They appear to indicate that, when composing his short essay, Aristotle did not intend to address abstract theoretical issues but rather attempted to intervene in a contemporary debate of major consequences. Once more he stressed the Greek view of the king's campaign and kept pleading for a model of government that events had made obsolete and was more utopian than practical. Whatever the precise circumstances and the nature of his involvement in the Pages' Conspiracy, Callisthenes clearly fell victim to the clash between Alexander's concept of universal monarchy and Greek political theory. His death marked the end of a process of estrangement and alienation.⁶⁴ In fact, one tradition, deriving from Chares and Aristobulus, records that Alexander combined his accusations against Callisthenes with overt warnings to Aristotle. The king even threatened to have the historian tried by the *sunedrion* of the League of Corinth in the presence of the philosopher (Plut. *Alex.* 56.7–9; cf. Arr. 4.11.3).

Athens in the 'Age of Lycurgus'

The history of Athens under Alexander illustrates the contradictions surrounding the 'monitored' freedom of the Greek cities established by the peace of Corinth in 338. Despite the complete loss of the works of the major historians of the time, the evidence is particularly rich here, owing both to the survival of a large number of speeches and to a constantly growing *corpus* of inscriptions shedding light on the political and administrative mechanisms of the democratic system at all levels.

⁶³ Prandi 1985; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 72–74. Whether Callisthenes followed Alexander as the *official* historian of the expedition, as suggested by Just. 12.6.17, remains unclear.

⁶⁴ Merlan 1954–1955: 76–81.

The fifteen years following the battle of Chaeronea were paradoxically a period of great vitality for Athens. Most aspects and institutions of the state became the object of thorough revision and reorganization and the *polis* attained almost unprecedented prosperity. Yet, the internal political dynamics remain difficult to grasp.

What needs to be preliminarily stressed is that Athenian history during this age was not exclusively dominated by the issue of Macedonia⁶⁵ but that other equally significant factors were at stake. A good example to this effect is offered by the 'law against tyranny' approved by the board of legislators (*nomothetai*) in the spring of 336 (*SEG* 12.87; Schwenk 1985: 33–41 [no. 6]). The core of the document consists of two main sections, the first of which merely re-enacted the existing legislation against attempts to set up a tyranny or to overthrow the democracy. By contrast, the second section was new and concerned the Areopagus: it stated that, in an attempt to overthrow the democracy, any activity of the Areopagus and of its members was to be deemed illegal. The motion was proposed by Eucrates of Piraeus and, since Eucrates was later sentenced to death by Antipater as one of the staunch anti-Macedonians who promoted the Lamian War, it has generally been assumed that the law was directed at protecting the democracy of Athens against possible Macedonian constitutional interference.⁶⁶ It must, however, be pointed out that, even on the doubtful assumption of the existence in Athens of active and strongly organized antidemocratic circles (cf. Hyp. 4.8–10), there are no grounds for belief that the supporters of democracy had anything to fear in particular from the Areopagus. Apart from its constantly changing composition⁶⁷ and the ensuing difficulty to pursue a coherent political line in the course of time, the Council had in the preceding years consistently proved its loyalty displaying unquestionable anti-Macedonian sentiments and supporting, if any, Demosthenes. There is therefore little attraction in the view that the law belongs in the context of a struggle between pro- and anti-Macedonian factions. We are thus brought back to Athenian internal issues.

⁶⁵ For this view, long dominant in scholarship, see Beloch 1925: 52–56; Tarn 1927: 440; and, more recently, Burke 1977.

⁶⁶ Ostwald 1955: 123–125.

⁶⁷ Hansen 1990.

Following a motion by Demosthenes passed some time in the second half of the 340s,⁶⁸ the Areopagus had benefited from increased punitive powers in case of treason and of other crimes against the state (Din. 1.62–63) and, even more importantly, in the aftermath of Chaeronea it had not hesitated to enforce its extended authority openly supporting the election of the cautious Phocion as general in charge of the defense of the city (Plut. *Phoc.* 16.4) and executing a number of citizens who had fled from Athens in the face of danger (Lyc. 1.52; Aeschin. 3.252). Eucrates' enactment may thus plausibly be explained against this background as a democratic reaction against measures which, though not violating the letter of the existing laws, were perceived as offensive and contrary to the spirit of the constitution.⁶⁹ It was, in other words, part of a revival of democratic ideology characteristic of Athens in this period.

Lycurgus, son of Lycophron, of Butadae appears to have been the most prominent politician of the time. Little is known of his career before 338 and much is disputed about the nature of his office and the methods by which he managed to exert political influence. He was exceptionally competent in the field of administration and public finances and, most probably in 336, was appointed to an extraordinary office which gave him the supervision over the city treasury and some sort of control over the allocation of funds (*merismos*) to the various spending authorities. For twelve years he was thus able to influence politics directly or indirectly and to implement his policies through his superior financial expertise.⁷⁰

The results of his administration were remarkable. The annual state revenues were quickly doubled and reached the sum of 1200 talents, so that Lycurgus' ability was later compared to that of Pericles (Paus. 1.29.16). How such increase was obtained is not at all clear. It may well be that special efforts were made to stimulate commerce to and from the Piraeus by encouraging foreign traders to settle in

⁶⁸ The date and scope of Demosthenes' motion are disputed: see Wallace 1989: 113–119; Hansen 1997: 238.

⁶⁹ Wallace 1989: 182–184; Sawada 1996: 82–84.

⁷⁰ On Lycurgus' career see Faraguna 1992: 195–209. For the title of his office (most probably *ho epi tei dioikesi*) cf. Hyp. fr. 118 Jensen; Dem. *Ep.* 3.2; Plut. *Mor.* 841B–C; *SEG* 19.119, ll. 7–9. I accept for his administration the lower chronology (336–324) proposed by Lewis 1997; for the traditional dating (338–326) cf. Beloch *ap.* Ampolo 1990: 102–103.

Athens and thus generate income through harbor-dues and other levies,⁷¹ but the evidence we possess, mainly epigraphical, seems to indicate that particular, almost obsessive, attention was devoted to systematic exploitation of all resources available in the Attic territory. The careful supervision over activity in the Laurion silver mines, large-scale sales of uncultivated or abandoned public land, the systematic leasing of sacred properties, the thorough inventorying of the riches and precious offerings stored in the temples down to the sale of the hides of sacrificial animals all point to the spirit of Lycurgus' administration and to a conscious effort towards efficiency and rationalization.⁷² It appears moreover that Lycurgus was successful in securing the financial support of a number of well-to-do Athenians and metics, who made substantial private donations to the state.

Although Lycurgus is usually mentioned as the leading figure of this age, his program was in fact the expression of a compact group recruited within the wealthy upper classes of Athenian society⁷³ and united by a common desire to avoid another armed confrontation with Macedon. From the time immediately after the battle of Chaeronea Athens had enjoyed privileged treatment from the Macedonian kings owing both to her military potential and, as we have seen, to her symbolic value within Panhellenic ideology. The sacking and destruction of Thebes had, however, revealed Alexander's determination in brutally pursuing any attempt to overthrow the order established by the 'Peace of Corinth'. Athens was again privileged in being spared harsh punishment but the episode had long lasting effects in shaping Athenian attitudes and policies. Some of the most compromised anti-Macedonians were forced to leave Attica and fled to Asia where they joined the Persian forces (Ephialtes, Charidemus, Chares, Thrasybulus). Those who stayed were either intimidated (Demosthenes) or marginalized (Hyperides). In his speech *On the Crown* Demosthenes had significantly very little to say to counter Aeschines' accusations concerning his activity, or rather almost total

⁷¹ Burke 1985; Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 206–207.

⁷² On the character of Athenian administration under Lycurgus see Mitchel 1970: 28–52; Humphreys 1985; and esp. Faraguna 1992: 289–396, where all the relevant documentation is analyzed. Most of the lease- and *poletai*-documents are now collected and re-edited by Lalonde, Langdon, and Walbank 1991; for the sales of public land see, most recently, Lambert 1997.

⁷³ Faraguna 1992: 211–243; Mikalson 1998: 32–36.

inactivity, in the years from the defeat at Chaeronea to the time of the trial.⁷⁴

Thus in 335 the political debate took a new turn. Thereafter, the main question facing Athens appeared to be not how to regain freedom and reassert Athenian power in Greece, but, rather, how to adapt to the unprecedented political and economic conditions arising from Macedonian supremacy. The answer given by Lycurgus and the group of prominent citizens who supported him was internal reform and reorganization.⁷⁵ It is difficult to assess the extent to which after 338 Athens was exposed to tensions and the risk of growing political division. We have already discussed the 'law against tyranny'. The city was, moreover, heavily dependent on grain imports: there is ample testimony that starting from the late 330s there were several periods of severe food shortages. These shortages were the result both of Macedonian interference with the grain supply routes from the East and of harvest shortfalls caused by prolonged drought conditions.⁷⁶ We know that around 330 the price of wheat had risen from five drachmas a bushel to sixteen ([Dem.] 34.37–39; *IG* II² 360; cf. [Dem.] 42.20 and 31). These conditions must have placed a strain on the whole of Athenian society.

Against this background, Lycurgus' reform program was primarily aimed at stimulating patriotism and strengthening civic cohesion. Innovation and conservatism characteristically intermingled in a unique effort to revitalize the political and religious institutions of the city. The reform of the *ephebeia* established by a law of Epicrates, probably in 336/5, extended service to members of the lowest census class and transformed it into a two-year compulsory period of formal military training and communal life at the state's expense (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 42; Lycurg. 1.76).⁷⁷ By extending the recruiting base for the hoplite army Epicrates' law, together with other provisions for improving fortification works, enhanced the ability of the Athenians to defend their territory. Large sums of money were also invested to increase the size and efficiency of the fleet.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Faraguna 1992: 239–243; Landucci Gattinoni 1994. Demosthenes: Cawkwell 1969; Sealey 1993: 207–212; Harris 1995: 138–148. Hyperides: Engels 1989.

⁷⁵ On the 'Lycurgan program' cf. Mitchel 1970; Humphreys 1985; Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 204–215; Faraguna 1992; Habicht 1997: 6–30.

⁷⁶ Garnsey 1988: 150–164; Tracy 1995: 30–35.

⁷⁷ See, most recently, Burckhardt 1996: 26–75; Habicht 1997: 16–17.

⁷⁸ Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 208; cf. also Gabrielsen 1994: 126–131, 146–149, and *passim*.

At the same time the law on the *ephebeia* was, however, also part of a wider program to revive democratic participation and ideology. The most striking aspect in this context is undoubtedly represented by a large-scale building program which both attracted private donations and probably absorbed a good share of Athens' increased public revenues. Construction of naval installations, namely the arsenal and the ship-sheds, was resumed and completed. Most of the building activity, however, was concentrated on the principal loci of communal participation. The Pnyx, where the Athenian Assembly met, was remodeled, the theater of Dionysus and the Panathenaic stadium were completed, and there was extensive building activity in the Agora and in some of the major sanctuaries both in the city and in the countryside. At the same time, the Athenians reorganized some of the public religious festivals and sacrifices and refurbished various cults.⁷⁹ The lower classes must have greatly benefited from all these activities both in terms of employment and as recipients of festival distributions but the emphasis of Lycurgus and his wealthy allies appears to have lain on the community as a whole. One of the characteristic features of the Lycurgan age is significantly a renewed interest for the cult of *Demokratia* (*IG* II² 1496, ll. 131–132, 140–141).⁸⁰

Thus, as recently remarked by Chr. Habicht, Lycurgus “created the conditions that would make it possible, after Alexander’s death, for Athens to challenge Macedonia’s military might with some prospect of success.”⁸¹ Despite their patriotism there is, however, little indication that Lycurgus and his associates considered conflict a possibility in the short term. In the early summer of 329 Lycurgus proposed a motion to honor Eudemus of Plataea for his benefactions to the Athenian people: first, possibly in 338, Eudemus had offered to donate the sum of 4,000 drachmas as a contribution for the war (*eis ton polemon*) if it should be needed, but later, presumably in 330, he had finally made available an equal amount of money for the construction of the Panathenaic stadium (Tod 198, ll. 10–20; Schwenk 1985:

⁷⁹ For an overview of the building program and of its implications see Faraguna 1992: 257–285; Knell 1995; Hintzen-Bohlen 1997. For the dating of the restructuring of the Pnyx to the second half of the IV century cf. Hansen 1997: 245–246. On religion and religious attitudes in this age see, most recently, Mikalson 1998: 11–45.

⁸⁰ Mikalson 1998: 38.

⁸¹ Habicht 1997: 8.

232–238 [no. 48]). At that time, the prospect of military confrontation with Alexander must have appeared very remote indeed. There is no decisive evidence suggesting that things changed at all until the Athenians were confronted with new events in 324.

Towards the 'Hellenic War'

After his return from India Alexander's relations with the Greeks suddenly and unexpectedly took a new turn. For several years he had been cut off from Greece. When he resumed contact, he was the king of an immense empire and was confronted with the still unresolved problem of the political order in Greece. Philip's attempt to base Macedonian hegemony on the consent of the loyal governments pledged to uphold the *koine eirene* had not provided sufficient guarantee for stability or ended military resistance. But Alexander's decision to abandon such policy and to enforce his power more autocratically had widespread political and social repercussions and resulted in disruption and general unrest.

The concrete expression of the king's new attitude was the 'Exiles' Decree' proclaimed by Nicanor of Stagira at the Olympic Games in early August 324. The letter solemnly read out by Alexander's envoy to an expectant crowd ordered the repatriation of exiles throughout the Greek world and threatened severe penalties against the cities not willing to comply (Diod. 18.8.1–5). The decree had been conceived and made public long before its promulgation, possibly in Susa, or in Alexander's camp, around the month of March.⁸² By the time Nicanor reached Olympia the news had already widely circulated in Greece (Din. 1.82). The edict was in all likelihood part of a larger set of instructions sent to the Greek states.⁸³

The consequences of this unilateral act, which totally bypassed the *sunedrion* and was clearly in breach of the fundamental tenets of the peace of Corinth (cf. esp. [Dem.] 17.16), were in general to be of far-reaching importance. Diodorus states that over 20,000 exiles were present and cheered at the announcement in Olympia. The nature of the problems arising from their repatriation in the cities can be

⁸² Wilcken 1922: 115–116; Badian 1961: 41–43; Jaschinski 1981: 164–163 n. 3.

⁸³ Worthington, "Hyper. 5," Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 221–222; Jehne 1994: 245–246.

inferred from a Tegean inscription setting detailed regulations with regard to the restitution of confiscated properties to the returning exiles (Tod 202; Heisserer 1980: 205–225; Thür and Taeuber 1994: 51–70 [no. 5]).⁸⁴ The two states most heavily affected by the decree were, however, Athens and the Aetolians. The latter had at some point illegally seized the Acharnian city of Oeniadae, strategically placed at the entrance of the Corinthian gulf, banishing its inhabitants (Diod. 18.8.6; Plut. *Alex.* 49.14–15).⁸⁵ Having already been promised retribution by Alexander, they now felt threatened by his edict.

The most complex and potentially most devastating case was nevertheless that of Athens. It is unclear whether Alexander had from the beginning considered the question of Samos. In 365 the Athenians had settled a cleruchy here and driven all the native citizens into exile.⁸⁶ A Samian decree praising Gorgos of Iasos and his brother refers to a pronouncement of Alexander at his camp to the effect that the king ‘was giving back Samos to the Samians’, and to the honors bestowed upon him by the Greeks present (*SIG*³ 312, ll. 12–16; Heisserer 1980: 182–193), yet the question remains whether such a specific ruling had been made at the same time as the general decree or on a later occasion.⁸⁷ What is beyond doubt is, however, that when Nicanor arrived in Greece in June 324 the possible consequences of the edict for Athens were immediately understood and quickly became cause for great concern. This would explain why Demosthenes was so eager to negotiate with Nicanor as official leader (*arkhitheoros*) of the Athenian delegation at Olympia (Din. 1.81–82; cf. 103).

A recently published inscription from Samos has revealed the reason for the alarm felt in Athens.⁸⁸ The document, which records a

⁸⁴ On this important inscription see also Maffi 1994.

⁸⁵ Mendels 1984: 129–149; Grainger 1999: 51–53. The date of the event is uncertain: cf. Grainger 1999: 51–52, favoring 330, and Jehne 1994: 241–243, pleading for c. 325/4.

⁸⁶ Shipley 1987: 138–143; Cargill 1995: 17–21. That the settlement of the cleruchy resulted in the expulsion of the entire body of the Samians emerges from Arist. fr. 611.35.

⁸⁷ For the *status quaestionis* see Jehne 1994: 254–255 n. 276. Errington 1975: 53–55 was the first to expound the view that the decision concerning Samos need not be contemporary with the general edict and may be as late as spring 323, and has been followed by many scholars; cf. Worthington 1992: 63. Rosen 1978: 34 with n. 96 plausibly dates the pronouncement to autumn 324 on the basis of Ephipp. *FGrHist* 126 F 5.

⁸⁸ Hallof and Habicht 1995; cf. also Habicht 1996.

list of the magistrates and of the 250 councillors (*buleutai*) of the Athenian community on the island in *c.* 350, is an eloquent testimony of the fact that about one third of the citizens of Athens at that time lived in Samos. The 'Exiles' Decree', ordering the restoration of the island to the Samians and, conversely, the return of the cleruchs to Attica, therefore affected Athens' most vital interests and, if enforced, would have social and economic consequences of the worst kind. At Olympia Demosthenes was apparently able to delay the implementation of the decree until the question could be directly negotiated with Alexander (Hyp. 1.19; Diod. 17.113.3) but the issue was to become the key factor determining political decisions in the near future.

The 'Exiles' Decree' therefore struck Greece like a bolt of lightning. Various communities reacted differently, but everywhere the decree met with strong opposition. Alexander's motives for such overt infringement of Greek *autonomia* have long been a matter of debate.⁸⁹ According to Diodorus, the king's act resulted from his desire for glory and from the wish to secure himself the support of partisans in the cities in case of revolutions and revolts (18.8.2) and the historian seems here to offer the right guidelines. Agis' war had clearly revealed the weaknesses and contradictions underlying the political system of the League of Corinth. It is conceivable that Alexander was now firmly determined to solve the problem of instability and disaffection in Greece at the root regardless of the consequences in the short term.

As stated in the letter read by Nicanor at Olympia, Alexander had not been responsible for the exiles' banishment: the above quoted inscription from Tegea (ll. 49–56) unmistakably reveals that the beneficiaries of the decree had been in exile for generations and this was also the case for Samos. Large numbers of expatriates moreover probably owed their condition to the political turmoil following the battle of Chaeronea and had therefore been victims of Philip's policies. On the contrary, it remains unclear whether the amnesty also applied to those banished after Alexander's accession⁹⁰—the

⁸⁹ For recent surveys of scholarship on this problem see Jaschinski 1981: 70–92; Jehne 1994: 247–252.

⁹⁰ On this point see the opposing views of Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 224 and Jehne 1994: 248 n. 338.

Thebans certainly did not qualify (Diod. 18.11.3–4; Plut. *Mor.* 221A)—but even if this was the case they cannot have been numerous. The restoration of the exiles would thus add to Alexander's glory promoting loyalty and consensus for the benefactor. And the stream of embassies sent to the king by the individual cities to negotiate how the edict would apply to them (Hyp. 1.19; Diod. 17.113.3; cf. Arr. 7.19.1 and 23.2) only served to strengthen his position as the absolute arbiter of the Greeks' destiny.

One should not underestimate the punitive contents of the decree. The return of the exiles was bound to cause disruption and tension within the Greek city-states and the main targets appear to have been Athens and Aetolia. According to a fragmentary passage of a speech of Hyperides, Nicanor also carried instructions concerning the common assemblies (*koinoi sullogoi*) of the Achaeans and of the Arcadians (1.18). Since these states had joined Agis in his anti-Macedonian movement Alexander's orders were probably meant to impose some restriction on the activities of their federal legislative bodies.⁹¹ The king's frame of mind at that time may in general be reflected by his determination to wage war on Athens if necessary (Ephipp. *FGrHist* 126 F 5; Curt. 10.2.2–3; Just. 13.5.7).

Unforeseeable events stirred the political debate at Athens to near frenzy. Harpalus, Alexander's companion in youth and treasurer, had fled from Babylonia fearing the king's wrath for his misbehavior and corruption⁹² and appeared off the Attic coast with 5,000 talents and 6,000 mercenaries to seek asylum in Athens (Diod. 17.108.4–7). Although he had previously been awarded Athenian citizenship (Python *TGrF* 91 F 1, ll. 14–16 *ap.* Athen. 13.586d), he was first rebuffed and sailed to Taenarum where he deposited the bulk of his forces with most of the money. Shortly thereafter, he returned to Athens as a suppliant with a small fleet and 700 talents and finally obtained admission into the city.

Harpalus made his first appearance after Nicanor's arrival in Greece when rumors concerning the 'Exiles' Decree' had already spread (Hyp. 1.18) and before the Olympic festival when the edict was

⁹¹ Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 221–222; *contra* Worthington, "Hyper. 5" 1986, suggesting that *sullogos* here refers to a military levy and that Alexander's directive prohibited 'any joint muster of forces'.

⁹² For Harpalus' career see Jaschinski 1981: 7–44; Heckel 1992: 213–221. On the purges following Alexander's return from India cf. Badian 1961: 16–25.

officially proclaimed.⁹³ His case suddenly became extremely delicate for Athens because the Macedonian authorities soon insisted on his surrender (Hyp. 1.8; Diod. 17.107.7; [Plut.] *Mor.* 846 B). Before Demosthenes' departure for Olympia a compromise was worked out: Harpalus was taken into custody and his money was confiscated and stored on the Acropolis until further instructions could be solicited from Alexander (Hyp. 1.8–9; Din. 1.68 and 89; [Plut.] *Mor.* 846 B). In due course Harpalus managed to bribe his way out of Athens and his escape was to become the object of a famous investigation and led to the trial of Demosthenes and several others. What needs to be stressed is, however, that at this time the prevailing mood in the city was still by and large inclined towards peace. The way the Athenians handled the crisis reveals that they did not wish to jeopardize their negotiations over the 'Exiles' Decree'.

The same attitude is evident in the political debate in Athens about the award of divine honors to Alexander, which in all probability occurred at the same time as the events we have so far examined.⁹⁴ It is not at all clear whether the request for these honors came from Alexander or not, but despite initial vehement opposition Demades finally passed a decree to grant them (Athen. 6.251b; Hyp. 1.31–32; Din. 1.94; Ael. *VH* 5.12). The discussion, however, assumed especially political overtones and was clearly influenced by preoccupation over the Samian cleruchy. Demades is reported to have warned the Athenians not to lose land out of their concern for heaven (Demad. fr. 11 De Falco).⁹⁵

Although the Athenians were willing to compromise on other issues, they had no intention to yield on the question of Samos. The chronology presents almost intractable problems depending on the precise

⁹³ To be more precise before the end of the archon-year 325/4 (July 21, 324), when Philocles was still the 'general in command of Munichia and the dockyards'; cf. Develin 1989: 402. For the chronology of Harpalus' movements see Badian 1961: 41–43; Worthington 'The Chronology' 1986. On the whole affair, which cannot be analyzed in detail here, see Badian 1961; Jaschinski 1981; Worthington 1992 and 1994.

⁹⁴ An early date for the debate, which may have protracted for some months, is suggested by the fact that Lycurgus is reported to have taken part: cf. [Plut.] *Mor.* 842 D. Lycurgus' death most probably occurred in summer 324; see Faraguna 1992: 199–200; Lewis 1997: 221–222.

⁹⁵ That a similar debate took place also at Sparta is demonstrated by Plut. *Mor.* 219 E. On the much discussed problem of Alexander's deification see, among the recent works, Badian 1981; Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 278–290; Hammond 1999, and Fredricksmeier in this volume.

time when Alexander confirmed his decision about the return of the Samians to the island (autumn 324; see n. 86), but two sequences of events are discernible. On the one hand, the Athenians were not afraid of using violence in order to thwart the provisions of the 'Exiles' Decree'. An inscription from Samos dated between 321 and 319 relates that when a group of Samians had attempted to force their way onto the island they were arrested on the orders of the Athenian Assembly, and, once transported to Athens, they were imprisoned and sentenced to death.⁹⁶ Political considerations prevented their execution and the prisoners were later ransomed by Antileon of Chalcis, whom the decree recorded on the stone honored. A state of open conflict between the Athenian cleruchs and the Samians trying to return to their island may, at any rate, also be referred to by another Samian decree of approximately the same date.⁹⁷ These two documents therefore suggest that following Alexander's pronouncement on Samos but before his death in June 323 the Athenians had already shown their determination to fight for their cleruchy.⁹⁸

On the other hand, during this period the Athenians also secretly began to make contact with the states most opposed to Alexander's autocratic methods. The key figure in this context was Leosthenes, a rather mysterious Athenian who had been instrumental in conveying to Taenarum a large group of the mercenaries disbanded by Alexander in Asia early in 324 (Paus. 1.25.5; 8.25.5) and whom they had elected as their supreme commander.⁹⁹ A combined reading of Diodorus 17.111.1–4 and 18.9.2–5 allows us to conclude that, although Leosthenes did not hold any official position in Athens until 323/2 (Hyp. 6.3),¹⁰⁰ he clearly entertained close relations with the Athenian authorities and that diplomatic approaches with Aetolia were under

⁹⁶ Habicht 1957: 156–164 (no. 1); see also Bielman 1994: 22–31 (no. 7); Jehne 1994: 259–261.

⁹⁷ Habicht 1957: 164–169 (no. 2) as restored by Badian 1976.

⁹⁸ Errington 1975; Shipley 1987: 165–168; Habicht 1997: 33–34.

⁹⁹ Badian 1961 remains the fundamental study on the subject.

¹⁰⁰ I find myself in agreement with those who believe that either Leosthenes is not to be identified with the Leosthenes son of Leosthenes of Kephale who appears as general with responsibility for the countryside (*epi tei khorai*) in a famous inscription from Oropus (Reinmuth 1971: 58–82 [no. 15]) or that, if he is, the inscription is probably considerably earlier and has no bearing on the question of the outbreak of the Lamian war; see Jaschinski 1981: 51–54; Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 293–294; Tracy 1995: 23–26.

way in the winter 324/3, long before an alliance was officially formalized after the death of Alexander (Diod. 18.9.5; 11.1).¹⁰¹

Thus, war was already looming during the last months of the conqueror's life. Philip's settlement at Corinth had been astutely inspired by time-honored Greek diplomatic practices; Alexander's attempt to rewrite the rules of such practices met with stiff resistance and had devastating consequences. The defection of the Thessalians eloquently testifies to the extent of the opposition generated by the 'Exiles' Decree'. The Thessalians had long been loyally subject to the authority of the Macedonian kings (and their cavalry had had no small part in Alexander's campaign), but after the outbreak in the fall of 324 of the Lamian War—which significantly came to be known to contemporaries as the 'Hellenic War'—they joined the side of the rebels and bravely 'fought for the liberty of the Greeks' (Diod. 18.11.1 and 12.3).¹⁰² Despite defeat and a rapidly changing world, *eleutheria* and *autonomia* were to remain the keystones of Greek political tradition.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Worthington 1984; Jehne 1994: 254–259; Landucci Gattinoni 1995: 77–91; *contra* Schmitt 1992: 10–49 and 164.

¹⁰² Sordi 1958: 302–309; Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 227; cf. also Schmitt 1992: 91–94. For the name of 'Hellenic War' (*IG* II² 448, ll. 43–44; 505, l. 17) see Ashton 1984.

¹⁰³ My heartfelt thanks go to my friend and colleague Edward Harris for his valuable suggestions during the preparation of this chapter and for helping me to improve the English with much patience and generosity. I would also like to thank Professor Filippo Cassola for reading over a draft of the text and for his continuous support over the years. I would finally like to mention with gratitude my wife Joanna, to whom I owe much more than I can here say.

PART THREE

CONQUEROR AND CONQUERED

CHAPTER FIVE

ALEXANDER: THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN

Barry S. Strauss

With his small but excellently trained and organized army, Alexander shattered the brittle states of Asia. Ruthlessly, without pause, he advanced through the vast expanse of Asia until he reached India.

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*¹

When Alexander III came to the throne of Macedon in 336 BC, the Greek city-states over which he ruled had engaged in sporadic war with the Persian Empire for more than two centuries. In all that time their only permanent gains had been to drive Persia out of the Balkans, the Aegean Islands, and the thin coastal strip of western Anatolia. Nor were they able to stop Persia from intervening at will in Greek affairs. Alexander, by contrast, after suppressing rebellions in Greece and the Balkans (336–335), crossed the Dardanelles and destroyed the Persian army in three field battles, conquered all of Persian-controlled western Asia, and had himself recognized as king of Asia, all within four years (334–330).² It took him another three years to destroy resistance in the eastern provinces of the former Persian empire, located in central Asia (330–327). In three more years (327–325) Alexander added to his domain the Kabul River valley and the Punjab (today representing parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India). In the following three years, he successfully conducted a winter campaign against rebels in the Zagros Mountains, organized a joint land-sea expedition to conquer and colonize Arabia, and he laid plans to conquer the central and western Mediterranean (325–323). Sober contemporaries gave him a reasonable chance of succeeding in those forthcoming enterprises. Then, suddenly, at age

¹ Clausewitz 1984: 587.

² For the argument that Alexander had himself recognized as king of Asia and not, as some would have it, king of Persia, see Fredricksmeier 2000.

33, he was dead (June 323), drunk on power, loneliness, or merely wine; victim of a virus made worse by his many war wounds; poisoned by an enemy—theories about Alexander's death are legion.³

None of Alexander's successors was able to maintain his single empire, but they carved it up into several rich and long-lasting kingdoms. Like Alexander, they were wealthy, warlike, and opportunistic. Meanwhile, it took the Persians over 150 years to restore the empire that Alexander had destroyed, and even then they rebuilt only the eastern half.

Only a handful of generals in history has made conquests on the scale of Alexander. None of them died as young as Alexander: Napoleon, for example, lived into his fifties, Caesar his sixties, Jenghiz Khan his seventies. Alexander died at age thirty-three, which only contributed to his legend. He conquered an area of over two million square miles, ranging from Greece and Egypt in the West to modern Tajikistan and the Indian Punjab in the East. His men marched an estimated 20,000 miles or more across deserts, mountains, and swamps; they advanced in winter snow and monsoon rains. His conquests included some of the richest and most intensely cultivated land on earth at the time. His army defeated horsemen, infantry, archers, scythed chariots, camels, and elephants. How did he do it?⁴

Alexander the General

According to the military historian Bevin Alexander, the essence of great generalship is to avoid the enemy's main strength and instead to strike a decisive blow on the enemy's flank, either actual or psychological. A great general attacks where least expected against opposition that is weak and disorganized. He "can see how to go around rather than through his opponent."⁵ In his public persona, moreover, a great general must be two-faced, conveying honesty and openness to his troops and subordinate leaders while displaying guile toward the enemy.

³ A good short introduction to Alexander is Hamilton 1973.

⁴ Wood 1997, who estimates 22,000 miles for Alexander's march (9) is a dramatic and engaging attempt to retrace his path. He discusses earlier such attempts (247–248).

⁵ Alexander 1993: 24.

Several character traits are implicit in this assessment: intelligence, self-control, industriousness, flexibility, versatility, courage, daring, speed, and relentlessness. So is political skill; that is, a great general must be a leader as well as a warrior. Another quality of a great general omitted by Bevin Alexander, and yet essential, is luck.

By these criteria, Alexander was indeed a great general. He was first and foremost a soldier. He had been schooled in war since childhood. Battlefield commander of the Macedonian cavalry at age eighteen—under his father Philip II, at Chaeronea in 338 BC, where the Greeks were crushed—he devoted most of the rest of his life to warfare. Alexander thrived on the military life. He was famous for his endurance, tirelessness, and ambition.

Clausewitz judged Alexander to be a supreme historical example of boldness, a quality which he considered to be the first requirement of a great military leader. "... a distinguished commander without boldness," Clausewitz wrote, "is unthinkable."⁶ Of the many examples of Alexander's audacity, consider only two: At Gaugamela in 331 BC, his third great field battle against the Persians, Alexander might well have been advised to refuse battle against so numerous and well-prepared a foe; instead, he fought and won. He gambled, but then, his entire invasion of the Persian empire was itself a gamble. When Alexander crossed the Dardanelles in 334 he had only 40,000 soldiers, thirty days' supply of food, an outnumbered and unreliable navy, and virtually no money. And yet he won more than could have been predicted by anyone—except perhaps himself.⁷

Only twenty-two when he crossed into Anatolia in 334 BC, Alexander had already experienced four years of warfare. He knew a lot, including the need to consult older and more experienced men. Yet he also knew when to reject advice in the interest of audacity. For example, when his senior general Parmenion advised him to wait for the next day at the Granicus and a likely Persian retreat to more favorable terrain for the Macedonian offensive, Alexander rejected the suggestion and insisted on attacking that very day. The king's course of action was risky, not least to himself (see below) but it yielded a lopsided victory and a stunning demonstration of Macedonian military power. Anatolia was now Alexander's for the taking.⁸

⁶ Clausewitz 1984: 192.

⁷ Alexander's problems in 334: Green 1991: 152–156.

⁸ Arr. 1.13.2; cf. Plut. *Al.* 16.3. Diod. 17.19.3 has no debate between Alexander

He was a superb leader of men. Alexander was popular and inspiring and he shared risks with the troops. He fought in the front ranks in his major battles and he had the wounds to show for it. He understood fighting men and he knew how to get the most out of them. Before the battle of Issus in 334 BC, for example, Alexander is said to have acted thus:

When the two armies were close, Alexander rode all along his front and bade them be good men and true, calling aloud with all proper distinctions the names not only of generals but even of commanders of squadrons and companies, as well as any of mercenaries who were conspicuous for rank or for any brave action. An answering cry went up from all sides to delay no longer, but to charge the enemy. He continued to lead on in lane, at marching pace at first, though he now had Darius' force in view, to avoid any part of the phalanx fluctuating in a more rapid advance and so breaking apart. Once within missile range, Alexander himself and his entourage were the first, stationed on the right, to charge. . . . (Arrian 2.10.2-3)⁹

Alexander paid his men generously. If it is true that his men mutinied in the monsoon rains in the Punjab in 325 BC and refused to follow Alexander to the Ganges and the Indian Ocean, it is also true that few commanders could ever have inspired them to march as far as they had in the previous nine years.¹⁰

Alexander's intellect was biting and shrewd. As a strategist, he planned to conquer the Persian Empire by avoiding its main strength, its fleet. Unable to beat the Persian navy at sea, Alexander attacked it on land by depriving it of ports, which he besieged and usually took. He equally planned to attack Persia where it was weak, by drawing the Persian army into set battles. In battle, as he knew, Macedon's superb army would hold the upper hand.

As a battle tactician, Alexander deployed his forces to take maximum advantage of his strength and to aim them precisely at Persia's weak points. At Issus in 331 BC, for example, Alexander led the cavalry in the main attack, which was directed at the Persian king Darius in the center of his line. Alexander calculated correctly that the javelin-armed enemy would not be able to withstand his men's

and Parmenion. Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 41 considers the possibility that the debate might be fictional; cf. Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, Vol. I *ad loc.*

⁹ Brunt 1976, I: 157.

¹⁰ On Alexander as a leader of men, see Keegan 1987.

stabbing lances. The rest of the Macedonian line, consisting of Macedonian infantry and allied cavalry, fared poorly. Yet the success in Alexander's sector proved decisive because in due course it forced Darius to flee. Once he did so, the rest of the Persian line turned in panic, leading to a Macedonian rout.

Surprise was a key tool in Alexander's armory. In his battle against the Indian king Porus in 326 BC, for example, Alexander had to cross the Hydaspes River to reach the enemy. He built a fleet over a period of weeks, keeping it hidden behind a forest and an island in a bend of the river. When the fleet was ready, Alexander crossed the Hydaspes at night with a force of 11,000 men (Arr. 5.14.1, 18.2). He achieved complete surprise over the enemy. At 327 BC at the rock of Sogdiana (in today's Uzbekistan), Alexander tricked the enemy into surrendering a virtually impregnable fortress 19,800 feet high and almost 19 miles in circumference at its summit. By sending several hundred climbers up the steep face of the rock, he terrified the defenders into believing that he was upon them, and so they surrendered.¹¹

Speed was Alexander's hallmark. In 335 BC, for example, in order to suppress the revolt of the important Greek city of Thebes, Alexander marched his army of 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry from Thrace to Thebes (about 300 miles) in thirteen days (Arr. 1.4–7; Curt. 1). He was near Thebes before the rebels were aware of it, and he prevented reinforcements from reaching them. Alexander would have agreed with Napoleon's dictum that "In war there is but one favorable moment; the great art is to seize it."¹²

Alexander's tactical versatility is reflected by the variety of his campaigns. He fought pitched battles, engaged in sieges of cities and fortresses, forced mountain passes, and pursued guerilla wars; he fought against nomadic tribes as well as an empire; he fought in terrain similar to Macedon's but also in desert, steppes, and mountains as high as the Hindu Kush (whose peaks reach a height of 25,230 feet; Macedon's highest mountain, Olympus, is only 9,800 feet); he moved armies by night as well as by day; he fought in winter as well as summer. Only a commander with a nimble mind, willing to

¹¹ Hydaspes: Bosworth *Alexander and the East* 1996: 13–14 and in this volume. Rock of Sogdiana: Ashley 1998: 301–302.

¹² Thebes: Ashley 1998: 175–176, 180.

consult others, and in charge of a versatile and veteran force, could have excelled in such a variety of military challenges.

Alexander was lucky both in his friends and in his enemies. Among his Macedonians he found brilliant commanders, both experienced veterans and ambitious young comers. The veterans included such men as Parmenio, who in his sixties commanded the left wing at the three great battles against the Persians; his son, Philotas, commander of the Companion Cavalry; and Cleitus "the Black" son of Dropides, who commanded the Royal Squadron of the Cavalry. New men included Coenus son of Polemocrates, who participated in battle from before the Granicus to the Hydaspes; Craterus son of Alexandros, inspired as an infantry commander in western Asia and Alexander's best general in the eastern parts of the Persian empire. Mention should also be made of Hephaestion son of Amyntor, a man whose talents ran to organization more than battle, but who was Alexander's best friend and ultimately commander of half of the Companion Cavalry. Meanwhile, under Darius III, the Persians lacked both strategic sense and tactical competence. Again and again they made poor choices and threw away advantages, which eased Alexander's progress.¹³

Alexander was lucky not only in what he was but in what he was not. He was not given to doubt nor to the contemplation of ethical niceties. Macedon's invasion and conquest of Persia was, after all, a war of aggression. Alexander either did not mind aggression or he believed his own propaganda about avenging Xerxes's invasion of Greece in 480 BC, 150 years earlier. Neither creativity nor originality was Alexander's hallmark, but that suited his position. Creativity might have budged the man from the path he had inherited. Alexander needed instead to be focused; that desideratum, he fulfilled brilliantly. His father, Philip, had already forged a new Macedonian military with a state to support it. Philip had pioneered the battlefield tactics of his army as well as the strategic feasibility of conquering a sea power like Athens without possessing a navy to match it. Finally, Philip had committed Macedon to the grand strategy of conquering Achaemenid Persia or at least its Anatolian province. Before his death in 336, Philip had sent an advance force of 10,000 men to Anatolia.¹⁴

¹³ On Alexander's generals, see Heckel 1992.

¹⁴ Philip's advance force and its campaign: Ashley 1998: 160–162.

Great general though he was, Alexander was far from perfect. Alexander was a shrewd strategist and tactician but he was not simply a rationalist. A religious man, he believed in his own divine inspiration and mission. He spoke to his troops in India of his “longing” (*pothos*) to continue the campaign, as if that might be a valid motive for a statesman. If he did not plan to conquer all of the Persian empire when he first crossed the Dardanelles, it is hard to imagine that he resisted the temptation for long. At his death in 324 BC, he was planning an invasion of Arabia, allegedly to be followed up by the conquest of the entire western Mediterranean. A vast, tyrannical exchange of populations between Europe and Asia was then to follow, in order to create one world. No ordinary general could have planned thus.

As a politician, Alexander proved shrewd and ruthless. He used his subordinate commanders without trusting them. He was second to no one when it came to the brutal moves of the Macedonian governing class. Indeed, it was rumored that he had played a part in the assassination of Philip in 336 BC, the father with whom Alexander quarreled and from whose death he profited. The veracity of such a rumor cannot of course be assessed. Alexander also turned on some of his top commanders; he had Philotas executed in 330 for alleged conspiracy against him, arranged immediately afterwards for the murder of Philotas’s father, Parmenio; he himself murdered Cleitus “the Black” in an apparent drunken rage in 328. There was no proof of Philotas’s guilt, and Cleitus’s main offense seems to have been speaking out against the pomp and majesty that were the outward signs of Alexander’s increasingly swollen head.¹⁵

Alexander’s audacity also raises questions. The risk-taker almost lost his own life in battle on two occasions. In the thick of battle at the Granicus in 334 BC, Alexander on horseback was struck hard enough for part of his helmet to be split and then almost struck again with what would have been a death blow, had not Cleitus “the Black” saved him by severing the attacker’s right arm. Fighting at a citadel of the Malli in the Punjab in 325, Alexander was hit in the chest with a lance. It was a serious wound, possibly puncturing one of his lungs.

¹⁵ See, however, Heckel in this volume.

A common denominator in many of Alexander's questionable decisions is his thirst for glory. In Swat (northeast of the Khyber Pass) in winter 326 BC, Alexander decided to lay siege to the 5,000-foot-high Rock of Aornus. There was no military necessity for this decision, since the rock could have been left isolated, but the king apparently wanted to outdo his putative ancestor. Heracles, the story went, had failed to take the rock. Alexander succeeded, risking heavy Macedonian casualties in the process, which fortunately were not called for. Nor was it necessary for Alexander to have conducted a two-month siege of Gaza in 332 BC, since he could have bypassed the city and waited for it to surrender. Some historians challenge the wisdom of Alexander's entire march through Phoenicia and Egypt 333–331 while Darius was still free and dangerous.¹⁶

Most observers condemn Alexander's decision in 325 BC to march a large part of his army back to Iran from India via the Gedrosian Desert (today known as the Makran, a region in Pakistan and Iran). The march cost Alexander a large number of men, horses, and materiel, although the Macedonian contingent seems to have remained largely intact. This campaign, had it been successful, would have served Alexander's glory but not any strategic goal. It seems that his motive was to outdo his famous Persian predecessor, Cyrus the Great, and the legendary Semiramis, queen of Babylon, each of whom was said to have lost an army in Gedrosia.

Even more troubling is Alexander's 326–325 BC invasion of India: that is, the Kabul Valley and the Upper and Lower Punjab, today in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. The campaign responded to no strategic necessity. The region posed no threat to Alexander's neighboring possessions in Central Asia. Nor was its conquest necessary for his prestige, because although India had once been part of the Achaemenid empire it had long since achieved independence. Nor did Alexander's conquests in India lead to permanent Macedonian rule; within two years of his death, his Indian possessions were largely free again.

The Indian campaign points to perhaps the least palatable aspect of Alexander's generalship: his taste for blood. From the start of his reign, Alexander used terror as a military and political tactic. His

¹⁶ Rock of Aornus: Ashley 1998: 313–317. March through Phoenicia and Egypt: Jonathan Roth forthcoming 2004.

appetite only grew with the eating. He was following in his father's footsteps. Beginning with Philip II, the Macedonians had made a point of pursuing a defeated enemy. In 358 BC, for example, Philip killed 7,000 out of a force of 15,000 Dardanians. At Issus in 333 BC, the Persians suffered far more losses while harried in their retreat than in the battle itself; reliable numbers have not survived, but it is clear that the slaughter was vast. At Hydaspes in 326 BC, Alexander inflicted about 12,000 battle deaths on the Indians, an estimated one-fourth to one-third of their army—that is, a bloodbath.¹⁷

Several massacres punctuated Alexander's progress through Greece and the Persian empire. In 335 BC at Thebes, for example, he allowed Thebes' long-time enemies to satisfy their vengeance by having 6,000 Theban men killed; 30,000 survivors were enslaved and most of the city was razed. After having conquered the Persian cavalry at the Granicus in 334 BC, Alexander refused to accept the surrender of the Greek infantry mercenaries who had fought for Persia. Branding them traitors, he had his army mow down most of them; he took the remaining 2,000 men prisoner. After breaking through the walls of Tyre in the siege of 332 BC, Alexander let his men kill 8,000 Tyrians of whom 2,000 were crucified on the coast—as a warning for passers-by.¹⁸

On the whole, however, Alexander followed a policy of restrained brutality, even of conciliation, in Greece and western Persia. As the heir to the Persian throne after crushing Darius at Gaugamela in 331, he commanded a certain grudging respect from the Iranian aristocracy and he generally exploited it. The inhabitants of the eastern Persian empire were less quick to cooperate, however; in the provinces of Bactria and Sogdiana they faced Alexander with open rebellion. Worse still, near Samarkand in 329, the rebel Spitamenes ambushed and massacred most of a Macedonian force of 2,300 men under the general Pharnuches. Alexander responded with ferocity. At Cyropolis in northern Sogdiana, for example, the Macedonians killed 8,000 defenders, enslaved 15,000 more, and razed the city—

¹⁷ On the battle of Hydaspes, see Bosworth *Alexander and the East* 1996: 5–21 and in this volume, Ashley 1998: 318–329, both with references to ancient sources and modern scholarship. On Philip II and the Dardanians, see Ashley 1998: 112–114.

¹⁸ On Thebes, Granicus, Tyre, see Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 32–33, 35–44, 64–67, 194–196; Ashley 1998: 177–181, 187–202, 237–249, with references to ancient sources and to earlier scholarship.

and Cyropolis was only one of seven cities in the vicinity to suffer this fate in 329. Other massacres followed in southern Sogdiana.¹⁹

Alexander was even less restrained in India. As in Sogdiana, if a town resisted, all adult males were to be killed and the women and children enslaved. Not even refugees were spared in India, however: they were hunted down and killed by Macedonian cavalry. In 325 BC, Alexander and his army moved south along the Indus in an ugly mood, after the mutiny by the Hyphasis. Towns that failed to resist were treated cruelly. In the citadel of the Malli where Alexander was wounded, the children and women as well as the men were massacred.

To sum up, Alexander was a brilliant strategist and tactician and a superb leader of men. He was courageous, bold, rugged, resolute, shrewd, versatile, and fast. He was lucky too to face second-rate opponents. Was Alexander a military genius, as some historians claim? That does not seem an excessive judgment. Yet there were other sides to Alexander as well. He was as infatuated with his own glory as he was willing to risk lives to achieve it. He turned on his own generals while he proclaimed himself divine. He unhesitatingly pursued a policy of terror which evolved in time into a policy of mass murder. Alexander was a great general but he was also a great killer of innocent people.²⁰

The Macedonian Army

Philip II created history's first great combined-force military. His army combined Greek science, Persian imperial scale, and Macedonian brutality. As honed by Alexander, it proved to be one of history's most flexible, powerful, and terrifying weapons.

Persian numbers are impossible to pin down. It is certain though that throughout Alexander's campaigns, they vastly outnumbered the

¹⁹ Ashley 1998: 296–297.

²⁰ The leading exponent of the realist view of Alexander is A. B. Bosworth, whose work I have relied on in this section, especially Bosworth *Alexander and the East* 1996. Good, skeptical assessments of Alexander's various military actions (marred unfortunately by minor errors) can also be found in Ashley 1998, which book I have also consulted often. Another realist introduction to Alexander is Hanson 1999: 174–197.

Macedonians. Alexander's achievement as conqueror, therefore, represents a triumph of quality over quantity.

Alexander's veterans were considered to be the best fighters whom the ancient world ever produced. The Silver Shields, for example, the survivors of the elite hypaspists, are said to have routed the enemy phalanx at the battle of Gabiene in 316 BC. According to a reliable ancient author, they caused 5,000 enemy casualties without suffering any losses of their own (Diod. 19.43.3, cf. Plut. *Eum.* 16.7). Five years earlier, in 321, eight veterans of Alexander, guarded by 400 soldiers, supposedly revolted successfully.²¹

The instrument of Philip's military success and Alexander's after him—was a well-trained, professional, year-round force. With its plains and horses, Macedon was cavalry country, and Philip made cavalry his main attack weapon. Up to one-fifth of Alexander's army was made up of cavalry, a high percentage for an army in any period of history.

The Macedonian phalanx was meant to hold the enemy phalanx until the cavalry could find a weak spot and attack. It was, as some have called it, a hammer-and-anvil tactic. Unlike classical Greek infantry battles, which contained little tactical refinement, the Macedonian military won through a combination of maneuver, timing, and tricks.

Macedonian hoplites (infantrymen) carried extra-long pikes to stop the enemy at a distance without engaging him head on. Known as a *sarissa*, the Macedonian pike was about 18-feet long. It was made of ash and had a small iron head, with a narrow diamond or lozenge shape in order best to penetrate body armor. It also had an iron butt for emplacement in the ground when not in use.²² Two hands were necessary to carry so long a pike. Unlike a classical Greek infantryman, therefore, a Macedonian hoplite could not hold a large body-shield in his left hand. Instead, he used a small button-shaped shield, held by a thong around his neck. He also wore only light body armor. It was the *sarissa* which kept the enemy at bay and

²¹ Silver shields: Bosworth *Alexander and the East* 1996: 27. In this section, on the Macedonian army, I rely in large part on Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 259–277 as well as on Jonathan Roth forthcoming 2004. For an introduction to Philip, Alexander, and the Macedonian army, see also Ferrill 1985: 175–180; Hanson 1999: 144–154.

²² See Sekunda 2001, which cites earlier work, much of which it supercedes.

provided the phalanx with its primary protection. Indeed, it appears that the sarissa reduced infantry casualties from their previous level.

A typical phalanx was sixteen-men deep, although eight-deep or thirty-two-deep phalanxes were not uncommon. Macedonian infantrymen trained year-round. The result was to teach individual infantrymen to work as a group. As a unit, the phalanx offered unmatched power and cohesion. It was not as flexible as the Roman legion would later prove to be; the Macedonian phalanx could not fight in mountains, for example. Yet it could handle rough or broken terrain, even a small river, as at Issus in 333 BC. The Macedonian phalanx was sufficiently flexible that the men in the middle could deal with gaps that opened up in the front of the line, as happened both at Issus and at Gaugamela in 331.

In addition to the regular phalanx, which was called the Foot Companions, the Macedonian army had an elite phalanx unit known as the hypaspists. The hypaspists were men picked for their skill and physique. At Alexander's death the hypaspists were 3,000 strong. The Macedonian infantry consisted of 27,000 men in 334 BC: 15,000 crossed into Anatolia, while 12,000 stayed in Macedon to prevent a Greek uprising in the rear. In addition, Alexander's Macedonian foot soldiers were enlarged by mercenaries and allied contingents, perhaps another 20,000 men in 334. These included both hoplites and specialist troops, among them Cretan archers and Agrianian light infantry. The Agrianians, javelin-carrying mountaineers, played a crucial role in Alexander's campaigns. They were the men to call in for fast and hard marches on rough terrain or as defensive screens before the main line in set battles, conditions for which the phalanx was insufficiently flexible.²³

The striking arm of Philip's and Alexander's army was the cavalry. The Macedonian cavalry, known as the Companions, consisted of 1,800 men in 334 BC. They wore light armor and carried a thrusting lance of cornel wood, tipped by a large iron spear-head to open up big, debilitating flesh wounds. Their name and their long-sleeved purple tunics were borrowed from Persian practice, but they were put to a purely Macedonian use. Philip made the cavalry into his striking force. While the Macedonian infantry maneuvered to

²³ On the discussion and statistics in this and the two following paragraphs, see Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 259–271.

hold the enemy phalanx and open up a break in its line, the cavalry, in a wedge-shaped formation, would exploit the gap and charge the exposed flank. Time and again, the result was to destroy the enemy's cohesion and send his army into flight, often with massive casualties inflicted upon them by Macedonians in pursuit.

The Macedonian cavalry was augmented by Thessalian cavalry which was almost of as high quality as well as by cavalry from Thrace and Paeonia; probably one of these latter groups served as the scout cavalry or *prodromoi*. Alexander had about 3,000 allied cavalry when he crossed the Dardanelles in 334 BC.

Philip also mastered the new technology of siegecraft. The approximately half century since the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404 BC had witnessed a revolution in the military technology of siege warfare. Warfare in Sicily between Carthaginians and Greeks in the late fifth century and throughout the fourth century was the testing ground for new techniques, which quickly made their way eastward to the Greek mainland.²⁴

The biggest development was the invention of artillery, culminating in the torsion catapult. Artillery, when coupled with battering rams and siege towers, made it possible to knock down walls and capture cities in a matter of weeks rather than years. When supplemented by specialized troops like archers or firemen (to put out blazes in the equipment set by defenders), besieging armies could prove devastatingly effective.²⁵ Alexander's greatest achievements in siegecraft were reached at Miletus, Gaza, and Tyre, all of which fell to his engineers. At Halicarnassus, he achieved only partial success against determined opposition led by Memnon of Rhodes: a sign of what Persia might have done against Macedon with better leadership. At least in his early years, Alexander also knew when to back off from a siege: in 333 BC at Termessus (sometimes called Telmissus) in Lycia, he decided that investing the city would prove too time-consuming and moved on. Since Termessus was located on a 3,000-foot steep cliff and posed little threat to his army, Alexander had made a wise choice (Arr. 1.27.5–28; cf. Strabo 666; Polyb. 22.18).²⁶

²⁴ Garlan 1974: 156–169; Caven 1990; Kern 1999: 163–193. On fourth-century BC Greek warfare generally, see Anderson 1970.

²⁵ For an introduction, see Hanson 1999: 159–171; Marsden 1969; Ober 1987.

²⁶ Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 170; Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 51; Ashley 1997: 213.

Another of Philip's achievements was to streamline logistics, a prerequisite to the speed that Alexander achieved. Philip had soldiers carry their own rations, cut back radically on the number of non-combatants, and cut out wheeled transport. Each soldier of Alexander carried his helmet, shield, leather, breastplate, greaves, spear or sarissa, and utensils; heavily armored troops also carried a cuirass and wore a kilt of leather strips covered with bronze. They also carried personal items in a back pack, swords, and possibly other supplies.²⁷

Alexander could not have motivated his army to maintain a fighting march all the way to India without continual attention on his part. He paid his men generously and there was booty aplenty to be looted in the conquered lands. At first, Alexander like Philip forbade wives and women, but the rule was relaxed when the army left the Mediterranean for Iraq; now, soldiers were allowed to have women, and children naturally followed. As far as other comforts, to judge from the drinking sprees that Alexander and his circle are often described as engaging in, liberal amounts of alcohol were available to the commanders. It is hard to imagine that the ordinary men did not follow suit, especially given the Macedonians' reputation for hard drinking. Whether that alcohol was needed as a way of forgetting the killing fields or whether, as has been suggested, sacrificing the enemy proved cathartic for Alexander's army, is an open question.²⁸

Manpower, of course, was a serious matter. Even a victorious army suffers casualties and desertion; men have to be replaced. In 334 BC Alexander had about 40,000 men: about 35,000 infantry and about 5,000 cavalry. It is estimated that about 15,000 new Macedonians, infantry and cavalry, joined Alexander between 333 and 331. About 30,000 Macedonians altogether, therefore, took part in Alexander's war. In 330 BC, Alexander felt secure enough to dismiss his Greek allied troops. He replaced them with Greek mercenaries and with Asian troops, but no new Macedonian units were sent out from the homeland after 331 BC, presumably because it had been picked dry.²⁹

²⁷ Engels 1978: p. 31 n. 21.

²⁸ On Alexander and alcohol, see Hammond *Alexander the Great* 1980: 297–299. For an account of drinking before hoplite battle in classical Greece see Hanson 2000: 126–131.

²⁹ Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 266–268.

After returning to his capital in Babylon from South Asia in 325 BC, Alexander began training a new army of 30,000 Iranians and dismissed 10,000 Macedonian troops. He and his main commanders all married Iranian women. In 324 BC Alexander staged a grand banquet in Mesopotamia for 9000, at which he prayed for "concord and a partnership in rule between Greeks and Persians." Such actions were a sharp break with traditional Greek ethnocentrism. Aristotle, for example, had said that the peoples of western Asia were fit only to be slaves. Alexander's policy no doubt owed less to idealism than to a desire for a new power base independent of the Macedonian nobility.

But this was not entirely a new institution. His new units may have been based on a pre-existing corps, either the Macedonian royal pages or, perhaps more likely, a Persian imperial infantry whom Briant identifies with the mysterious *kardakes*.

Tactics and Strategy

On the eve of invasion, Persia vastly outnumbered Macedon on both land and sea. The Persian navy numbered 400 warships; Alexander's had only 160. Alexander entered Anatolia with about 40,000 men; the size of Persia's army is not known, but it can confidently be put at several times larger than Alexander's. Well over 20,000 Greek infantrymen fought for Persia against the Macedonians. Darius III of Persia was rich, but Alexander's treasury was virtually empty. The Macedonian expeditionary force was short on supplies. The peoples in Persia's multiethnic empire were restive, but so too were Alexander's Greek allies, the mainstay of his fleet. One of Darius's advisers proposed a naval campaign to raise a revolt in Greece and force the Macedonians home. The 10,000 Macedonians sent to Anatolia by Philip in 336 had won victories at first but in 335 a Persian counter-offensive had pushed them back to the region of the Dardanelles. How then did Alexander propose to conquer Persia?³⁰

³⁰ Navies: Ashley 1998: 91–92, 104–105. Alexander's empty treasury and his supply problems: Green 1991: 152–156. Mercenaries: Ashley 1998: 61; cf. Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 61. Initial Macedonian offensive in Anatolia: Bosworth 1988: 34–35. On Alexander's strategy, Fuller 1960: 81–143 is still fundamental.

The answer was his faith in the Macedonian army. Although Alexander invaded Anatolia with only about 40,000 men, they were the fastest marching, most experienced and most skilled army in the eastern Mediterranean. If Persia would fight the Macedonians in a set battle, Alexander had good reason to be confident of victory—and there was reason to believe that Persia would do just that.

Of Persia under Darius III, an observer might have said, as Thucydides said of Sparta from the point of view of Athens during the Peloponnesian War, that Alexander had found “the most convenient people in the world . . . to be at war with” (Thuc. 8.96.5). Although Achaemenid Persia had many weaknesses, it had many strengths too. Used properly, they could have defeated Alexander.³¹

From the mid-sixth to the late-fifth centuries BC, the Persian Empire and the Greek city-states duelled for control of the Aegean Sea. Until 479 BC, Persia ruled; with the defeat of its invasion of Greece in that year, Persia lost the initiative to the Greeks. A coalition of Greek city-states, led by Athens, dominated the Aegean until 412 BC. Greece’s Achilles heel was the intermittent war between the city-states. In 412, during the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC), the advantage swung to Sparta, which presented an opening into which Persia reinserted its power. Between 412 BC and the 350s BC, Persia was generally successful at keeping the Greek city-states divided and weak. The rise of Macedon under Philip, however, changed the strategic balance. By uniting the Greek peninsula under the rule of his kingdom, Philip raised the possibility of a new strategic offensive against Persia.

Persia’s obvious response was to return to the strategy which it had served it well for a half-century: divide and conquer. Macedon’s alliance system was ripe for destabilizing. The leading Greek powers, Athens and Thebes, had been forced into alliance with Philip on the battlefield. His assassination in 336 occasioned a series of revolts. Thebes was removed from the equation by Alexander’s brutal suppression of its rebellion in 335 BC, after his accession to the throne. Persia had supported Athens in 340 by supplying mercenaries to stop Philip in the region of the Gallipoli peninsula; in 335

³¹ For Alexander’s conquests from the Persian point of view—as a war of “Macedonian aggression”—see Briant *Alexander the Great* 1996 and *Histoire de l’empire perse* 1996: 837–890, and Brosius in this volume. For a positive assessment of the Achaemenid Persian empire, see Wiesehofer 1996: 5–107.

it supplied money to Greek rebels against Alexander. In both cases, it was too little, too late.

Alexander seems to have understood that in order to conquer Persia, he had to neutralize a Persian offensive in Greece. Greece remained unreliable enough that when he invaded Anatolia in 334, he left behind a force of 12,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry under the able general Antipater (Diod. 17.17.5). That ought to have sufficed to offset the inducement to revolt which Persian monetary disbursements might represent. A naval offensive, however, was not countered as easily. Alexander had only 160 warships at his disposal. They would have been no match for Persia's resources of up to 400 warships even had they been trustworthy; since most of the ships were not Macedonian but Greek, having been contributed by the allies, they were unreliable.

How then, was Alexander to respond? The strategy he followed, not unlike Philip's strategy against Athens, was to strangle the Persian navy in its cradle. By taking Persian fortified ports like Miletus and Halicarnassus, he would deprive Persia of its Anatolian naval bases as well as its access to manpower resources, thereby forcing the Persian fleet out of the Aegean. If he continued the policy in Phoenicia, he would drive the Persians south to Egypt.

Alexander might never have succeeded had Darius adhered to the advice of his ablest general. He was Memnon of Rhodes, a Greek mercenary who had served the Persians for over a decade. Memnon had also spent time in Macedon during Philip's reign and he knew the extent of its military power. He proposed a sophisticated, dual strategy for Persia: in the east, retreat and a scorched-earth policy; in the west, an offensive. One ancient source describes the plan thus:

Memnon the Rhodian, famed for his military competence, advocated a policy of not fighting a pitched battle, but of stripping the countryside and through the shortage of supplies preventing the Macedonians from advancing further, while at the same time they [the Persians] sent naval and land forces across to Macedonia and transferred the impact of war to Europe. (Diod. 17.18.2)³²

Memnon's strategy was brilliant but unpopular. Many Persians owned land in western Anatolia; one governor there is said to have rejected scorched-earth tactics out of hand. Yet Memnon's move would have

³² Welles 1963: 169.

cost Alexander dearly. When the Macedonian army set out in early spring 334, it carried only 30 days' worth of food supplies; when they crossed the Dardanelles, that was down to 10 days' worth (Plut. *Moral.* 342e). Alexander's men would be dependent on requisition from locals and foraging. Had the Persians ravaged their fields and orchards and emptied their storehouses, the Macedonians might have starved. Yet only after Alexander had conquered most of Anatolia, in 333, did the Persian satrap of Cilicia, the rich province in southern Anatolia, lay waste his territory.

By then, Alexander had won his first great battle at the Granicus River just south of the Dardanelles (334 BC). Realizing that he had neither the money nor the men to beat Memnon, Alexander had simply dissolved most of his fleet. He had retained 20 Athenian ships to carry his siege equipment and provide, in its crews, 4,000 Athenian hostages. He had taken the great cities of Anatolia, including Miletus, which he successfully besieged.

By the same token, however, Memnon made great headway in 333 with his naval strategy. With a fleet of 300 ships that Darius put at his disposal, Memnon conquered several important Aegean islands, including Chios and most of Lesbos, and disbursed money liberally to potential allies on the Greek mainland. The city of Miletus was recaptured by Persian forces. The year before, at Halicarnassus, Memnon had directed the resistance to Alexander's siege; although Memnon could not save the city, he prevented Alexander from taking Halicarnassus's twin citadels on the harbor. Unfortunately for Persia, however, Memnon died of an illness in June 333. If he had lived, writes Plutarch,

Memnon . . . was thought likely to give Alexander abundant trouble and infinite annoyance. . . . (*Alexander*, 18.5)³³

Although the Persian fleet continued to advance under his successors, the strategy of raising a revolt in Macedon's rear no longer had an advocate at court; Memnon's policy died with him.³⁴

Persian elite ideology had always favored the use of the army to face the enemy head-on. Darius, moreover, was a new monarch and a usurper and was under pressure to prove himself in the field. Besides, he had ascended the throne in part on his record of per-

³³ Perrin 1971: 275.

³⁴ On the war at sea, see Hammond 1997: 71–73, 83–86, 90–97.

sonal bravery (Diod. 17.6.1; Just. 10.3) and might well have chafed at having to avoid battle. After Memnon's death, he took the path of least resistance. He compounded the error of abandoning Memnon's strategy by deciding to raise a huge army and man it himself. At a conference at Susa in mid-summer 333, Darius's adviser Charidemus, an Athenian general exiled by Alexander two years before, counseled otherwise. He favored a small army by Persian standards—100,000 men, of whom one-third would be Greek mercenaries—led by Charidemus while Darius stayed home and minded the empire. Not only did Darius reject the advice, but he had Charidemus executed, allegedly after picking him up bodily in response to an exchange of insults about the relative fighting skills of Persians and Greeks.³⁵

Darius mobilized his forces in summer and moved rapidly to the Mediterranean coast. A decisive battle ensued about November 1 at Issus, located today in southern Turkey. The battle took place on the Pinarus River, a stream on a strip of land between the Amanus Mountains and the Gulf of Iskenderun, at a place perhaps about 3 miles wide (the exact site of the battle is uncertain). Issus took place somewhere about 75 miles north of today's Turco-Syrian border. Although Darius achieved tactical surprise, the Macedonians nonetheless crushed his army. They inflicted heavy casualties and forced Darius to flee and to leave behind his mother, wife, and children, who were in his camp.

Issus was a military and political disaster for Persia. Darius was now constrained to offer Alexander the kingship of all Asia west of Mesopotamia; Alexander understood that it was to his advantage to refuse and seek better terms. Meanwhile, he would have to use force to take what Darius had offered him, but the result would be a huge boost in military and political capital for future battles.

Alexander demonstrated his strategic insight by marching south along the Mediterranean, demanding the surrender of every city he came to. This was necessary as long as the Persian fleet remained intact; Alexander kept his eyes on the threat. Indeed, the great seaport of Tyre, a major Persian naval base, refused surrender. Alexander responded, appropriately, by laying siege to the town. Part way through the siege, the Persian fleet broke up; several of the contingents joined Alexander and helped him finally to conquer Tyre, after

³⁵ On Darius, see Strauss and Ober 1990: 112–114, 124.

seven months of resistance. At this point Alexander might have turned eastward to seek out Darius, but he continued southward to Palestine and Egypt, which he added to his realm.

Darius, meanwhile, demonstrated his continuing strategic misjudgment. As Alexander prepared to turn east, it was now more than ever the time for a scorched-earth policy as Memnon had advised. The Euphrates River is easy to cross but the Tigris presented a potential obstacle for the Macedonians, because it is deep, fast, and high-banked. Darius could have defended every fording-place with cavalry. Yet he did not. Nor did he do all that he could to deny Alexander food supplies. Darius ordered the crops burned along the Euphrates but not the Tigris, across which plentiful provisions awaited the Macedonians.

Darius was either careless or over-confident; indeed, he might have wished to draw the enemy into battle. Since Issus, Darius had raised another army from Persia and his eastern domains. Its size is unknown, but it is clear that it greatly outnumbered Alexander's approximately 50,000 men. The two armies met about 75 miles from the Tigris crossing, at a place named Gaugamela near the modern city of Mosul in northern Iraq. The date was about October 1, 331.³⁶

Curtius represents Alexander on the eve of the battle as appreciating Darius's miscalculation. The Macedonian said to an adviser:

When Darius was burning the land, destroying villages and ruining our food supplies, I was beside myself with despair. But now that he is preparing to decide the issue in battle, what do I have to fear? Good heavens, he has answered my prayers! (Curtius 4.13.23–24).³⁷

Macedon crushed the enemy at Gaugamela. Darius fled into Iran, was deposed, assassinated, and replaced by a man whom Alexander captured and executed. By 328 Alexander's claim to be king of Persia was sealed with blood and iron.

He had not, however, conquered Iran nor the eastern satrapies, which took his attention from 330 to 327. Alexander's first goal was to capture Bessus, the Persian aristocrat who had succeeded Darius, as well as the leaders who supported him. Those leaders eventually joined Alexander, who pardoned them, but Bessus required pursuit into Bactria and Sogdiana. Neither Bessus nor Alexander's other

³⁶ Army strengths at Gaugamela: for one estimate, see Ashley 1998: 258–259.

³⁷ Yardley 1984: 81.

opponents in these regions was about to fight a decisive battle against him, as Darius had. Instead, they pursued mobile techniques, using the excellent cavalry for which the eastern Persian empire was famous. Alexander replied in kind, dividing up his army and using cavalry and light infantry. He also used mercenary infantry to man garrisons in his new realm.

Bessus was captured in 328 BC. It took another year for Alexander to defeat the most troublesome of his opponents in Sogdiana, Spitamenes, who had crushed a Macedonian force in 329 (above). In 327, Alexander defeated Spitamenes' cavalry and then received Spitamenes's severed head as a sign of submission from the locals.

In 327 BC, Alexander crossed the Hindu Kush again into India. Although he fought a pitched battle there against Porus in 326, his military campaigns consisted primarily of sieges and massacres. Indian resistance was furious but not especially effective. It was homesickness and weather that drove his men to mutiny and so finally defeated Alexander. After a difficult return to Mesopotamia in 325 via the desert (for part of his troops) and the Arabian Sea (for another part), Alexander waged a winter war in the Zagros Mountains against the Cossaeans and began the preparatory stages of an Arabian campaign. Death stopped him in 323.³⁸

Battle

The war against Darius was decided in three great battles: at the Granicus River in Anatolia (334 BC), at Issus in Syria (333 BC), and at Gaugamela in Mesopotamia (331 BC). Each of them demonstrated Alexander's tactical skill and the superb qualities of his army. In each of them, however, he was also helped by Persian blunders.³⁹

At the Granicus River, the western satraps of the Persian empire chose to make a stand, against Memnon of Rhodes's advice. They had strong cavalry and nearly 20,000 Greek mercenaries (Arr. 1.14.4). Between them and the Macedonians stood the Granicus, a shallow

³⁸ For an overview of Alexander's war against Darius, see Strauss and Ober 1990: 103–131.

³⁹ Good introductions (though often debatable on particular points) can be found in Ashley 1998: 187–202, 222–235, 257–269.

river with steep banks. The ancient sources leave much doubt as to where the Persians stood; it is unclear whether they chose a position for their cavalry that gave them enough room to charge and whether they placed their infantry appropriately. In any case, whether they chose a good or bad location, they had misjudged the ability of their javelin-armed horsemen to withstand the power of the Macedonian cavalry lances. The Macedonian cavalry on the right led the attack, with Alexander in the thick of things in the second wave. They crossed the river on one or more of the stretches where gravel deposits eased the ascent, charged diagonally into the Persians, and blunted the Persian advance. Then the Macedonians hacked the cavalry to pieces with their lances. Instead of pursuing the enemy in flight, the Macedonians turned on the Greek mercenary infantry, whose surrender they refused. Instead, Alexander insisted that most of the Greeks be slaughtered as traitors. There was no little hypocrisy in this, since in truth Macedon posed a greater threat to Greek freedom in 334 than did Persia.⁴⁰

Between Granicus and the second pitched battle at Issus came Alexander's march through Anatolia, the successful siege of Miletus and partially successful siege of Halicarnassus, the rise and fall of Memnon of Rhodes's naval offensive, and finally, the gathering of an army by Darius III. In his pursuit of Alexander in October 333, Darius led his army westward across the Syrian desert and then north on the eastern side of the Amanus Mountains. Alexander, meanwhile, marched south on the western side of the Amanus range. On the day of the battle, Darius led his army through a pass in the Amanus Mountains to Issus on the coast. He thereby cut off Alexander from his supplies in the rear. Darius then advanced southward several miles to encamp at the Pinarus River, more accurately described as a stream.

A lesser man might have lost his nerve at this surprise but not Alexander. Instead he calmly rallied his troops, realizing that the turn of events actually stood to his advantage. Darius had forced Alexander into a sudden battle but he had also ensured that it would be fought on unfavorable terrain, because Persia could not outflank its numerically inferior opponent in the narrow territory between the mountains and the sea. Darius would have been better off had he

⁴⁰ On the cavalry at Granicus, see Harl 1997.

followed the advice of a Macedonian deserter in his entourage, one Amyntas, who proposed that they wait for Alexander east of the mountains, in the Syrian desert, whose flat plains would allow a full deployment of the Persian force.

At Issus, the Persians deployed their cavalry on their right, beside the sea; the Greek mercenary infantry held the center, while the Persian infantry stood on the left, rising into the foothills. Opposite them, Alexander drew up the Thessalian infantry on his left, the phalanx in the center, and the Companion Cavalry on the right. The Companion Cavalry led the charge, heading for Darius in his war chariot. As at the Granicus, the Persian javelin-men were unable to withstand the power of the Macedonian lancers. Meanwhile, the Persian cavalry and the Greek infantry made substantial progress. Not only did they push the Macedonian line back, but the Greek mercenaries ripped open gaps in the Macedonian phalanx, which might have torn apart the hitherto invincible formation. Fortunately for Alexander, his cavalry drove Darius from the field before the enemy could do its damage. They turned and followed him. It appears that Darius had no choice; he was no coward, but if he hadn't fled, he would have been captured.

The battle of Gaugamela in 331 BC told a similar story. Here, Darius chose a flat plain to deploy his vast army. He vastly outnumbered the Macedonians, apparently even more so than at Issus, supported as he now was by a large and excellent cavalry force from the eastern satrapies of the empire. He no longer had a large force of Greek mercenaries, but Darius hoped to rend gashes in the Macedonian phalanx by using two hundred scythed chariots. That weapon, however, which harkened back to the second millennium BC, was well past its prime. Alexander countered successfully by attacking the horses with his archers and by having his well-disciplined men open ranks to let the surviving chariots pass through.

Alexander's main innovation, however, appears to have been arranging his men in a hollow square. At least this plausible interpretation of the evidence allows us to understand how he planned to protect his army from the inevitable outflanking by the Persians. Alexander began the battle by moving his army toward the right, where the Persians outflanked him; the Persians responded by attacking the Macedonian left, which had been outflanked in turn by Alexander's move. The Macedonian left, commanded by Parmenio, was pounded hard by the Persians while on the right, Alexander and the Companion

Cavalry once again found and exploited a gap. Darius was driven from the field and Alexander pursued him until evening for a distance of twenty miles. Meanwhile, Parmenio did an excellent job of keeping the Macedonian left intact.

The Macedonians did not fight another set battle for five years, until they faced the Indian king Porus in 326 BC near the Hydaspes (modern Jhelum) River. The intervening years challenged Alexander with the pursuit first of Darius and then of Bessus, the able cavalry commander who had arrested Darius and then succeeded him when Darius was murdered. Afterwards came the conquest of the eastern satrapies, which saw mountain fighting, cavalry chases, the crossing of wide rivers, the capture of rocky forts, and the by-now familiar siege of walled towns.⁴¹

The battle against Porus in 326 must have almost been a relief, by contrast. Porus commanded a force employing as many as two hundred elephants. The number of his men was unknown, but it was smaller than Alexander's army. Porus represented nothing like the kind of military threat that Darius had. Alexander employed against him only a small force, consisting of 11,000 men. Apparently, Porus had hoped to use the Hydaspes River as a barrier to stop Alexander and to entice him toward easier targets. Once Alexander had made his surprise crossing of the river (see above), his victory was all but assured. Alexander's infantry suffered considerable casualties before inflicting enough wounds on the elephants to make them uncontrollable. The Macedonians dealt with the elephants as adeptly as they had dealt with Darius's scythed chariots, by opening their ranks. They killed the drivers with their sarissae and forced the elephants back into enemy lines. Now rampaging, the elephants trampled Porus's own men to death. Some of the Indian infantry escaped, but the cavalry were massacred.

Conclusion

Let us return to the question with which this chapter opened—How did Alexander do it? In the story of Alexander, history united one

⁴¹ A stimulating discussion of the Hydaspes can be found in Bosworth *Alexander and the East* 1996: 5–21, and see Chapter 6 in this volume.

of its most formidable military machines—the Macedonian army—with a brilliant and bloodthirsty general, in a mission to which his men gave unquestioning devotion for eleven years, against an enemy who proved to be incompetent. Think of Alexander as an awful accident—in which the right man got the right tools to use against the right foe—or let him inspire you. In either case, do not forget that after Alexander's death, the Macedonians tore up his plans for future conquest. Few will regret that history has never quite seen his like again.

CHAPTER SIX

THE INDIAN CAMPAIGNS, 327–325 BC*


A. Brian Bosworth

The invasion of India had been maturing for some time with the encouragement of Indian refugees, notably Sisicottus who had served with Alexander throughout the Sogdian revolt. Interested rulers from the Indus valley, notably the prince of Taxila, had also intrigued with the conqueror, hoping to use his army for their own purposes. But no encouragement was needed. As Alexander surely knew from Herodotus, the Indus valley had been acquired for the Persian empire by Darius I, and the inhabitants of the Kabul valley at least had sent cavalry and elephants to the Persian grand army at Gaugamela.¹ There was also the factor of emulation. Greek tradition knew of the exploits of the legendary Babylonian queen Semiramis and her conquests in India; and, more pertinently, there was already a legend in vogue that Dionysus had begun his triumphal progress in the eastern lands. Alexander's staff was ready to find and create evidence for the presence of both Heracles and Dionysus. Most conveniently a small community which surrendered to him in the mountains between the Choes and the Kunar valley was identified as the birth-place of Dionysus. Nearby was a mountain whose local name recalled the Greek *meros* (Dionysus was reputed to have been concealed in the thigh (*mêros gk*) of Zeus, and there were abundant growths of ivy and bay trees. That encouraged the presumption that the inhabitants worshipped Dionysus and were descended from the god's entourage. They were accordingly granted their freedom (under the supervision of Alexander's satrap) with high commendation of their aristocratic government.²

* The following chapter was originally published in D. M. Lewis, J. Boardman, S. Hornblower and M. Ostwald, eds. 1994. *The Cambridge Ancient History* Second Edition. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge: vol. 6: 826–834. It is preceded by an account of Alexander's responses to local insurrections in Sogdiana and Bactria.

¹ Arr. 3.8.3,6. See further Badian 1985: 462.

² On this episode see Goukowsky 1978–81: II 21–33; Brunt 1976–83: II 437–42;



Map 1. The Kabul Valley.

Other communities were less fortunate, and the record of the campaign in Gandhara makes grim reading. Alexander began his invasion from Parapamisadae, after reinforcing his new Alexandria (Begram) with extra settlers. Half the Macedonian troops and all the mercenaries followed Hephaestion and Perdiccas along the main road to the Indus. The elite troops left with Alexander campaigned in the mountain districts, in what is now Bajaur and Swat. The pattern was set in the valley of the Choes (Alingar?),³ where resistance was punished by massacre and destruction. Some settlements capitulated, but most of the populace took refuge in the mountains until the storm passed. Alexander overran the territory, took numerous prisoners when he came into contact with the fugitive population and established military settlements at strategic sites. The methods devised for the Sogdian insurgency were employed again in India.

The most determined resistance came from the Assaceni of the Lower Swat. The local ruler had a moderate army (30,000 foot and 2,000 horse) which he strengthened with mercenaries from the plains and distributed around his strongholds. It was futile. The largest city, Massaga, had fortifications of mud brick and stone which quickly gave way before the Macedonian artillery barrage. On the verge of capture the city was surrendered under guarantee that the mercenary garrison would join Alexander's army. The mercenaries were in fact massacred under mysterious circumstances, possibly through a misunderstanding; and the city was then taken by assault. That did not encourage surrender elsewhere. The neighbouring cities, Ora and Bazira, held out until Ora was taken by storm. Bazira was evacuated, and the population at large took refuge in the mountain fortress of Aornus. It was associated with the Indian deity Krishna, whom Alexander's staff identified as Heracles, and it was allegedly impregnable—even by Heracles. That inspired Alexander to emulate and surpass. Unlike Heracles he had the most modern anti-personnel catapults, and, helped by local guides, he occupied a position high on a saddle threatening the citadel.⁴ A siege mound was

Bosworth *From Arrian to Alexander* 1988: 70–2. It was mentioned as early as Theophrastus (*Hist. Pl.* 4.4.1).

³ The topography of the early campaign is in dispute. I follow in the main the reconstruction of Eggermont 1970: 108; cf. Goukowsky 1978–81: II.23–4; *contra*, Stein 1929: 41; Seibert 1985: 150–I.

⁴ Identified attractively by Sir Aurel Stein as the ridge of Pit Sar, a level plateau

then constructed to support his siege artillery and its relentless advance forced the defenders first to capitulation and then to flight. The most formidable natural fortress of the area was captured relatively quickly and with a modest force of light infantry and phalanx troops. After this shock the resistance collapsed. The last enemy forces under arms left the mountains of Buner to find refuge with Abisares, prince of Hazara to the east of the Indus.


Meanwhile Hephaestion and Perdikkas had pushed forward to the Indus, capturing the capital of Peucelaotis (Charsadda) en route.⁵ Even before Alexander began his siege of Aornus, they had bridged the Indus. To the west Gandhara was quiet under a Macedonian satrap, subdued by an autumn and winter of terror and repression. Now, in the spring of 326, Alexander crossed the Indus near Ohind, where he met Omphis (Ambhi), the prince of Taxila. The submission formally offered in Sogdiana was renewed, and he was confirmed in his principedom under the satrap appointed by Alexander. The union was celebrated by sacrifices and games at Taxila itself, while emissaries visited the neighbouring princes. Abisares was prudent enough to offer submission, but Porus, ruler of the rich country between the Hydaspes (Jhelum) and Acesines (Chenab), rejected the overtures and prepared to defend his realm.

The campaign of the Hydaspes ensued. Alexander immediately led his army from Taxila, intent on reaching the river before it was in full spate. He crossed the Great Salt Range⁶ and established his base camp on the river bank in the face of Porus' army, which held the eastern side, its elephants in full view. The strategic problem was the river crossing. Alexander kept his forces in constant motion, at the same time transporting a flotilla by land from the Indus and giving the impression that he was prepared to wait until the river reached low water in September. During these manoeuvres he had identified a crossing point where the Hydaspes flowed around a densely wooded headland and an island was conveniently placed to conceal the fleet. Under the cover of a spring thunderstorm he made

with wheat fields (Stein 1929: 131–2). For an alternative suggestion (Mt Ilam) see Eggermont 1984; Badian 1987: 717.

⁵ Arr. 4.22.8. See Wheeler 1968: 95–8; Badian 1987.

⁶ For the various locations of the campaign see Seibert 1972: 158–60; 1985: 156–7. Given the gradual changes of the river system since antiquity, it is unlikely that certainty will ever be achieved—unless Alexander's commemorative foundations are one day unearthed.



Map 2. The Punjab. The main map illustrates the present-day topography. The map in the inset is a conjectural approximation of the river system in the eighth century AD. In Alexander's day the main rivers are likely to have flowed still further to the east.




Fig. 19. Designs from five-shekel coins struck by Alexander in Babylon, about 323 BC. Horseman (Alexander?) attacking a war elephant; Alexander holding the thunderbolt, crowned by Nike. (Cf. Goukowsky 1972: 478, figs. 1-3; M. J. Price, *The Coinage in the Name of Alexander* (London, 1991) 33, 452-3, pl. 159g-h.)

his crossing, while divisions of the army made ostentatious manoeuvres to distract the enemy from the main striking force. This, it seems, was relatively small: 6,000 foot and 5,000 horse (half the Companions and Bactrian and Saca cavalry from the north-east frontier). Even so Porus' forces were outmatched and maybe even outnumbered. He had other fronts to cope with and could not concentrate his army at a single point.

At dawn the Macedonian army reached the east bank and began its advance to the main Indian army, fording a secondary channel of the Hydaspes at the expense of considerable time and trouble. A detachment of Indian cavalry and war chariots under the command of one of Porus' sons was easily routed, the cumbersome six-man chariots foundering in the rain-soaked mud. The fugitives alerted Porus, who deployed his forces, stationing his elephants at intervals along his line of infantry, with cavalry and war chariots at the flanks (Fig. 19). The elephants were intended to win the battle, smashing the phalanx infantry as Darius had hoped his scythed chariots would at Gaugamela. But the Macedonians now had experience of elephants, and there had been ample time before the battle to refine tactics. Alexander used his cavalry (which was numerically and qualitatively superior) to cause the maximum disruption.⁷ The Indian

⁷ Arr. 5.16.3 (cf. Curt. 8.14.15; Plut. *Alex.* 60.10). For the difficulties of Arrian's language see Hamilton 1956 (*contra*, Tarn 1948: II 193-8).

cavalry on Porus' left wing was attacked by the bulk of the Macedonian horse led by Alexander. An onslaught by massed mounted archers created confusion which he exploited by a full charge at the head of the Companions. The vortex this produced attracted cavalry reinforcements from the right of the Indian line, and, while they were in transit Coenus struck at the right with a compact cavalry force, two hipparchies strong. Caught between hammer and anvil, the Indian cavalry was forced back into Porus' infantry column. Meanwhile the elephants were largely neutralized, as the Macedonian phalanx opened its ranks, disabled the drivers and stabbed upwards at the beasts. Eventually they were driven upon their own line, an increasingly chaotic amalgam of infantry, cavalry and elephants, under constant harassment from the Macedonian cavalry, now united in one body. The final act came when the elephants, mostly out of control, began to trample their own troops. Then the phalanx pressed the attack frontally in close formation while the cavalry virtually enveloped the rear of the Indian line. From that point it was a massacre; the few survivors who broke the cordon were hounded to annihilation by the fresh forces under Craterus who crossed the river when victory was assured and began the pursuit.

The victory was complete, celebrated by games at the site and by new city foundations, Bucephala (located at the base camp) and Nicaea on the field of battle.⁸ Later it was to be celebrated in two great coin series issued from the Babylon mint, tetradrachms and decadrachms, the latter depicting a mounted Alexander armed with a *sarissa* and attacking Porus' war elephant. After Alexander the main beneficiary of the battle, paradoxically, was Porus. He had fought to the last and thrown himself on the victor's mercy. Impressed by his courage and his physique (he was over 2 metres tall), Alexander confirmed him in his realms and took his enemies as his own, just as he had done with the ruler of Taxila. While a fleet was being constructed in the timber-rich country of the Glausae (which he added to Porus' domains), he moved against Porus' eastern neighbour, a homonymous cousin, who had offered submission before the Battle of the Hydaspes but took flight with his army at the news of Porus' promotion. There was comparatively little resistance as the army proceeded across the Acesines and then the Hydraotes (Ravi),

⁸ Arr. 5.19.4; Strabo 15.1.29; cf. Radet 1941 *contra*, Tarn 1948: II 236-7.

but the advance was seriously complicated by the event of the monsoon rains. The Hydaspes had been crossed in May against a background of spring thunderstorms, and by late June, when the army reached the Acesines, the monsoon deluge was in full spate and lasted until the rising of Arcturus, late in September.⁹ After the annexation of the lands of Porus' cousin, the king crossed the Hydraotes to attack the autonomous Indians. Their chief stronghold, Sangala (near Lahore and Amritsar), was captured and destroyed after a brief siege; the populations of neighbouring cities were evacuated and ruthlessly harried in flight. Porus yet again was conceded sovereignty, placing garrisons in the surviving cities.

Alexander intended to go further. How far we cannot determine. The vulgate tradition, based on Cleitarchus, suggests that he had heard rumours of the realm of the Nandas, far away on the eastern Ganges (their capital, Paraliputra, lay near the modern city of Patna).¹⁰ Arrian (5.25.1) speaks of an aristocratically governed people, rich in elephants. Perhaps we have in the two reports a short-term or long-term objective- or a stated end and a rumoured ambition. Whatever the case, the army had had enough. At the banks of the Hyphasis (Beas) the long simmering dissatisfaction coalesced in informal meetings and complaints by the rank and file. Alexander tested the sentiments of his officers, only to be told bluntly by Coenus, one of the most senior of the phalanx commanders, that the troops would go no further east.¹¹ A second meeting was no more successful, and Alexander retired to his tent with the threat that he would go on alone, if necessary. This time his bluff was called. The troops waited in silence for three days while he nursed his wrath. Then he capitulated, ostensibly finding the omens for crossing unfavourable, and announced that he would turn back. His men were jubilant, but he never forgot the humiliation and, as his reign progressed, he deliberately reduced his dependence upon them. Perhaps significantly, their spokesman, Coenus, died within days of the reconciliation and

⁹ Strabo 15.1.17-18 (Aristobulus *FGrH* F 35, Nearchus *FGrH* F 18). In Arrian (5.29.5) there is one retrospective reference to the monsoon conditions.

¹⁰ Diod. 17.93.2-4; Curt. 9.2.2-7; Plut. *Alex.* 62.2-3. The tradition was apparently familiar to Hieronymus of Cardia (Meyer 1927); Hornblower 1981: 84-6). Cf. Schachermeyr 1955; Brunt 1976-83: II 463-5; Kienast 1965.

¹¹ On the sources and the character of the reported speeches see Bosworth *From Arrian to Alexander* 1988: 123-34.

Alexander's entourage increasingly comprised only men who would approve his ambitions.

At the Hydaspes, where Alexander returned late in September, he found a fleet under construction in his new foundations of Bucephala and Nicaea. It was a great assembly of light transport craft, mainly two-banked *triaconters*, designed to convey horses, men and provisions to the southern Ocean. Under the command of his boyhood friend, Nearchus of Crete, seconded by the royal helmsman, Onesicritus of Astypalaea, the fleet began its voyage, carrying a large proportion of the cavalry as well as the hypaspists and archers. The rest of the army, including 200 elephants, moved along the banks to right and left under the command of Craterus and Hephaestion. There was a minor debacle at the confluence of the Acesines and Hydaspes, where the strong current caused a good deal of damage and delayed the advance. The main thrust of Alexander's campaign in this area was directed against the Oxydracae (Ksudrakas) and Malli (Malavas), who were determined to resist invasion and had begun concentrating the population in defensible strongholds. Their territory was located on the lower reaches of the Hydraotes, and, while the fleet and the main army column continued the journey down the Acesines, Alexander led a mobile striking force across desert terrain to attack the Malli from the north.¹² He took them completely by surprise, cutting off assistance from the Oxydracae. The depressing policy of terror was again employed. Citadels which held out against him were stormed and the defenders massacred; and the refugees who sought sanctuary in the desert were relentlessly harassed.

Finally the surviving Malli warriors crossed the Hydraotes and made a last stand in a neighbouring fortified city. The walls were captured easily and the inner citadel alone withstood the attack. Here the assault flagged and Alexander, who had detected loss of morale in an earlier siege, decided to set an object lesson. He scaled the wall and with a handful of companions, notably Peucestas, he stood there isolated and exposed, while his hypaspists tried vainly to reach him. At this point he leaped down inside the citadel, to become the single target of the defenders. He received a serious arrow wound

¹² The campaign is known only from Arrian (6.6–10) whose account is unitary and derived from Ptolemy (cf. 6.10.1). Though detailed, the report is not based on autopsy, since Ptolemy was not personally involved in the attack on the Malli. See, for full discussion, Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* 1988: 75–83.

when his right chest was penetrated, and his immediate bodyguard were hard put to protect him until the hypaspists stormed the wall and killed every living person. The king came close to death before he was rescued by the surgery of Critobulus of Cos; and the news of his peril caused panic among the rank and file, who had a realistic appreciation of their future in hostile territory with no obvious successor to the command. There were scenes of high emotion, when he appeared alive and apparently sound in the base camp. During his convalescence he received the formal submission of the Malli and Oxydracae, and the territory south to the confluence of the Acesines and Indus was consolidated under the satrapal authority of Philip, son of Machatas. The fleet now moved on to Sind, which was proclaimed a satrapy under Peithon, son of Agenor. Many of its peoples had already capitulated. Those who had not, notably Musicanus and Oxycanus, were rapidly terrorized into submission. Revolts, like that of Sambus in the western mountains, were dealt with savagely, and the Brahman ascetics, who inspired and encouraged resistance, received special attention. Musicanus, who revoked his allegiance, was crucified in his capital along with his Brahman advisers. As Alexander approached the southern province of Patalene, the populace fled in terror before his advance, and he found the capital Patala an empty shell. His repression had been all too effective, and he was forced to give guarantees of safety before he could recruit the native labour force he required for his projects. The Indian lands had accepted the fact of conquest but it was a grudging acquiescence which turned into active hostility after Alexander and his army moved west.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ALEXANDER AND THE PERSIANS

Maria Brosius

Any investigation of the relationship between Alexander and the Persians¹ is limited by the imbalance of the literary and archaeological sources. The overwhelming majority of sources which have come down to us were written by Greek and Roman authors, who, with few exceptions, were predominantly in favour of the Macedonian king. Thus, our views of Alexander's conquest of Persia are shaped and restricted by the way historical events are presented in order to give a favourable depiction of Alexander. The historical viewpoint privileges that of the victor over the conquered, while the Persian perspective can only be glimpsed at through the eyes of the Greeks, never directly be seen in its own light. Other restrictions arise from the limits to the information which Macedonians and Greeks possessed at any time about the Persian empire. Thus, it is doubtful that the Macedonians and Greeks had any in-depth knowledge of the geographical extent and geophysical extremes of the empire, of the careful balance between exercising royal power and accepting the ethnic, cultural and religious diversity of the empire's population, or of the power structures between the king, his relatives, the satraps, and the Persian nobility—issues which were of vital importance for the stability of the empire, and which determined how successfully the empire could be held after a military conquest. To that extent, it can be argued that Alexander failed in his objective to become 'king of Asia', since at no point during his conquest Macedonian control over the former Persian empire was absolute.

¹ When speaking of 'Persians' it must, of course, be understood that we are talking about the Persian ruling class who were members of the royal family or members of the Persian nobility. It was from them that Alexander sought to achieve political recognition, if not acceptance. The term 'Persians' cannot comprise the different peoples of the empire who were identified through their ethnic origin, language, customs and religions which the Persian kings left in place for political purposes.

A further problem of the extant historiography is the attempt made by the classical authors to depict Alexander's opponent, Darius III, as a weak and feeble king, lacking political and military leadership skills. At the same time the figure of the Persian king is used to symbolise a weak and decadent empire at the impending end of its life-cycle. This depiction has little to do with historical reality and more with historiographical considerations which aimed to depict the glory of the conqueror Alexander, as has recently been discussed by Briant (Briant 1996: 715–16; 789–833). This presentation of Darius III provides a paradox in itself, as a fight against a truly weak king would also diminish the extent of Alexander's victory. The fact that the principal features of the political structure and organisation of the Persian empire were taken over by the Macedonians is proof of the well-functioning state of affairs at the time of Darius III, which should once and for all eradicate the notion of a 'decadent' empire (cf. Briant 1996: 895). The Achaemenid empire still functioned with the same satrapal organisation, bureaucratic, financial and military efficiency in the mid-fourth century BC, as it had done at the outset. Taxes and tribute were collected in the satrapal centres and from there taken to the king, while military support would be ensured by the satraps according to royal command. Upheavals in the empire mainly seem to have been connected with succession struggles following the death of Darius II, but they did not shake the fundamental structure of the Achaemenid empire. Achaemenid power continued to be held within the same dynasty for over 230 years. Under Artaxerxes III Egypt was recovered for the empire, while Artashata (cf. Sachs 1977: 143) had gained a reputation for successfully fighting against the Cadusians before he succeeded to the throne as Darius III (Diod. 17.5.6).² The image of a decadent empire, which was faced with inevitable decline, is one projected by the Greek historiographers, but does not reflect historical reality.³ In his

² For Persia's battle against the Cadusians see van der Spek 1998: 239–256. Hornblower acknowledges Darius' courage against the Cadusians, but describes Darius as 'Alexander's cowardly opponent', as the king fleeing from the battlefields of Issus and Gaugamela (Hornblower 1994: 50). Such sentiments ignore the fact that the king as the centre of the army and the empire was the one symbol for which the army remained intact. His death would have meant the total collapse of the army; it was therefore of eminent importance for the continuation of the fight against the Macedonians that the king should stay alive. Diodorus' description of Darius' bravery is doubted by Briant 1996: 797.

³ For these views see Kuhrt 1996: 675; Briant 1996: 837–891. For the following see, however, Strauss in this volume.

fight against Alexander, Darius III showed strategic planning and military leadership. He was quick to realise Alexander's impending aggression and ordered the army under Memnon to Cyzicus (Diod. 17.7.2). The political loyalty of the satraps and the financial stability of the economy enabled Darius III to levy troops in Babylon (Diod. 17.53.1–3) and Ecbatana (Diod. 17.64.1–2; 73.1–2; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 3.19.5; Briant 1996: 884) during his campaigns against Alexander. Darius' death did not lead automatically to Alexander's recognition as king of Persia, or to the surrender of the Persian satraps and the Persian nobility. Neither did the Greek mercenaries serving in the Persian army surrender to the Macedonian side. Darius' son Ochus, and his brother Oxyathres, either of whom had a legitimate right to succeed to the throne after Darius' death, were in Alexander's 'care'. Alexander appointed Oxyathres to be one of his personal guards (Diod. 17.77.4: *doryphoros*),⁴ a gesture which expressed his need to exhibit his closeness to the Achaemenids and which implied Oxyathres' apparent approval of Alexander's succession to the Persian throne, but which is not synonymous with Oxyathres' acceptance of Alexander.⁵ Oxyathres' position in Alexander's entourage meant that his movements could be watched and his contacts with other Persians controlled. In effect, Oxyathres and Ochus were hostages whom Alexander could not eliminate, since he regarded himself as the successor to the murdered Darius III and to the Achaemenid throne. Oxyathres and Ochus were little more than prisoners in a gilded cage.⁶

Alexander claimed a kingship as 'king of Asia', but no source reveals that he was ever regarded by the Persians as 'Great King, king of kings, king of lands', the traditional royal title. The title 'king of lands' was given to him in Babylon (Sachs, Hunger 1988: no. 329, B obv.), but he equally was regarded as a foreigner, 'Alexander

⁴ According to Curt. 6.2.11 Oxyathres was made one of his friends (*in cohortem amicorum*).

⁵ *Contra* Bosworth who claims that Oxyathres' inclusion in Alexander's entourage "was an effective demonstration that Alexander took his claims of kingship seriously. He was no transient conqueror but the genuine successor to the Persian monarchs, supported and served by the brother of his predecessor" (Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 99; cf. Wiesehöfer *Die dunklen Jahrhunderte* 1994: 41).

⁶ The case of Bessus, who, as Artaxerxes V, established himself as an Achaemenid king with local support (Arr. *Anab.* 3.21.5, 30.4; Diod. 17.77.4), exemplifies that the threat to Alexander from members of the royal family was real (cf. Wiesehöfer *Die dunklen Jahrhunderte* 1994: 41 with n. 118).

the king who is from the land of Hani' (Sachs, Hunger 1988: 328 LE; cf. Kuhrt 1990: 121–130; Kuhrt, Sherwin-White 1994: 315–318). No contemporary Persian sources survive which could shed light on the way the Persians perceived the Macedonian conqueror. We do not know to what extent they accepted him as their king, whether he was ever more than a foreign conqueror who, despite defeating the Persian king, failed to maintain the empire which had existed, and equally failed to hold on to the conquered satrapies. One Iranian tradition clearly sees Alexander as the brutal conqueror who had raided the country and had destroyed the sacred books of the Avesta.⁷ The argument that Alexander was merely a conqueror who did not seek to be seen as a ruler has been put forward in modern scholarship (cf. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1993: 185). Alexander's short-term strategies, his military aggression, his violent reactions against any demonstration of resistance, the ruthless killing of local populations, and the destruction of cities and towns throughout his twelve-year campaign certainly allow that conclusion. Yet at the same time Alexander sought co-operation with the Persians, politically and militarily, which suggests that he must have realised at some point that mere conquest of territory was no guarantee for maintaining the land and the people who had been conquered. Alexander's conflict between being king of an empire and a mere conqueror who imposed foreign rule on his subjects finds its expression in many of Alexander's political dealings with Persia. As a conqueror he could not resolve the conflict between Persians and Macedonians and—on a different level—the conflict between the Macedonians and the Greeks, yet his aim was to be accepted as king by both sides.

In the following attempt to investigate the way in which Alexander and his conquest of Persia would have been perceived by the Persians, we need to consider the question as to which features of the Persian empire—from the point of view of the Persian noble class—captured the essence of the Persian power, and whether their disregard during Alexander's rule had any bearing on the success or failure of

⁷ Cf. Shaki 1981: 114–125; Afnan 1962: 77–8; Hamza al-Isfahānī 1961: 24. For a discussion of the continuation of Zoroastrianism in the transition from the Sasanian to the early Islamic period see Gutas 1998: 34–45. In contrast, a second Iranian tradition, the so-called Alexander Romance, regards Alexander as the legitimate successor of the Achaemenid kings (cf. Southgate 1977). As these documents are dated to the much later period of early Islam their historicity is more difficult to ascertain.

his reign in Persia. Essentially these features are identified in the ideology of Persian kingship, including the recognition of the royal religious cult of Ahura Mazda, the importance of the royal cities within a 'migrating' kingship, as well as the intricate hierarchical structure between the king, his satraps, and the Persian nobility, which was determined by familial relationship, extended privilege and gift-giving. I shall argue that, despite Alexander's adaptation of many features of Persian kingship and imperial rule, there is little evidence to suggest that these adaptations were any more than superficial statements which lacked political understanding and knowledge of the organisation of the Persian empire and its administration, the importance of the personal ties between king and satraps and the political importance of allowing each ethnic group its cultural and religious identity. Alexander failed to understand the ideological issues underlying Persian kingship, and his treatment of the royal cities and his attitude towards the satraps broke the vital link to the king. Preliminary to this investigation it seems useful to elucidate Alexander's conflict between conqueror and 'king of Asia', as well as his ambiguity towards Persia and the Persians.

i. *Alexander's ambiguous attitude towards the Persians*

Under the pretext of fighting for the freedom of the Greeks of Asia, and of avenging Xerxes' invasion of Greece in 480/79 BC, Philip II and Alexander created an ideological background for the Macedonian invasion of the Persian empire in 334 BC.⁸ His ambition to fight a war against Persia was so immense that even his lack of finances did not stop him. Macedonia possessed all of 60 talents and a debt of 500 talents (Arr. *Anab.* 7.9.6; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 15.2) to finance a war. In the course of his conquests of Persian satrapies Alexander's attitude changed from the ideology-laden slogan of 'Greeks *versus* barbarians' to that of a conqueror who saw himself as 'king of

⁸ Macedonia's political connection with Persia had been of long standing, and it is still difficult to explain why Philip II identified the Persian empire as the hostile power against which he wanted to lead a war. In the fifth century, Amyntas had offered earth and water to Darius I (Hdt. 5.18.1), and a Macedonian infantry fought in Xerxes' army in 480/79 (Hdt. 7.185). Alexander I had mediated between Mardonius and Athens, proposing the peace terms to the Athenians (Hdt. 8.136).

Asia⁹ and adopted Persian dress, the tiara and the girdle, Persian court ceremony, and—unsuccessfully—*proskynesis*. He included noble Persians in his circle of Companions and body-guards, and allowed women to attend banquets and to accompany the army train. A Persian royal guard of spearbearers, called *melophoroi*, became a new feature of Alexander's army (Arr. *Anab.* 7.29.4). Persian women were married to noble Macedonians and soldiers in an ostentatious attempt at achieving unity between the two cultures. His city foundations in Eastern Iran, settled by Macedonian and Greek soldiers as well as tribal peoples and local populations, were intended as a *symbiosis* between the rulers and the ruled. Yet none of these actions amounted to a 'Verschmelzungspolitik', or *synoikism* (cf. Wiesehöfer *Die dunklen Jahrhunderte* 1994a: 42; Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1980).

Perhaps most revealing in his ambiguity towards the Persians is Alexander's attitude towards Cyrus II. On the one hand Alexander created an ideology-laden 'fantasy-world' of the Persian empire as the ultimate enemy of Greece, in which the Macedonian king led the revenge for Xerxes' invasion and took the role of the champion of the freedom of the Greeks. Yet on the other hand he regarded Cyrus II as the exceptional model of a conqueror-king in whose footsteps he wanted to follow. Whenever an opportunity arose, Alexander demonstrated his affinity with the founder of the empire, wanting to be regarded as a *philokyros* (Strabo 11.11.4). His 'respect' for Cyrus II was explicitly demonstrated in his concern for Cyrus' tomb at Pasargadae (Arr. *Anab.* 6.29.4–11). During his campaigns Alexander made frequent gestures underlining his kinship with Cyrus II. Among these, his entry into Babylon, reminiscent of Cyrus' entry into the city in 539 (see below p. 185–6), must have carried a considerable

⁹ See Arr. *Anab.* 2.14.8–9; Curt. 4.1–14; Plut. *Alex.* 34.1; cf. Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1980: 5–6. For the disputed date when the title was first use see Hatzopoulos 1997: 44. More importantly, Hatzopoulos asks the question whether Alexander envisaged a Macedonian-Greek rule over the provinces of a former empire or a new European-Asian empire when using the title 'king of Asia'. Discussing the title 'king of Asia', Fredricksmeyer argues that Alexander never intended to be the successor of the Achaemenid kings, but created a new form of kingship as 'King of Asia' (Fredricksmeyer 2000: 136–166). Emphasising the Greek origin of this title (Fredricksmeyer 2000: 140–142), as well as Alexander's gratitude to the Greek and Macedonian gods rather than the Persian gods (Fredricksmeyer 2000: 143–145), Fredricksmeyer identifies his kingship as that of an absolute monarch. Though Fredricksmeyer does not explicitly say so, his argument underlines Alexander's behaviour as that of a conqueror of the Persian empire. I wish to thank Peter Rhodes for drawing my attention to this article.

propagandistic weight. Continuity of benign rule was further expressed in Alexander's granting freedom to the Ariasprians because their people had been made Benefactors of the King by Cyrus II (Arr. *Anab.* 3.27.4; cf. Wiesehöfer 1980: 17–21). He also followed in Cyrus' footsteps on his march to India, a fact which apparently inspired him (Arr. *Anab.* 6.2–3). Arrian invites a comparison between the Indians encountered by Alexander and the Persians who first supported Cyrus' conquest of Media (Arr. *Anab.* 5.4.5). Even Alexander's disastrous march through the Gedrosian desert was apparently inspired by Cyrus'—failed—attempt to cross the desert (Arr. *Anab.* 6.2–3). With these gestures Alexander pursued a carefully orchestrated ideological agenda. They were meant to invite comparison with Cyrus, and to link himself with the Persian king hailed for his noble spirit and humane rulership as they were depicted in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*.

While Alexander's attitude towards Cyrus II reflects an ideological ambiguity towards Persia, there are also ambiguities on a practical level. Political union between Persians and Macedonians, as well as city-foundations with mixed populations, appear to have been the aim of a new empire: "His highest concept of government, as far as the evidence at our disposal permits us to see, was the Macedonian-Persian Empire embracing geographically Greece proper, the Balkans to the Danube (as a deep frontier-zone) and the satrapies of the Persian Empire, from Egypt to the Jaxartes and the Indus" (Fraser 1996: 181). Yet how feasible was such a Macedonian-Persian empire? Alexander's attitude as conqueror and the idea of a Macedonian-Persian empire headed by a 'king of Asia' were mutually exclusive propositions. Despite his ambition to create a Macedonian-Persian ruling élite, the Persians were treated with distrust. The 30,000 Persian youths who were taken from Persian noble families and trained in Macedonian warfare and clothed in Macedonian-style dresses (Arr. *Anab.* 7.6.1; Diod. 18.108.1; Plut. *Alex.* 71.1), gave Alexander a direct hold over the Persian nobility. Their male offspring were in fact hostages of Macedonia, forcing the Persian nobles to give in to Alexander and to abandon their hopes for resistance.¹⁰

Only after 331 Persians began to play a rôle in the leading military corps of his army, but they were never given political power

¹⁰ At the same time this military unit was meant to act as a counter-group to the Macedonians (Diod. 17.108.3; *antitagma*; cf. Briant 1982: 34–39; Bosworth "Alexander and the Iranians" 1980: 17).

of any degree, and certainly no military power. The new empire was to be established through Persian participation in the administration, the *synoikism* of the city foundations, and found further expression in Alexander's recognition as 'king of Asia' and his acceptance of Persian court life. Yet the lack of co-operation by the Persian nobles and the resentment by his Macedonian officers of his growing 'persianisation' meant that Alexander's vision failed. While Macedonian acceptance of Persian nobles was limited, we know nothing about how the Persians regarded their rôle in the corps of Alexander's bodyguards and the Companions. Several events perhaps make it clear that any fusion between Persians and Macedonians found little support and was hindered as much as possible. For example, when Alexander sent back to Macedonia the Macedonian soldiers who had fathered children with women of the Persian empire, he promised to bring them up in the Macedonian military tradition (Arr. *Anab.* 7.12.2; Diod. 17.110.3).¹¹

The weddings in Susa in the spring of 324 are often regarded as a demonstration of the Macedonian-Persian union Alexander aimed for. But in actual fact they were a demonstration of Macedonian domination and presumption of power (cf. Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 157; Bosworth 1994: 840). The success of these marriages and their long-term effect was limited.¹² One of Alexander's

¹¹ Likewise, Alexander's funeral was to be conducted according to Macedonian customs (Paus. 1.6.3; cf. Fraser 1996: 184). According to the Alexander historians, Alexander was to be buried in Egypt, where his body was laid to rest first in Memphis, and later in Alexandria (Curt. 10.10.20). Diodorus (Diod. 18.28.2-3) indicates that the body was to be brought to the Oasis of Ammon, but was instead taken to Alexandria (cf. Plut. *Alex.* 76.9). The mere fact that Egypt was the chosen destination for Alexander's burial, rather than Persis, where the bodies of the Achaemenid kings were laid to rest, seems to speak against the idea of a Macedonian-Persian fusion, and particularly against a Macedonian recognition of Alexander as the last Achaemenid king. At the very least, it demonstrates that his Macedonian successors had no intention to enhance the status of Persis as the designated region for Alexander's tomb. It is doubtful whether the funerary cart, which transported the body, was a particularly 'Persian' cart, a term used by Aelian (*Ael. var. hist.* 12.64); Diodorus Siculus' description of the elaborate construction (Diod. 18.26.3-27.5) points to a Greek artistic style, though Persian elements and artistic motifs may well have been included (cf. Diod. 18.27.1; 27.3), but whether this allows a comparison with the royal funerary carts of the Persian kings, as Briant implies (Briant "Le roi" 1991: 4-6), has to remain doubtful.

¹² The marriages of the 10,000 Macedonian soldiers (Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.8) were dissolved almost immediately, since the Macedonians were not allowed to take their wives and children home. Badian regards this mass wedding as a calculated action on the part of Alexander, who, he believes, saw the military potential of the sons

wives, Barsine/ Stateira, a daughter of Darius III (Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.4; Diod. 17.107.6; Plut. *Alex.* 70.3) was killed by Roxane (Diod. 17.54.2; Plut. *Alex.* 77.6). The fate of Parysatis, a daughter of Artaxerxes III (Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.4; Curt. 4.10.2), who also was married by Alexander, is unknown, but if Alexander's wife Roxane was afraid that the offspring of the royal Persian daughters would rank higher than her own sons in the succession stakes, she had reason to eliminate her as well. Roxane obviously regarded Darius' daughter Drypetis as a threat because she killed her a short time after she had been widowed by the death of Hephaistion (Diod. 17.107.6; Plut. *Alex.* 77.6; cf. Brosius 1996: 78 n. 69; Carney, this volume).

Darius' niece Amastris was married to Craterus (Memnon *FGrH* 434 F 1 4.4; Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.5), but was abandoned by him after Alexander's death.¹³ Two daughters of Artabazus, Artacama and Artonis (cf. Plut. *Eum.* 1.1), were married to Ptolemy and Eumenes (Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.6) respectively. Artacama was abandoned by Ptolemy in favour of Antipater's daughter Eurydice (Berve 1926: 52, no. 97). A daughter of Barsine, also a daughter of Artabazus, was married to Nearchus, and Apame, a daughter of the rebellious Spitamenes, rose to fame as the wife of Seleucus and mother of Antiochus I (Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.6; Strabo 16.2.4; App. *Syr.* 57; cf. Plut. *Demet.* 31).¹⁴ Thus, with the royal daughters killed, only Amastris, Darius' niece, was able to succeed to power through different marriages, despite having been rejected by Craterus. The only Macedonians who recognised the political need for co-operation between the two cultures, and who were exceptions to the rule, were Seleucus and Peucestas. Seleucus remained married to Apame and successfully combined Achaemenid satrapal policy with Macedonian rule. Peucestas, who

of these mixed marriages, belonging neither to Macedonia nor to Persia (cf. Badian 1985: 483–484).

¹³ She then married Dionysius of Heraclea Pontica (Memnon *FGrH* 434 F 1 4.4; Strabo 12.3.10; Steph. Byz. s.v. 'Amastris'; cf. Carney 1988: 135 and n. 8. cf. Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 157), with whom she had three children, Clearchus, Oxathres and Amastris. Dionysius died in 306 and Amastris then was married to Lysimachus in 302, with whom she had a son, Alexandros (Polyaen. 6.12). As regent of her city-foundation, Amastris, she minted coins bearing the legend "Ἀμάστρις βασιλίσσης" (Imhoof-Blumer 1885: 25). Her daughter was also called Amestris (Schmitt 1985: 937).

¹⁴ Three cities were named after her, Apamea-Euphrates, Apamea-Silhu, and Apamea Zeugma, founded between 301 and 281 BC (Sherwin-White, Kuhrt 1993: 15.20).

became satrap of Persis, adapted Persian manners and learned the Persian language (Arr. *Anab.* 6.30.3). It is plausible to suggest that he, too, married a Persian noble woman.¹⁵

In regard to the city-foundations as deliberate undertakings to foster the union between Persians and Macedonians, Peter Fraser has suggested that the success of these foundations was rather short-lived (Fraser 1996).¹⁶ Noting that with the exception of the new foundation of Alexandria in Egypt the cities built in eastern Iran were all founded on or near the sites of existing Achaemenid settlements, either fortresses or satrapal capitals,¹⁷ Fraser points out that the cohabitation of the mixed population in these settlements was by no means accepted by the Greeks. Thus, for example, Alexandria Eschate was settled with Greek mercenaries, Macedonians who were no longer able to fight, and local people from adjacent tribes (Arr. *Anab.* 4.4.1; Fraser 1996: 186).¹⁸ The isolation which the new inhabitants must have felt (cf. Fraser 1996: 177) is poignantly expressed in the reaction of Greek soldiers who had been settled in these remote areas. On hearing the news of Alexander's death, they immediately deserted their settlements and made a desperate (and futile) attempt to return to Greece (Diod. 18.7; Fraser 1996: 185, 193). Their uprising, however, began the open hostilities between Greeks and Macedonians. It is reasonable to follow Fraser's argument that it is unlikely that Macedonians settled in any of these places. They were immediately involved in the power struggles that broke out among the Macedonian generals after Alexander's death. As Fraser concludes: "We should then, probably suppose either that Alexander's settlements virtually died out, and were abandoned, or that, only a few non-

¹⁵ Macedonian supremacy over Persian nobles furthermore is expressed in the separation of Persians and Macedonians during the wedding ceremonies, with the *hypaspists* being separated from the Persian *melophoroi*, and the Macedonian forces with their elephants standing separately from the 10,000 Persians (Cf. Polyae. 4.3.24; Bosworth "Alexander and the Iranians" 1980: 8).

¹⁶ Fraser also reduces the number of the actual city foundations from eighteen, as recorded by Stephanus of Byzantium (Fraser 1996: 1-2), to six, namely Alexandria in Egypt, Alexandria in Aria, Alexandria Eschate, Alexandria in Susiana, Alexandria-Bucephala, and Alexandria among the Oreitai (Fraser 1996: 201).

¹⁷ Alexandria in Aria was built near the Achaemenid centre Artacoana, and Alexandria in Arachosia was built on the site of Achaemenid Kandahar. Alexandria ad Caucasum was built on or near the site of Kapisakani-Begram, and Alexandria Eschate near Cyropolis, the city of Cyrus built at the Jaxartes, probably near Khojend (cf. Fraser 1996: 172-3).

¹⁸ Cf. the settlement of Alexandria ad Caucasum (Arr. *Anab.* 4.22.5).

active members of the Macedonian and Greek population having remained behind, these were absorbed in due course in the native background, and that the oasis-dwellers and even nomads moved in to fill the vacuum and maintain their native way of life. In other words, the decline of these cities began very soon after Alexander's death, though no doubt it proceeded unequally in different places" (Fraser 1996: 195).¹⁹

The ambiguous attitudes which characterise Alexander's politics towards Persia and the Persians may assist us in understanding why he failed in his ambition to be recognised as king of a new Macedonian-Persian empire. We can now turn to the question how this ambition was shattered further due to his failure to understand the underlying values of Achaemenid kingship, including the crucial role of the royal cities and the satraps.

ii. *The ideology of Achaemenid kingship*

Achaemenid kingship was based on the recognition of the king by the Persian nobility, who were identified as a group through their celebration of the principal Persian royal cult of Ahura Mazda, and probably through a common script, Old Persian. Continuity of Achaemenid kingship was demonstrated through royal art and architecture, and court ceremony. It included the adherence to the traditional court procedures at the point of the accession of a new king, thereby recognising the historical dimension of the Persian dynasty. Thus the inauguration of the new king took place in Pasargadae (Plut. *Art.* 3), the city of Cyrus II, to celebrate the rites customary for the Persian king, wearing Cyrus' dress and eating a fig cake, chew terebinth and drink a bowl of sour milk, as a reminder of the humble beginnings of the empire as well as the humbleness and mortality of the king in power. Yet no Greek source reports any such ceremony taking place when Alexander claimed his kingship as 'king of Asia'. As discussed above, reasons for his homage to Cyrus II were ideological, but from the point of view of the Persian nobles

¹⁹ This view is given further support in the literary sources which, as Fraser points out, refer to Alexander's city foundations as places which had formerly existed, but were no longer there (cf. Pliny *nat. hist.* 3.116; Strabo 11.11.4), and which were unknown to geographers of Iran (Fraser 1996: 198).

this did not amount to the same as following the accession ceremony of the Achaemenid kings. Alexander wanted to express his affinity to the founder of the empire, and wanted to be seen as the guardian of Cyrus' empire, expressing anger when the tomb had been violated and—unfounded or not—torturing the priests of Pasargadae on suspicion of having played a part in the tomb raid.²⁰

Although several scholars argue that Alexander recognised the importance of Ahura Mazda and other Persian gods within the ideology of Achaemenid kingship,²¹ the case seems to be rather more complicated. In the royal inscriptions the Achaemenid kings unfailingly recognise their principal god and express their gratitude for the success of their endeavours. More importantly, perhaps, was the fact that the Persian nobility was connected to this cult and thereby to the Persian king. By not recognising this important bond between king and nobility, a strong link between these two powers was cut. The loss of status of the Persian nobility, as can be viewed from the status of the satraps, make it doubtful whether Alexander was aware of the link between religion, the king and the nobility. It could be argued that victory celebrations of the Macedonians do not reflect recognition of Persian traditions or attempt to include the Persian noble class. The celebration of Greek festivals and sacrifices suggests

²⁰ The reasons for the priests' violation of the tomb remain unclear, considering that they had guarded it dutifully for two centuries, making monthly sacrifices before it (Arr. *Anab.* 6.29.7). One explanation offered is that the priests hoped that the violation of Cyrus' tomb would lead to Persian resentment against Alexander (Will 1986: 164; cf. Wiesehöfer *Die dunklen Jahrhunderte* 1994: 44).

²¹ See especially Briant 1982: 375–380, who argued that, at the point of Alexander's invasion of Asia Minor, references to Alexander's offerings to the gods include the gods of the Persians, in addition to the Greek and Macedonian gods. His view is followed by Badian 1985: 459 and Wiesehöfer *Die dunklen Jahrhunderte* 1994: 29 with n. 41. According to Briant this reflects a Macedonian-Persian convergence, already detectable in the early stages of his conquest. In support of his argument Briant referred to an inscription from Asia Minor, which apparently shows the assimilation between Zeus and Ahura Mazda in the Greek reference to Ahura Mazda as 'Zeus Baradates'. But, as F. Gschnitzer has demonstrated, Baradates is not an epithet for the god, but a personal name, and 'Zeus of Baradates' is a reference to a special cult of the Greek god Zeus by an otherwise unknown Iranian called Baradates (Gschnitzer 1986: 45–54; cf. Brosius 1998: 235). Accepting Gschnitzer's argument, Briant subsequently stated that we need to be cautious about accepting an *interpretatio graeca* of Persian cults in Asia Minor (Briant 1996: 697). Consequently, Alexander's reference 'to all the other gods' may not be as ambiguous as Briant first suggested, and that it instead is meant as a straightforward reference to the gods of the Greeks and Macedonians (cf. Fredricksmeyer 2000: 143–145). For Alexander's relations with non-Greek deities and religious customs see Fredricksmeyer in this volume.

that no Persian religious element was included in the official ceremonies,²² and Alexander's violation of Persian religious rites during Hephaestion's funeral give further support for his disregard for the cult of Ahura Mazda and other Persian gods:

The king ordered, therefore, in regard to the funeral procedure, that the neighbouring cities contribute to its embellishment according to their abilities, and he ordered all the peoples of Asia to quench the fire which is called sacred by the Persians, until the funeral proceedings would be finished. As was customary, the Persians did this at the time when their kings died. The people thought the order to be a bad omen, and that divine powers were predicting the king's own death. (Diod. 17.114.4)

If Alexander indeed extinguished the sacred fires—and considering his grief for Hephaestion, such a dramatic gesture is not inconceivable—he must have caused major offence to the Persian nobles witnessing the event. To them, this action displayed a blatant violation of Persian custom and royal funerary rites. To what extent the royal religious rituals continued to be celebrated by the Persian nobility is impossible to say, but without the central figure of the king, they must have been severely threatened, if not completely dissolved.

iii. *Royal Cities*

Just as royal religious cults and court procedures formed part of the way Persian kingship was expressed, the royal cities also filled a vital rôle for the 'migrating' king and his entourage, his regular movements between the cities demonstrating the peace and stability of the empire. In contrast, Alexander's treatment of the royal cities shows that he did not comprehend their ideological importance for the kingship. Their only value to him was monetary, but their political

²² The festivals and religious celebrations taking place in all cities conquered by the Macedonians stand in stark contrast to Persian policies. The Nabonidus Chronicle makes the point that Cyrus' entry into Babylon took place without interruption of the festival of Esagila (Nabonidus Chronicle II: 18). In his letter to Gadatas Darius I reproaches the satrap for acting improperly in regard to the temple of Apollo (M/L 12). Persian policy is distinctive in that it does not impose the cults of the king onto the local population precisely because it would have alienated the people from the king. Such measures were only taken in retaliation for disloyal behaviour towards the king.

importance as royal centres, where the king presented himself, and was expected to carry out representational and judicial functions, escaped Alexander. As vital communication centres for the king and his satraps, the royal and the satrapal cities offered opportunities for the nobility to enforce their status within their own hierarchical structure and to express their closeness to the king. Among the royal cities, Persepolis took first place. The destruction of the centre of the Achaemenid kings not only marks the end of Persian power, it also manifests Alexander's position as conqueror. The royal terrace of the Persian capital, Parsa, known to the Greeks as Persepolis, was burnt down in the spring of 330 BC.²³ Arrian has only a slight mention of this brutal act of a conqueror, stating:

He burnt the palace of the Persian kings, though this act was against the advice of Parmenion, who urged him to spare it for various reasons, chiefly because it was hardly wise to destroy what was now his property and because the Asians would, in his opinion, be less willing to support him if he seemed bent merely upon passing through as their conqueror rather than upon ruling it securely as a king. Alexander's answer was that he wished to punish the Persians for their invasion of Greece; his present act was retribution for the destruction of Athens, the burning of the temples, and all the other crimes they had committed against the Greeks. (Arr. *Anab.* 3.18.11; cf. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1993: 177)

²³ The sources follow two different strands of interpretation for Alexander's destruction of Persepolis, one arguing for a deliberate destruction in revenge for Xerxes' destruction of Athenian temples, the other describing it as an act done in drunken stupor on the instigation of the courtesan Thais (see Bosworth 1994: 817 with fn. 47 including further literature). It is equally possible that the destruction of Persepolis was ordered in retaliation for Ariobarzanes' resistance towards Alexander at the Persian Gates (Arr. *Anab.* 3.18.1–9; cf. Wiesehöfer *Die dunklen Jahrhunderte* 1994: 37–39). After leaving Susa, Alexander and his army had to march across the Zagros mountains to reach Persis with its capital Persepolis. Taking the mountain route through the Zagros, Alexander was attacked by Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Persis, who had been waiting to attack him at the Persian Gates (Arr. *Anab.* 3.18.2; cf. Strabo 15.3.6; Plut. *Alex.* 37.1; Diod. 17.68.1). The Macedonians were hopelessly exposed to the Persian attack from the top of the gorge, suffering heavy losses. Being informed by the Persian prisoners in his train about a route through the mountains around the pass, Alexander was led through the mountains and attacked Ariobarzanes from behind. Ariobarzanes was forced to abandon the attack and fled. His determination to defend the entrance to Persis demonstrates that even after Arbela satraps still were loyal to Darius and resisted Alexander's forces as much as possible. Alexander was well justified in distrusting (Diod. 17.71.3: *hepistei*) the Persians of Persis.

Diodorus provides a more detailed description of the brutality and destruction which the Macedonian army inflicted upon Persepolis and its inhabitants. The city was given over by Alexander to be plundered by the soldiers, its population slaughtered, killed and deported, the women were taken as the soldiers' prisoners (Diod. 17.70.6):

It was the wealthiest city under the sun, and the private houses had been filled with all kinds of luxury over many years. The Macedonians stormed it and slaughtered all the men whom they met, plundering the houses, many of which belonged to the ordinary inhabitants, and which were furnished and decorated with all kinds of ornaments. From there a lot of silver was carried off and no small amount of gold, and many elaborate dresses, in sea purple or with gold embroidery, became the reward of the victors. The enormous palaces, known throughout the entire world, were turned to ruins through hybris and utter destruction. (Diod. 17.70.1-3)

The frenzy which ensued among the Macedonian soldiers during the plundering led to fighting amongst each other for the booty, attacking and even killing each other for their possessions. According to Curtius Rufus the inhabitants of Persepolis were slaughtered at random (Curt. 5.6.6; cf. Plut. *Alex.* 37.3). Many Persians and their families committed suicide in order to escape the savage brutality of their attackers (Curt. 5.6.7).

This brutal attack on Persepolis was unprecedented for the conquest of the Persian royal cities. There is no evidence that the inhabitants put up any kind of resistance. Indeed, it appears as if the Persian royal capital had been left without any defence whatsoever. Tiridates, the governor of Persepolis (*kyrieuontos*) (Diod. 17.69.1; cf. Curt. 5.5.2), is said to have offered the city to Alexander, ahead of a Persian defence set up by Darius III. This act of hooliganism on the part of the Macedonian soldiers was a senseless act of unprovoked violence, brutal killing and deliberate destruction of the central capital of the Achaemenid kings.

The royal terrace was reserved for Alexander himself. Plundering the royal treasury he ordered the gold to be carried off to Susa. By transferring the wealth of Persepolis to Susa Alexander indicated his contempt for the city (Diod. 17.70.1) and his determination to destroy its central position within the Persian empire. Sancisi-Weerdenburg argued that Alexander burnt Persepolis deliberately as the centre of

Achaemenid power to destroy the central links between the royal centre and the satrapies (Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1993: 184–5). As will be further demonstrated below, this is a valid argument, though the question remains whether Alexander foresaw that the destruction of Persepolis would ultimately backfire on him. His action in Persepolis led to the dilemma that on the one hand Alexander clearly emerged as the conqueror, while on the other he sought Persian recognition as king of Asia (cf. Wiesehöfer *Die dunklen Jahrhunderte* 1994: 39). The destruction of Persepolis meant the loss of the central focus point of the Persian satrapies because Persepolis symbolised the empire in its entirety since the time of Darius I. Here representatives and ambassadors from the satrapies were received in the royal audience hall and the peoples of the empire proceeded to bring gifts to the king—a scene set in stone for eternity and presenting, if not an actual event, an ideal vision of the king's subjects in direct communication with the king—to pay homage to the king. Among the royal cities of the empire, Persepolis took first place. It was the utmost expression of royal kingship and of Persian rule. The city linked all the different satrapies with each other. With its destruction Alexander severed that link, and his action led to the disintegration of the satrapies.²⁴

In a way, Persepolis marked the turning point in Alexander's conquest of Persia. The destruction of the royal terrace, which was begun deliberately in Xerxes' palace, symbolised the fulfilment of the

²⁴ I fail to agree with Fredricksmeyer's description of Persepolis as "the holy city of Ahura Mazda as the supreme deity of the Persian empire and the Achaemenid kings" (Fredricksmeyer 2000: 145), nor with his argument that the destruction of Persepolis was a "calculated act of policy" because it was "the religious centre of the Persian empire" (Fredricksmeyer 2000: 149). Persepolis was the royal centre of the Achaemenid kings, and undoubtedly took an eminent position in the celebration of royal ceremonies, but it was certainly not a religious centre devoted to Ahura Mazda. The Persepolis Fortification texts give evidence that the priests of Persepolis performed religious rites for many other deities, including Elamite and Babylonian gods. The buildings on the royal terrace are exclusively expressions of Achaemenid kingship, with reliefs depicting the king in audience or in ceremonial procession, or, in case of the Apadana reliefs, featuring representatives of the peoples of the empire bringing gifts to the king. Against Fredricksmeyer's claim, that this religious aspect gains more weight in light of the fact that Susa was the true symbol of Persian power, but was spared Greek revenge, while Persepolis was barely known to the Greeks (Fredricksmeyer 2000: 148), scholarly debate has acknowledged that Persepolis was known to the Greeks well before Alexander's arrival there (Ctes. 45; cf. Lewis 1977: 74; Cameron 1973: 56). For the further history of Persepolis and Persis after Alexander's conquest see Wiesehöfer *Die dunklen Jahrhunderte* 1994.

Greek revenge for Xerxes' invasion of Greece. The burning of Persepolis thus brought Alexander's campaigns to an end.²⁵ But during the months Alexander spent at Persepolis, his ambition to become 'king of Asia' opened up a new political and military perspective and must have seemed to be a real possibility. This ambition, however, could only be achieved through a continuation of Persian royal policy, which included adherence to the Persian idea of kingship and to royal co-operation with the satraps. But the destruction of the royal centre of the Achaemenid kings in fact had already made Alexander's ambition impossible.

The royal city of Babylon had been taken by Alexander after the battle at Arbela when he entered the city as the victorious conqueror. Babylon opened its city gates to avoid a battle, meeting the king outside the city and negotiating the terms of surrender (Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.3; Curt. 5.1.17–23). Kuhrt and Sherwin-White have argued that Alexander's acceptance in Babylon depended on the negotiations with the ruling classes of Babylon who advised Alexander on the proper steps to take in order to gain support of the Babylonians (Kuhrt, Sherwin-White 1994: 315–316).²⁶ In particular this meant the recognition of the religious duties of a king, including the performance of religious rites, and restoration work to be carried out on the temples.²⁷ Alexander's entry is reminiscent of Cyrus' entry in

²⁵ With the destruction of Persepolis and the death of Darius III, the army must have expected to return home (Curt. 6.2.15–4.1; cf. Hatzopoulos 1997: 42). The argument finds further support if we date the letter addressed to the city of Philippi at the time of Alexander's stay in Persis, i.e. to the first half of 330 BC. This interpretation rests on the restoration of the letters]PΞΙΔ[as a reference to Persis, rather than the identification of a personal name of one of the ambassadors (Hatzopoulos 1997: 50–52. I owe this reference to Tony Spawforth).

²⁶ Against the rose-tinted picture of the welcomed 'liberation' by the Babylonians as well as by the Egyptians (see Badian 1985: 437; Bosworth 1994: 815). While there always had been a resistance in Egypt against Persian rule, from Cambyse's harsh policy towards many Egyptian temples (Demotic Chronicle; Devauchelle 1995), the revolt of Inaros between 464/3 and 454, and the long independence from Persia between 404 and 343/2, the case of Egypt is certainly different from that of Babylonia (though even in Egypt co-operation of individuals with the Persian powers existed (cf. Stele of Somtutefnakht; Lichtheim 1980: 41–44; Kuhrt 1996: 674–5). For a detailed discussion on Alexander's acceptance in Babylon see Kuhrt 1990: 121–130.

²⁷ The symbolism of this act has been convincingly demonstrated by Kuhrt 1990: 127: "(...) the significance of Alexander's order to rebuild lies less in the actual necessity to repair sanctuaries (...), but rather in the fact that he was acting in precise accordance with Babylonian concepts which served as a confirmation to the

Babylon in 539 BC. Cyrus, too, was greeted by the Babylonians after they had learned of Cyrus' victory at Opis, and, after considering their options—facing the same fate as the people of Opis²⁸ or keeping the city and staying alive—opted for surrender. Cyrus then entered the city only after the major negotiations had been carried out and Persian rule had been established under Ugbaru (Nabonidus Chronicle III: 15). When Cyrus finally entered the city, the Babylonian chronicle records that the Babylonians welcomed him as king of Babylon, while the religious festival continued uninterrupted. Cyrus himself emphasises his contribution to the building work carried out in Babylon for the city-god Bel-Marduk in his inscription, the Cyrus-Cylinder (Berger 1975: 192–234). In both cases, the supposedly 'peaceful' entrance of the conqueror into the city is an ambiguous event: it is less the welcoming of the usurper by the local population, than their adherence to a 'Realpolitik' in the face of being confronted with a foreign king and his army.

In Alexander's conquest of Babylon, grounds for suspicion and distrust remained on either side. Although the Persian satrap Mazaeus remained in office (cf. Bosworth 1994: 862), as elsewhere in the former Persian satrapies, his authority was curbed by a Macedonian general, Apollodorus, and a tax-official, Asclepiodorus (Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.4). Yet Mazaeus' satrapal office was no guarantee of Babylonia's quiet acceptance of Macedonian rule.²⁹

Susa was taken twenty days after Babylon, in a sequence of events reminiscent of those at Babylon: This time Oxathres, the son of the satrap Abulites (Arr. *Anab.* 3.18.2), was sent outside the city to meet Alexander and inform him of the city's surrender to Alexander. Abulites is said to have received his orders of surrender from Darius himself (Diod. 17.65.5). The performing of religious rites seems to have been less dominant in Susa, for the sources are vague in their reference to sacrifices according to an ancient custom (*patriôî nomôi*; Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.9); the games played on this occasion indicate that the festival celebrating the conquest was indeed a Greek one. To

inhabitants that their decision to surrender had not incurred divine wrath and to him that they fully accepted him."

²⁸ For the battle at Opis see Nabonidus Chronicle II: 12–14; Kuhrt 1996: 602.

²⁹ Kuhrt, Sherwin-White 1993: 8, with references to the hostilities against Alexander expressed in the *Dynastic Prophecy* (cf. Grayson *Babylonian Historical-Literary Texts* 1975: 24–37).

the population of Susa the imposition of Greek games must have appeared as a blatant demonstration of the conqueror's domination over his subjects. As in Babylon, the satrap's lack of resistance meant that Abulites could remain in office, albeit guarded by Mazarus and Archelaus (Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.9). However, both Abulites and Oxathres were later accused of disloyalty and dismissed from office.

Ecbatana seems to have been taken without any ceremony whatsoever. *En route* to meet Darius in battle, Alexander learned that Darius had left the city with 7,000 talents and an army of cavalry and infantry (Arr. *Anab.* 3.19.5). Ecbatana was turned into a military garrison, with Parmenion, Harpagus, and a substantial part of the Macedonian army in control of the city. The satrapy of Media was given to Oxydates, possibly in 330 BC (Arr. *Anab.* 3.20.3); he was soon to be replaced by Atropates (winter 328/7) since Oxydates failed to show his dutifulness to Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* 4.18.3).

Atropates became one of the few Persian satraps who remained loyal to Alexander until his death in 323. In 324 he delivered the rebel Baryaxes to Alexander who had claimed the title as king of Persia and Media; Alexander put him and his supporters to death (Arr. *Anab.* 6.29.3). A daughter of Atropates was married to Perdiccas at the weddings at Susa (Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.5), though no further mention is made of her or her marriage.³⁰ But there are two ways to read Atropates' acquiescence in Alexander's rule, either as loyal devotion, or as quietly biding his time in an attempt to survive a temporary usurpation. After all, Atropates sought political independence from Macedonian rule immediately after Alexander's death, and he established himself in a region of north-western Media (Arr. *Anab.* 4.18.3; 7.4.5; cf. Wiesehöfer 1993: 151), named after him as Atropatene, and still distinguishable in the modern name Azerbaidjan (cf. Sherwin-White, Kuhrt 1993: 9).³¹ The rest of Media came under the control of the Macedonian Peithon in 323 (Diod. 18.3.1).

³⁰ In 330 Perdiccas had become a member of the royal bodyguard and in 324 led a hipparchy (Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 275). He took effectively command after Alexander's death in 323. Perdiccas had installed the sister of Alexander, Cleopatra, as satrap of Lydia (Arr. *Successors* F 1.25.2 Roos).

³¹ This kingdom retained its independence under the Seleucids (Strabo 11.13.1), and possibly under its Parthian and Roman successors (cf. Kuhrt, Sherwin-White 1993: 77–78; Bernard 1980: 308 n. 27; Schottky 1989).

iv. *Satraps and satrapies*

As representatives of the king the satraps were the immediate supporters of royal power in the Persian satrapies; their palaces and *paradeisoi* reflected Achaemenid court-life and royal architecture and on a smaller scale. The satraps were members of the royal family or related to the royal household by marriage. As mentioned above, as members of the Persian noble class their position furthermore was expressed by their participation in the royal religious cults (Berossus *FGrH* 680 F 11; Briant 1986: 431), and the use of Old Persian as their common script. Satrapal power extended to collecting the taxes of the local population, controlling the administration of their province, and levying troops on the king's demand. The king relied on their loyalty and support in order to be able to control a vast empire such as the Persian empire. Loyalty and good service to the king were rewarded with royal gifts, including the marriage to a royal daughter. It was also possible for noble Persians to marry members of the local nobility, thus in turn strengthening the ties between the Persian ruling class and the upper classes of the local nobility.³²

Within this intricate system of satrapal power, the satraps' relationship with the king, royal reward and beneficial elevation within the hierarchy of the noble class, this form of political organisation had proved its efficiency since Cyrus II. Alexander took over the satrapal system and after 331 appointed members of the Persian nobility as satraps or confirmed them in their office. But their power was hugely infringed by Macedonian officials controlling the military forces and financial resources of the satrapy, clearly imposing their role as conquerors.³³ This made it impossible for the Persian

³² Bosworth suggests that the satrap Mazaeus might have been married to a Babylonian wife (Bosworth 1994: 815). Mixed marriages between members of the Persian nobility and foreigners reflect the degree of Persian integration into the existing society, and, due to their political usefulness, were probably usual practice. Thus, although the Persians were foreign usurpers when conquering Egypt, a certain degree of cultural mixing must have been achieved. The funerary stela from Saqqara mentioning Artam and the Egyptian woman Tanofrether as the parents of a son who is given an Egyptian name, Djerbherbes (Mathiesen et al. 1995: 23–41), provides further evidence of a mixed marriage between a Persian and an Egyptian woman.

³³ Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* (1988: 235) considers that Mazaeus was kept fully occupied with the administrative side of the control of the satrapy of Babylonia, a view which fails to acknowledge the considerable loss of status for the Persian satrap. For his further discussion of the satraps see Bosworth 1988: 235–238; Bosworth 1994: 862–864.

nobility, established within a centuries-old structure of power and authority, of official recognition by the king through political and military offices, marriage alliances and gift-giving, to accept a ruler who had severed the links between ruler and satrap. On Alexander's return from India in 325/4 most satrapies were in revolt from Macedonian domination.³⁴ The satraps' loss of status, as well as the lack of affinity with the king, led to their disloyalty. The case of Orxines, who appointed himself as successor to the satrap of Persis, is probably the best illustration for the satraps' lack of loyalty towards Alexander,³⁵ but the frequent revolts of the Persian satraps from Macedonian domination also attest to the lack of support. When the satrap of Babylon, Mazaeus, died in 328 he was replaced by Stamenes (Arr. *Anab.* 4.18.3). Late in 331 Abulites was confirmed in office in Susa, but was killed in 324 on Alexander's orders. Likewise his son Oxathres, who had been made satrap of Paraetacene in 330 (Arr. *Anab.* 3.189.2), was killed together with his father (Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.1). Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Persis who had opposed Alexander at the Persian Gates (Arr. *Anab.* 3.18.2), was replaced by Phrasaortes (Arr. *Anab.* 3.18.11), who died some time before Alexander's return from India in 324 (Arr. *Anab.* 6.29.2). Within two years Oxydates was replaced by Atropates as satrap of Media (see above p. 187). Amminapes was appointed satrap of Parthya and Hyrcania in 330 (Arr. *Anab.* 3.22.1), though he must have been replaced in the same year by Phrataphernes (Arr. *Anab.* 3.28.2; 4.7.1), who was still in office in 324 (Arr. *Anab.* 6.6.4).³⁶ His son, Pharismanes, seems to

³⁴ Bosworth notes Alexander's short-term policy in regard to the satrapies while expecting to be accepted 'universally and unconditionally' as king (Bosworth 1994: 864; cf. Badian 1985: 476–480). This attitude may reflect Alexander's high regard for himself, but credits him with little ability for a realistic view on the political facts. While these revolts challenged his authority, Alexander was also faced with resistance from the Macedonians. The Companions resented Alexander's inclusion of Persians into their circle and his adoption of Persian royal court-ceremony. The army's refusal to continue the conquests beyond the Hyphasis River (Arr. *Anab.* 5.25.1–2) changed Alexander's standing with the army: conquest for the sake of conquest had become meaningless.

³⁵ Although Alexander had appointed Phrasaortes as the new satrap of Persis, Orxines, a Persian noble, took up this office after Phrasaortes' death, without having asked Alexander's permission, thereby showing a complete disregard for the king's authority (Arr. *Anab.* 6.29.2). Orxines was put to death (Arr. *Anab.* 6.30.2–3) and replaced by a Macedonian, Peucestas.

³⁶ Hyrcania came under Seleucid control with Seleucus I (App. *Syr.* 57). For the problematic position of Parthya see Sherwin-White, Kuhrt 1993: 84–90.

have succeeded him in office (Arr. *Anab.* 6.27.3). Autophradates was made satrap of the Taupurians (Arr. *Anab.* 3.24.3), but he does not seem to have regarded Alexander as an authority to be obeyed, since he repeatedly failed to comply with Alexander's demands (Arr. *Anab.* 4.18.20). Satibarzanes had been satrap of Areia under Darius III; it was he who killed the Persian king on his flight from Alexander. Although Satibarzanes was confirmed in his office by Alexander, he saw no necessity to show any loyalty towards the Macedonian, and revolted in the same year 330/29 (Arr. *Anab.* 3.25.5). He had rid himself of his Macedonian 'shadow', Anaxippus, who had commanded the javelin-men, and now was in open revolt from Alexander. It took a substantial military effort to counter Satibarzanes and his army; the revolt was quashed when Erigyius killed Satibarzanes during the battle (Arr. *Anab.* 3.28.3). Satibarzanes was replaced by another Persian, Arsaces (Arr. *Anab.* 3.25.7), but in less than a year Arsaces was arrested because of disloyalty towards Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* 3.29.5) and replaced by a Macedonian, Stasanor. Satibarzanes' revolt had triggered a long period of unrest in eastern Iran, involving Areia, Bactria, Drangiana, and finally Sogdiana.

An unnamed Persian was appointed satrap of a district in the Hindu Kush called Proxes (Arr. *Anab.* 3.28.4); nothing further is known about the Persian or the length of time in office. Artabazus was appointed satrap of Bactria in 329 (Arr. *Anab.* 3.29.10), and he fulfilled his satrapal duties, but by 328 opted for early retirement (Arr. *Anab.* 4.17.3), the reasons for which we can only speculate (cf. Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 237; Bosworth 1994: 863). Astaspes had been appointed satrap of Carmania, and met Alexander on his return from India in 325, already being suspected of revolt and shortly afterwards killed (Curt. 9.10.25.28). The case of Astaspes as well as that of Abulites and Orxines demonstrate that Alexander's power failed to ensure the loyalty of the Persians (Bosworth 1994: 864; Badian 1961: 17–23).

Within six or seven years of Alexander's conquest the Persian satraps were replaced by Macedonians—a strong indicator for the fact that overall the co-operation between him and the satraps had failed. The Persian nobility did not accept Alexander as king, neither as the successor of Darius III nor as the foreign conqueror and founder of a new empire. Persian resentment was openly expressed through disobedience, ignoring Alexander's orders, actively staging

revolts or, as in the case of Artabazus, resigning from office. The reasons are all too clear: The satraps and their centres, like the royal cities of the Persian king, had lost their place within the Achaemenid power structure, their representational value as cities of the king made void, and the satraps' ties to the royal court severed. Persian satraps will have taken a role in continuing the administration, but effectively the Persian satrap no longer had any power while Macedonians controlled the army and the finances. Their function may have been to present a Persian link between the Persian population and the Macedonian conquerors, displaying an outer acceptance of the part of the Persian nobility of the new Macedonian power. It is doubtful whether the Persian nobles themselves ever regarded Alexander as other than a foreign invader. Alexander's inability to consolidate the empire, his long absence from Persia while campaigning in India, meant that no king was in the empire itself. By 325/4 the loss of a royal centre and the lack of a royal power represented in the capitals had led to the disintegration of the empire into individual political units striving for power in the former Persian satrapies. The Persian king and his court traditionally showed their presence in the empire by moving between the royal cities. The sight of the king, his court and the vast entourage were public demonstrations of the king's power and control over an empire at peace. Alexander either was not aware of this aspect of Persian kingship or disregarded it as irrelevant. As we rely solely on Greek literary sources for any information about Persia during the time of Alexander's conquest, it is difficult to extract from their projected image of Alexander how his conquest was perceived in the Persian empire as a whole, and by the Persian nobility in particular. Their co-operation with Alexander was likely to stem from a lack of alternative and the natural desire to stay alive. It did not necessarily amount to a recognition or acceptance of Alexander as the new ruler, let alone as the 'Great King, king of kings, king of lands'.

Satrapal centres also suffered during the Macedonian conquest. Sardis surrendered to Alexander, with Mithrenes and the nobility of Sardis meeting Alexander outside the city gates (Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.3-8). Although the Lydian population was 'liberated', Macedonians were left in political and military control of the city (Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.7-8). Miletus, which put up a fight under the command of Hegesistratus, suffered a Macedonian attack at sea and the city was taken by force

(Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.4–19.6).³⁷ Maracanda (modern Samarkand), the satrapal centre of Sodgiana, put up a long resistance against the Macedonians (Arr. *Anab.* 4.4.2–9), and likewise the occupation of Bactra (Arr. *Anab.* 3.29.1) followed after a long rebellion in the satrapy. The political status of these satrapal centres as part of the Persian empire was reduced when their satraps were replaced by Macedonians or were restricted in their office by Macedonians controlling the military and financial power. When Alexander limited the power of the Persian satraps to a purely administrative and representational position, the Macedonian conqueror eroded the pyramidal structure of Achaemenid power from the top downwards. Failing to create a bond between the Persian satraps and Alexander, the attitude of the dominant conqueror towards the Persian nobility failed to provide the loyalty and military support he needed to maintain the empire. As a result, Alexander could not achieve the recognition as new king from the vital element in the Persian structure of monarchical rule, which relied on the satraps identifying with the Achaemenid dynasty and the unquestioned recognition of the king. He may have regarded himself as ‘king of Asia’, but whether this convinced the Persian nobles, as Bosworth suggests (Bosworth “Alexander and the Iranians” 1980: 6), is far from certain. With very few exceptions, the satraps remained reserved towards Alexander and abandoned Macedonian control as soon as the opportunity arose.

The discussion may allow us to conclude that the vision of a new empire based upon a Macedonian-Persian élite failed not only due to Alexander’s unquestioned position as a conqueror, but also due to Alexander’s failure to understand the vital rôle of the Persian noble class as the extended arm of Achaemenid kingship. Macedonian power was dominated by military aggression, relentless fighting and remorseless punishment for any resistance. Following Philip II’s policy, Alexander ascertained his military superiority over the Greeks, and, after crossing the Hellespont, employed the same aggressive and military methods to achieve his goal and ‘bulldozed’ his way into the Persian centre. His treatment of the royal capitals revealed his purely military interest in them, lacking any understanding of their ideological values as centuries-old royal capitals of former empires,

³⁷ Hegesistratus apparently acted against Darius’ order to surrender the city peacefully (Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.4). Perhaps the peaceful surrender of cities like Sardis was also due to Darius’ intention to avoid unnecessary loss of life and destruction of cities.

which expressed the long tradition on which Achaemenid power had been based, as well as the historical continuity of power that these former capitals represented.

The discussion furthermore allows us to argue that there is little evidence to suggest that Alexander understood the ideological implications of Achaemenid kingship, as well as the careful political balance which existed between imperial control and satrapal and semi-autonomous power at local level. As a conqueror Alexander failed to maintain an empire and control it for any length of time. With the destruction of Persepolis he severed the link between the king and empire. The failure to recognise the importance and political function of the royal cities of Ecbatana, Susa, and Babylon, but only exploit them for their treasuries, furthermore destroyed the Persian idea of kingship and the way it was represented. The celebration of Greek religious festivals and banquets were an expression of Macedonian domination over the Persian noble class. Finally, the integration of Persians into a Macedonian-Persian circle failed due to the resistance of the Macedonians, but also due to the Persian resistance to accepting Alexander as their king. No integration between Macedonians and Persians was achieved in the army, and the city-foundations, short-lived as they may have been, show little or no evidence of a successful *synoikism* between them. The Achaemenid ideology of the '*pax Persica*', so imbedded in Achaemenid kingship proved incompatible with the military conquest of Alexander and the imposition of Macedonian power onto the Persians.³⁸

³⁸ I wish to thank Professor P. J. Rhodes and Professor A. J. S. Spawforth for their reading of and commenting on earlier drafts of this contribution. Their helpful advice was greatly appreciated. The responsibility for the views expressed in this paper rests entirely with the author.

PART FOUR

ALEXANDER'S REIGN: POLITICAL AND
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES

CHAPTER EIGHT

KING AND “COMPANIONS”: OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF POWER IN THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER

Waldemar Heckel

The Persian ‘Royal Judges’, when required to make a difficult decision on the legality of Cambyses’ plans to marry his sister, replied that they had found a law allowing the king to do whatever he pleased.¹ For such is the nature of autocracy, which can be tempered only by the restraint of the ruler or an assassin’s dagger.² This, at least, is the simplistic view across the breach of time, but for contemporaries—for both the subjects and the king himself—the reality was much more nuanced. Power does not exist, nor is it created, in a vacuum, and privileges are normally balanced by responsibilities, submission by expectation of protection. In short, power is negotiated between the ruler and the ruled, especially when the latter do not, in fact, constitute a uniform whole but rather a hierarchically ordered entity whose members can stand united against a king or splinter, with some parties supporting the king against the remainder. To suppress the masses, if this is what is desired, the king and the aristocracy wield an awesome power; to limit the aspirations of the aristocracy, the king can easily turn to the army or the mob. This, at least, is the common perception. In truth, these groupings, although they display a superficial uniformity, prove upon closer examination to be faction-ridden or politically ambivalent.

Hence, the increasingly popular view of Alexander the Great as a ruthless autocrat, who is the perpetrator of conspiracies against his own *hetairoi* more often than the intended victim of others’ plots,³

¹ Hdt. 3.31.4.

² Elizabeth Carney’s comment that “Macedonian kings tended to die with their boots on” in “Regicide” (1983) 260, comes to mind, though admittedly this includes those who died in war. For the importance of restraint see Justin 11.1.9 and Yardley & Heckel 1997: 78.

³ See now Badian 2000.

fails to take into account the complexities of the Macedonian power-structure. Not only does such an interpretation over-simplify the workings of Alexander's Court and exaggerate the extent of the king's power, but it displays all the symptoms of what David Hackett Fischer aptly terms the 'furtive fallacy'.⁴ But it is not a modern idea: Justin, in the final chapter of his *Epitome* of Trogus' ninth book, preserves a comparison of Philip and Alexander. The wording is probably close to Trogus' original, but the sentiments almost certainly echo those of Trogus' sources. Neither king is treated with kindness, Alexander even less so than his father. It was not the enemy who suffered from Alexander's brutality but rather his own men: *non in hostem sed in suos saeviebat* (9.8.15). In this study, I wish to examine the limits on Alexander's power, his relations with commanders and advisors, and ultimately his authority over the common soldier.⁵

King, Political Factions and Military Commands

In 340, Alexander was a secure, and somewhat arrogant, young man of sixteen who, in his father's absence, defeated the Maedi in pitched battle and founded a new settlement, which he named Alexandropolis.⁶ Six years later, when he crossed into Asia at the head of the army that would conquer the Persian east, his position was far less certain. The support of Antipater had played no small part in placing Alexander on the throne in the face of opposition from Attalus, uncle and guardian of Philip's last wife.⁷ The fact that her new-born

⁴ Fischer 1970: 74 defines this as "the erroneous idea that facts of special significance are dark and dirty things and that history itself is a story of causes mostly insidious and results mostly invidious. It begins with the premise that . . . history happens on the back stairs after midnight, or else in a smoke-filled room, or a perfumed boudoir, or an executive penthouse or somewhere in the inner sanctum of the Vatican, or the Kremlin, or the Reich Chancellery, or the Pentagon." And, indeed, there are certain scholars who are fond of comparing Alexander with Hitler and Stalin.

⁵ I wish to acknowledge here the kind help and patience of Joseph Roisman, who has saved me from numerous errors and caused me to think through some rather hastily formulated ideas. It should not be assumed, however, that he endorses all my arguments. I am also grateful to Arda Okur and my friend, Konrad Kinzl, for their careful reading of the typescript.

⁶ Plut. *Alex.* 9.1. Curt. 8.1.25 may be an imprecise reference to the Maedian campaign.

⁷ For Attalus see Berve 1926: 2.94, no. 182 and Heckel 1992: 4–5. For the

child had turned out to be female must certainly have weakened Attalus' position.⁸ But Antipater was doubtless opposed to the upstart⁹ Attalus and fearful of his coalition with Parmenion (also formalized by marriage).¹⁰ Significantly, he judged it more prudent to back the Crown Prince, who had proved his worth—and probably won the admiration of the army—at Chaeronea, than the dark-horse, Amyntas son of Perdiccas III, whom the Macedonians in a time of crisis had set aside in favour of Philip II. For it appears that Arrhabaeus and Heromenes—the sons of Aëropus and brothers of Alexander, who had married Antipater's daughter¹¹—and perhaps also Philip's assassin, Pausanias of Orestis, had brought about the king's death with a view to restoring the rightful heir.¹² Relegated to the sidelines, and married to Alexander's half-sister Cynanne,¹³ Amyntas became the victim of his (possibly unwilling) candidacy. Together with the brothers of Lyncestian Alexander (Heromenes and Arrhabaeus), Amyntas was executed by the new king. The network of alliances that preceded Philip's death remained, for the most part, unchanged: only the professed allegiances of the Macedonian aristocracy had shifted.

extent of his power at the Macedonian court see Heckel 1986: 297–8. See also Carney *Women and Monarchy* 2000: 69–75; Ogden 1999: 17 ff.

⁸ Satyrus *ap.* Athen. 13.557 d. For the unhistorical Caranus, believed by Justin and Green to be Cleopatra-Eurydice's son, see Heckel 1979.

⁹ Diod. 16.93.7 speaks of Attalus' power at the court but this power was surely acquired as a result of his ward's marriage. Carney *Women and Monarchy* 2000: 70–1 comments that "Philip may have chosen a wife from Attalus's family to avoid the divisiveness that would ensue if he took a bride from the families of either Parmenion or Antipater . . .". This is an interesting suggestion, and indeed Parmenion and Antipater both had daughters of marriageable age. But the argument fails to take into account the fact that (a) there was no pressure on Philip to take another bride at this time—unlike Alexander in the period 336–334; Philip could just as easily have arranged for Alexander to marry Attalus' ward—and (b) the sources state explicitly that Philip's last marriage was a love-match, hence not influenced by political considerations.

¹⁰ Curt. 6.9.17. In all likelihood, Attalus' widow married Coenus son of Polemocrates in 335/4 (cf. Curt. 6.9.30).

¹¹ Curt. 7.1.7; Justin 12.14.1; cf. Diod. 17.80.2 ('Antigonos' is an error for 'Antipater'); see also Habicht 1977; Heckel 1989: 33.

¹² See Bosworth "Philip II" 1971. This group appears to have included Amyntas son of Antiochus and Neoptolemus son of Arrhabaeus, both of whom fled to Asia Minor after Alexander's accession.

¹³ Prandi 1998: 100 n. 48 rightly rejects the notion that, by marrying Amyntas to Cynanne, Philip was recognizing his claims to the throne. Nevertheless, the bride's ambitions may have been a factor, and ultimately harmful to her husband's health. The view that Amyntas son of Perdiccas and Amyntas son of Antiochus were actively conspiring against Alexander (Ellis 1971) has been thoroughly discredited.

Hence, when Alexander crossed the Hellespont, the composition of his military command reflected his political accommodation with the aristocracy.

The Antipatrid-Antigonid Group

By far the most important official of the Macedonian state, after the king himself, was Antipater son of Iolaus. As regent of Macedon and *strategos autokrator* of Europe he ensured the obedience of the Greeks to the south, both those who had submitted under coercion after Chaeronea and the recalcitrant, most notably the Lacedaemonians. Furthermore, he guaranteed the flow of reinforcements to Alexander in the east and the security of the Thracian marches. For this reason, too, his son-in-law, Alexander 'the Lyncestian', was relieved of the *strategia* of Thrace¹⁴ and accompanied the king, ostensibly as an adviser. He received command of the Thessalian horse after Calas son of Harpalus had been assigned the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia. Amyntas son of Arrhabaeus led the *prodromoi*, four *ilai* of scouts, until he disappeared from history in 333 BC. This man was most likely a nephew of Alexander Lyncestes, and (what is more telling) the brother of the defector Neoptolemus, who fought against the Macedonian forces at Halicarnassus.¹⁵

Another of the regent's sons-in-law was the Somatophylax Balacrus (Balagros) son of Nicanor: he had married the eldest of Antipater's daughters, Phila, who was destined to play a major role in the his-

¹⁴ The *strategia* of Thrace was given to a certain Memnon (Diod. 17.62.4–6, 63.1). Diodorus clearly states that Memnon rebelled against Alexander, but if Curt. 9.3.21 is correct in saying that Memnon brought reinforcements to Alexander in India, then it is clear that he did not fear reprisals from the king (cf. Berve 1926: 2.254). Perhaps Alexander appointed Memnon as a check on Antipater's power; he may therefore have given tacit approval to Memnon's uprising. On the other hand, Curtius' Memnon may be either (1) a different individual or (2) a corruption of the name Menon (possibly Berve no. 516). Curtius says that he brought 5,000 Thracian cavalry and 7,000 infantry from Harpalus (i.e. in Babylon) as well as armour for 25,000 soldiers. Hence he himself need not have come from Thrace but was merely entrusted with the task of conveying the troops and equipment to India.

¹⁵ Thus Berve 1926: 2.29–30, no. 59; Heckel 1992: 352–3. Neoptolemus: Diod. 17.25.5; Arr. 1.20.10. Welles 1963: 188 n. 1 prefers Diodorus' account, which has Neoptolemus fighting on the Macedonian side. Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 109 does not think that the father of Amyntas and Neoptolemus was Arrhabaeus the regicide.

tory of the Successors.¹⁶ Balacrus may have served already as Somatophylax of Philip II, and as such may have been regarded by Antipater as a worthy (*viz.* influential) son-in-law—though it is possible that he became a Somatophylax of the new king in 336, or at least before 334. After Issus, Balacrus was entrusted with the satrapy of Cilicia, and was thus the first of the Somatophylakes to be removed from the 'Staff'. But the office was not entirely administrative: Balacrus cooperated with Calas and Antigonos the One-Eyed in the task of mopping up resistance in Asia Minor when the king moved into Phoenicia.¹⁷ Now Antigonos himself was a long-time friend and supporter of Antipater; and, thus, the regent may have been able to count on the support of Antigonos' kinsman, Asander son of Agathon: this man is probably the cavalry commander whose name has been corrupted in the MSS of Diod. 17.17.4 into 'Casander';¹⁸ unless we are dealing with Asander son of Philotas, whom Alexander appointed satrap of Lydia. This man is usually identified as the officer who campaigned in Caria with Ptolemaeus, another supposed brother of Monophthalmus.¹⁹

¹⁶ Heckel 1987.

¹⁷ Thus Curt. 4.5.13. See Schachermeyr 1973: 212; Briant 1973: 70; Bosworth 1980: 219; Billows 1990: 44–5. I see no reason, however, for assuming that Balacrus was killed at this time; and, indeed, we hear of no new satrap of Cilicia until Philotas the taxiarch, who was probably installed there by Craterus in 324.

¹⁸ Adams 1979 believes that this is in fact a reference to Antipater's son. It is, however, difficult to explain his disappearance, though the same is true for Asander son of Agathon. Adams is right in pointing out that Antipater's faction must have been prominently represented in the command-structure in 334 (113). For the kinship of Asander son of Agathon and Antigonos the One-Eyed see Arr. *Succ.* 25.1. See Billows 1990: 60, on the friendship of Antigonos and Antipater.

¹⁹ Billows 1990: 425–6, no. 99 'Polemaios I'. Billows identifies him with the father of that Ptolemaeus, who was appointed Somatophylax of Philip III at Triparadeisus. Arr. *Succ.* 1.38 calls him 'Ptolemaeus son of Ptolemaeus', which Billows assumes is the equivalent of 'Polemaios son of Polemaios'. At any rate, if we assume that Antigonids and Antipatrids were closely connected, and if we accept the possibility of a link between Antigonos and the house of Harpalus (cf. Heckel 1992: 308 n. 45), then Asia Minor will have been solidly in the hands of this group. Asander and Ptolemaeus in Caria: Arr. 2.5.7. Asander son of Philotas is problematical. That he was a brother of Parmenion is doubtful (see Heckel 1992: 385; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 130); what became of him is unknown. If one assumes, however, that Arrian is wrong in calling him 'son of Philotas' (either the author's own mistake or an error in the manuscript), then one might be able to identify Asander the satrap of Lydia with the later ruler of Caria. The former is last heard of when he rejoined Alexander in Central Asia (Curt. 7.10.12), the latter is first attested in Babylon during Alexander's final days and soon afterwards is named satrap of Caria, where an Asander had campaigned in 334/3. The name is, of course, invariably corrupted into [C]asander.

Parmenion's Group

By comparison, the Parmenion faction—often portrayed as so powerful that Alexander found it necessary to plot its systematic dismantling—is far less impressive. The realignment that followed Philip's assassination saw Parmenion sacrifice the most ambitious member of his 'faction', his son-in-law Attalus. That 'gesture' effectively elevated him to the position of Alexander's second-in-command in Asia Minor. Certainly, he lacked the political power of Antipater, who remained in Europe as Regent of Macedon,²⁰ but the new king may well have wanted Parmenion's group as a counter-weight to Antipatrid power. Parmenion's people were still represented in the command-structure of the Macedonian army long after most of Antipater's supporters had been deposited in Asia Minor. Of the old general's three attested sons, Philotas led the Companion Cavalry and Nicanor the Hypaspists. Coenus son of Polemocrates was their brother-in-law, as was (apparently)²¹ Cleander, who commanded mercenaries. Hegelochus son of Hippostratus, who shared the command of the fleet with Amphoterus son of Alexander and later perished as an ilarch of the Companions at Gaugamela, was probably a kinsman of Attalus; he had remained on friendly terms with the house of Parmenion.²² The sons of Andromenes, all of whom accompanied Alexander from the start of the expedition, had close ties with Philotas. The eldest, Amyntas, commanded a *taxis* of *pezhetairoi*, a rank shared later (in 333) by his kinsman Polyperchon son of Simmias.²³ There is no need, however, to assume that Demetrius the Somatophylax, who was

²⁰ Diod. 17.17.5 says he retained 12,000 infantry and 1,500 horse.

²¹ The identification of Coenus and Cleander as brothers has never been seriously challenged. Both are sons of Polemocrates (Arr. 1.24.1, 2).

²² Heckel 1992: 6–12. His fleet command: Arr. 2.2.3; 3.2.3. At Gaugamela: Arr. 3.11.8. His death: Curt. 6.11.22.

²³ Again there is no way of knowing for certain whether Simmias, the father of Polyperchon, was related to the house of Andromenes. Andromenes may have married the sister of Polyperchon, in which case the recurrence of the name Simmias honours the maternal grandfather (see Heckel 1992: 189). We should not make too much out of Polyperchon's support of Parmenion's suggestion of a 'night attack' at Gaugamela (Curt. 4.13.7–8): Curtius seems to have inserted him for literary rather than historical reasons. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Alexander promoted Polyperchon to the rank of taxiarch in the second year of the Asiatic campaign, something one would not expect him to have done if he (a) he feared Parmenion's group and (b) Polyperchon was one of its adherents.

deposed and executed in connection with the Philotas affair, was at this time an adherent of Parmenion's group.²⁴

Alexander's Group

There were, of course, those on whose support Alexander could rely from the very beginning: *syntrophoi* (see below) or kinsmen are also reasonably well represented, though it must be emphasised that most were in the early stages of their careers and occupied lower military ranks than the prominent adherents of Parmenion and Antipater. The king's closest friend, Hephaestion, began the expedition without a major military command. Demetrius son of Althaemenes, closely associated with—and possibly even related to—Hephaestion, served as an *ilarch* of the Companion Cavalry, perhaps from the start of the expedition.²⁵ He is the only one of the Gaugamela hipparchs (named by Arr. 3.11.8) who attained prominence in the latter half of the campaign.²⁶ Another *ilarch*, specifically the commander of the *ile basilike*, Black Cleitus, was almost certainly one of the king's strongest supporters at the beginning of the campaign, despite his outspoken criticism at Maracanda in 328. His sister Lanice had been Alexander's wet-nurse;²⁷ and indeed Proteas, a son of Lanice, is an attested drinking-companion of Alexander.²⁸

It would, furthermore, be reasonable to assume that Arybbas the Somatophylax and the Aeacid Neoptolemus (who succeeded Nicanor son of Parmenion as *archihypaspistes*) were kinsmen of Olympias and

²⁴ Demetrius the Somatophylax: Heckel 1992: 261–2. His role in the 'Philotas Affair': Arr. 3.27.5; Curt. 6.7.15, 11.37–38.

²⁵ See Heckel 1992, 345. That Demetrius was also *ilarch* at the Granicus and Issus is, however, not explicitly attested. But a family connection with Hephaestion, under whose command he served on at least one occasion (Arr. 5.21.5), is at best speculative and assumes that Amyntor son of Demetrius, honoured in Athens (*IG* ii².405) is Hephaestion's father.

²⁶ It is interesting that Sopolis, the father of Hermolaus, was apparently passed over for a similar promotion, and sent back to Macedonia on a recruiting mission (Arr. 4.18.3), shortly before the conspiracy of Pages occurred (Arr. 4.22.2; details reported at 4.13.1–14.2, out of historical context).

²⁷ Arr. 4.9.3; Curt. 8.1.21; cf. 8.2.8–9; Justin 12.6.10. See also Carney "The Death" 1981 for further discussion of possible family-connections.

²⁸ Aelian, *VH* 12.26; cf. Athen. 4.129a, 10.434a.

hence supporters of her son.²⁹ Neoptolemus' patronymikon, unfortunately, is unknown. When Arybbas died of illness in Egypt, Alexander replaced him with Leonnatus, who had connections with the royal house, though, in this case, on the Philip's side. Another known *syn-trophos* of Alexander (Arr. *Succ.* 12 = *Suda* s.v. 'Leonnatus'), he was still relatively inexperienced. The *Suda* makes him a relative of Eurydice, the Lyncestian mother of Philip II. Indeed, in Alexander's entourage we find several individuals who have some connection with Olympias or with territories dependent upon Epirus. Leonidas, the king's first teacher and a hard disciplinarian, was Epirote; whereas the second known tutor, Lysimachus, was an Acarnanian who was fond of emphasizing Alexander's connections with Achilles and the Aeacidae; Philip of Acarnania, the physician is described by Curtius as having a long-standing intimate relationship with Alexander,³⁰ and we have no reason to doubt some kind of close personal connection.

Craterus and his brother Amphoterus were nothing but faithful to their king from the beginning, and we have no indication that either was related by birth or marriage to the Parmenion or Antipater factions.³¹ Perdiccas and his brother Alcetas were possibly related to the royal house,³² and appear to have been on friendly terms with Leonnatus and Hephaestion,³³ though we must be careful not to read

²⁹ For their careers see Heckel 1992: 261 (Arybbas), 300–2 (Neoptolemus); for the latter's Aeacid descent see Arr. 2.27.6; cf. Beloch iv².2.145. Hoffmann 1906 includes the name Arybbas in his index of 'makedonische Personennamen' but on 176 lists only Epirotes of that name. No examples in Tataki 1998, though an 'Arrybas' listed on p.267 as 'Macedonian?' appears on *IG* xii.5 125 (218 BC). It is worth recalling that Olympias' brother, the future Alexander I of Epirus, was raised at Philip's court, presumably as a *pais basilikos* (Justin 8.6.4–8).

³⁰ Curt. 3.6.1: "*Erat inter nobiles medicos ex Macedonia regem secutus Philippus, natione Acarnan, fidus admodum regi puero comes et custos salutis datus, non ut regem modo sed etiam ut alumnus eximia caritate dilegebat.*"

³¹ Since Amphoterus acted both as the agent who carried the king's orders that Alexander Lyncestes be arrested (Arr. 1.25.9–10) and also shared command of the Aegean fleet with Hegelochus (Curt. 3.1.19; 4.5.14 ff.; Arr. 2.2.3; 3.2.6), he may have been looking after Alexander's interests vis-à-vis the Antipatrid and Parmenion factions.

³² Curt. 10.7.8.

³³ The significance of this should not be underestimated: both Perdiccas and Hephaestion were abrasive and not popular with their colleagues (Justin 13.8.2; cf. Beloch iv².1.88). Anecdotal information links Leonnatus with Menelaus, possibly the brother of Ptolemy son of Lagus. Perdiccas, Leonnatus and Attalus (possibly the son of Andromenes) were Royal Hypaspists at the time of Philip's assassination. Hence Perdiccas' promotion to taxiarch was Alexander's doing.

back too much from their later careers. Ptolemy son of Lagus, who would later claim to be a bastard son of Philip II, was a 'late-bloomer' but enjoyed (and reciprocated) Alexander's friendship and support.³⁴

Paides Basilikoi and Syntrophoi

Those who enjoyed power at the Court were generally those individuals who would have been designated as *hetairoi* ('Companions': Latin *amici*); in Diodorus' history and in the terminology of the Hellenistic kingdoms they are *philoi*.³⁵ Originally, the term must have applied to all those who could afford a horse and cavalry equipment and accompanied the king, his *comitatus*.³⁶ This group would thus have comprised the Macedonian aristocracy, the most important of whom commanded the army—both regional levies and specialised troops—and formed the king's council (*consilium amicorum*). And from this number too were selected the members of the seven-man Bodyguard (the Somatophylakes). The sons of the king's *hetairoi* began their careers as *paides basilikoi*, 'royal youths' or, to use a medieval analogy, the king's 'Pages'.³⁷

The *paides basilikoi* were a feature of the Macedonian court since at least the reign of Philip II; the institution was perhaps inspired by similar practice at the Persian Court.³⁸ Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.9) remarks that the sons of prominent Persians were raised at the Court where they would see men honoured or punished by the Great King, and thus learned 'both how to rule and to be ruled'. The historians of Macedon agree that the *paides basilikoi* were the sons of Macedonians aristocratic families, that they were brought up at the Court and

³⁴ For his career under Alexander see Heckel 1992: 222–7; cf. Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 328–9; but see also Seibert 1969.

³⁵ *Philoi* is found also in Arrian, e.g., 1.25.4, which clearly refers to the king's *consilium*. For *philoi* at the Hellenistic Courts see Herman 1980–81.

³⁶ Thus Tarn ii.137; Kienast 1973: 37–9 = 273–4.

³⁷ See Hammond 1989: 56–7; Heckel 1986 and 1992: 237–44, and Roisman in this volume.

³⁸ Arr. 4.13.1; Aelian, *VH* 14.48. Curt. 8.8.3 and Val. Max. 3.3 ext. 1 suggest it antedates Philip. Decamnichus and Crateuas ('Crataeus', Arist. *Pol.* 1311 b; 'Craterus', Diod. 14.37.6) may have been Pages of Archelaus (Hammond & Griffith 1979: 167; Carney "Regicide" 1983: 271–2). For the imitation of Achaemenid practice see Kienast 1973: 28–30 = 264–6.

attended upon the king (*therapeia tou basileos*).³⁹ Hence, they guarded the king as he slept, prepared his horse and accompanied him on the hunt and, occasionally, also into battle.⁴⁰ The training was rigorous, the tasks often menial, and punishments for misconduct or negligence severe. But these young men developed personal ties with the king's own sons,⁴¹ particularly with the Crown Prince, and ultimately provided the Macedonians with generals and governors.⁴²

It was, of course, one of the aims of the institution to promote stability within the kingdom: the sons of a powerful aristocracy served as hostages for their fathers' good behaviour, and at the Court, there was not only a philosophical education to be had in the company of the king's sons,⁴³ but indoctrination in the ways of the central authority, specifically, of the Argead house. It was, however, an unfortunate consequence of such training that young men were confronted by difficult choices: the path to political advancement often crossed that of family policy or local faction, and, while the bonds of kinship through marriage were easily broken, there were also those who betrayed their blood.⁴⁴

Somatophylakes

Perhaps the most important individuals at Court were the Somatophylakes, or the 'Seven'. These were appointed by the king, appar-

³⁹ Arr. 4.13.1; Aelian, *VH* 14.48; Curt. 5.1.42, cf. 8.6.2; cf. Livy 45.6.7; see also Diod. 17.65.1; Justin 12.7.2.

⁴⁰ For Pages engaged in battle see Arr. 4.16.6; Aretis, the king's *anaboleus* who fought at the Granicus, may have been a Page: Arr. 1.15.6; Berve 1926: 2.58, no. 110; cf. Heckel 1992: 354 "Aretes".

⁴¹ As such they were known as *syntrophoi* ("foster-brothers" or "those raised together with" an individual). Although there may have been those who called themselves *syntrophoi* of Arrhidaeus (later Philip III), the Pages will also have included *syntrophoi* of Alexander's cousin, Amyntas son of Perdiccas: possibly Philotas son of Parmenion (Curt. 6.10.24), Hegelochus son of Hippostratus (Curt. 6.11.22–29; cf. Heckel 1982); Amyntas son of Antiochus (see Ellis 1971 and Prandi 1998), and perhaps the two eldest sons of Andromenes, Amyntas and Simmias (Curt. 7.1.11). Alexander's own *syntrophoi* included Hephæstion, Leonnatus, Marsyas of Pella (Heckel 1980). The *syntrophoi* of Alexander IV are mentioned by Diod. 19.52.4.

⁴² Curt. 5.1.42; 8.6.6.

⁴³ Aristotle and Callisthenes were both tutors of Pages.

⁴⁴ Coenus appears to have had no qualms about betraying his brother-in-law, Philotas; just as Parmenion could sacrifice his son-in-law Attalus—the connection by marriage involved the same woman in both cases. In the age of the Diadochi,

ently from a limited number of families; possibly there was some form of regional representation.⁴⁵ They were, as the title makes clear, the king's most important Bodyguard, at least, in non-combat situations. They are found in the king's immediate vicinity in ceremonial situations or at social functions; during the night at least two of them slept inside the king's bedchamber, while a handful of *paides basilikoi* kept guard outside the door. During the hunt they are found at the king's side, even if Alexander did not wholly appreciate their 'protection'.⁴⁶ In the early stages of the campaign, they may also have remained with the king, but this requirement was later relaxed as prominent Somatophylakes were given command of hipparchies or larger units of the army. For, as members of Alexander's Staff, they were involved in both the planning and execution of military plans.

Of those Somatophylakes whom Alexander 'inherited' from his father, the political affiliations of two are impossible to determine—Ptolemaeus and Demetrius. Neither can be identified as a brother of Antigonos Monophthalmus: Ptolemaeus (or Polemaeus) the father of Antigonos' nephew of the same name outlived Alexander, and the Somatophylax did not; Demetrius, the uncle and eponym of the Besieger died in the mid-330s.⁴⁷ Arybbas was undoubtedly an Aeacid, and thus related to Alexander's mother Olympias, while Balacrus son of Nicanor was a son-in-law of Antipater. Lysimachus, Peithon and Aristonous were all faithful servants of Alexander, but the dates of their appointments cannot be established with certainty. It is tempting to see Lysimachus as the son of a naturalised 'Makedon', whose father Agathocles was one of Philip's Thessalian *hetairoi*.⁴⁸ The best known of the Somatophylakes are, of course, those appointed by

we find Polemaeus betraying his uncle, Antigonos, and Alexander his father Polyperchon.

⁴⁵ Geographic origin can, however, be obscured by the fact individuals who were raised at the Court were referred to as *Pellaioi*, "men from Pella".

⁴⁶ Consider the king's alleged remarks to Lysimachus during the lion-hunt in Sogdiana (Curt. 8.1.11–18).

⁴⁷ Plut. *Demetr.* 2.1 suggests that Demetrius the brother of Antigonos had died before the beginning of the Asiatic campaign (see discussion in Heckel 1992: 261). Billows 1990, however, makes a strong case for seeing in Ptolemaeus son of Ptolemaeus, the Somatophylax of Philip III, a nephew of Antigonos. But his father did not die until 313 (Diod. 19.68.5). Ptolemaeus the Somatophylax of Alexander died in 334 (Arr. 1.22.7).

⁴⁸ For his Thessalian origin, based on Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 81 *ap.* Athen. 6.259 F–260 A, see Geyer, *RE* xiv.1 (1928) 1. Naturalised Makedon: Heckel 1992: 267–8; Lund 1992: 2. Rejection of Thessalian origin: Merker 1979; Berve ii.239.

Alexander himself in the course of the campaign—with the notable exception of Menes son of Dionysius, who served only briefly and about whose origins and affiliations nothing is known.

* * * *

These, then, are the most important political alignments at the Court, and within the army, of Alexander. It is, of course, virtually pointless to differentiate between military status and political power, since Alexander's army represented the Macedonian state-on-the-move and supplanted in importance the sedentary, geographically circumscribed kingdom of Macedonia, which was now subservient to the kingdom in arms. How the power-structures within Alexander's moving state interacted can only be seen in non-military situations; for although there were gestures of disaffection—the *secessio* at the Hyphasis and the more serious mutiny at Opis—there were no cases of civil war or of uprisings that had to be suppressed by force of arms within Alexander's camp.⁴⁹ And the obvious manifestations of power-struggles are significant changes in the military commands, public confrontations between prominent individuals,⁵⁰ and conspiracies, which are of course the products of clandestine attempts to institute change. It is with the aim of understanding how these Macedonian 'factions' interacted both with each other and with the king that I turn to these three points, placing special emphasis on the matter of 'conspiracies', real and imagined.

⁴⁹ The ringleaders of the Opis mutiny, whom the king's hypaspists seized and threw shackled into the Tigris were apparently non-entities and their supporters easily cowed by the swift retribution and an innate veneration of Alexander (Curt. 10.2.30–3.4, 4.1–2).

⁵⁰ It is worth noting, however, that of the two prominent Macedonians who publicly criticised Alexander, one (Black Cleitus) was killed by the king himself and the other was never promoted (Meleager: Curt. 8.12.18; cf. Strabo 15.1.28 C 698; Plut. *Alex.* 59.5); cf. Green 1970: 388. Callisthenes is a different case, since he was Greek and not of the officer class. Leonnatus earned the king's temporary disfavour by ridiculing the Persians who performed *proskynesis* (Arr. 4.12.2); the story of Polyperchon's rough treatment by Alexander for the same offence is a doublet and a fiction (Heckel 1992: 190–1; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 86–7 argues the reverse, crediting the story about Polyperchon and doubting Leonnatus' role, or at least accepting Berve's identification of the latter with the son of Antipater of Aegae: no. 467). It should not be forgotten that such open clashes did not always express disagreement with the king's actions: Craterus and Hephaestion came to blows in front of their respective troops in India (Plut. *Alex.* 47.9–11).

Changes in Military Commands

Major shuffles in the command-structure of Alexander's army were made necessary by administrative appointments or the elimination of officers who had been convicted of treasonous activity. Other changes followed the deaths of commanders in battle or from illness, or by wholesale reorganizations of military units. The evidence for the replacement of those officers who had died in battle, or from illness, is generally not terribly enlightening; for it was customary for the Macedonian territorial levies to be commanded by members of their own aristocracy. Hence, Polyperchon son of Simmias replaced Ptolemaeus son of Seleucus on a permanent basis, just as Simmias son of Andromenes served as taxiarch in the temporary absence of his brother Amyntas.⁵¹ Of the changes that followed deaths in battle or from natural causes, the only truly significant ones were the apparent elevation of Hephaestion to the rank of Somatophylax after the death of Ptolemaeus at Halicarnassus, the appointment of Leonnatus as Somatophylax after the death of Arybbas, and the promotion of Neoptolemus to the rank of *archihypaspistes* after the death of Nicanor son of Parmenion.⁵² The last example is, of course, complicated by the fact that Philotas and Parmenion were executed on charges of treason soon afterwards and the change may have been part of a wholesale restructuring of command. Nevertheless, as Bosworth observed, Neoptolemus was presumably trusted to command the entire hypaspist force, at a time when other commands were being restricted (e.g. the Companion Cavalry), because of his kinship with Alexander.⁵³

Reorganisation of the army, on the other hand, does show which commanders were regarded by the king as trustworthy and supportive. Hence, we find numerous officers promoted: Craterus, Coenus, Perdikkas (and later White Cleitus) rose from the rank of taxiarch (of *pezhetairoi*) to hipparch; two Somatophylakes—Leonnatus and

⁵¹ Polyperchon's replacement of Ptolemaeus son of Seleucus (who died at Issus) as taxiarch of the Tymphaian brigade: Arr. 2.12.2; cf. Diod. 17.57.2; Curt. 4.13.28; Arr. 3.11.9. Simmias' command of Amyntas' taxis: Arr. 3.11.9; Diod. 17.57.3 says the unit was commanded by Philip son of Balacrus; cf. Curt. 4.13.28 'Philagrus'.

⁵² That Neoptolemus was *archihypaspistes* is known only from Plut. *Eum.* 1.6, but it is a reasonable conjecture that he assumed office after Nicanor's death in 330.

⁵³ Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 104. Philotas' command was divided between Cleitus and Hephaestion (Arr. 3.27.4).

Ptolemy—begin to lead sections (as large as a third) of the army, but apparently not as hipparchs. All this, no doubt, a consequence of the hasty and ill-considered promotion of Hephaestion in 330 to command of half the Companion Cavalry (see further below). At the lower levels, restructuring tells us less, since some units were now commanded by officers selected on the basis of merit (i.e. valour). The chiliarchs and pentacosiarchs appointed at Sittacene provide a useful example. Of the eight named individuals, only one Atarrhias son of Deinomenes has an attested patronymikon, such was the gene-pool of the lesser commanders.⁵⁴

Most significant, however, are the changes necessitated by 'promotion'. As we have already seen, the adherents of the Antipatrid-Antigonid group are removed from the army in the first two years of the campaign and deposited in Asia Minor. Calas son of Harpalus, Menander, Antigonus Monophthalmus, Balacrus and Nearchus are all assigned satrapies in Asia Minor.⁵⁵

Conspiracies

Already during the first winter of the campaign (334/3), word reached Alexander at Phaselis of treasonous conduct by Alexander son of Aëropus, the same man who had first hailed him as king in 336. The informant was a certain Sisines,⁵⁶ who carried a message from Darius III to Alexander, although his cover-story was that he was

⁵⁴ Curt. 5.2.3–5; cf. Atkinson 1987; see also Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 148–9.

⁵⁵ Calas son of Harpalus governed Hellespontine Phrygia (Arr. 1.17.1–2; cf. 2.4.2; Curt. 3.1.24); Alexander son of Aëropus replaced him as commander of the Thessalian horse (Arr. 1.25.2). Menander received Lydia and the command of the Greek mercenaries was given to Cleander (Arr. 3.6.7–8; for the confusion of the names Clearchus and Cleander see Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 285; cf. also Dittenberger, *Syll.*³ 302, 405). Antigonus Monophthalmus received Phrygia (Arr. 1.29.3; cf. Curt. 4.1.35) and relinquished the allied infantry to Balacrus son of Amyntas; Balacrus son of Nicanor was appointed satrap of Cilicia and replaced as Somatophylax by Menes son of Dionysius (Arr. 2.12.2). What office, if any, Nearchus relinquished when he became satrap of Lycia and Pamphylia (Arr. 3.6.6; cf. 1.24.4) is unknown.

⁵⁶ The extant Alexander historians mention two men of this name. One is the son of Phrataphernes, satrap of Parthia and Hyrcania, and was enrolled in the *agema* of the Companions (Arr. 7.6.4) at Susa in 324 (Berve 1926: no. 709). The other (no. 710) was almost certainly executed on Alexander's order (thus Curt. 3.7.15). Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 161 does not regard the Sisines in Curtius' account as the agent sent to Alexander, *contra* Berve 1926: ii.356.

on a mission to Atizyes, satrap of Phrygia. Captured by Parmenion, who had been left by Alexander in Sardes with orders to proceed to Phrygia, Sisines was interrogated and sent to the king to reveal the true purpose of his mission, namely to induce the Lyncestian to assassinate Alexander. In return he offered Alexander 1,000 talents in gold and the Macedonian throne. The story conjures up images of Pausanias the Spartan in Byzantium intriguing with Xerxes, but the essential details need not be doubted. When Alexander was finally permitted the opportunity of a public defence, he was lost for words, despite having had at least three years to contemplate the matter. In effect, it was a plea of 'no contest'. Nothing he could say now would save him. But this does not mean that he was innocent, much less that he was the victim of a conspiracy devised by the king himself.⁵⁷

Now the story is far from straightforward: the ancient sources themselves are not in total agreement concerning some of the important players and the chronology of events. Diodorus places the arrest of the Lyncestian in the period shortly before Issus⁵⁸ and says that Alexander reacted to warnings sent by his mother, Olympias.⁵⁹ Curtius discussed the episode in the lost second book of his work, but preserved a story about the arrest of Sisines, which although it is somewhat garbled preserves valuable details that may nevertheless be true.⁶⁰ In fact, the curious details concerning the Persian agent appear to derive from the common source—generally thought to be Cleitarchus—of the so-called 'Alexander Vulgate'. Curtius, however, often accepted an alternative version, given by Ptolemy, without reconciling or rejecting the 'Cleitarchean' account.⁶¹ In the case of Alexander Lyncestes, the careless use of sources can be seen in the comment at 7.1.8 (cf. Diod. 17.80.2) that Alexander, when he was put on trial at Phrada in late 330, had been incarcerated for three years, which must be taken to mean 'since just before the battle of

⁵⁷ Thus Badian 2000: 59, who, by means of this fiction, attempts to establish a precedent for an equally fictitious conspiracy by Alexander against Philotas.

⁵⁸ The probable date of the battle is late October or November 333: see Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I.

⁵⁹ Diod. 17.32.1–2. Abramenko's ingenious argument (Abramenko 1992) that the 'mother of Alexander' mentioned by Diodorus is, in fact, his adoptive mother, Ada of Halicarnassus, is intriguing but implausible.

⁶⁰ For Curtius' discussion of Alexander' arrest see Heckel 1991: 125; cf. Baynham 1998: 40; for the Sisines episode: Curt. 3.7.11–15.

⁶¹ For Curtius' often clumsy manipulation of his sources see Heckel 1994.

Issus'. Finally, both Curtius and Diodorus relate the suspected treachery of Philip of Acarnania, Alexander's personal physician, in such a way that their story bears a disturbing resemblance, in the details of the promises made by the Persian king, to the case of Alexander Lyncestes. Arrian's version, meanwhile, seems to echo Xenophon's account of the arrest and punishment of the traitor Orontas.⁶²

Curtius' comments on Sisines are important: he had spent some time at the Court of Philip II, having been sent there by the satrap of Egypt, presumably during the reign of Artaxerxes III Ochus. And, although the author is probably wrong in placing him in Alexander's entourage in 334/3 (§11),⁶³ the claim that he had resided at the Macedonian Court for a lengthy period adds credence to Sisines' role as an intermediary. For Sisines will have learned enough Greek (or Macedonian) to be able to communicate with Alexander the Lyncestian, whom he may even have known personally. Hence there is no reason to suppose, as Badian (2000: 58) does, that Sisines could have delivered his message or have been interrogated only through interpreters, whose translations were therefore suspect and capable of being misrepresented by a scheming king who plotted the Lyncestian's destruction.⁶⁴

In fact, the difficulties presented by the news of the Lyncestian's treasonous actions are clear from Arrian's account: Alexander first called a meeting of his *hetairoi* to discuss what action should be taken; then, he sent Amphoterus, the brother of Craterus, in disguise to Parmenion with orders for Alexander's arrest. First the council of the *hetairoi*. This *consilium* will have included the prominent Companions

⁶² On this see Xen. *Anab.* 1.6, with Heckel 1983. Orontas, too, takes a fatalistic approach to his 'trial' and punishment.

⁶³ It is interesting that Diodorus (17.30.2), immediately before he relates the stories of Philip the physician and the charges against Alexander Lyncestes, says (incorrectly) that the Athenian exile, Charidemus, had been a 'comrade-in-arms and an advisor' of Philip II! Hence, presumably someone in the original version (i.e. that of Cleitarchus) had been at Philip's Court. Whether Sisines was with Alexander's army or with the enemy is not really important. What matters is that he was conducting negotiations between Alexander and the Persian king.

⁶⁴ Mithrenes, who surrendered Sardes (Arr. 1.17.3-4) and remained in Alexander's entourage until he was appointed satrap of Armenia (Arr. 3.16.5), was probably another one of those Persians who had a 'working knowledge' of Greek. This at least would make sense of Curtius' otherwise otiose remark (3.12.6) that he was sent to captive Persian queens because 'he was skilled in the Persian language' (*peritum linguae Persicae*): what is implied is, of course, that he could receive a message from Alexander in Greek and convey it to the captives in Persian.

of the king, representing a broad spectrum of political affiliations; at this early stage of the campaign, Alexander could scarcely have restricted the meeting to a small clique of favourites who would thus help him plot the destruction of an innocent man. And, the very fact that Alexander consulted his council before taking action must be seen as more than a mere attempt to give his actions a veneer of legality. The king was acutely conscious of the political dynamics of the situation.⁶⁵ Furthermore, Amyntas son of Arrhabaeus—if not a nephew, then certainly a kinsman of the Lyncestian—was still serving in Alexander's own camp: as commander of the scouts, he fought in a bloody battle at Sagalassus; thereafter he vanishes from our records. Either his death or (possibly) his removal from office went unrecorded; perhaps he was replaced when Alexander's forces rejoined those of Parmenion at Gordium. What we do know is that at Issus, Protomachus commanded those troops formerly under Amyntas' command.⁶⁶ Second, had Alexander been totally innocent, negotiating with neither Sisines nor anyone else, what need was there of Amphoterus' disguise? Arrian (1.25.9) tells us that he traveled from Phaselis to Parmenion's camp in native dress, so that he would not be recognised en route but would arrive in Parmenion's camp undetected.

Alexander was thus deposed and kept in detention, a sign that the king feared for his own safety but did not yet feel strong enough to take extreme measures against someone of the Lyncestian's stature at a time when the adherents of Antipater formed the most powerful group in his army.⁶⁷ Indeed, we might ask whether it would have been possible—or at least considered possible or feasible by the king and his alleged co-conspirators⁶⁸—to keep an innocent man of such stature incarcerated for so long and at a time when his 'group' enjoyed special prominence.

⁶⁵ That is, the political networks discussed above.

⁶⁶ See Heckel 1992: 353; Berve ii.329.

⁶⁷ The chronological question is insoluble, and it is difficult to see how there could have been two stages to the arrest of the Lyncestian. On the other hand, Harpalus' sudden flight before Issus may have been motivated in part by anxieties concerning Alexander's recent arrest.

⁶⁸ First and foremost, the perpetrators of such a shameful deed must have evaluated their chances of succeeding; for the dangers of framing an innocent man with powerful connections greatly outweighed the advantage of eliminating a potential enemy. It must also be remembered that in 333, in the campaigning season that followed the Lyncestian's arrest, Alexander relied most heavily on the Antipatrid-Antigonid group.

By contrast, the alleged plot of Philip of Acarnania, smacks of literary fiction, though the physician himself is probably historical. Alexander's education and health had been entrusted to various Epirotes and Acarnanians, all of them apparently selected by his mother. On the other hand, Philip of Acarnania is attested only in the first years of the campaign,⁶⁹ and the story may have been inserted by the lost primary source—Cleitarchus is the favoured candidate⁷⁰—to explain Philotas' later reluctance to credit Cebalinus' information. In Curtius' account, which is the most complete (but admittedly also the most heavily reworked), Philotas remarks that the example of Parmenion, who gave what proved to be a false report of Philip's plan to poison Alexander, made him wary of revealing what Cebalinus had told him (6.10.34–35, adding that on other occasions he had been mocked for his credulity: *cum ludibrio credulitatis repulsus sum*; cf. 6.7.33).

Conspiracies are, of course, symptoms or expressions of political dissent, but this dissent often reflects other changes, particularly changes in the way an individual or group of individuals perceives the king's actions and the king himself. Hence critics (or even some conspirators) need not have had a long history of hostility; indeed, as we shall see in the case of Black Cleitus, bitter vocal opposition can come from the most trusted followers of the king.⁷¹

Alexander's victories brought with them the rapid acquisition of territories and new subjects, and the discovery that to conquer and to govern were two separate issues, the latter considerably more difficult. Alexander had learned from the actions of his father, who prided himself more on the things he accomplished without battle (whether through 'compassion or duplicity'),⁷² for whom a flexible

⁶⁹ He appears also in Curt. 4.6.17, treating Alexander at Gaza. The reference to Philip the doctor (*iatros*) in Ps.-Call. 3.31.8; cf. Metz, *LM* 97 must be treated with caution, since the so-called 'Last Days and Testament' is fictitious. It is tempting to see Philip as fulfilling a role similar to that played by the seer Aristander, who is last attested shortly before the Cleitus episode and whom C. A. Robinson, Jr. saw as a feature of Callisthenes' history (Robinson 1929; the idea was not new—see Berve ii.62, with reference to earlier literature). Again, this need not imply that the seer himself was fictitious. See Berve ii.62–3 (Aristander) and ii.388–9 (Philip).

⁷⁰ See, e.g., Hammond 1983: 121.

⁷¹ Arr. 4.8.4 shows that Cleitus, whose devotion to the king can hardly be questioned, was gradually becoming alienated by Alexander's orientalism and by the comments of his sycophants.

⁷² Thus Justin 9.8.7.

approach to allies and potential subjects paid dividends. But Philip's dealings were with Greeks or with western barbarians who were long familiar to the Macedonians. To enrol Thracians or Thessalians in ranks of the *hetairoi* was far less offensive than to do the same with eastern barbarians. Playing the champion of Apollo during the Sacred War was not the same as respecting religious sensitivities of the east. Philip could take a Thracian or Illyrian wife without any documented political backlash—the turmoil in the women's quarters was, perhaps, another matter—but the conservative Macedonians were less receptive to the young king's mistress, Barsine, who was half Persian. Philip permitted the Scythian king, Atheas, to adopt him;⁷³ less popular was Alexander's adoption by the Carian queen, Ada. And, indeed, most troublesome was the king's willingness to be recognised, according to Egyptian tradition, as the son of Amun. The orientalizing of the Macedonian king began long before Alexander ever adopted Persian dress in Hyrcania. It was the change of style, the outward appearance of their king—changes made for the benefit of the subject peoples, or rather for the sake of winning their approval—that alienated the soldiers whose sweat and blood on the battlefield had effected the conquest. The soldiers, and their leaders. For the Macedonian aristocracy as a whole was not noted for its progressive thinking.

In this context, Hegelochus' complaints in Egypt are perfectly understandable, especially when they were made to Philotas son of Parmenion, who shared Hegelochus' views and felt, rightly or wrongly (we do not know), that his own hard work and particularly that of his father were being overlooked, that the young king who after his visit to Siwah was referring to Philip as 'my so-called father' had forgotten his origins and become intoxicated with premature and easy success. In the event, Hegelochus' plans to assassinate Alexander came to naught, since they were overruled by Parmenion, who saw no advantage in the elimination of the king as long as the war on Persia continued and Darius III lived. *Cui bono?* Certainly not the house of Parmenion, and although Hegelochus could claim blood-ties to Attalus and Philip's last wife, Cleopatra, these were dead. By

⁷³ Justin 9.2.1. The proposed adoption renders Hammond's suggestion that Philip married Atheas' daughter (who was the occupant of the antechamber of Tomb II) implausible (Hammond 1978: 336; cf. 1982: 123, 'such adoption entailed marriage to the heiress').

the time news of the proposed plot came to light, Hegelochus was long dead, a casualty of the last victory over Darius at Gaugamela.⁷⁴

Which brings us to the most famous—though possibly not the most dangerous—of the conspiracies against the king, that which gave rise to the Philotas affair. The plot was, allegedly, designed by a certain Dimnus (or, possibly, Limnus),⁷⁵ together with a cast of seeming non-entities. But Dimnus, when he revealed the plot to his lover Nicomachus, claimed that the conspiracy had the support of at least one prominent officer, the Somatophylax Demetrius. That Amyntas son of Andromenes was ever involved is unlikely.⁷⁶ It was Dimnus' attempt to enlist Nicomachus that ruined the conspiracy and doomed its participants; for Nicomachus reported everything to his brother Cebalinus, who in turn tried to bring the matter to the king's attention.

Arrian gives an abbreviated version, which demonstrates that Philotas, when he was confronted with the charges, denied any involvement in the plot but was forced to admit to knowledge of it,

⁷⁴ For Hegelochus' proposed conspiracy see Curt. 6.11.22–29. Hegelochus son of Hippostratus appears to have been a nephew of Cleopatra-Eurydice, last wife of Philip II, and thus a kinsman of Attalus. Despite the fact that Parmenion eliminated Attalus in order to gain Alexander's goodwill and a measure of power, Hegelochus remained an adherent of the Parmenion faction. See Heckel 1992: 6–12 for his career. It is perhaps significant that Hegelochus' command in the Aegean in 333–332 was shared with Amphoterus, who had demonstrated his loyalty in the case of Alexander Lyncestes. I see no reason to doubt Hegelochus' hostility towards Alexander, and it strikes me as particularly unlikely that Curtius himself invented the story (as suggested by Badian 1960: 332). It has become all too easy to dismiss details in the extant historians as inventions without asking first why such things should be invented at all and why they involve individuals about whom the extant Alexander historians know nothing. Only prosopographical research that draws information from a variety of sources can establish the identity and family connections of certain individuals. How is it, then, that Curtius invented a conspiracy involving an individual who upon examination of other sources—i.e. information not available to Curtius himself—proves to be a relative of Parmenion's son-in-law?

⁷⁵ Thus Diod. 17.79.1, who calls him 'one of the king's *philoi*', in which case his obscurity is only of modern manufacture. But Curtius tells us, more plausibly, that he revealed a conspiracy to which he was party (6.7.6); hence there is no contradiction when Curtius later says that Demetrius and Calis confessed that they had planned the whole affair (6.11.37). Diodorus also differs from Curtius in saying that Alexander extracted the truth from Dimnus, who only later committed suicide when Philotas and Cebalinus were summoned (17.79.5); in Curt. 6.7.29–30 he dies before he can be made to confess.

⁷⁶ The only reason for suspecting Amyntas and his brothers was their association with Philotas. The Amyntas named by Dimnus as one of his confederates was clearly not the son of Andromenes (Curt. 6.7.15).

which he failed to convey to the king. This was, in fact, the only irrefutable charge that could be brought against him; for his subsequent 'confessions' were made under torture, and therefore suspect.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, such evidence proved useful, and it is not only unwise but methodologically wrong to discard it as worthless: what would not stand up in a modern court of law has no bearing on a case tried before a Greek jury or a Macedonian armed assembly, any more than it would have troubled the Spanish Inquisition. What is important is that our sources preserve enough evidence to convict Philotas. It remained for Alexander to determine whether the charges were severe enough to warrant (in the king's own opinion) and justify (in the minds of his men) Philotas' execution. Treason was, after all, not a matter to be taken lightly in a state where few rulers died in their sleep. An earlier investigation, conducted largely by his enemy Craterus, produced witnesses who testified that Philotas had, on numerous occasions, uttered disloyal remarks to his mistress, Antigone.⁷⁸ This established a pattern of behaviour—to use the jargon of the modern legal system without resorting to its methods—that affected how the matter of negligence should be regarded.

Arrogant and tactless, Philotas was his own worst enemy. His political opponents were numerous, the most jealous also the most powerful with the king—Hephaestion, Craterus, Perdikkas, Leonnatus—and even his brother-in-law Coenus was quick to repudiate his ties. The king himself, who had relied heavily in the early going on Parmenion's generalship and influence with the army—though clearly he must have resented both—and had used the Parmenion group to counter-balance the Antipatrid-Antigonid faction, was at this point in the campaign free of the father's interference and less inclined to overlook the indiscretions of the son. Parmenion had remained behind in Ecbatana, his original orders to rejoin the king cancelled in the months that followed. Alexander's 'New Men', some of whom held

⁷⁷ Professor Roisman has pointed out to me that, although Philotas could have put an end to the torture simply by confessing to involvement in the Dimnus conspiracy, Philotas did not do so, but he did provide *new* information that was unknown before his confession.

⁷⁸ Plut. *Alex.* 48.4–49.2. This—and only this—is what Plutarch refers to when he says that Philotas was ignorant of the fact that he was being conspired against. The attempt to link this remark with Dimnus' conspiracy was exposed as flawed already by Hamilton 1969: 134–5. My own objections were published originally in 1977 and refined in my discussion of the career of Philotas (Heckel 1992: 25–32).

no major military office when the expedition left Europe, were now well represented, both in rank and numbers in the structure of command. But, although Parmenion's group had been eclipsed, it nevertheless remained a potent force, especially with old general controlling the lines of communication in Media, with the treasures of the empire near to hand and at his disposal.

Philotas' error proved fatal. Rival commanders saw the opportunity and pressed Alexander, warning him of the dangers of clemency. The king must surely have agreed that his own safety demanded Philotas' elimination, and it is doubtful that he liked him much. But the sword of justice was double-edged: security at the court, gained by the execution of Philotas, threatened the empire, if Parmenion were given the opportunity to react. The former's execution—even in the guise of meting out just punishment—required the murder of the latter. This Alexander had known all along. Hence, also, his hesitation: neither weak-kneed nor simple-minded—and certainly not unwittingly manipulated by his men—Alexander was rather an astute politician who had the good sense to consult his advisors instead of acting on impulse.⁷⁹ The decision was made; Philotas and the members of the conspiracy he claims not to have taken seriously were executed;⁸⁰ and on the heels of this riders were dispatched to order and oversee the murder of Parmenion.

The old general and his family had supported Alexander by eliminating Attalus in 336 and by arresting Alexander Lyncestes in 334/3. The adherents of his group benefited also when the Antipatrid-Antigonid faction was left to administer Asia Minor, and exercised greater power in the years 332–330. Of the known members of the Antipatrid group, no one continued to hold a major military office

⁷⁹ Goukowsky 1981: 133 remarks: "si l'on adopte les vues de Heckel, il faut aussi accorder à Alexandre une surprenante dose d'inconscience." My argument has always been that Alexander needed to be persuaded that the execution of Philotas was both necessary and worth the risk; for he knew all along that he could not eliminate Philotas without taking extreme measures against Parmenion as well.

⁸⁰ The execution of Dimnus' confederates, together with (either immediately or afterwards) Demetrius the Somatophylax, should be sufficient proof of some sort of mischief on their part. Dimnus was, as noted, a member of the *hetairoi*, which makes him a man of some importance. Furthermore, Cebalinus came upon Philotas only by chance—he did not seek out Philotas specifically, only someone of high rank to whom he give the news (Curt. 6.7.17–18): --and this argues strongly against the view that the entire purpose of revealing the details of the conspiracy to Philotas was to trap or 'frame' him. I owe this last observation to W. Lindsay Adams, whose own discussion of the Philotas affair will be published elsewhere.

with the army in Central Asia, unless one assigns to that faction Philip and Tauron, the sons of Machatas. Tauron is, admittedly, later found in the service of Antigonos; but both were brothers of Harpalus the treasurer and may have been regarded as 'the king's men'.⁸¹ But Parmenion's faction had declined as well before the disaster at Phrada in late 330: the general's son Hector drowned in the Nile, Hegelochus son of Hippostratus fell in the battle of Gaugamela, and Nicanor died of illness. Hence only Cleander and Coenus, along with the sons of Andromenes survived the fall of Philotas. Of these, Coenus turned against his brother-in-law and Cleander shared in Parmenion's murder. Amyntas and Simmias, sons of Andromenes, were probably closer to Philotas, both in age and sentiment: Amyntas soon died in battle and Simmias received no further command,⁸² but Attalus was clearly a *syntrophos* of Alexander, a colleague of Leonnatus and Perdikkas, and thus regarded as trustworthy.⁸³ To him the king gave the infantry brigade that Amyntas had led.

Public Confrontations

The fall of Philotas opened the way for further redistributions of the chief military offices. It would, however, be simplistic to speak of Alexander's victory over the Parmenion faction or of the victory of the 'New Men'; for, as I argued at the outset, political groupings are not static, nor is an individual bound to only one group. Marriage

⁸¹ When Iolaus and Philip, the sons of Antipater, joined the king as *paides basilikoi* is uncertain, but since they are identified as such in 323 and the normal age-limits for membership were probably 13 to 18, it is hard to imagine that either joined arrived at Alexander's court before 328, unless they accompanied him from the beginning of the campaign as children to serve as hostages for their father's behaviour. For Tauron son of Machatas at Eretria see *IG* xii.9, 197, in the company of Myllenas son of Asander, perhaps a Beroean and a relative of Asander son of Agathon; cf. also Billows 1990: 450, no. 139; Tataki 1998: 76 and 81, nos. 16 and 39. This son of Agathon may be the Asander who campaigned in Caria with Ptolemaeus (Polemaios) and may have assumed control of the satrapy at some point in Alexander's lifetime.

⁸² Simmias is not heard of again, and Alexander may have passed him over deliberately; but only the most sinister interpretation makes the king responsible for Amyntas' death.

⁸³ It is highly likely that he is the bodyguard (i.e. royal hypaspist) who pursued Philip's assassin, Pausanias of Orestis. See Diod. 16.94.4, Heckel 1992: 180.

to Philotas' sister did not commit Coenus to a losing cause; the sons of Machatas (Tauron and Philip) could have had connections with the Antigonids and still be considered loyal to Alexander, at least until the disgrace of their brother Harpalus, Alexander's friend and treasurer.⁸⁴ If not before, then certainly now, Neoptolemus was appointed *archihypaspistes*, and Demetrius was replaced as Somatophylax by Ptolemy son of Lagus.⁸⁵

In place of Philotas, Black Cleitus and Hephaestion shared command of the Companion Cavalry. Cleitus was indeed 'in line' to succeed Philotas: he had commanded the *ile basilike*, and in this capacity had saved the king's life at the Granicus. By contrast, Hephaestion's promotion was shameless nepotism; for he was distinguished more for his servitude to the king than for his service on the battlefield. Others would clash with him at their own peril, and only the most accomplished could do so openly.⁸⁶ The dual command may have been designed to pre-empt criticism of Hephaestion's elevation.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, we see a brief lull in the careers of several of Philotas' rivals in the period between the trial in Phrada and the events that led up to Cleitus' murder. Coenus is virtually unheard of, Perdicas continues to serve as taxiarch alongside the unimaginative Meleager, and both Ptolemy and Leonnatus are less than conspicuous. Only in 328, do we see these officers move from the level of brigade commanders to field marshals, and then perhaps at Cleitus' expense.

The campaigns beyond the Hindu Kush proved arduous and unproductive. Spitamenes, Catanes, Dataphernes and others arrested

⁸⁴ The fact that both Philip son of Machatas and Calas son of Harpalus died *in battle* in the last years of Alexander's reign will have no bearing on the Treasurer's misdeeds.

⁸⁵ Arr. 3.27.5.

⁸⁶ For both Callisthenes and Eumenes, opposition to Hephaestion proved dangerous (Plut. *Alex.* 55.1; Plut. *Eum.* 2.1–3; Arr. 7.13.1, 14.9); Craterus alone could survive such a public confrontation unscathed (Plut. *Alex.* 47.9–11), although one might wonder whether his command of the smaller portion of the army during the descent of the Indus was not in fact a 'demotion' (Arr. *Anab.* 6.2.2, *Ind.* 19.1; cf. Heckel 1992: 122).

⁸⁷ Arrian's remark that Alexander did not trust any single individual, not even his dearest friend, with command of an entire force of such importance, suggests that he had reasons for distrusting even Hephaestion, but this could refer to Cleitus as much as to Hephaestion and reflects, in all likelihood, the opinion held later in life by Ptolemy. Hephaestion and Perdicas appear to have been compatible and friendly; Ptolemy had attested reasons for disliking Perdicas, and he may have been less than fond of Hephaestion as well.

and extradited Bessus (who had styled himself Artaxerxes) in the expectation of bringing the conquest to an end. In this they were disappointed, and they drew back in suspicion of any proposed negotiations with Alexander. The situation thus called for tactical innovation and military reform. But these reforms entailed the appointment of new hipparchs, which in turn meant redefining the positions of both Hephaestion and Cleitus. The former could be appeased with titles in lieu of real power;⁸⁸ the latter 'promoted' to the governorship of Bactria-Sogdiana in place of Artabazus, who was stepping down on account of old age. Some scholars have seen in Alexander's decision to replace Artabazus with Cleitus an underlying cause of the latter's outburst at the banquet in Maracanda.⁸⁹ He was being 'put out to pasture'—and in one of the world's most remote pastures at that.

The Cleitus affair need not be analyzed here, and *Quellenforschung* since Cauer and Schubert has added little to our understanding.⁹⁰ This is because, as Bosworth rightly notes, the main issues are presented in a surprisingly uniform way.⁹¹ It suffices to note that Cleitus' criticisms of the king detailed the resentment felt by the generation that had served under Philip towards the man who had distanced himself from tradition and from many of his *hetairoi*. Alexander had fallen too heavily under the spell of ambitious officers and shameless sycophants: the former approved his policies and his ostentatious conduct, the latter compared him with heroes and gods.⁹² Under the spell of such men, the king had abandoned his roots and trampled

⁸⁸ This is surely the point at which 'Hephaestion's Chiliarchy' (Arr. 7.14.10), that is, the first and most distinguished (*epiphanestate*) hipparchy (Diod. 18.3.4), came into being. The new hipparchs were Perdikkas, Coenus and Craterus (formerly taxiarchs: their *taxies* were now led by Alcetas, Peithon and Gorgias) and Demetrius son of Althaemenes (hitherto an ilarch).

⁸⁹ Notably Schachermeyr: "in Wahrheit aber bedeutete es Entfernung aus dem königlichen Kreis, aus der kämpfenden Truppe, bedeutete es Isolierung und Kaltstellung" (1973: 364). Cf. Lane Fox: "For a former Hipparch of the Companions, this was a poor reward. . . . Cleitus, therefore, was being downgraded" (1973: 311). The removal of Cleitus from the camp and court "was ominously reminiscent of Parmenion's assignment to Media, and there is no wonder that Cleitus was in a truculent mood" (Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 56).

⁹⁰ Cauer 1894; Schubert 1898; Hamilton 1969; cf. Schachermeyr 1973: 364–5.

⁹¹ Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 51: "Given the confused recollection of the symposium which must have prevailed after the event, it is not surprising that different sources have different emphases. The wonder is that there is so much unanimity."

⁹² Cf. Arr. 4.8.4.

on the traditions of the state. Indeed, what would Cleitus have said, had he lived to see Alexander's marriage to Roxane or the attempt to introduce *proskynesis* at the court?

These then are the tensions that underlie Cleitus' drunken rebuke of the king and his courtiers, whether it was triggered by an offensive poem, the flattery of tiresome parasites, or by the king's own boastful comments.⁹³ But the truest cause of his dissatisfaction and resentment was the fact that he was being deposited in the remotest corner of the new empire, his appointment simultaneously clearing the path for the promotion of younger officers to the hipparchies of the reformed Companion Cavalry. Cleitus had enjoyed his military promotion for but a brief time, and he was understandably reluctant to exchange his new rank for the pleasures of ruling 'wild beasts with aggressive natures'.⁹⁴

Cleitus' outburst cannot be construed as treasonous: Macedonian practice allowed the *hetairoi* to speak freely to their king. Nevertheless the words were designed to sting, especially since they came from one to whom Alexander owed his life. If he had resented the glory that attached to Parmenion after the initial victories of the campaign, then Cleitus' reminder of his service at the Granicus—and this was doubtless not the first time he had mentioned it—was even less welcome.⁹⁵ But the comments about Philotas need not be taken to mean that Cleitus believed in his innocence, merely that he regarded his execution and the murder of his father as excessive punishment.

⁹³ According to Plutarch (*Alex.* 50.8ff.) a certain Pranichus or Pierion recited a poem that seemed to mock a Macedonian military defeat. Holt 1988: 78–9 n. 118 makes the attractive suggestion that they commemorated the heroics of one of their own, Aristonicus the *kitharoidos*, who was killed near Bactra by Spitamenes' men. The slight was thus unintended and Cleitus can be regarded as over-sensitive. That the disaster at the Polytimetus was the subject of the offending poem (cf. Carney 1981: 155 n. 17) strikes me as implausible, given the gravity of defeat and the tribute paid by Alexander to the dead (Curt. 7.9.21; *Metz Epit.* 13). For the flatterers' comparisons with the Dioscuri and Herakles see Arr. 4.8.2–3. For the king's own boasting see Curt. 8.1.23–26; Justin 12.6.2.

⁹⁴ Curt. 8.1.35: *Mittor ad feras bestias praecipitia ingenia sortitas*. Is it coincidental that in Plutarch's version Alexander apologizes to his Greek guests for the barbarous behaviour of the Macedonians, comparing them with wild beasts.

⁹⁵ Curt. 8.1.15 shows Alexander's resentment at Lysimachus' attempt to protect him during a lion-hunt in Sogdiana. The emphasis on *somatophylakia* is clear from what follows in §18.

Conspiracy—Again

One final conspiracy, that of Hermolaus and the Pages, can also be dealt with briefly. The incident that incited Hermolaus to conspire with his cohorts was relatively trivial, though psychologically understandable when one considers the unmeasured responses of wounded adolescent pride. The attitudes of the conspirators to their king doubtless reflect what they had heard from their fathers. But where Cleitus was merely giving voice to his frustrations, the Pages with the indignation of youth were prepared to act.

Hermolaus had been flogged for anticipating the king in striking a boar during the hunt; to add to his humiliation, Alexander deprived him of his horse. Such punishment was neither unprecedented nor outside the king's authority. But it is worthy of note that only shortly before the incident, the boy's father, Sopolis, had been passed over for promotion from *ilarch* to *hipparch* (cf. Demetrius son of Althae-*menes*) and sent back to Macedonia on a recruiting mission. Hermolaus could scarcely have escaped punishment even if Sopolis had not already departed; for Antipater, whose father Asclepiodorus (the former satrap of Syria) had only recently rejoined Alexander, was tortured and executed despite his father's presence in the camp.⁹⁶ One wonders, however, whether Sopolis' parting words to his son included any complaints against the king. The others who supported him—Sostratus, Epimenes, Anticles and Philotas—did so out of friendship, and probably because they too had grown to dislike Alexander.⁹⁷

Two points are worth considering: the Pages were well positioned to strike at the king—they guarded the entrance to his sleeping quarters—and despite their ages their hostility to the king is of some consequence; for they were the sons of prominent fathers and their tutor, Callisthenes, had only a short while before opposed Alexander's bid

⁹⁶ Asclepiodorus' arrival: Arr. 4.7.2. Sopolis' departure: Arr. 4.18.3.

⁹⁷ It is misleading, indeed simply wrong, to dismiss these Pages as sons of insignificant fathers ('no one above *ilarch*, it seems'): thus Badian 2000: 70. Antipater was the son of a former satrap and (probably future *trierarch*—emending Arr. *Ind.* 18.3). Epimenes was a friend of Charicles, son of the Lydian satrap Menander, though admittedly Charicles was not party to the conspiracy. Carsis the Thracian father of Philotas must have been a man of some stature, since he had won both a Macedonian bride and the privilege of having a son raised at court. It is, of course, futile to attempt an identification of Amyntas the father of Sostratus.

to introduce *proskynesis* at the court. Certainly, both Aristoboulus and Ptolemy reported that the boys themselves had confessed that it was Callisthenes who had incited them, and it was on suspicion of complicity in, or even instigation of, the plot that he was arrested. As a Greek in the midst of the Macedonian military camp, he was not entitled to a formal trial and could make no defence—in effect, he had little status and belonged to the ‘hired help’. Whatever we conclude about his role in the Hermolaus affair must, therefore, remain speculation. Nor are the circumstances of his death clear: if he died, as some have suggested, after a period of captivity, then there may be some truth to story that Alexander planned to have him judged by his fellow Greeks. But his death, whenever and however it occurred,⁹⁸ will have caused little consternation amongst the Macedonians. In the circles of power he was not well liked, and it was generally believed that he had the ability and inclination to foment such mischief.

Conspiracies and rivalries thus reflected the ebb and flow of political tides.⁹⁹ What is surprising about the reign of Alexander the Great is not that conspiracies occurred but rather that there were not more of them and, more significantly, that no one ever came close to doing the king any physical harm.¹⁰⁰ Those conspiracies that existed

⁹⁸ See Arr. 4.14.3. Aristoboulus says he was incarcerated and died afterwards; cf. Chares *ap.* Plut. *Alex.* 55.9 (= *FGrH* 125 F 15), who places his death from illness seven months later. There is no support for Ptolemy’s claim that Callisthenes was crucified (but Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 100 notes that crucifixion was reserved for rebels).

⁹⁹ Abramenko 2000 postulates one more conspiracy against Alexander, this one devised by certain Babylonian officials—of whom Apollodorus of Amphipolis (Berve 1926: 55–6, no. 101) was the most prominent—who sought to avoid punishment for mismanagement of affairs in Alexander’s absence. Their failure to curb the actions of Harpalus would have been interpreted by the king as proof of either complicity or negligence (“eine unglaubliche Nachlässigkeit,” p. 372). Apollodorus does indeed fear punishment at Alexander’s hands (cf. Bosworth *Alexander and the East* 1996: 23, with n. 63, who comments on the “degree of [Apollodorus] terror”), and Stamenes (Berve 1926: 361, no. 718) vanishes without a trace: but the evidence for such a plot is flimsy and unconvincing, if not actually contradicted by Arr. 7.18.1–4. At any rate, it appears that Apollodorus had been summoned by Alexander *before* Harpalus absconded with the treasures from Babylon.

¹⁰⁰ Since it has become fashionable to compare Alexander with Hitler, it is perhaps worth contrasting Alexander’s rather modest security needs with those of the Führer, the complexity of which are elucidated in Hoffmann 2000. According to Hoffmann’s tabulation (pp. 268–9), Hitler survived some 27 assassination attempts or plots against his life between the years 1933–1945, a period that corresponds closely to the length of Alexander’s reign. Even on a generous interpretation of ‘conspiracy’, we should be hard pressed to come up with ten such plots against Alexander.

were uncovered and pre-empted, largely through the efforts of those around him, whose task amongst others was to provide for the king's safety. Similarly, there were no serious mutinies by the army: the *secessio* at the Hyphasis was, in all likelihood, contrived, to put the onus for turning back on the men rather than on Alexander himself;¹⁰¹ the Opis 'mutiny' was a reaction to Alexander's orientalism. In fact, Curtius' comments on the events at Opis serve to underscore the mood of Alexander's troops and their relationship with their king:

quis crederet saevam paulo ante contionem obtorpuisse subito metu, et cum ad supplicium videret trahi nihilo ausos graviora quam ceteros? Sive nominis, quod gentes, quae sunt sub regibus, inter deos colunt, sive propria ipsius veneratio, sive fiducia tanta vi exercentis imperium conterruit eos: singulare certe ediderunt patientiae exemplum, adeoque non sunt accensi supplicio commilitonum, cum sub noctem interfectos esse cognoscent, ut nihil omiserint quod singuli magis oboedienter et pie facerent.

Who would have believed that a gathering fiercely hostile moments before could be paralysed with sudden panic at the sight of men being dragged off for punishment whose actions had been no worse than the others? They were terror-stricken, whether from respect for the title of king, for which people living in a monarchy have a divine reverence, or from respect for Alexander personally; or perhaps it was because of the confidence with which he so forcefully exerted his authority. At all events they were the very model of submissiveness: when, towards evening, they learned of their comrades' execution, so far from being infuriated at the punishment, they did everything to express individually their increased loyalty and devotion (Curt. 10.3.1-4; trans. J. C. Yardley).¹⁰²

Like the doughty Craterus, the troops could venerate their king without approving his policies. For, despite the modern scholarly trend, which sees Alexander as the greatest butcher of antiquity,¹⁰³ he was undoubtedly one of the most popular military leaders who ever lived.

¹⁰¹ As suggested by Spann 1999, an argument which I develop elsewhere.

¹⁰² Cf. Curtius' comments at 3.6.17-20, in the time before Issus. Whatever changes Alexander had undergone both personally and in relation to his senior officers, the common soldiers continued to regard him with awe and affection.

¹⁰³ See now Hanson 2001: 60-98, with the requisite references to Hitler at 89-90, inspired by, but carrying to extremes, the views of Bosworth *Alexander and the East* 1996.

CHAPTER NINE

WOMEN IN ALEXANDER'S COURT

Elizabeth D. Carney

Women played a prominent role in the political struggles of Alexander's reign despite the fact that few of them were physically present at his itinerant court for extensive periods. The most influential of these women, his mother Olympias and his full sister Cleopatra, never saw Alexander again after his departure for Asia. Because of the general nature of Macedonian monarchy as well as circumstances peculiar to the period of Alexander, a few women managed to act independently of the king and a larger number became pawns in the intrigues of others. In Macedonia, kingship belonged to the Argead clan. Women who belonged to the clan, whether by blood or by marriage, were therefore inextricably linked to the central political institution of Macedonia. Before the fourth century, royal Macedonian women had ordinarily functioned as little more than dynastic tokens. Changes in the nature of monarchy initiated by Philip II and expanded by Alexander increased the distinction between the royal dynasty and the rest of Macedonian society and thus elevated royal women along with royal men. The scarcity of male Argeads during Alexander's reign and his prolonged absence from the Macedonian homeland further inflated the role of royal women.

The best way to understand the role of women at the court of Alexander is to begin by considering the role of women in Macedonian monarchy before his reign. With that background, we can then turn to an examination of the careers of those women related to him by blood (Olympias, Cleopatra, and his two half-sisters), by marriage or sexual relationship (Roxane, Stateira, Parysatis, Barsine), or by the establishment of pseudo mother-son relationships with the king. Once we have gained some familiarity with the lives and actions of these individuals during Alexander's reign, we can determine to what degree the role of women at Alexander's court was a consequence of the king's policy and to what degree a consequence of the actions of individual women.

Until the time of Alexander's grandfather, Amyntas III, we hear of royal women in Macedonia only as the brides in marriage alliances. It is likely that Macedonian kings had long practiced polygamy, but there is no certain evidence until the reign of Philip II.¹ Alexander's grandmother, Eurydice, is the first royal woman known to have played a role in the public and political life of Macedonia. Literary evidence paints a contradictory picture of her as either or both a scheming adulteress willing to take the life of son or husband or as a loyal mother desperately trying to secure the succession of her sons to the throne (the latter is the more likely picture).² Recently discovered inscriptions indicate that Eurydice dedicated a temple in the *agora* (marketplace) at Vergina, the site now generally recognized as Aegae, the ancient capital of Macedonia.³

Whereas Eurydice's public career was to some degree the consequence of chance circumstance, her son Philip II made royal women prominent as a matter of policy, although their prominence largely consisted of playing traditional roles on a grand scale. Philip was polygamous to an unprecedented degree: he married seven women, primarily for political reasons (Athen. 13.557 b-e). Polygamy was alien to the classical Greek world to the south and Philip's court became notorious there both because of the role Greeks believed women played in court intrigue (Plut. *Alex.* 9.3-5) and because of the role sexual relationships between adult males in court life (Athen. 6.260 f). Philip's assassination was directly linked to the tensions created at court by his sexual relationships with men (Diod. 16.93.3-94.1; Just. 9.6.4-7.14). Indirectly, the conflicting aspirations of two of his wives (Olympias and another Cleopatra, ward of Attalus) and their families for the succession of their sons (living and hoped-for) may also have been a factor in the murder of Philip. There can be no doubt that the conflict between the factions of Olympias and Cleopatra led to serious trouble in the last two years of Philip's reign: after a public insult inflicted by Cleopatra's guardian Attalus, Alexander and his mother Olympias chose to go leave Macedonia. A public reconciliation between Alexander and Philip (and possibly between Philip and Olympias) was affected shortly before Philip's

¹ See Greenwalt 1989: 19-45; Carney *Women and Monarchy* 2000: 23-27.

² Mortensen 1992: 155-69.

³ See Carney *Women and Monarchy* 2000: 40-46, 242-43, for references and the possibility that Eurydice's tomb has been found at Vergina.

death, but tensions remained high, whether or not Alexander and his mother actually had a hand in the murder of Philip (See below for discussion).

Philip made royal women part of the public presentation of Macedonian monarchy by means other than simply his own many marriages. He attempted to arrange a marriage for Alexander's half-brother (Plut. *Alex.* 10.1), Arrhidacus although we know of no plans of his for Alexander's marriage. Alexander's youngest half-sister, Thessalonice, was too young for marriage during her father's reign, but Philip did arrange a marriage for Cynnane, Alexander's other half-sister, with Philip's nephew Amyntas. This marriage, arranged toward the end of Philip's reign, was probably intended to increase the number of Argead heirs available as well as to consolidate the dynasty. Much more important was the marriage Philip arranged for Cleopatra, Alexander's only full sister, with Alexander, ruler of Molossia, Olympias' brother (Diod. 16.91.4–92.1). The marriage was obviously intended to reconfirm the Macedonian-Molossian alliance initiated by Olympias' own marriage but jeopardized by the dispute that led to the temporary departure of Alexander and Olympias. The fact that the wedding celebrations for the marriage of his daughter Cleopatra were the occasion for Philip's assassination has tended to obscure the fact that Philip made this wedding into an international festival, a precedent that many Hellenistic rulers would follow. In the same way that Philip used his daughter's wedding to highlight his wealth and power, he used the images of his mother Eurydice and his wife Olympias, as well as those of his father Amyntas and son Alexander, to highlight the wealth and power at the dynasty. Within the sacred precinct at Olympia, Philip had constructed a circular building known as the Philippeum in which were placed large statues of these four family members, as well as one of himself. All five statues were made of gold and ivory, a substance previously used only in statues of gods (Paus. 5.17.4, 20.9–10). The Philippeum, while not a temple, suggests that Philip was flirting with the idea of divinity, not just for himself (Diod. 16.92.5) but for the dynasty and for the women of the dynasty as well as the men.⁴

Thus, at the time Alexander took the throne, the young king had experienced first hand the advantages and disadvantages of royal

⁴ Carney *Women and Monarchy* 2000: 212–16.

polygamy used for political ends and had seen his father begin to establish a sort of institutionalized public role for royal women. The youthful ruler would for some time demonstrate no interest in marriage and the production of heirs. He apparently deemed the kinds of alliances his father had either established or confirmed by such marriages as more "entangling" than beneficial. Late in his reign he took three wives, belatedly replicating his father's marriage policy. None of the wives achieved any significant public role or influence, primarily because all were Asian women scorned by the xenophobic Macedonians and Greeks, and secondarily because none of them produced an heir until after the death of Alexander himself. Certainly none of Alexander's wives was able to build a political position for herself based on being the advocate for the succession of a son in the way that Eurydice and Olympias had done. As a consequence of Alexander's delay in marrying and the obscurity of his wives once acquired as well as his long absence from Macedonia, his mother and full sister not only retained their earlier prominence but actually increased it. Compared to Philip, Alexander was uninterested in the public presentation of the dynasty as opposed to the presentation of his own image (thus, for instance, his striking lack of concern for the succession). To the degree that he did concern himself with dynastic rather individual power, he emphasized the role of his mother and sister. He appeared to be more comfortable with the role of royal son or brother as opposed to that of royal husband or father. Not surprisingly, Alexander demonstrated the same preference in dealing with other dynasties. He made both Ada of the Hecatomnid dynasty of Caria and Sisygambis, mother of Darius III, secondary or substitute mothers. Although he did marry one of Darius' daughters in 324, Alexander played a role more like that of brother to these young women for most of his reign.

Whereas Philip had increased the formal public role of women in Macedonian monarchy but prevented them from exercising any power independent of him, some royal women clearly did acquire power independent or at least distinct from that of the king during Alexander's reign. This happened despite his comparative indifference to dynastic issues. We shall need to consider to what degree those women who became power brokers in their own right and those who remained virtually entirely in the shade of the royal presence did so because of their own actions and choices, those of the king, or both.

Let us begin this consideration with those women related to

Alexander by blood. His youngest half-sister Thessalonice, despite the fact that she must have reached marriageable age during the reign of her brother, remained unmarried, probably in the company of Olympias. Alexander widowed his other half-sister Cynnane when he had her husband Amyntas executed, supposedly for plotting against the throne (Plut. *Moral.* 327 c; Curt. 6.9.17, 10.24; Just. 12.6.14; *FGrH* 156 F 9.22). Alexander did attempt to marry Cynnane off, doubtless to try to remove her from any possible political base in Macedonia, but the "barbarian" groom he had found for his half-Illyrian sibling died before the wedding could take place (Arr. 1.5.4–5). Cynnane spent the rest of Alexander's reign in Macedonia in obscurity, apparently training her daughter Adea in the military arts, as she had been trained, and probably in control of some wealth.⁵

So far as we know, Alexander did not attempt to find another husband for Cynnane (Polyaenus 8.60 claims that she herself did not wish to remarry). The same comparative lack of interest in marriage alliances he demonstrated for himself and his two half-sisters was also present in his treatment of Cleopatra, his full sister. Cleopatra had two children by Alexander of Molossia (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 5.5) but was soon widowed when her husband died on campaign in Italy. She remained a widow throughout the rest of Alexander's reign, but certainly not an obscure one like her half-sister.

For one thing, Cleopatra clearly had her brother's official favor and was apparently believed to have influence over him and his decisions. Alexander sent her spoils from his military success (Plut. *Alex.* 25.4). Tradition, not necessarily accurately, pictures her brother as indulging his sister's personal peccadilloes (Plut. *Mor.* 818 b–c). Cleopatra was asked to use her influence with her brother to intercede for the tyrant of Heracleia, Dionysius, and she was able to do so with success (Memnon *FGrH* 434 F 4.37).

Good evidence exists that demonstrates that during her brother's reign Cleopatra was able to do more than enjoy the benefits of Alexander's favor and the ability to use that favor to influence his policy. Cleopatra clearly exercised power in her own right during this period, although exactly what sort of power it was, where it was based, and to what degree it depended on the support and cooperation of her

⁵ Her ability, after the death of Alexander, to raise sufficient troops to escape Antipater and reach the main Macedonian army in Asia strongly suggests that she had private wealth. See further Carney *Women and Monarchy* 2000: 69–70, 129–31.

brother and/or her mother is uncertain. It is likely that Cleopatra acted as regent in Molossia from the time of her husband's departure to Italy until some time well after his death in winter 331/30. The Athenians sent an embassy to her with condolences after her husband's death (Aeschin. 3.242). While the Athenians could have sent this embassy merely as a politic gesture to Alexander's sister, other evidence suggests that she held some official position in Molossia. Cleopatra shipped grain to Corinth no later than 330 (Lycurg. *Leoc.* 26) and around 330 she appears on an inscription (*SEG XXIII* 198) as *thearodoch* (a person who receives envoys sent to consult an oracle or be present at a festival), probably for the newly formed Epirote alliance. Her name appears on another inscription that lists those who received grain from Cyrene (*SEG IX* 2). The list, whose date could have been as early as 333,⁶ does not say for what state she received grain during a period of famine, but it refers to her by her personal name alone. On the basis of parallel male usage, this has been taken to mean that Cleopatra (and her mother, whose name appears on the list twice; see below) was functioning as a head of state.⁷ Cleopatra's activities as both a provider and recipient of grain may well have been done in cooperation with her brother and in furtherance, at least in part, of his interests in the eastern Mediterranean.⁸ Certainly Molossian and Macedonian rulers had often acted in cooperative fashion in the recent past. Granted the surviving evidence, it seems reasonable to conclude that Cleopatra was regent of Molossia at least as late as 330.⁹ In private life, Molossian women could act as guardians for their minor sons¹⁰ and so a female regent for Molossia who herself had royal Molossian blood (she was, herself, the product of the initiation of the Macedonian/Molossian alliance) and who was the sister of Alexander seems perfectly plausible.

Nonetheless, Cleopatra may not have ruled Molossia alone during her brother's reign and it is likely that toward the end of Alexander's reign she gave up the Molossian regency entirely. Possibly as early as the death of her brother Alexander, Olympias returned to Molossia. Granted that her name appeared on the Cyrene inscrip-

⁶ See Blackwell 1999: 96-98 and Kingsley 1986: 171-77 for references and convincing arguments for an early date.

⁷ Charneux 1966: 178.

⁸ Kingsley 1986: 167.

⁹ Kingsley 1986: 165-77.

¹⁰ Cabanes 1980: 324-51.

tion twice (*SEG IX 2*), Olympias too seems to have functioned as a head of state, although which state is not clear. Plutarch (*Alex.* 68.3) says that in the period after Alexander's return from India restlessness and eagerness for change was so common that Olympias and Cleopatra raised a faction against Antipater and divided his rule between them, with Olympias taking Epirus and Cleopatra Macedonia.¹¹ According to Plutarch, a surprisingly uninvolved Alexander simply commented that his mother had made the better choice because the Macedonians would not put up with being ruled by a woman. It is difficult to determine the specifics of this complex situation. Cleopatra seems to have acted in concert with her mother and with either the approval or the indifference of her brother, exchanged her position as regent or co-regent in Molossia for one of some authority in Macedonia. This happened despite the fact that Antipater, contrary to the orders of Alexander (*Arr.* 7.12.4–7), remained in Macedonia and was still there at the time of Alexander's death.

Olympias, Cleopatra's mother, was the most important woman in Alexander's court and would remain a prominent and controversial figure in Macedonian power politics well after her son's death, until her own murder. Whereas the surviving sources offer little opportunity to form an understanding of Cleopatra's personality and character, the literary tradition is full of anecdotal material about Olympias and her actions during the reigns of her husband and son. Much of it is hostile to both her and Macedonia and virtually all of it is replete with stereotypes about women and the exercise of political power. It is also contaminated by the propaganda wars of the Successors of Alexander. Too often modern readers, both scholarly and popular, have read the ancient sources uncritically and the result has been something more like a caricature than a portrait of a political figure. A careful reading of the sources, one that puts more weight on evidence for Olympias' actions than on anecdotal material about her, produces an understanding of her as person of considerable intelligence, courage and ruthlessness, but no more brutality than many other members of the Macedonian elite. Like her son, she was sometimes capable of serious misjudgment, but nothing in her actions suggests that she was any less in control of her actions than he and

¹¹ Blackwell 1999: 95–96 suggests that the passage can be read somewhat more generally, leaving open the possibility that the Olympias' and Cleopatra's actions happened somewhat earlier than Alexander's return.

events after Alexander's sudden death actually demonstrate that, at least in that period, she was capable of considerable circumspection. In general, we often know little of her motivation and wisdom suggests that unbridled speculation about it can easily lead to distortion.¹²

There is no direct evidence that Olympias or any other royal woman exercised independent power and influence during her husband's reign. Some scholars have, however, believe that several of her husband's decisions demonstrate her ability to influence him. Philip, after earlier signs of favor, put her brother on the throne of Molossia (Just. 8.6.5; Diod. 16.72.1). The king chose as one of Alexander's important tutors a kinsman of Olympias (Plut. *Alex.* 5.4–5; Athen. 10.435 a). He reasserted the importance of the Molossian alliance through the marriage of Olympias' daughter to Olympias' brother (Diod. 16.91.4–93.2; Just. 9.6.1–3). One could surmise that these actions were examples of Olympias' influence over Philip,¹³ but this interpretation probably puts the cart before the horse. Olympias was important because of the Molossian alliance; the Molossian alliance was not important because of Olympias. She also gained public recognition, as the placement of her statue in the Philippeum indicated, because she was the mother of the son Philip was treating as heir.

Had Philip's final marriage not somehow shaken his apparent plans for the succession, we would probably know nothing other than formalities about Olympias during her husband's reign and it is possible that her role during her son's reign might have been smaller. Philip's toleration (Athen. 13.557 d–e) or even approval (Just. 9.7.4; Plut. *Alex.* 9.4–5) of Attalus' public questioning of Alexander's qualifications as heir led Alexander to leave court, taking his mother with him and depositing her in the court of her brother in Molossia. Olympias was not present when the insult was made and Alexander, not she, initiated their departure, but is very likely to have approved it. Whether or not, as Justin (9.7.7) claimed, she tried to convince her brother to go to war with Macedonia, she doubtless encouraged him to pressure Philip to remedy the public insult done the Molossian dynasty. Perhaps it was thanks at least in part to her that Philip then arranged a marriage between her daughter and her husband.¹⁴

¹² Carney 1993: 29–56.

¹³ Berve 1926: 2: 283; Macurdy 1932: 26.

¹⁴ Justin (9.7.7) claims that Olympias' brother would have gone to war with Philip,

The marriage was certainly a conciliatory gesture, particularly given the publicity Philip created to celebrate it.

By the time of Philip's murder, he had publicly reconciled with his son and Olympias may well have returned to Macedonia when her son did.¹⁵ This reconciliation was more formal than real. Alexander's attempt to substitute himself for his half-brother in a marriage alliance Philip was negotiating with Pixodarus, satrap of Caria, infuriated the king and led him to send a number of Alexander's associates into exile. Plutarch (*Alex.* 10.1) explains that it was Alexander's mother and unnamed friends (quite possibly those subsequently exiled) who encouraged him to interject himself into the projected marriage.

Thus it is not surprising that Plutarch (*Alex.* 10.4) and Justin (9.7.1) report that many blamed Olympias for the murder of Philip and some blamed Alexander as well. The threat to the succession had been posed to mother and son as a unit, they had apparently responded as a unit, and continued to act together, apparently continuing to see Philip as their common enemy, as a person neither any longer trusted. Whether Olympias and/or Alexander actually supported the assassin Pausanias will probably never be known. Both would later demonstrate that they were capable of murder and both certainly benefited from Philip's demise, particularly from its timing. On the other hand, many members of the Macedonian elite were equally murderous, regicide was something of a Macedonian tradition, and a number of individuals and groups also benefited from his murder or might have hoped to do so (not least of them, the Persian king). Whatever the truth of their role in the assassination, it is significant that both were suspected of it and both may have benefited from the fact that many thought that they had engineered it.¹⁶

The events immediately after Philip's death would have done nothing to disabuse anyone of the suspicion that mother and son had brought about the king's death because they feared that Alexander

as his sister urged, had Philip not forestalled him by arranging the marriage with Olympias' daughter.

¹⁵ Plutarch (*Mor.* 179 c) reports that Philip was reconciled with Olympias as well as Alexander. Justin (9.7.10) says Olympias was present at Aegae by the time of Philip's funeral (and possibly earlier), but his account of Olympias' actions immediately after Philip's death is not believable. None of the sources say that she did not return and it is difficult to believe, granted the nature of the insult that had precipitated the departure of mother and son, that she would not have been included in the public reconciliation. See further Carney *Women and Monarchy* 2000: 66, 79–81.

¹⁶ See full discussion in Carney 1992: 169–89.

would not otherwise succeed his father. Aside from the foreign threats presented by the Illyrians and Thebans, in the first year or so of his reign Alexander also moved quickly against domestic enemies. He had his cousin Amyntas, Cynnane's husband, and two associates of Amyntas killed (Plut. *Mor.* 327 c; Curt. 12.6.14; Arr. 1.25.1). He also arranged the death of Attalus, guardian of Philip's last wife (Diod. 17.2.3–5, 5.2; Just. 12.6.14; Curt. 7.1.3).¹⁷ Sometime during this period, Attalus' former ward Cleopatra, along with her baby, was killed. Our evidence for the murder is poor (Just. 9.7.12; Paus. 8.7.5; Plut. *Alex.* 10.7), probably because the murder was carried out in private and because, once Philip was dead, the world in general was no longer interested in this young woman. Almost certainly, Olympias murdered Cleopatra and her baby, although by what means and whether with Alexander's knowledge is not certain.¹⁸

The murder of a young royal child was not unprecedented in Macedonia (Pl. *Grg.* 471 c) and Olympias was not the first royal Macedonian woman to be suspected of murder (Just. 7.4.7, 5.4–8; schol. ad. Aeschin. 2.29). Revenge for the insult offered by Cleopatra's family to that of Olympias doubtless played a role in the murder, but it is primarily a dynastic murder,¹⁹ part of the general elimination of Alexander's enemies at the beginning of his reign. Had they lived, Cleopatra and her child could have caused the same kind of trouble for the family of Alexander and Olympias that Cynnane and Adea Eurydice would later make.²⁰ It is unlikely that Olympias would have acted without her son's approval although it is quite believable that he may have tried to escape public blame for the act. Thus

¹⁷ Justin 11.5.1 says that Alexander killed all of Cleopatra's relatives; Heckel 1992: 5–12 argues that this statement was an exaggeration and that only Attalus was meant. Heckel makes a good case for the survival, at least temporarily, of some of Attalus' kin, but there is nothing implausible in the idea that other members of Cleopatra's family were eliminated around the time of Attalus' murder.

¹⁸ Justin and Pausanias clearly attribute the murder of Cleopatra to Olympias, although they give contradictory accounts of the act. Plutarch says that Alexander scolded his mother for treating Cleopatra (the baby is not mentioned) savagely while he was gone; it is not clear whether this is a euphemistic reference to the murder or not. If so, one need not believe that Alexander's reproach was sincere. See further discussion in Carney 1993: 37–41.

¹⁹ So Carney 1993: 39–40, *contra* Heckel 1981: 57.

²⁰ Justin (9.7.3) seems to refer to a son born to Cleopatra and reports (11.2.3) that, after the death of Philip, Alexander murdered his step-mother's son, a half-brother called Caranus. The arguments of Heckel 1979: 385–93 against the historicity of "Caranus," are, however, generally accepted. It is believed that Cleopatra bore only one child to Philip, a daughter called Europe (Athen. 13. 557 d–e).

Olympias' began her son's reign as she had ended that of her husband's, as the advocate for her son's and his heirs succession and subsequent security on the throne. It was a policy that she followed the rest of her life, one that ultimately caused her own death.²¹

During Alexander's reign, despite or perhaps partly because of her son's long absence, his mother received considerable public attention in the Greek world. In 333 she made offerings in Athens to the goddess Hygeia, probably for her son's health (*Hyp. Eux.* 19) and in 331/30 she offered very splendid dedications at Delphi (*SIG I*³ 252 N 5ff.), apparently made up of booty sent her by her son (*Plut. Alex.* 25.4). These actions were typical of royal women in the Greek world before and after Olympias' day.

Olympias, however, also played a more active role than any previous royal woman had in public affairs not only in Molossia and Macedonia, but in the Greek peninsula and, long distance, in Alexander's court. As we have seen, she left Macedonia for Molossia, perhaps as early as the time of her brother's death in 331/30 (*Liv.* 8.24.17; *Paus.* 1.11.3). Diodorus (18.49.4), referring to Olympias' situation many years later in 319, says that she had returned to Molossia some time before because of a quarrel with Antipater. A speech of Hyperides (*Eux.* 25), dated c. 330, which has Olympias saying that Molossia belonged to her also implies that she was back in Molossia by c. 330.²² Once there, although her daughter Cleopatra seems to have been acting as regent, at some point Olympias must have joined her in that role and at some further point, come to rule Molossia by herself.

It is difficult to doubt that Olympias held a position of authority during part of her son's reign. We have already mentioned that her name occurred twice on the Cyrene grain list, implying that she was acting as head of state (*SEG IX 2*)²³ and that Plutarch (*Alex.* 68.3)

²¹ I do not mean to imply that Olympias pursued this policy for selfless reasons alone. The policy served her own self-interest since the source of her power and influence was her relationship to male Argeads.

²² Blackwell 1999: 100–101 suggests that Olympias left at this period because Antipater's victory against the Spartan king Agis limited chances for increasing her power in Macedonia.

²³ Mendels 1984: 138–39 suggests that as early as the Cyrene grain shipments, Alexander consciously supported the development of a "zone of influence" for his mother against Antipater; Blackwell 1999: 91 points out that such a development was unlikely so early in Alexander's reign when he still needed reinforcements from Antipater.

says that she took over control of Molossia at some point in her son's reign. More confusingly, earlier in the same speech in which he says that Molossia belonged to Olympias (*Eux.* 25), Hyperides imagines that Olympias and Alexander will bring accusations against certain Athenians and he also associates Olympias with the Macedonians (*Eux.* 19–20). When Alexander's larcenous treasurer Harpalus bolted to Athens, taking with him considerable royal funds, not only Philoxenus and Antipater demanded his extradition but, according to Diodorus (17.108.7), so did Olympias.²⁴

There is, however, a fundamental difficulty with assuming that either Olympias or Cleopatra had any authority in Macedonia other than that conveyed by the prestige of their relationship to Alexander. It has generally been supposed that Alexander had entrusted the rule of Macedonia and control of Greek affairs to Antipater when he departed for Asia²⁵ and that the old general remained in this position until his own death in 319, years after the death of Alexander himself. Various solutions have been proposed²⁶ to the problem of this contradictory body of evidence about rule and authority in the Greek peninsula during Alexander's absence.

Previous Macedonian experience had not led to the development of a clearly defined office of substitute kingship. In the past, when a king was unable to rule in his own right, the person chosen to rule for him, a member of the royal family, usually quickly became king in his own right. This may have been the way Philip II came to the throne.²⁷ Kingship itself was probably not understood as an office with clearly defined powers until, at least, Antigonid times (partly because it was understood as the possession of the Argead dynasty more than the possession of an individual Argead). It is hardly surprising that the powers of those who stood in for the king were even less clearly defined. In the king's absence, more than one person may have substituted for the king in various tasks. For instance,

²⁴ Some have doubted that either Antipater or Olympias requested Harpalus. See convincing arguments against these doubts in Blackwell 1999: 20–27.

²⁵ See Baynham, "Antipater" 1994: 337 and Carney 1995: 371–2 for discussion of the various terms used by the sources to describe Antipater's situation; it is not clear that he had a title or that, if he did, our sources know it.

²⁶ Hammond "Some Passages" 1980: 471–6; Baynham, "Antipater" 1994: 337–46.

²⁷ Scholarly opinion differs as to whether Philip II ruled as king immediately after his brother Perdikkas' death or whether he was briefly regent for his brother's infant son, Amyntas: see discussion in Borza 1990: 200–201; cf. Worthington in this volume.

when Philip II was out of Macedonia on campaign and Alexander was about sixteen, evidence suggests that both Alexander and Antipater had power and authority.²⁸

At the time of Alexander's departure, the sources indicate that Antipater was in general control of Macedonia and the Greek peninsula. Diodorus (17.118.1) says that Alexander made Antipater *strategos* (commander) of Europe, but elsewhere (17.17.5) he speaks of Antipater's *hegemonia* (chief command). Arrian (1.11.3) says that Alexander entrusted to Antipater matters Macedonian and Greek. It is unlikely that Antipater had an office or that any of these passages preserve standard Macedonian terminology, if such a thing existed. This evidence, in addition to the subsequent known actions of Antipater, suggests that his duties were primarily military and secondarily administrative. Nothing suggests that he had any religious duties and his diplomatic powers seem limited to those actions intended to perpetuate Macedonian domination; certainly, as shown by the Exiles' Decree, Alexander could supersede him.

Alexander may have intended from the start that Olympias function as a counter-weight to Antipater; he had a life-long tendency to play favorites off against each other. The lack of definition in Antipater's duties must have made it easy for Olympias to see Antipater as over-stepping them. Olympias used her role as the mother of the king (and possibly a ritual role as well) to undercut Antipater's position in a variety of ways. At first, she was not successful and so, once her daughter was regent of Molossia and certainly once her brother was dead, she left for Molossia (Diod. 18.49.4; Paus. 1.11.3). Gradually, she and her daughter began to increase their power and influence, for a variety of reasons. The longer the king was gone, the more royal his mother and daughter seemed; the emphasis Alexander placed on their connection to him probably increased this tendency. Meanwhile, relations between Alexander and Antipater became more distant and ultimately hostile, thanks to Alexander's orientalizing policy and his elimination of prominent Macedonians. Olympias' charges against Antipater probably also contributed to the deterioration in their relationship (see below). By the last year or so of Alexander's reign, Antipater and Alexander were edging closer to confrontation and Olympias and Cleopatra

²⁸ For the evidence, see Carney 1995: 371, n. 11.

were able to benefit from this. Alexander no longer had much reason to support Antipater against them and the entire controversy seems to have moving in the direction of becoming a confrontation between the Argead and Antipatrid clan, a feud that burst out full blown in the period after Alexander's death.²⁹

Olympias' attacks against Antipater and his counter-thrusts were waged long distance, via correspondence with her son (Arr. 7.12.5–7; Diod. 17.118.1; Just. 12.14.3, Plut. *Alex.* 39.7, *Mor.* 180 d). According to literary tradition, Antipater was not the only object of Olympias' epistolary attack. How much attention Alexander paid to these supposed attacks is not clear. Both Diodorus (17.118.1) and Arrian (7.12.5–7) believe that Alexander's decision to remove Antipater as general of Europe came, in part, as the result of Olympias' accusations against him. Plutarch, on the other hand, denies that Alexander let Olympias interfere in either public or military affairs and ignored her complaints about his indifference to her opinion, although even Plutarch implies that Antipater's criticism of Olympias did have some affect on Alexander (*Alex.* 39.7). When Olympias criticized Hephaestion, Hephaestion dared to write back and scold her (Diod. 17.114.3) and Plutarch even claims that Alexander let him read at least one of her letters (*Alex.* 39.5; *Mor.* 180 d, 33 a, 340 a). Despite her charges against the sons of Andromenes (Curt. 7.1.36–40), they were acquitted, although her remarks did seem to have something to do with the fact that they were charged at all.³⁰ Diodorus, on the other hand, attributes the arrest of Lyncestian Alexander to Olympias (17.32.1–2), but Arrian (1.25.1–10) tells a different story. Plutarch (*Alex.* 39.5) even quotes a letter in which Olympias supposedly warned Alexander against being overly generous in distributing wealth to his friends.

²⁹ It is difficult to deny that relations between Alexander and Antipater had deteriorated, but opinions differ as to the severity of the deterioration in their relationship. See Badian 1961: 36–40; Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 161–2; Baynham. "Antipater" 1994: 337–46.

³⁰ Amyntas, the most important of these brothers, claimed that Olympias was hostile to him because of actions he had taken while back in Macedonia to bring reinforcements to the army in Asia. In Curtius (7.1.37–38), Amyntas claimed that Olympias had been keeping young men in her household who were fit for service and that Alexander himself had instructed him to bring them. This statement is made in a lengthy speech, but its dubious context need not mean that it is untrue. Blackwell 1999: 104 suggests that these young men of Olympias' household could have been part of a personal bodyguard she had created.

The authenticity of any or all of these epistolary attacks is doubtful,³¹ but quite apart from that issue, most of the passages dealing with these supposed attacks of Olympias are not very clear about her motivation. Indeed, so generally hostile is the tradition about Olympias that there may have been no perceived need to explain her motivation: she was just mean and nasty and that was the end of the matter. In the case of Hephaestion, Plutarch seem to blame the quarrel to her personal jealousy; if so she was hardly alone. He also says that Craterus (Plut. *Alex.* 47.5–7) and Eumenes (Plut. *Eum.* 2.1–2, 4–5) were jealous of Hephaestion. Curtius' narrative has one of the sons of Andromenes attribute Olympias' hostility to his attempt to take military recruits from her household (7.1.36–40), but it could certainly have sprung from his connection to Parmenion, just as her suspicions of Lyncestian Alexander may have arisen in part because he was Antipater's son-in-law.

It would be most important to understand the motivation behind her hostility to Antipater, but the tradition is vague here too. Only Arrian (7.12.6–7) provides any information. According to Arrian, Antipater complained that Olympias demonstrated *authadeia* (stubbornness or willfulness), *oxutes* (sharpness) and *polupragmosune* (officiousness or meddlesomeness). Antipater supposedly considered such action inappropriate for the king's mother and Arrian tells an anecdote which implies that Alexander either agreed or found his mother's conduct troublesome. Arrian reports that Olympias considered Antipater *huperogkon* (immoderate, excessive) on account of his *axiosis* (rank) and *therapeia* (attention or court paid him). She believed that he had forgotten who had appointed him and that he claimed preeminence among Macedonians and Greeks. Thus, she seems to have believed, as she did of the others, that Antipater was acquiring too much power at the expense of her son's, that he was acting too much like a king in his own right, not like an appointee of a king. Their charges and counter-charges seem similar: each accuses the other of arrogance and acting in excess what is appropriate for the position.

There can be little doubt that Olympias retained influence over her son throughout her reign. It is likely that her power grew as did his distrust of virtually everyone other than herself. The foundation

³¹ The authenticity of letters preserved in Plutarch's lives is uncertain; general scholarly practice evaluates each letter on its merits. See further references in Carney 1987: 49, n. 43.

of the relationship between mother and son may have been genuine love and affection—how can we know—but it was certainly also trust. Olympias (and to a much lesser degree her daughter) was the only person whose own self-interest was so intimately bound up with that of Alexander himself. From the moment of his death, his mother and sister were in physical danger;³² as long as he lived, he was the source not only of their security, but much of their power. This was the foundation for the trust between mother and son and, to some degree, between sister and brother.

Alexander did not marry for the first time until 327, comparatively late in his reign. Despite the fact that Alexander had a lengthy sexual relationship with Barsine, daughter of Artabazus, married three Persian wives, and tradition preserves a few references to his relationships with various courtesans, both scholarship and popular writing has often suggested that Alexander was uninterested in women sexually and postponed marriage for that reason. Such suggestions misunderstand the purpose of ancient marriage, particularly for members of the elite, and oversimplify the nature of sexuality in the Hellenic world in general, and that of Macedonia in particular. The purpose of any ancient Greek marriage was procreation (rulers, of course, were particularly in need of heirs) and Argead kings (most notoriously Philip, as we have seen) often used marriage to commemorate or perhaps even initiate political alliances. Alexander's long delay in marrying must signify, therefore, his comparative lack of interest in immediately securing a successor to his throne and a tendency to see royal marriages as the source of more trouble than advantage. Indeed, his failure to arrange marriages for his sisters confirms the latter conclusion. Alexander's prolonged indifference to the problem of the succession may speak to an understanding of his identity as primarily that of a hero, but his "gun-shyness" about marriage seems an unsurprising consequence of his painful personal and political experiences in the last two years of his father's reign.

It would be a misunderstanding of the construction of Graeco-Macedonian sexuality and more particularly of Alexander's to consider him a homosexual. Certainly Alexander seems to have had a sexual relationship with a Persian eunuch named Bagoas (Plut. *Alex.*

³² See Carney *Women and Monarchy* 2000: 119–23, 123–28 for discussion of the careers of Olympias and Cleopatra after Alexander's death. Ultimately, each died a violent death at the hands of one of the Successors.

67.4; Athen. 603 a-b), probably had a sexual relationship with his long-time friend Hephaestion, and supposedly showed some general sexual interest in men (Athen. 603 a). Hellenic culture did not generally assume that a person would be interested only in his or her own sex or only in the opposite sex. There was a general presumption that men, particularly young elite males like Alexander, would be interested in both sexes. In southern Greece, the ideal for same sex relationships between men supposed that the participants were both fairly young, but that one partner (the younger) would be the beloved and the other (the elder) the lover. In the Macedonian elite such relationships lasted into middle age and did not necessarily involve men of different ages. Alexander's father was notorious not only for his many marriages and heterosexual affairs, but also for his sexual relationships with men, one of which led to his murder.³³ The evidence, such as it is, implies that Alexander was not a very sexual person and that his sexual interest in both men and women was modest but present.³⁴ While a modern reading of Alexander's sexuality might conclude that he was more interested in power than sex, Alexander and his contemporaries probably understood his limited sexuality as a sign of his self-control and admired his ability to withstand mere bodily needs (as Plut. *Alex.* 21.4–22.3, *Mor.* 1099 c–d does).

Alexander began a sexual relationship with Barsine,³⁵ probably soon after her capture in 333 (Plut. *Alex.* 21.4, *Eum.* 1.3). The relationship endured until at least 327 (Diod. 20.20.1; Just. 15.2.3 implies a later date) when Barsine bore him a son called Heracles. Barsine was no courtesan. Her father, Artabazus, was the grandson of a Persian king and her mother was Greek, the sister of Mentor and Memnon, Rhodian mercenary captains whom the Persian kings employed in their navy. When Barsine was a child, Artabazus led a failed revolt against Artaxerxes III and, as a consequence, he and his family (his wife, his children, and his younger brother-in-law Memnon), spent a number of years in exile in Macedonia in Philip's court (Diod. 16.52.3; Curt. 6.5.2–3). After her father's return to royal

³³ My description of the ideal for sexual relationships between men in southern Greece is the orthodox one, first formulated by Dover 1978, but recently challenged by Ogden 1996: 109 and Davidson 1998: 168. Both Mortensen 1997: 119–29 and Reames-Zimmerman 1998: 152–72 and 1999: 81–89 conclude that the construction of sexual relationships between men in the Macedonian elite was different.

³⁴ See discussion and references in Carney *Women and Monarchy* 2000: 97–98.

³⁵ See Brunt 1975: 23–34; Carney *Women and Monarchy* 2000: 102.

favor and departure for Asia (c. 342), Barsine married her elder maternal uncle Mentor. Mentor soon died and his younger brother Memnon took over both his job (commander of the coastal forces of the Persian king) and his wife. Barsine, soon widowed a second time, apparently remained at the Persian court and was captured at Damascus after the battle of Issus, along with members of her family and the wives and children of the Persian elite (Plut. *Alex.* 21.4). By the time of her capture, Barsine was the mother of two children (one by each husband) and stepmother to several more.

The relationship between Alexander and Barsine is more interesting and perhaps more personal than his subsequent marriages. The lovers likely knew each other as children (they were about the same age)³⁶ and their fathers had been guest-friends. Barsine was not only an ethnic but also a cultural mix, a young woman with connections to the bluest Persian blood who had come to marriageable age in Macedonia; she supposedly had a Greek education (Plut. *Alex.* 21.4). The relationship on Alexander's side was clearly one of choice, not duty, and it is significant that it endured so many years.

Yet even this relationship had its political side. Personal friendship with Artabazus and practical political considerations surely meant that Alexander would not have purposely offended Barsine's father. Despite his Macedonian connections, Artabazus remained committed to Darius III until the king's murder in 330 (Arr. 3.21.4, 23.7; Curt. 5.9.1–12.19, 6.5.1–5). During a period when he was still trying to win over the Persian aristocracy, Alexander had every reason to try to conciliate Artabazus yet he initiated the sexual relationship years *before* Artabazus went over to his camp. It is likely that neither Alexander nor Artabazus (at first) perceived Barsine's relationship with the king as unrespectable. In her work on Achaemenid women, Maria Brosius has noted a distinction between married women of the king (these women had to be Achaemenid or at least Persian) and unmarried women of the king (foreign women). Although only women in the first category could produce legitimate sons, women in the second category were more respectable than mere concubines.³⁷ Barsine and her powerful family may have understood her position as that of a woman in the second category. Alexander,

³⁶ Lane Fox 1974: 177 suggested this. On Barsine's age, see Carney *Women and Monarchy* 2000: 101.

³⁷ Brosius 1996: 31, 190–91.

reluctant to marry a Persian, much less an Achaemenid, may have intended his relationship with Barsine to be interpreted in those terms, hoping to, on the one hand, spare Macedonian sensibilities by avoiding marriage to an Asian and, on the other, to cater to the Persian elite. Granted that Artabazus and his family, once Darius was dead, held high offices under Alexander, that the relationship endured so many years and that the son who was the fruit of it was given the dynastically significant name of Heracles, there seems no good reason to doubt that, at least until 327, Barsine's relationship to Alexander was not only respectable but conferred honor.

In 327, however, Alexander did marry an Asian woman, Roxane, the daughter of another satrap although one of less distinction (Arr. 4.19.5; Plut. *Alex.* 47; Curt. 8.4.23–29). In the same year Barsine had her son (Diod. 20.20.1) and Artabazus chose to retire (Curt. 8.1.20). His retirement was probably his response to the change in his family's status implied by the marriage; for the first time, Alexander's failure to marry Barsine began to seem insulting. Barsine and her family continued, however, to exercise influence: her brother held office and, as late as 324, Plutarch (*Eum.* 1.3) describes as the king's greatest honor to Eumenes the fact that he married one of the two sisters of Barsine (described, significantly, as her sisters rather than Artabazus' daughters). Plutarch characterizes this marriage as establishing kinship with Alexander and mentions, in this context, young Heracles.

Alexander's first bride Roxane seems a curious choice. Granted that he could have married one of the daughters of Darius or Barsine any time from 333 on, his preference for a comparatively obscure Asian woman is somewhat surprising. By marrying her, he offended much of the Persian elite (by his apparent preference for her over one of Darius' daughters) and the Greeks and Macedonians as well, who did not want him to marry any Asian woman (Curt. 8.4.30). Our sources claim that *eros* (sexual desire) motivated Alexander's marriage (Arr. 4.19.5; Plut. *Alex.* 47.4; Curt. 8.4.25), much as they claimed that passion inspired Philip's marriage to Olympias (Plut. *Alex.* 2.1). In neither case is *eros* likely to have been the primary motivation; kings married for policy and for heirs. Alexander apparently concluded the benefits of the marriage outweighed the disadvantages. He needed to conciliate remaining resistance in Bactria; Oxyartes was probably still opposing Alexander at the time of his daughter's wedding. Roxane's comparative obscurity may have been an actual

selling point; she would have seemed like some of the shadowy figures Philip married. Moreover, Alexander was older now and enduring a less heroic phase of his campaigns. By 327, he may have been more inclined to think in terms of the future and the production of an heir. Alexander's marriage to Roxane was important only because she was pregnant with the baby who would turn out to be Alexander's only legitimate son when the king so suddenly died in Babylon.

Had Alexander lived longer, Roxane's importance would almost certainly have been over-shadowed by his Achaemenid brides, Stateira the daughter of Darius III and Parysatis, daughter of Artaxerxes III. If Plutarch's report (*Alex.* 77.4) that, soon after Alexander's death, Roxane and Perdiccas arranged the murder of Stateira is correct, then Roxane must have realized this herself. The murder was surely intended to prevent any possibility that Stateira could produce a baby said to be Alexander's son.

Alexander treated both the daughters of Darius more like daughters or sisters than prospective brides (Just. 11.9.16; Diod. 17.38.1; Curt. 3.12.12, 23, 4.11.3) when he first encountered them and for some years to come. It was part of his general approach to dealing with the captive royal Persian family to substitute himself for Darius within the family (Curt. 8.4.25). Nonetheless, it is likely that he intended to marry one of them all along. Soon after their capture, Alexander reconfirmed the titles and status of all the royal Persian women (Arr. 2.12.5; Diod. 17.38.1; Curt. 3.12.2, 23, 4.11.3) and was excruciatingly genteel in his treatment of them. Following Persian rather than Macedonian royal custom (Athen. 557b), Alexander kept the royal women on campaign until 330. By that year it is likely that he had formed an intention to marry one of Darius' daughters because he arranged for their instruction in Greek (Diod. 17.67.1; Arr. 3.22.6).³⁸ On the other hand, since he left all the Achaemenid women behind in that year, he must have made a conscious decision to postpone any Achaemenid marriage alliance until his return. Although he left the women of Darius' family behind, he must have taken Barsine (granted that she bore him a son in 327) and probably Roxane (*Metz Epit.* 70) with him, most likely because he hoped to produce some heirs before he returned.

Finally, nine years after he could have, in 324, Alexander married Stateira, the elder daughter of Darius. The marriage was cele-

³⁸ Tarn 1948: 336.

brated as part of the mass wedding ceremonies at Susa in which Alexander had many members of the Macedonian elite take brides from the Persian elite; Hephæstion married the younger daughter of Darius (Plut. *Alex.* 70.2; *Mor.* 329 e, 338 d-e; Arr. 7.4.4-6; Just. 12.10.9-10; Curt. 10.3.12; Diod. 17.107.6). Despite the fact that only Arrian (7.4.4) reports the information, it is likely that Alexander married another Achaemenid princess, Parysatis, the daughter of Ochus, at the same time. The mass marriages at Susa were clearly an engineered event, an elaborate display meant to convince and impress. Still, Justin (12.10.10) may have been right to conclude that Alexander put his Achaemenid marriages in the context of the others in order to distract from the significance of what he personally was doing. Alexander's Achaemenid marriage happened about the same time as the arrival of the *Epigonoí* and the "mutiny" and subsequent departure of many of the Macedonians troops. The implication is clear: as long as Alexander considered the Macedonians central to his power, he dared not marry an Achaemenid. Only when he had established an Asian power base did proceed with marriages that signaled his new primary identity as an Asian ruler, not a Macedonian king. Moreover, by postponing his marriage to Stateira and Parysatis so long, his brides became not so much symbols of the conquest, now long completed, but of continuity with the Persian past.

Although most sources insist that Alexander extended his courtly treatment of the Persian royal family to Darius' wife, Stateira, as well as to Darius' daughters and mother, some possibility exists that rather than having never met her (Plut. *Alex.* 22.3) or exercising sexual restraint despite her great beauty, the king treated her in the more traditional way captured women, especially captured Asian women, had long been treated by Greek warriors. Despite all the talk about respecting her chastity, he may have used her sexually. His public grief was so extravagant when she died (Curt. 4.21.4; Diod. 17.54.6; Plut. *Alex.* 30.1-3; Just. 11.12.6-8) that Curtius claims (4.10.31-34) that Darius himself wondered whether Alexander had an intimate relationship with Stateira. There is also the awkward fact that both Plutarch (*Alex.* 30.1) and Justin (11.12.6) say that she died in childbirth, apparently about two years after she had last seen her husband. The awkwardness can be resolved either by concluding that Stateira died of some cause other than childbirth (Curtius 4.10.18 says that she died of travel fatigue and Diodorus 17.54.7 offers no cause of death at all) or by concluding that, even if she

did die in childbirth, her death occurred much earlier than the narratives seem to imply.³⁹ Justin's apology for Alexander's excessive grief (11.12.6–7; "non amoris, sed humanitatis causa fecisse . . .") makes it clear people wondered, as does all the emphasis in the tradition on Alexander's respect for the elder Stateira's virtue. On balance, it seems likely that Alexander did not make a sexual as well as a military conquest of Stateira. His propaganda themes aimed at a Persian audience emphasizing legitimacy and continuity make it unlikely, but it is worth remembering that the burning of Persepolis violates that same theme and Alexander really did burn Persepolis.

Although majority tradition insists that Alexander treated all the Persian women with courtliness, the focus of his attention was neither Darius' wife nor his daughters but Darius' mother, Sisygambis. Curtius (3.12.17.25) and Diodorus (17.37.6) say that he treated her like his own mother. There are probably two reasons for his focus on Sisygambis. Greek tradition insisted that the mother of a Persian king was a powerful political figure; whether or not this tradition was actually true,⁴⁰ Alexander had to act as though it were to his Graeco-Macedonian audience. Alexander was, as we have seen, more comfortable playing the role of royal son or brother than that of husband for both personal and political reasons and this disposition clearly extended to his dealings with other royal dynasties. In addition, Maria Brosius has suggested that there was a Near Eastern tradition of honorable treatment of the queen mother of an old dynasty by the king of a new dynasty.⁴¹ It is unclear, however, whether Alexander would have been aware of such a custom. Alexander made Sisygambis his primary symbol of continuity with the Persian past. It is not surprising that a number of sources (Diod. 17.118.3; Just. 13.1.5–6; Curt. 10.5.19–25) report that Sisygambis killed herself after mourning the death of Alexander. Once Alexander was dead, there was little interest in the Macedonian elite in symbols of continuity with either the Persian or Argead past, as the murder of the younger Stateira as well as the murders of Alexander's sisters and mother demonstrate. Sisygambis understood the meaning of his death.

Sisygambis was not the only substitute royal mother figure to play a role in Alexander's reign. Plutarch (*Alex.* 22.7) and Arrian (1.23.8)

³⁹ See Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 221 for discussion and references.

⁴⁰ Sancisi-Weerdenberg 1983: 20–33; Hall 1989: 95; Brosius 1996: 186–88.

⁴¹ Brosius 1996: 21–22.

claim that the king treated Ada of Caria⁴² in much the same way he did Sisygambis. Plutarch says that he addressed her too as "Mother," that Alexander re-instated her as ruler of Caria and that she, in recompense, tried to send him special culinary treats but that Alexander, in keeping with his reputation for moderation, rejected just as his tutor had forced him to reject similar treats sent by his real mother. Arrian (1.23.8), probably more correctly, reports that she adopted Alexander as her son.

There were certainly good practical political reasons for Alexander's adoption of Ada as a second mother. Women in the Hecatomnid dynasty of Caria sometimes ruled Caria, either with or after the deaths of their brother-husbands, although it is unclear whether Persian kings recognized them officially as satraps.⁴³ Ada was no exception: the daughter of Hecatomnus, she married her brother Idrieus; after his death she ruled Caria alone until her younger brother Pixodarus drove her from power in 340 and forced her retirement to Alinda, the strongest citadel in Caria (Diod. 16.74.2; Arr. 1.23.7–8; Strab. 14.2.17). Pixodarus had no sons and, after the failure of his attempted marriage alliance with Philip via Alexander's half-brother Arrhidaeus, he found a husband for his daughter in the Persian Orontobates, who had apparently succeeded his father-in-law in rule of Caria by the time Alexander had arrived in Asia. Upon Alexander's arrival, Ada petitioned him to help her recover the throne and, in return for his granting of her petition and reconfirming her control of Alinda, she enabled him to win over the support of many Carians (Diod. 17.24.2–3; Arr. 1.23.8; Strab. 14.2.17). She assisted in his capture of the Carian capital Halicarnassus (Strab. 14.2.17) and this capture enabled her to be reinstated in control of all Caria. Ada apparently had no daughters to offer in marriage and so suggested adoption instead, making Alexander hereditary dynast of Caria. Ada remained in control of the satrapy for some years, although her death led to the appointment of a Macedonian to the satrapy sometime before Alexander's demise (Arr. 7.23.1).

Whereas Sisygambis' role as substitute royal mother seems to have endured as long as Alexander's rule, Ada's time as substitute mother was brief; she faded from sight as soon as Caria ceased to be an

⁴² On Ada, see Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 152–4; Hornblower 1982; Ruzicka 1992.

⁴³ Ruzicka 1992: 124.

issue for Alexander. Sisygambis' prominence continued because Alexander made long term capital out of claiming to be legitimate ruler of the Persian empire whereas Ada sank into obscurity because rule of Caria had no long term significance; she was the maternal equivalent of one of Philip's more obscure brides whom he married to serve some ephemeral political need.

There can be no doubt that the only women who commanded political power and influence at the court of Alexander were those most closely related to him by blood, his mother Olympias and his full sister Cleopatra. Alexander's postponement of marriage, the prejudice against Asians common among Macedonians and Greeks, Alexander's long absence from his homeland, and the scarcity of male Argeads all acted to empower these two women. They had a power base that derived from Alexander but enabled them to take action independent of him. After his death, although their lives were more precarious, both continued to play a role in power politics, as actors do, not simply pawns.⁴⁴ Macedonian monarchy had belonged to the Argead clan and when Olympias, the last genuine caretaker of the dynasty was killed, so, for practical purposes, was the dynasty.

Neither Barsine, Alexander's mistress, nor his Asian wives are known to have exercised any power during Alexander's lifetime, although their relationships to the king conferred honor and prestige on their birth families and on themselves. After Alexander's death, although both Roxane and Barsine were the mother of potential heirs to the throne, neither was able to turn that status into a power base by becoming, as Olympias had, an advocate for her son's succession. The prejudice of the Macedonian elite against Asians was too great. Indeed, it was Olympias rather than his mother Roxane who became an effective succession advocate for Alexander IV for a time; even after Olympias' death, Roxane was unable to assume the role. Throughout their lives, Roxane, Barsine, Stateira, and Parysatis were never able to become more than tools in the cut-throat world of Macedonian politics; even their murders were afterthoughts of a sort, a kind of tidying up of dynastic loose ends by the Successors of Alexander.⁴⁵ To put it another way, Olympias and Cleopatra were killed to prevent them from continuing to exercise

⁴⁴ On the subsequent careers of Olympias and Cleopatra, see Carney *Women and Monarchy* 2000: 119–28.

⁴⁵ Those who murdered their sons chose to eliminate them at the same time.

power whereas Barsine, Roxane and Stateira were eliminated to prevent other from using them to acquire power.

The limited role that Asian women were able to play at the court of Alexander was not simply the consequence of general Graeco-Macedonian prejudice against them. Because of the complex nature of Greek tradition about Persian women, especially royal women, Alexander had to treat them with great care. He could make use of them as symbols of victory, as modern Andromaches. Alexander, who believed himself the descendant of Achilles, could hardly resist this possibility: Barsine and, as we have seen, possibly the elder Stateira, played this function. On the other hand, Greek tradition assigned a role of importance to Persian royal women and Alexander clearly manipulated that tradition for his own ends. For Persians, marriage to an Achaemenid woman, something Darius himself had offered (Arr. 2.25.3), promised the possibility of continuity with and some commitment to the Persian past. Alexander exploited this possibility as well. However, Greek tradition also saw the influence of Persian culture in general and that of elite women in particular as corrupting, softening, even emasculating. Alexander tried to take advantage of the positive symbolic value of these women without being compromised by the negative part of the tradition. The result of these contradictory goals was that Alexander kept his distance from all these women and could not possibly have allowed any of them to build the kind of independent base he granted his mother and sister. Their role as ambiguous symbols prevented them from having meaningful access to royal power.⁴⁶

Women were prominent at the court of Alexander because of the nature and circumstances of monarchy in his day: the traditionally tribal or clan nature of Macedonian monarchy, Philip and Alexander's innovations in Macedonian monarchy which elevated all members of the royal family above the rest of the elite, the practice of royal polygamy which tended to transform mothers and sons into political units advocating the succession of the sons, the real and perceived importance of Achaemenid women in Achaemenid monarchy, the role of women in dynasties with which Alexander had dealings, and the ability of royal women to function as symbols of dynastic

⁴⁶ On the ambiguous symbolic role Persian women played at Alexander's court, see further Carney "Alexander" 1996: 563-583.

continuity. Their prominence was possible because states ruled by hereditary monarchs could not draw a sharp line between public and private, between the worlds of men and of women, as did Greek *poleis*. In Macedonia itself, in the Hellenistic period, the role of royal women in politics declined dramatically although their formal role in the monarchy may have been more officially recognized, but in the other two great Hellenistic dynasties their political prominence continued and, in the case of the Ptolemies, actually increased.⁴⁷ The role royal women played at the court of Alexander was no accident, then, but a product of tradition and circumstance, a model which could be used or adapted by the Hellenistic and later Roman imitators of Alexander.

⁴⁷ For royal women in the Antigonid dynasty, see Le Bohec 1993: 229–45 and Carney *Women and Monarchy* 2000: 179–202. For the Seleucid dynasty, the best discussion remains Macurdy 1932: 77–101. For Ptolemaic royal women, see Macurdy 1932: 102–223 and Pomeroy 1984: 3–40.

CHAPTER TEN

ALEXANDER'S RELIGION AND DIVINITY

Ernst Fredricksmeier

Alexander was extremely avid for honor . . . and most conscientious in his devotion to the gods. Arrian 7.28.1.

What we may call Alexander's religion has two major aspects, one, his relationship as an individual and as king to the world of the gods, the other, his relation to Zeus as his father, and his own divinity. As for the former, the ancient sources provide more information about it than on any other person in antiquity. This is not just an accident of our tradition, but also reflects Alexander's personal faith and values. There exists no comprehensive treatment of this subject, and the purpose of the first part of this study is to provide it. The other aspect of Alexander's religion, his divine sonship and his divinity, touches on Alexander's inmost beliefs and values, his very identity, and no other subject of his career has been so extensively discussed and so hotly debated by modern scholars. I have tried to present a critical treatment of it which draws on the best of modern scholarship, and also expresses what I consider most plausible. Not everyone will agree with my assessment, but it is firmly based on the evidence, and speculation has been kept to a minimum. Finally, I have tried to consider Alexander's religion, as far as possible, from his own perspective and that of his age, rather than from that of our own.

Part I

1. Early Influences

Alexander early learned the virtues of religious piety (*eusebeia*, *eulabeia*) and of martial valor (*aretē*) from his parents. Both were acknowledged

descendants of the gods, Philip from Heracles the son of Zeus, Olympias from Achilles the son of Thetis.¹ After his victory over Olynthus, Philip showed his gratitude to the gods by lavishly celebrating the festival of Olympian Zeus at Dium (Diod. 16.55.1; cf. Arr. 1.11.1). He prosecuted a 'Sacred War' as champion of Apollo against the sacrilegious Phocians, and after their defeat punished them as executor of divine justice (Diod. 16.35.6; Just. 8.2.3–7). He was awarded the presidency of the next Pythian Games, and gave appropriate thanks to Apollo for the victory. Diodorus (16.60.4; cf. 16.64.3) says that Philip returned to Macedonia with a high reputation for his piety. Both Speusippus and Isocrates in their letters to Philip encouraged his martial ambitions by stressing his descent from Heracles.² It comes as no surprise that Philip featured on his coins the images of Zeus, Apollo, and Heracles.³

After his triumph at Chaeronea, Philip announced that he wished to lead the Greeks against the barbarians, to punish them for the injuries they inflicted on the Greeks, and especially their desecration of Greek temples, in their invasion of 480/79.⁴ This panhellenic slogan advertised Philip's piety and discouraged Greek opposition. Then, wishing to enter the war with the gods' approval, Philip consulted Apollo's oracle at Delphi and received a response which he took as prediction of his conquest of the Persian King (Diod. 16.91.2–4). It was not to be. On the last day of his life, at the celebration of his daughter's wedding and the opening of the campaign against Persia, Philip displayed in a solemn procession to an assembled multitude his own precious statue on par with those of the Twelve Gods as 'enthroned with them' (*synthronos*) (Diod. 16.92.5; 95.1). Moments later, the assassin struck.

¹ *Philip*: Isoc. 5.32, 105, 109–15, 127; Arr. 2.5.9; 3.3.2; 4.10.6; 4.11.6; 6.3.2; Diod. 17.1.5; Curt. 4.2.3; Plut. *Alex.* 2.1; *Mor.* 334 D. *Olympias*: Plut. *Alex.* 2.1; *Mor.* 334 D; Arr. 1.11.8; 4.11.6; Diod. 17.1.5; Curt. 4.6.29; 8.4.26; Just. 11.3.1; Strabo 13.1.27; Theopompus, *FGrHist* 115 F 355. I take it here as a given that in the fourth c. most Macedonians still believed in the reality of the Olympian gods and the heroes, and a fortiori Alexander himself, who moreover as king had a vested interest in this faith. Cf. Wilamowitz 1932: 265: "Was gibt uns Veranlassung zu bezweifeln dass Alexander ebenso wie sein Volk an dem Glauben an die Götter festhielt?" Hammond *The Miracle* 1991: 150: "Alexander was typically Macedonian in the intense religious belief which was the mainspring of his activity." Also Edmunds 1971: esp. 368–91; Wirth 1973: 123; Kern 1963: 38–57.

² Speus. *Epist. Socrat.* 30.3; Isoc. 5.105, 111–5, 127.

³ Hammond 1979: 663–7; 1994: 114, 158.

⁴ Diod. 16.89.2; cf. 17.4.9.

We may wonder if Philip intended to use this occasion to obtain formal recognition as a god. There were precedents for the deification of mortals in their lifetime, for the greatness of their achievements, power, and abilities. Even so, at this point Philip probably wished only to suggest that he deserved to be honored on a level with the gods, if not on this very occasion, then surely after his crowning achievement of conquering the Great King. The procession marked the opening of the war against Persia, Apollo had predicted, as Philip thought, his conquest of the Great King, and Isocrates had said in an open letter to him that after the conquest of the King nothing would be left for him 'but to become a god' (*Ep.* 3.5). Whatever Isocrates meant by this statement, it is not unlikely that Philip took it as encouragement for his deification after conquering the Persian king.⁵ Alexander was present on that fateful day at Aegae, and we may be sure that the significance of Philip's demonstration was not lost on him.

Olympias' influence on Alexander's religious development no doubt also was considerable. Most important, it is possible that she suggested to Alexander that his father was not Philip, but a god. At the same time, she no doubt emphasized Alexander's descent through her from the 'brilliant' Achilles, and thus reinforced Philip's influence in encouraging Alexander's ambition to emulate his heroic ancestors. Apparently she influenced the choice of Alexander's early tutors. One of them, Leonidas, was her kinsman, and another, Lysimachus, encouraged Alexander's emulation of Achilles by identifying him with Achilles, Philip with Peleus, and himself with Phoenix, and he earned praise for this.⁶

Alexander's main tutor Aristotle, appointed by Philip, influenced Alexander's religious education not with his philosophy, of which there is no hint, but by stressing the heroic ethos and thus reinforcing the influence of his other mentors. So in his *Hymn to Excellence* (*Arete*), he singled out Alexander's ancestors Heracles, Achilles, and Aias as heroic models. At the center of Alexander's studies, he placed the tale of the *Iliad* as a handbook of martial valor, and Alexander

⁵ Fredricksmeyer 1979: 58–60; Borza 1992: 249–50; Baynham "The Question" 1994: 35–43. Cf. Schumacher 1990: 434–5; Flower 2000: 121. Hammond (1999: 107) thinks that the Macedonians had already formally granted Philip divine honors and that the procession at Aegae was meant to advertise them. See also Prestianni Giallombardo 1975: 27–35. *Contra*: Balsdon 1950: 365–8; Badian 1981: 31 n. 9.

⁶ Plut. *Alex.* 5.8; 24.10; 25.7–8; *Mor.* 179 E–F; Plin. *NH* 12.62.

is said to have learned it by heart.⁷ His veneration of Achilles lasted throughout his life.⁸

Because of these early influences, as well as by his unique personality make-up, Alexander became the most charismatic and successful, but also the most complex, problematic and controversial, champion of an ancient warrior code, embraced in Macedonia even in the 4th c., which considered as the greatest glory to which a hero could aspire supremacy in war and conquest, because by this, as Homer and the poets taught, he might approximate the gods, and win immortal fame.⁹

2. *Patrios Nomos. Foreign Gods*

As King of the Macedonians Alexander was also their high priest and intermediary in their dealings with the gods. The Macedonians considered themselves descended from Macedon, son of Zeus, and the Argead kings were acknowledged as descendants of Heracles son of Zeus through Temenus, king of Argos in the Peloponnese (Baegel 1913: 1; Hdt. 8.137; Thuc. 2.99).¹⁰ In the exercise of his religious functions, Alexander was assisted by his (half) brother Arrhidaeus, son of Philip (Curt. 10.7.2),¹¹ and a staff of experts in supplicating and thanking the gods, divining their will and intentions, purifying from pollution, conducting funerals, and organizing festivals, processions and contests in honor of the gods. Alexander performed most of these functions in accord with the 'ancestral tradition' (*patrios nomos*), both on a daily basis (with the first sacrifice at dawn), and at all special events, such as campaigns, battles, victories, escape from dangers, foundations of cities, crossing of rivers and straits, banquets, and so on. Many sacrifices were part of elaborate services, with dedications, as at Ephesus and Tyre, processions, sometimes with the whole army in battle array, races, and literary and athletic contests,

⁷ *Hymn to Arete*: Athen. 15.696 B-D. Study of *Iliad*: Plut. *Alex* 8.2; 26.1-2; Plin. *NH* 7.108; Strabo 13.1.27. Memorizing *Iliad*: Dio Chrysostom. 4.39.

⁸ Curt. 4.6.29; 9.3.19; Arr. 5.28.3; 7.14.4; Plut. *Alex*. 15.8-9; 62.5; 72.3; Diod. 17.97.3; Ael. *VH* 7.8. Ameling 1988: 670-92; King 1987: *passim*; Stewart 1993: 78-86. Cf. Cohen 1995: 483-6; Carney, "Artifice" 2000: 274-85.

⁹ Edmunds 1971: 363-91; King 1987: 1-45; Fredricksmeier 1990: 304-6; Ameling 1988: 658-60; Stewart 1993: 81; Huttner 1997: *passim*.

¹⁰ Hammond 1979: 3-14; Edson 1970: 37-8.

¹¹ Berve 1926: II, 385 no. 781.

preferably at established festivals and sanctuaries, as at Dium and Ephesus, but also in the field.¹²

Alexander worshipped the gods either individually or in a traditional canon of Twelve (Diod. 16.92.5), as at the Hellespont (Just. 11.5.4) and at the Hyphasis (Arr. 5.29.1–2; Diod. 17.95.1; Curt. 9.3.19; cf. Strabo 3.5.5; Plut. *Alex.* 62.8). In Alexander's time the canon apparently consisted of Zeus, Athena, Heracles, Dionysus, Apollo, Artemis, Asclepius, Posidon, Helios, Selene, and Ge.¹³ Various expressions of devotion by Alexander are on record to all these, and other, gods, as well as to Heroes. So he sacrificed to Zeus Olympius and the Muses at their festival at Dium (Diod. 17.16.3; Arr. 1.11.1); Artemis at her famous sanctuary in Ephesus;¹⁴ Asclepius at Soli (Arr. 2.5.8; Curt. 3.7.3), Epidaurus (Arr. 7.14.6), and Gortys in Arcadia (Paus. 8.28.1); Posidon, Oceanus, and other sea divinities;¹⁵ Selene, Helios, and Ge at the eclipse of the moon before the battle at Gaugamela (Arr. 3.7.6); Helios in India (Diod. 17.89.3; Curt. 9.1.1); the Dioscuri;¹⁶ and Phobos before Gaugamela (Plut. *Alex.* 31.9).

To the Heroes, Alexander sacrificed usually at their graves or tombs, as to Protesilaus at the Hellespont, not to begrudge him a more auspicious crossing (Arr. 1.11.5; cf. Hom. *Il.* 2.695–708); the Homeric heroes in the plain of Troy, especially Alexander's ancestors Achilles and Aias;¹⁷ Priam, an apotropaic sacrifice to purge the sacrilege of Alexander's ancestor Neoptolemus (Arr. 1.11.8); Amphilochous in Cilicia because of their shared connections with Argos (Arr. 2.5.9; Strabo 14.5.17); Alexander's friend and *alter ego* Hephaestion after ordering an empire-wide hero cult for him by permission of Zeus Ammon (who disallowed divine honors), with an immense funerary monument in Babylon and two magnificent shrines in Alexandria;¹⁸ and we hear of Alexander's intention to found a posthumous cult

¹² Diod. 13.108.4; 17.16.3–4; Arr. 1.11.1; 1.18.2; 2.5.8; 2.24.6; 3.1.4; 3.5.2; 3.6.1; 3.16.9; 3.25.1; 4.4.1; 5.3.6; 5.8.3; 5.20.1; 5.29.2; 6.28.3; 7.14.1; *Ind.* 18.12; 36.3; 42.8; Curt. 3.7.3; Plut. *Alex.* 29.1–2; 63.14.

¹³ Baegge 1913: *s.v.*; Berve 1926: I, 87.

¹⁴ Arr. 1.17.10; 1.18.2; Strabo 14.1.22–3. Also various votive gifts to Artemis: *Anth.Gr.* 6.97, 128; Plin. *NH* 35.92. Note also, Alexander's intention, toward the end of his life, to erect a great temple to Artemis at Amphipolis. Diod. 18.4.5.

¹⁵ POxy 1798, *FGrHist* 148, 44 col. II; Arr. 1.4.5; 1.11.6; 5.28.4; 6.3.1–2; 6.19.5; *Ind.* 18.11–2; 20.10; 36.3; Diod. 17.104.1; Just. 12.10.4.

¹⁶ Arr. 4.8.2; Plut. *Alex.* 50.7; Plin. *NH* 35.93.

¹⁷ Arr. 1.12.1; 7.14.4; Plut. *Alex.* 15.8; Diod. 17.17.3; Just. 11.5.12; Philostr. *Her.* 53.16.

¹⁸ Arr. 7.14.7–10; 7.23.6–8; Plut. *Alex.* 72.2–5; 75.3; Just. 12.12.12; Diod. 17.114–5;

for Olympias (Curt. 9.6.26; 10.5.30). The dispositions for Hephaestion and Olympias attest to Alexander's passionate personal attachment to them. All the other expressions of Alexander's piety were also in accord with 'ancestral tradition.'

It may be appropriate here to note Alexander's relations to non-Greek deities. The Greeks had always, of course, acknowledged a divine element in foreign gods, often identifying them with their own, and were willing to pay tribute to them. According to Curtius (3.8.22; 9.9.27) it was 'ancestral custom' (*patrius mos*) for Alexander to sacrifice to the gods of the locale or region (*dis praesidibus loci; praesidibus et maris et locorum dis*) wherever he found himself. But it is noteworthy that apart from sacrifices to these gods, who seem to have represented elements of nature, and his religious activities in Egypt and Babylon, which were politically motivated, we have no knowledge of any sacrifices by Alexander to clearly non-Greek deities.¹⁹ In Memphis in 332, Alexander sacrificed to Apis, 'the sacred bull of Ptah,' his 'incarnation,' 'soul,' 'herold,' 'life,' and 'son' (Arr. 3.1.4).²⁰ This sacrifice may have been obligatory for Alexander at his enthronement as Pharaoh in the temple of Ptah (Ps. Call. 1.34.2).²¹ We know that Alexander performed the sacred duties of Pharaoh, such as ordering the restoration of Egyptian temples, and several of his Pharaonic titles have been preserved.²² At the founding of Alexan-

18.4.2; Hyp. *Epit.* 21; Ael. *VH* 7.8. On the problem of Hephaestion's pyre/tomb, see now Palagia 2000: 167–75, with refs.

¹⁹ No doubt Alexander considered the Ephesian Artemis an Hellenic deity, with Asian accretions (Diod. 5.77.6–8), just as he regarded the Tyrian Melcart as Heracles. A possible exception may be found in the account of Josephus (*Antiqu.* 11.317–45), with parallels in Ps. Callisthenes, Rec. C, and rabbinic literature, based on the same Hellenistic Jewish sources as those used by Josephus. According to Josephus (11.329–38), after the fall of Gaza in 332, Alexander was met near Jerusalem by a delegation of Jews led by their High Priest; Alexander paid obeisance to the High Priest as representative of god, and then visited Jerusalem, where he sacrificed to God in his temple. The historicity of this information has been debated by scholars for well over a century. But the weight of opinion appears to be with those who reject the account, among them F. Pfister, W. W. Tarn, V. Ehrenberg, E. Renan, E. Bickerman, M. Marcus, and V. Tscherikower. A reasonable conclusion would seem to be that while Alexander's obeisance (*proskynesis*) before the High Priest, and his visit to Jerusalem, are probably fictitious, he may well have met a delegation of Jews on his way to Egypt, and treated the High Priest with respect and even reverence. Such conduct would be entirely in character for Alexander. For good accounts of the controversy, with extensive references, see esp. Marcus 1956: 512–32, and Seibert 1994: 103–7, 271–4.

²⁰ Kees 1931: 676; Grieshammer 1996: 847; Pietschmann 1894: 2808.

²¹ E.g. Koenen 1977: 31 and 53, and see Stewart in this volume. Burstein argues that Alexander was not enthroned as Pharaoh. 1991: 139–45.

²² Fredricksmeyer 2000: 146, with refs.

dria, Alexander designated both the temples for Greek gods, and one for Isis in the Egyptian district (Arr. 3.1.5). In Babylon in 331, Alexander carried out all the recommendations of the [Babylonian] priests concerning the temples, and in particular he sacrificed to Bel according to their instructions (Arr. 3.16.5). It is not unlikely that, as in Egypt, Alexander had himself enthroned as native king in Babylon, and that he performed all sacred functions in this capacity, as he ordered in particular the reconstruction of the great pyramid temple Etemenanki in the temple complex Esagila of Bel, as well as of other temples in a bad state of repair (Arr. 3.16.4–5; 7.17.1–3; Strabo 16.1.5; Joseph. *c. Ap.* 1.192).²³

Alexander's measures in Egypt and Babylon contrast with those of the later Achaemenid kings, who attempted to suppress the native religions by committing various outrages against the native gods, even killing Apis and abducting the statue of Bel.²⁴ While in both countries Persian rule was resented, Alexander courted the good will of the people and their powerful priesthoods.

It is the more remarkable, therefore, that in Persia, Alexander destroyed the sacred capital Persepolis (330), the high citadel of Ahuramazda, the supreme deity of the Achaemenid empire and its kings as deputies of the god on earth.²⁵ By this act Alexander fulfilled his religious obligation to the Greek gods, to which he had committed himself, of exacting vengeance from the Persians for their sacrilege of 480/79. But beyond this, there is reason to believe that, since

²³ Fredricksmeyer 2000: 146–7; Unger 1970: 191–200; Högemann 1985: 49–52. For Alexander's attitudes toward non-Greek religious beliefs see also Brosius in this volume.

²⁴ *Egypt*: Hdt. 3.27–9; Plut. *Mor.* 368 F; Diod. 16.51; Ael. *NA* 10.28; *VH* 4.8; 6.8. *Babylon*: Hdt. 1.183. Unger 1970: 39, 191, 209; 1928: 334–5; 356; 365. Both the Egyptians and the Babylonians, as represented by our Greek and Roman sources, exaggerated the Persian offenses.

²⁵ Ms. Brosius (in this volume, p. 184, n. 24) faults me for saying, at 2000: 148, that before Alexander, Persepolis was “barely known” to the Greeks. I wrote not “barely” but “little” known (there is a difference), as compared with Susa, and this is certainly true. Susa, not Persepolis, was for the Greeks the great symbol of Persian “power, aggression and arrogance” (2000: 148), and so the question remains why, in order to punish the Persians for their sacrilege of 480/79, Alexander destroyed Persepolis, not Susa. The most likely answer still seems to me that Persepolis was the ritual center of the Persian empire under the aegis of Ahuramazda as the supreme deity of the Achaemenid dynasty. Cf. Fredricksmeyer 2000: 145, 147–50, 163, with refs. Also Dandamaev 1989: 255: “The majority of scholars believe that Persepolis was not a center of administration or the capital of a world empire, but was rather the representative dynastic, ritual city of the Achaemenid kings.” Pope 1957: 125: “Persepolis was a ritual city . . . imbued with the peculiar virtue of royal authority, conferred by the power of Ahuramazda.” Pope 1969: 6: Persepolis was “the most

Alexander attributed his own kingship of Asia, as promulgated after his conquest of Darius at Gaugamela (331), to his own prowess and the support of his gods, he considered the near-monotheistic Ahuramazda creed of the Achaemenid kings incompatible with the cult of his own gods, and that by destroying Persepolis he meant to signal that, along with the ancien régime, the dynastic cult of Ahuramazda was to be superseded by a new imperial cult of the Graeco-Macedonian gods.²⁶

Apart from this Graeco-Macedonian religious superstructure, however, Alexander apparently meant to grant religious toleration to all peoples of his realm.²⁷ In 324, after crushing the Macedonian mutiny at Opis, Alexander staged a feast of reconciliation which he used also to promote Macedonian-Persian cooperation. Appropriately, Greek seers initiated the ceremony for the Macedonians and Persian magi for the Persians, but Alexander himself sacrificed to the gods "to whom it was his custom (*nomos*) to sacrifice," that is, to his Graeco-Macedonian gods (Arr. 7.11.8–9).²⁸

3. *The Great Patron Gods*

Alexander adopted from Philip the slogan of a war as a religious crusade to punish the Persians for their sacrilege against the Greek

sacred spot in Persia, a veritable Holy of Holies." Note also the comment of Cicero (*Rep.* 3.14) on the incompatibility of the Persian and Greek religions. Cf. *Leg.* 2.26; *Hdt.* 1.131; 8.109; *Plut. Mor.* 328 D. For an instructive discussion of Iranian, and in particular also Achaemenid, religion see Dandamaev 1989: 320–66. For the Greek perspective on the burning of Persepolis, see e.g. Wheeler 1968: 45–59. On the religious significance of Pasargadae, see Fredricksmeier 2000: 163, with refs.

²⁶ It is here accepted that Alexander's firing of Persepolis was not an act of drunken impulse but of policy. See Fredricksmeier 2000: 149–50, with n. 37.

²⁷ Note e.g. Alexander's burial of Darius' wife "according to the ancestral custom of the Persians" (*Curt.* 3.12.13; 4.10.23). Polybius (5.10.8) says that "even when he crossed to Asia to chastise the Persians for the outrage they had perpetrated against the Greeks . . . he refrained from injuring anything consecrated to the gods, although it was in this respect that the Persians had offended most while in Greece." Alexander punished severely the desecration of holy places by any of his underlings in Asia. *Arr.* 6.30.2; *Curt.* 10.1.8. On the other hand, Alexander's savage repression of Brahmans in southern India was prompted by their resistance to him. See now Bosworth 1998: esp. 196–203. Arrian (7.14.5) reports that in Ecbatana in 324, in his grief over the death of Hephaestion, Alexander ordered the temple of Asclepius (a local healing god identified with Asclepius) to be razed to the ground. Arrian does not credit the story, on the ground that this act would have been utterly out of character for Alexander. Arrian is probably right.

²⁸ At Siwah in 331, Zeus Ammon gave Alexander instructions for sacrifices on his campaign in Asia, and especially for the occasion when he completed his con-

gods in their invasion of 480/79.²⁹ At the same time, like Philip, he embarked on the campaign also as a war of conquest for his own ends. It appears that he considered five gods as his main champions in the undertaking: Zeus, Athena, Heracles, Dionysus, and Apollo. While still in Macedonia, he issued his new imperial coinage featuring on his silver tetradrachmas the head of Heracles on one side, and Zeus Basileus, with eagle and scepter, on the other, and on his gold staters the helmeted head of Athena on one side, and the figure of Nike (as attribute of Athena) on the other.³⁰ In 334, on crossing the Hellespont from Europe to Asia, Alexander dedicated altars to Zeus, Athena, and Heracles (Arr. 1.11.7), as he did again after his victory at Issus (Curt. 3.12.27; cf. Diod. 17.40.1; Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.9), and no doubt on other strategic occasions.³¹

Alexander interpreted various portents as sent by Zeus, Athena, or Heracles to give him aid and directions. So at Gordium in Phrygia he undid the famous Gordian Knot and took this to mean, in accord with an ancient oracle, that Zeus Basileus vouchsafed him the rule over Asia.³² In Memphis, he honored Zeus Basileus with an elaborate sacrifice, including a parade of his army and athletic and literary contests (Arr. 3.5.2), probably in thanksgiving for the god's prediction at Gordium, and its confirmation by Zeus Ammon at Siwah.³³ Before the battle at Gaugamela, which he expected to decide the kingship of Asia (Arr. 3.9.6), Alexander supplicated Zeus with Athena Nike for victory (Curt. 4.13.15). At the Hydaspes in India, he sacrificed to Zeus Ammon, along with Heracles and other gods,

quest. We may assume that the gods whom Zeus Ammon specified were largely identical with Alexander's ancestral gods. Fredricksmeyer 1991: 199–214.

²⁹ Diod. 11.29.3; 16.89.2; 17.4.9; Arr. 2.14.4; 3.18.12; Just. 11.5.6; Polyb. 3.6.13; 5.10.8; Hdt. 8.109; Cic. *Rep.* 3.14–15; *Leg.* 2.26; *ND* 1.115; *Verr.* 2.1.48. On the revenge motif, see Bellen 1974: 58–67. Cf. Seibert 1998: 5–58.

³⁰ Price 1991: 29–31; 1974: 24–5, with pl. 11.60 and 63. Cf. Fredricksmeyer 2000: 144 n. 18. In 335, after crossing the Danube and dispersing the Getae, Alexander sacrificed on the bank of the river to Zeus Soter, Heracles, and Ister (Danube) (Arr. 1.4.5).

³¹ J. D. Bing (1991: 161–5) believes that the Zeus, Heracles, and Athena to whom Alexander according to Curtius (3.12.27) sacrificed in thanksgiving after the victory at Issus were actually the Cilician gods Ba'al Tarz/Tarhunzas, Nergal/Rasheph/Runzas, and 'Anat/Ishara. This is unlikely. They were rather the same Zeus, Athena, and Heracles whom Alexander worshipped, along with the other Graeco-Macedonian gods, at the Hellespont and throughout his career. Fredricksmeyer 2000: 143–5.

³² Fredricksmeyer 1961: 160–8.

³³ Fredricksmeyer 1961: 166. Cf. Kienast 1987: 313. The opinion occasionally expressed that the god whom Alexander worshipped in Memphis was not the Graeco-Macedonian Zeus Basileus (Arrian) but the Egyptian Oserapis or Amon-Ra is unlikely. Correct: Wilcken 1967: 130; Hammond *Alexander the Great* 1980: 129.

in supplication for a successful expedition to the Indian Ocean (Arr. 6.3.2). In Carmania, he performed lavish thanksgiving sacrifices to Zeus Soter, with Heracles, Apollo Alexikakos, and Posidon for the successful naval expedition of Nearchus from India (Arr. *Ind.* 36.3). In Babylon in 323, Alexander received a number of sacred embassies in the order of the prestige of their sanctuaries, with one from Zeus Olympius at Elis first, and one from Zeus Ammon at Siwah second (Diod. 17.113.3–4). And shortly before his death, Alexander planned magnificent temples for Zeus at Dium and at Dodona (Diod. 18.4.5). By far the closest of all the gods to Alexander personally was Zeus in his manifestation as Ammon at Siwah, and we will consider him shortly.

Athena was probably the tutelary goddess of Alexander's Hellenic (Corinthian) League.³⁴ She had been the personal champion of Heracles and Achilles, and she assumed (or confirmed) this role for Alexander at Ilium, when his chief diviner Aristander interpreted a portent as vouchsafing the goddess's help in the future. In thanksgiving Alexander made a lavish sacrifice, dedicated his armor to her in return for a sacred shield from her temple, and thereafter had it carried before him in battle. In India, it was to save his life.³⁵ Alexander worshipped *Athena*, alone or with other gods, throughout his career with sacrifices of supplication and thanksgiving, and with generous dedications at her sanctuaries when possible.³⁶ One of his last projects was to build magnificent temples for *Athena* at Ilium and in Macedonia (Diod. 18.4.5; Strabo 13.1.26).³⁷

Alexander worshipped *Heracles* as his divine ancestor and heroic model, either alone or with other gods, especially Zeus and *Athena*.³⁸ He is said to have kept on his table throughout his career a statuette of Heracles (the original *Herakles Epitrapezios* of Lysippus) with which (whom) he used to commune and to whom he appealed for success in battle (Stat. *Silv.* 4.6.59–74; cf. Mart. 9.43.6–8). In nego-

³⁴ Price 1991: 29; 1974: 24.

³⁵ Diod. 17.17.6; 17.18.1; 17.21.2; Arr. 1.11.7–8; 6.9.3; 6.10.2; Plut. *Alex.* 15.7.

³⁶ Plut. *Alex.* 16.18 = Arr. 1.16.7; Squillace 1992–4: 9–20 (Athens); Strabo 13.1.26 (Ilium); Dittenberger, *Syll.* No. 277 (Dedication of the new temple of *Athena Polias* at Priene); Curt. 3.7.3; Arr. 2.5.8, 9 (Soli and Magarsus); Curt. 3.12.27 (after Issus); Curt. 4.13.15 (before Gaugamela); *FGHist* IIIB, Anagraphe von Lindos XXXVIII, p. 511 (Lindus); Curt. 8.2.32 (after surrender of Rock of Chorienes in Sogdiana); Arr. 4.22.6 (at Nicaea in the Paropamisadae to inaugurate the invasion of India); Curt. 8.11.24 (conquest of Aornus).

³⁷ On Zeus and *Athena* as Alexander's patron gods in Asia, see also Prandi 1990: 345–69.

³⁸ Arr. 1.4.5; 1.11.7; 2.24.6; 3.3.1–2; 4.30.4; 6.3.2; *Ind.* 36.3; Curt. 3.12.27; Plut. *Mor.* 326 B; 332 A–B; 334 D; 542 D. Edmunds 1971: 374–6; Huttner 1997: 86–123.

tiations with the Thessalians in 336, he appealed to their common connections with Heracles to gain their allegiance (Diod. 17.4.1). After the fall of Thebes, a certain Cleades (otherwise unknown) is said by Justin (11.4.5–7) to have tried to avert the destruction of the city, claimed by the Thebans as the birthplace of Heracles, by appealing to his devotion to the god, but unsuccessfully. One reason no doubt was the Thebans' disloyalty to the Greek cause not only at this time but also in the Persian War, while Alexander was hoping to lead a panhellenic crusade against the Persians as the common enemy of the Greeks.³⁹ Even so, as Polybius (5.10.7) observes, Alexander was careful not to offend against religion, and took the utmost precautions against even involuntary damage done to the temples or any part of the sacred enclosures. Also the priests and priestesses, as well as the houses of Pindar and some friends of the Macedonians, were spared (Arr. 1.9.9; Plut. *Alex.* 11.12).

Alexander accepted citizenship from the Megarians at their claim that before him only Heracles had been so honored (Plut. *Mor.* 826C; cf. Sen. *Ben.* 1.13.1–2); at Ephesus he increased the sacred *temenos*, the area of asylum of the temple of Artemis, perhaps in emulation of Heracles, who was said to have done the same (Strabo 14.1.23; Tac. *Ann.* 3.61); and at Mallus in Cilicia he remitted the city's tribute because of their common connections to Heracles (Arr. 2.5.9; cf. Strabo 14.5.17). At Tyre, Heracles came to special prominence when the Tyrians refused Alexander's request to sacrifice in the city to their main god Melcart, whom Alexander considered to be Heracles.⁴⁰ Alexander decided to take the city by force. Aristander interpreted Alexander's dream of Heracles inviting him into the city to mean that he would take the island fortress, reputedly impregnable, but with great exertion (*ponos*), the mark of Heracles.⁴¹ At the city's fall Alexander meted out terrible punishment to the people but spared those, including the king, who had sought asylum in Heracles' temple (Arr. 2.24.5; Curt. 4.4.13).⁴² Alexander sacrificed to Heracles lavishly

³⁹ The Thebans had called on the Greeks together with them and the Great King to remove the tyranny of Alexander over Greece. Diod. 17.9.5. Cf. Flower 2000: 97 and 130 n. 143.

⁴⁰ Arr. 2.15.7; 2.16.7; Diod. 17.40.2; Curt. 4.2.2–4; Just. 11.10.10.

⁴¹ Arr. 2.18.1; Plut. *Alex.* 24.5; Curt. 4.2.17; Huttner 1997: 98.

⁴² Note also Alexander's letter to Megabyxus concerning a run-away slave who had taken refuge in a sanctuary, directing him to try if possible to entice him outside, but not to lay hands on him in the sanctuary. Plut. *Alex.* 42.1; Hamilton 1969: 110.

for his aid in the city's fall, with parades on land and sea, an athletic contest, torch race, dedication of the engine that breached the wall, rededication of the Tyrian sacred ship with a new inscription, and other votive gifts, and on his return from Egypt in the following year he honored Heracles similarly.⁴³

Alexander named his son by Barsine Heracles,⁴⁴ and in Bactria and Sogdiana he is said, no doubt because of the hardships of the campaign, to have named some of his new settlements Heraclea.⁴⁵ At the Hindu Kush and in India (328–6), the Macedonians came to think that they were following in the tracks of Heracles.⁴⁶ Alexander's decision to conquer the huge rock fortress Aornus in N.W. India was inspired by the claim of the natives (so he understood) that before him even Heracles had tried but failed to conquer the rock.⁴⁷ And both at the Jaxartes in Sogdiana and at the Hyphasis in India, Alexander erected altars in emulation of Heracles and Dionysus to mark the termini of his Eastern conquests.⁴⁸ Throughout his career, but especially on the grueling campaigns in Afghanistan and India, Alexander was driven by an obsession to surpass the heroic achievements of Heracles and Dionysus, and he appealed to their example to inspire his troops.⁴⁹

The cult of *Dionysus* was ancient in Macedonia, and in Philip's and Alexander's time seems to have played a major role in the Macedonian state religion.⁵⁰ Alexander's mother worshipped Dionysus with special fervor.⁵¹ Although Alexander's reasons for the destruction of Thebes, reputedly the home of Dionysus, were no doubt

⁴³ Arr. 2.24.6; 3.6.1; Diod. 17.46.6; Curt. 4.8.16; Moretti 1975: No. 113.

⁴⁴ Diod. 20.20.1–2; Plut. *Eum.* 1.3; Curt. 10.6.11; Just. 11.10.3; 12.15.9; 13.2.7; 15.2.3; Paus. 9.7.2. Brunt 1975: esp. 34; Carney *Women and Monarchy* 2000: 101–5, 149–50.

⁴⁵ Loewe 1936: 34 and 39.

⁴⁶ Arr. 4.28.1–4; 5.3.2–4; 5.26.5; *Ind.* 5.11–3; Diod. 17.83.1; 17.96.2–3; Curt. 7.3.22; 8.14.11; 9.4.1–3; Just. 12.9.2; Strabo 11.5.5; 15.1.8. Brunt 1983: 437; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 213–7; Huttner 1997: 108–9.

⁴⁷ Arr. 4.28.1–4; 4.30.4; 5.26.5; *Ind.* 5.10; Diod. 17.85.2; 17.96.2–3; Curt. 8.11.2; Just. 12.7.12–3; Strabo 15.1.8.

⁴⁸ Plin. *NH* 6.49; Curt. 7.9.15 (Jaxartes); Strabo 3.5.5; Curt. 3.10.5; cf. Philostr. *Vit. Ap.* 2.43, of doubtful authenticity.

⁴⁹ E.g. Strabo 3.5.5; Arr. 5.26.5; Curt. 3.10.5; 3.12.18; 9.2.29; 9.4.21; Plut. *Mor.* 326 B; 332 A. On the identification by the Macedonians of Indian deities with Heracles and Dionysus, see Hartman 1965: esp. 60–3.

⁵⁰ Fredricksmeier 1966: 179–82. Cf. Baynham 2000: 258–9.

⁵¹ Plut. *Alex.* 2.5; Athen. 13.560 F; 14.659 F.

compelling, he is said later to have been remorseful, and to have felt the god's anger over the destruction (Plut. *Alex.* 13.4; Arr. 2.15.2–3). It is possible that after his victory at Gaugamela, Alexander assumed a diadem derived from the iconography of the god as the badge of his newly proclaimed kingship of Asia, and because of the legend of the god's campaigns in the East, he may have regarded him (since Heracles at this time had not yet been taken to the East) as inspiration for his conquest of Asia.⁵² At the firing of Persepolis, he conducted a 'victory procession' (*epinikion kōmon*) in honor of Dionysus (Diod. 17.72.4). In Sogdiana and India, Alexander's cult of Dionysus intensified when the Macedonians found traces of the god's campaigns and felt challenged to surpass them.⁵³ At the Jaxartes and the Hyphasis rivers, as noted, Alexander set up altars in rivalry with Dionysus and Heracles, and on their return from India, the Macedonians are said to have celebrated their survival from the Gedrosian desert with an extended *kōmos* in honor of the god.⁵⁴ Alexander's rivalry with Dionysus and Heracles soon became a rhetorical commonplace in which fact and fiction became inextricably fused.⁵⁵

To turn to *Apollo*. Alexander apparently launched the invasion of Persia with an oracle from the god at Delphi, taken over from Philip, which predicted, as he wished to believe, the demise through him of the Great King (Diod. 16.91.2–3).⁵⁶ Accordingly, when on first landing on Asian soil Alexander claimed Asia as 'gift of the gods' (Diod. 17.17.2), and when he made the same claim again in his

⁵² Fredricksmeyer 1997: 97, 102–7.

⁵³ Arr. 5.1.1–2.7; 6.14.2; 7.10.6; *Ind.* 1.4–7; 5.8–9; Diod. 1.19.7; Curt. 3.12.18; 7.9.15; 8.10.1; 8.10.7–18; 9.2.29; 9.4.21; 9.8.5; Just. 12.7.6–8; Plut. *Mor.* 326 B; 332 B; Strabo 15.1.8; 15.1.33; Clitarchus, *FGrHist* 137 F 17 = Schol. Apoll. Rhod. 2.904; Philostr. *Vit. Ap.* 2.9.

⁵⁴ Arr. 6.28.1–2; Diod. 17.106.1; Curt. 3.12.18; 9.10.24–30; Plut. *Alex.* 67; Plin. *NH* 16.144. Further sacrifices to Dionysus: Arr. 4.9.5; 5.2.6; Suet. *Aug.* 94.5; Athen. 12.538A; 13.595 E; Diod. 17.117.1.

⁵⁵ See Brunt 1983: 435–42. The story that Alexander considered Dionysus his ancestor is probably apocryphal. Nock 1928: 21–30. On Alexander's relations with Dionysus, see also Goukowsky 1981: *passim*; Bosworth, *Alexander and the East*, 98–132, 164–5, and *passim*; Edmunds 1971: 376–8; Seibert 1994: 204–6.

⁵⁶ Alexander's application to himself of Philip's oracle explains why he himself did not obtain an oracle from Delphi. Instinsky 1949: 36–40; Hamilton 1969: 34–5. At the time of Alexander's crossing of the Hellespont, Olympias made inquiry of Apollo's oracle at Cyzicus (or perhaps Zeleia) whether Alexander would conquer "the land of the Persians," and received what appeared to be a favorable reply. *Anth. Gr.* 14.114. Cf. Kaiser-Raiss 1984: 40. Note also Alexander's votive offering to Apollo at Cyme in Aeolia in 334. Plin. *NH* 34.14.

letter to Darius after the battle at Issus (Arr. 2.14.7), he no doubt based this confidence on the oracle of Apollo at Delphi.

At Tyre, Alexander attributed the city's fall, after a seven months' bloody siege, to the aid of Apollo as well as of Heracles. When he came in the city upon a statue of Apollo chained to its pedestal, he was told that it was a gift of the Carthaginians (a colony of Tyre) who had robbed it from the people of Gela in Sicily; that the Tyrians identified the god with one of their own, but during the siege someone had a vision of the god announcing that he was about to go over to Alexander. To prevent this, the Tyrians, calling him an 'Alexandrist' (Plut. *Alex.* 24.7), chained him to his pedestal. Alexander now freed him from his bonds, directed that he should henceforth be called 'Apollo Philalexandros' (Diod. 17.46.6), and celebrated him with great splendor.⁵⁷

In 331, from the miraculously reactivated oracle at Didyma near Miletus, the god among other utterances renewed his prediction at Delphi of the death of the Great King, and also seemed to confirm Alexander's identification by Zeus Ammon at Siwah as the son of Zeus.⁵⁸

Years later, in 329 in Sogdiana, Alexander had an opportunity to return the god's favors when he came upon a community of Greeks whose ancestors had desecrated and betrayed Apollo's temple at Didyma to Xerxes, and then followed him East to escape the wrath of their countrymen. Alexander now extirpated them.⁵⁹ Some scholars have rejected this abhorrent report, but it is quite plausible.⁶⁰ We remember Alexander's massacres in Sogdiana and India, and other acts of savagery, which balance his equally memorable acts of gallantry. In this case, Alexander acted as champion of the god, as avenger of sacrilege, as Philip had done when he killed hundreds of Phocians for their sacrilege against Apollo at Delphi (Diod. 16.35.6; Just. 8.2.3-7).

Alexander continued to honor Apollo, as in Carmania for the safe return of Nearchus and his fleet from India (Arr. *Ind.* 36.3; cf. 3.27.5); in 323 in Babylon he received envoys from Delphi as ranking only

⁵⁷ Diod. 13.108.3-4; 17.41.7-8; 17.46.6; Curt. 4.3.21-2; Plut. *Alex.* 24.6-8.

⁵⁸ Callisthenes, *FGHist* 124 F14 a = Strabo 17.1.43.

⁵⁹ Curt. 7.5.28-35; Diod. 17. Table of Contents K; Plut. *Mor.* 557 B; Strabo 11.11.4; 14.1.5; 17.1.43; Suda s.v. *Branchidae*.

⁶⁰ Hammond 1998: 339-44; Holt 1989: 73-5; Bellen 1974: 63-5. *Contra* Tarn 1948: II, 272-5.

after Elis (Zeus Olympius) and Siwah (Zeus Ammon) (Diod. 17.113.4); and one of his last plans was the construction of two magnificent new temples for Apollo, at Delos and at Delphi (Diod. 18.4.5).

4. *Portents and Divination*

The gods gave to humans directions, encouragements, warnings, and hints of the future through their seated oracles as at Delphi and Siwah, and in many other ways such as the entrails of sacrificial animals, the flight and behavior of birds, phenomena of the weather, dreams, and any other occurrences which did not have a known explanation. It is not surprising that in the course of such momentous events as Alexander's conquest of the East, in vast and unknown lands, fraught with ever-present dangers, Alexander and his men greatly depended on these signs from the gods and their correct interpretation. The seers advised Alexander on what gods to propitiate and what rites to employ, and they interpreted the condition of sacrificial victims and omens of all kinds.⁶¹ The fact that Alexander was usually successful facilitated their task. We hear mostly of favorable pronouncements, which came true. Except that Alexander naturally desired reports which supported his designs, he seems seldom to have tried to pressure or manipulate his seers.⁶² They showed considerable independence. We hear of one instance, at the Jaxartes (329), when Aristander declared the omens unfavorable and refused to come up with better ones but, provoked by the enemy's taunts, Alexander finally proceeded across the river against the omens. He fell seriously ill from dysentery, and thus vindicated the seer (Arr. 4.4.3, 9).⁶³

At the Hyphasis, when Alexander's exhausted troops frustrated his desire to proceed further, Alexander took the omens but they were

⁶¹ Arr. 4.15.8; 6.3.1; 7.22.4; 7.24.3-4; *Ind.* 18.11-2; Diod. 17.116.4, 7; 17.116.7-117.1; Plut. *Alex* 74.1. See also Greenwalt 1982: 17-25, with further refs.

⁶² A conspicuous exception, if true, is Alexander's rejection, in 326/5, of the warning of his seer Demophon to delay his assault on the city of the Malli, and Alexander sustained the most severe wound of his life. Diod. 17.98.3-4; Curt. 9.4.26-30.

⁶³ Curtius (7.7.21-9) says that after Aristander declared the omens unfavorable, Alexander browbeat him, at which he took the omens again and declared that never before had they been more favorable. Obviously this information, which is part of the rhetorical fiction which marks Curtius' whole account of the episode (7.7.5-29), cannot stand against the testimony of Arrian. Cf. Greenwalt 1982: 20-4.

unfavorable. At this, he gave orders to turn back.⁶⁴ It has been said that Alexander had made up his mind, and so the sacrifices naturally were unfavorable.⁶⁵ But Alexander always was able somehow to impose his will on his men. It is not unlikely, especially after the experience at the Jaxartes, that the omens really did influence Alexander's decision.⁶⁶

Our sources report a number of bad omens shortly before Alexander's death, some of them distorted or fabricated *ex eventu*, some probably true.⁶⁷ They reinforced each other to cause Alexander concern. So at his approach to Babylon, the local priests warned Alexander against entering the city by appealing to an oracle from Bel, but despite well-founded suspicions of the priests's motives, Alexander at first tried to comply with their request at least to enter the city from the West, rather than directly from the East, and he entered only when this proved impossible because of the nature of the terrain. Even so, Alexander was troubled by his failure to comply.⁶⁸ When on his arrival in the city Alexander was informed that a seer named Peithagoras had obtained a bad omen about him, and when on being questioned the seer confirmed the report, Alexander accepted this, but when shortly thereafter occurred two more disturbing portents, a sailor innocently donning Alexander's diadem (when it had fallen onto a reed in a swamp and the sailor swam out to retrieve it), and an unknown person unaccountably taking a seat on Alexander's momentarily empty throne, Alexander followed the seers's advice to have the men put away, to avert disaster from himself.⁶⁹ The importance which Alexander attached to portents and divination can be

⁶⁴ Ptolemy, *FGrHist* 138 F 23 = Arr. 5.28.4; Strabo 15.1.27.

⁶⁵ Tarn 1948: I, 100.

⁶⁶ Cf. Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 133: "... it was the gods to whom he deferred, not his men."

⁶⁷ Arr. 7.16.5; 7.30.2; Plut. *Alex* 73; 74.1; 75.1-2; Diod. 17.112.4; 17.116.1, 4. Mederer 1936: 120-33.

⁶⁸ Aristobulus, *FGrHist* 139 F 54 = Arr. 7.16.5-17.6; Plut. *Alex*. 73.2; 74.1; 75.1; Diod. 17.112; Just. 12.13.3; App. *B.C.* 2.152. Alexander's initial distrust of the Chaldaeans is shown by his response to them with a quote from Euripides that "the best propohets are the ones who guess the best" (Arr. 7.16.7). But, perhaps from a premonition of his coming illness, Alexander's nonchalance soon turned to anxiety. Plutarch (*Alex*. 75.1-2) says that toward the end in Babylon Alexander became extremely sensitive to all occurrences that could be taken as portents, and his palace was filled with "sacrificers, purifiers, and diviners."

⁶⁹ Peithagoras: Arr. 7.18.1-5; Plut. *Alex*. 73.3-5; App. *B.C.* 2.152. Royal diadem and stranger on throne: Arr. 7.22.4; 7.24.1-3; Diod. 17.116.4-117.1; Plut. *Alex*. 73.7 74.1

gauged also from the fact that while in the earlier days of his final illness he performed his 'customary' (*nomitzomena*) sacrifices, on his last four days he performed 'assigned' (*tetagmena*) sacrifices, that is, sacrifices prescribed by the seers (Arr. 7.25.2–5).

In his later years, Alexander increasingly assumed the ways of Eastern despotism, but there is no good reason to believe that at that time the seers were predominantly Orientals.⁷⁰ Alexander's Greek and Macedonian seers no doubt were quick enough to adapt themselves to the changing times. The deputation which consulted a Babylonian healing god for Alexander *in extremis* consisted of five distinguished Macedonian officers and, significantly, two priests, both Greek (Arr. 7.26.2). The crucifixion after Philip's assassination of the seer who presumably had declared the omens favorable⁷¹ suggests that we need not look for Orientals to advise Alexander on divination in his last period.

Of the many additional portents listed by our sources, we can mention here only a few. At Thebes, Alexander no doubt is informed of the various portents which foretold the city's demise (Diod. 17.10.1–6). At the temple of Athena at Ilium, Aristander interprets the fallen statue of a former Persian satrap as portending victory in the coming battle and Athena's help also in the future (Diod. 17.17.6–7). At Miletus, Alexander interprets, differently from Parmenion, the appearance on the shore of an eagle, messenger of Zeus, as confirming his strategy to defeat the Persian fleet on the land by depriving it of its bases (Arr. 1.18.6, 9; 1.20.1). In Lycia, Alexander is encouraged by the discovery of a tablet allegedly predicting the destruction of the Persian Empire by the Greeks (Plut. *Alex.* 17.4). At the siege of Gaza, as Alexander sacrifices, a bird drops a pebble on his head, at which he consults Aristander, who declares that Alexander would capture the city but should beware on this day. After at first complying, Alexander joins the fray in the heat of battle and is wounded, but he is glad because the seer has foretold the

⁷⁰ But so Berve 1926: I, 92. Elsewhere (98 n. 3) Berve doubts the influence of Oriental seers on Alexander. Plutarch's remark (*Alex.* 57.4) that Alexander employed Babylonian purifiers is not attested elsewhere. According to Curtius (4.10.4), Alexander employed Egyptian seers as early as 331. Very possibly Alexander used some Oriental seers all along, but no doubt their function was secondary to that of the Graeco-Macedonian seers. Certainly no seer ever equaled the influence on Alexander of Aristander of Telmessus, who had served with distinction already under Philip (Plut. *Alex.* 2.5). Greenwalt 1982: 24–5.

⁷¹ Hammond 1994: 177, with nn. 2 and 3.

city's fall.⁷² At the Persian Gates, after unsuccessful attempts to obtain omens from the victims, Alexander abandons the attempt as 'untimely' (Curt. 5.4.2). During the difficult campaign against Spitamenes, there is discovered near Alexander's tent by the Oxus river a spring of water and nearby one of oil (perhaps the first petroleum ever seen by Europeans). At this prodigy Alexander sacrifices as the soothsayers direct, and Aristander declares the oil as portending victory after hardship (Arr. 4.15.7–8). According to Plutarch (*Alex.* 57.8; cf. Athen. 2.42 F), Alexander stated in a letter to Antipater that this was one of the greatest revelations vouchsafed to him by god.

Part II

1. Consultation of the Oracle of Zeus Ammon at Siwah. Son of Zeus

On the occasion of his occupation of Egypt in 332–31, Alexander made a pilgrimage to the oasis of Siwah in the Libyan desert to consult the oracle of Zeus Ammon. While Darius was readying his forces for the final decision, Alexander took six weeks and several hundred miles to visit the oracle. We should think that his reasons were compelling.⁷³

Ammon at Siwah was derived from the Egyptian Amon-Ra at Thebes, but the Greeks had long identified him as Zeus (e.g. Pindar, *Pyth.* 4.16), and there can be no doubt that Alexander too considered him as Zeus.⁷⁴ We can identify several motives for Alexander's trip. Ammon was already well known in the Greek world, with cults in a number of places including Macedonia and Athens, and his oracle was considered infallible (Arr. 3.3.1).⁷⁵ The tradition that Alexander's ancestors Heracles and Perseus also had consulted the

⁷² Arr. 2.26.4–27.4; Curt. 4.6.10–3; Plut. *Alex.* 25.4–5.

⁷³ On the visit, see Arr. 3.3.3–4; Diod. 17.49.2–51.4; Curt. 4.7.5–8; Just. 11.11.2–12; Plut. *Alex.* 26.11–27.11; Strabo 17.1.43. *Important studies:* Bosworth 1977: 51–75; Badian 1981: 27–71; Brunt 1976: 467–80. See also Lane Fox 1973: 200–18; Green 1991: 272–5. *A good survey:* Seibert 1994: 116–25.

⁷⁴ Denied by Tarn 1948: II, 348–59. But see Badian 1981: 45–6, with nn. 20 and 23; Bosworth 1977: 52; *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 282–3; Fredricksmeyer 1991: 199–200. When, as he did on one occasion, Alexander swore by "Zeus of the Greeks and the Libyan Ammon," he did not mean two different gods but the god whom the Greeks call "Zeus," the Libyans "Ammon." Arr. *Ind.* 35.8.

⁷⁵ Classen 1959: 349–55; Baege 1913: 16.

oracle provided further incentive (Arr. 3.3.1–2; cf. Strabo 17.1.43). Certainly Alexander wished to consult the oracle about the future. In particular, it is likely that he hoped for confirmation of the prediction of Apollo at Delphi for his conquest of the Persian king,⁷⁶ and that of Zeus Basileus at Gordium for his rule over Asia, and to be given instructions for sacrifices along the way.⁷⁷ Most important, there is reason to think that by this time Alexander had already conceived the notion that, like Heracles and Perseus, he too was a son of Zeus, and that he now hoped for confirmation and clarification of this relationship (Arr. 3.3.2).⁷⁸ We may assume that Alexander informed the priests in advance of his visit and of his expectations.⁷⁹

At his arrival, Alexander was conducted into the inner sanctum of the temple, and probably after some ritual act before the idol of the god posed his questions. The high priest in a secret listening chamber recorded the questions, formulated the god's responses in writing, and then communicated them to Alexander.⁸⁰ After rejoining his followers outside the temple, Alexander said that he had heard what he hoped for (Arr. 3.4.5). This would suggest that at least at this time, Alexander did not divulge either his questions or the god's responses, except to say that the priest expressly (*rhētōs*) acknowledged him, no doubt in the name of the god, as his son, and the priest may have confirmed this statement (Callisthenes, *FGrHist* 124 F14 a = Strabo 17.1.43).⁸¹

When and how did Alexander first conceive the notion that he was the son of Zeus? He probably did not derive it from his status as Pharaoh in Egypt, by which he was *ex officio* son of Amon-Ra and

⁷⁶ This is intrinsically probable.

⁷⁷ Fredricksmeyer 1991: 205–14; Edmunds 1971: 378–9.

⁷⁸ Bosworth 1977: 67–75; *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 282. Cf. Taeger 1957: 192; Badian 1985: 433.

⁷⁹ Justin (11.11.6) says (but no one else) that Alexander sent men ahead to bribe (*subornat*) the priests to give the responses he wished. An underhanded trick like this would have been so uncharacteristic of Alexander that we can safely dismiss it. At the very least, he was not so heavy-handed. Compare for instance Zeus Ammon allowing only heroic honors for Hephaestion even though Alexander wished for divine honors for him. Cf. Wilamowitz 1932: 265: "Dass er den Zug zu dem Gotte nicht unternommen hat, um eine Komödie zu spielen und die Welt zu betrügen, darüber verliere ich keine Worte."

⁸⁰ Kuhlmann 1988: 144–6.

⁸¹ Alexander may have divulged some information at a later time. Fredricksmeyer 1991: 200–2. After the consultation, Alexander made generous thank offerings to the god and his priests. Diod. 17.51.4; Curt. 4.7.28; Plut. *Alex.* 27.7.

Osiris, and god (as Horus). It is unlikely that he concerned himself with the intricacies of Egyptian theology,⁸² and Arrian, on the authority either of Ptolemy or of Aristobulus, states clearly that already by now Alexander attributed his birth to Ammon (that is, Zeus), in the sense that tradition attributed the birth of Heracles and Perseus to Zeus (3.3.2). This then was a Greek, not an Egyptian, concept. Possibly it was Olympias who first suggested it to him, being as she was antagonistic to Philip, extremely ambitious for herself and her son, and, as we have noted, intensely religious. In particular, she was devoted to Dionysiac and Orphic mysteries, which may have encouraged her belief that she had conceived Alexander by a god. Plutarch (*Alex.* 2.6) says that Philip once saw a serpent in bed with Olympias, and thought that she might have been visited by a divine being. Serpents were especially prominent in the cult of Dionysus, and Olympias may have come to believe that Alexander had been fathered by a god, whether Dionysus or perhaps even Zeus, in the form of a serpent.⁸³ Eratosthenes (*FGrHist* 241 F 28 = Plut. *Alex.* 3.3) claims that before his departure for the war, Olympias told Alexander the secret of his begetting, and charged him to entertain thoughts worthy of it. If Olympias suggested to Alexander that he was the son of Dionysus, rather than of Zeus, he subsequently changed his mind, and imputed his birth to Zeus, and at Siwah the god confirmed the relationship.

Soon afterwards word reached Alexander that the oracle of Apollo at Didyma, and the prophetess Athenais at Erythrae, in Ionia, also had revealed Alexander's sonship of Zeus (Callisthenes, *FGrHist* 124 F14 a = Strabo 17.1.43). In an address to his Greek troops before the battle at Gaugamela, he prayed the gods for assistance if he was truly the son of Zeus (Callisthenes, *FGrHist* 124 F 36 = Plut. *Alex.* 33.1).⁸⁴ Some time after the battle, probably at Babylon, Apelles painted Alexander, surely at his initiative, as wielder of the thunderbolt, that is, as son of Zeus (Plin. *NH* 35.92; Plut. *Alex.* 4.3),⁸⁵ and on Alexander's return from India, in 324, there was issued, probably at Susa, a silver decadrachma in celebration of his Indian

⁸² Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 70; Hammond 1997: 102. On the Egyptian doctrines of Pharaonic worship, see Kuhlmann 1988: 146–54.

⁸³ Hamilton 1969: 4–5; Wirth 1973: 120; Brunt 1976: 477; Badian 1996: 19.

⁸⁴ Badian 1981: 63 n. 61; Brunt 1976: 475–6.

⁸⁵ Stewart 1993: 193–7, and in this volume.

conquest, again no doubt at Alexander's initiative, or at least his encouragement. It shows on one side Alexander in victorious combat with Indians, and on the other Alexander in full armor, being crowned by Nike, and wielding, as in the painting by Apelles, the thunderbolt of his father.⁸⁶ In 328 in Sogdiana, Alexander's general Cleitus during a drunken altercation taunted Alexander with his claim of a divine paternity (Plut. *Alex.* 50.11; Curt. 8.1.42), and in 324 at Opis the mutinous Macedonians did the same.⁸⁷ But Alexander persisted. In a letter to the Athenians, probably early in 323, he is said to have referred to Philip as his 'so-called father' (Plut. *Alex.* 28.2). If the letter is spurious, it was authored almost certainly not long afterwards by someone who believed that Alexander acknowledged a father other than Philip.⁸⁸

After Alexander's death, there was found among his papers a plan for a monumental cenotaph for Philip (Diod. 18.4.4–6).⁸⁹ Perhaps his intention was to show that he still acknowledged Philip as his earthly father. But this show of *pietas* did not mean a lessening of Alexander's commitment to his divine father. He adhered to it in the face of the resentment of many, especially the Macedonians who saw in it a rejection of their beloved Philip.⁹⁰ Others, whether from conviction or flattery, accepted it. There is reason to believe that after his return from India in 324, Alexander hoped to be deified, at any rate at Athens, as son of Zeus Ammon,⁹¹ and on his deathbed he requested burial, not with Philip at the traditional resting place of the Argead Kings in Macedonia, but with Zeus Ammon at Siwah.⁹²

Perhaps we can probe a bit further into this remarkable obsession. Alexander's descent from Heracles, which he never disavowed (Arr. 3.3.2; 6.3.2), meant that he was the son of Philip (Arr. 7.9.2). But as we know from Arrian (3.3.2), drawing on either Ptolemy or Aristobulus, Alexander also attributed his birth to Ammon, that is Zeus, 'just as' (*kathaper*) tradition attributed the birth of Heracles and

⁸⁶ Lane Fox 1996: 87–108; Bosworth 1994: 831, fig. 39.

⁸⁷ Arr. 7.8.3; Diod. 17.108.3; Just. 12.11.6.

⁸⁸ Bosworth 1977: 67 n. 89. Cf. Högemann 1985: 135 n. 2. According to Megasthenes, Alexander advertised himself as son of Zeus also to the Indians. *FGH* Hist 715 F34 a = Strabo 15.1.68. Cf. Curt. 8.10.1.

⁸⁹ Fredricksmeyer 1990: 312–4.

⁹⁰ Plut. *Alex.* 50.11; Curt. 4.10.3; 6.11.23; 8.7.13.

⁹¹ Fredricksmeyer 1979 [1980]: 5–7.

⁹² Diod. 18.3.5; 18.28.3; Curt. 10.5.4; Just. 12.15.7.

of Perseus to Zeus. This must mean that Alexander considered himself the son of both Philip and Zeus, and it clarifies Arrian's statement that Alexander attributed 'part' (*ti*) of his birth to Ammon (Arr. 3.3.2): the other part came from Philip.⁹³ Perhaps after changing his mind about the earlier notion of his conception from a god in form of a serpent, Alexander came to think that in fathering him, Zeus assumed the form of Philip, or that he was the product of the seed of both. Whatever the explanation, we may believe that the priest at Siwah confirmed and explained the matter to Alexander in a way that made sense to him. Shortly afterwards he wrote to his mother that he had received "'certain secret (*aporrhêtous*) responses' from the oracle which he would tell her, and her alone, after his return" (Plut. *Alex.* 27.8). It is not unlikely that these responses concerned the intimate subject of Alexander's conception.⁹⁴

We can be sure that Alexander's faith in the fatherhood of Zeus quickened his determination to validate this relationship by his achievements, and before long he came to think that on this basis he himself deserved to be honored as a god.⁹⁵

2. *Alexander the God*

In the spring of 327, in Bactria, Alexander attempted to extend to the Greeks and Macedonians at his court the Persian homage to the king called (by the Greeks) *proskynesis*, which the Orientals accorded him as their new king as a matter of course.⁹⁶ It has been thought that by this device Alexander meant to introduce his cult as god of his empire.⁹⁷ But for the Persians, the king was not a god, and thus for them the act did not mean worship but was a gesture of obeisance to an absolute potentate. We should think therefore that

⁹³ Bosworth 1977: 70–1; *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 282–3.

⁹⁴ Cf. Lauffer 1993: 89: "Dabei könnte es sich nur um die Frage seiner göttlichen Herkunft handeln."

⁹⁵ Cf. Wilamowitz 1932: 266: "[Since Alexander's visit to Zeus Ammon at Siwah] lebt er durch den Glauben an das Göttliche in ihm. Sein ganzes Leben und Handeln, sein Heldentum und auch seine Sünden werden begreiflich, wie ich meine, allein begreiflich durch diesen echten und heissen Glauben."

⁹⁶ Plut. *Alex.* 54; Arr. 4.9.9–12.7; Curt. 8.5.1–6.1; Just. 12.7.1–3; 15.3.3.

⁹⁷ E.g. Tarn 1948: II, 359–69. Cf. Bosworth, *Alexander and the East* 1996: 109: The aim was "the acknowledgment of Alexander's divine status and absolute monarchy."

Alexander's purpose in extending the practice to his Western followers was to establish a ritual acknowledgment of his new status as an autocrat for all his subjects alike without distinction.⁹⁸

But there was more. To the Greeks and Macedonians, *proskynesis* had always meant or suggested divine worship, and although by now they certainly understood that this was not what it meant to the Persians, the notion persisted. Alexander must have known this, and we should think therefore that he was not averse to the traditional implication which the gesture conveyed for the Greeks and Macedonians.⁹⁹ It is not unlikely, therefore, that he hoped to apply it for the introduction of a formal cult, possibly empire-wide, at some time in the future. Meanwhile, the issue officially was the coordination of court ceremonial between Persians and Macedonians before Alexander as an absolute monarch, and although many of his subjects encouraged this affectation of Persian despotism, most others resented it. Alexander's court historian Callisthenes, a nephew of Aristotle, who celebrated Alexander as an Hellenic hero and son of Zeus,¹⁰⁰ but was no friend of barbarians and Oriental despotism, stood forth as their spokesman. At a rehearsal of the procedure he provocatively failed to perform, and Alexander, realizing that Callisthenes had the support of others, dropped the matter, for the time being. Callisthenes, of course, was doomed.

Alexander was not to be denied. Within a few years, with the crushing of the Macedonian mutiny at Opis in 324, he achieved absolute ascendancy over the Macedonians. Along with this grew his appetite for godhood. It had already been quickened by his successful rivalry with the reputed conquests of Dionysus and Heracles in India (Curt. 8.10.1).¹⁰¹ And when after his return to Mesopotamia

⁹⁸ So *int. al.*, Wilcken 1967: 168–70; Brunt 1976: 536–41; Lane Fox 1973: 322–3; Will 1986: 135–7; Hamilton 1973: 105.

⁹⁹ There probably were discussions of this issue at court at this time which are reflected in the later story of the mostly fictional debate on deification in Arrian (4.10.6–11.9) and Curtius (8.5.9–19). See e.g. Jacoby 1919: 1679; Brown 1949: 242; Brunt 1976: 538. Others consider the debate largely authentic. E.g. Edmunds 1971: 386–90; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 77–90; *Alexander and the East* 1996: 109–12; Badian 1981: 28–32, 48–54.

¹⁰⁰ Callisthenes, *FGrHist* 124 F14 a = Strabo 12.1.43; F 36 = Plut. *Alex.* 33. Cf. F 31.

¹⁰¹ Bosworth "Alexander, Euripides" 1996: 153 and *passim*; *Alexander and the East* 1996: 98, 117–32.

he was informed that the Arabs worshipped only two gods, the cosmic deity Uranus, and Dionysus for his Indian campaign, Alexander declared himself worthy to be worshipped by the Arabs as a third god, "since his achievements were as magnificent as those of Dionysus, given that he would conquer the Arabs too, and permit them, like the Indians, to be governed by their own laws" (Aristobulus, *FGrHist* 139 F 55 = Arr. 7.20.1). The comparison with Dionysus is entirely plausible.¹⁰² It not only confirms Alexander's avidity for divine status, but also points up the main basis on which he considered himself, as son of Zeus, entitled to it: his conquests in victorious rivalry with the greatest heroes of the past.

It is not unlikely that Alexander felt encouraged in his quest by his divine father at Siwah. Among the responses which the god communicated to him in 331 very possibly was a promise that he would be acknowledged as a god in his lifetime, most likely upon completion of his conquest of Asia.¹⁰³ We are not surprised, then, that in 324 Alexander sent word to the cities of Greece that he expected them to honor him as a god.¹⁰⁴ In response, early in 323 some, or possibly all, of the cities instituted cults for Alexander.¹⁰⁵ At some unknown date, or dates, at least some of the Greek cities of Asia Minor also founded cults for Alexander, most likely perhaps in conjunction, somehow, with the cults of the Greek homeland.¹⁰⁶

At Athens, and probably elsewhere, Alexander appears to have been deified as son of Zeus Ammon.¹⁰⁷ While a cult which acknowledged his relationship to the god no doubt accorded with Alexander's wishes, it may well be that more than one cult title was proposed, and perhaps adopted, in any one city. So we hear of a proposal at Athens to erect a statue of Alexander as 'Unconquered God' (*Anikētos Theos*) (Hyp. Dem. 32). It confirms that Alexander was known to asso-

¹⁰² Bosworth "Alexander, Euripides" 1996: 156 and n. 85. The fact that Alexander's information was faulty (Högemann 1985: 131, 138-43) is irrelevant here.

¹⁰³ Badian 1981: 66; Fredricksmeyer 1991: 206-14.

¹⁰⁴ Din. Dem. 94; Hyp. Dem. 31-2; Epit. 21; Timaeus, *FGrHist* 566 F 155 = Polyb. 12.12b.3; Plut. Mor. 219 E-F; 408 B; 842 D; Ael. VH 2.19; 5.12; Athen. 6.251 B; Val. Max. 7.2 ext. 13; D.L. 6.63.

¹⁰⁵ Habicht 1970: 28-36, 246-52; Fredricksmeyer 1979 [1980]: 3-7; Hamilton 1984: 11-2.

¹⁰⁶ For 334, see Habicht 1970: 17-25, 243, 245. For a later date, or dates, in Alexander's lifetime, see Badian 1981: 59-63; Walbank 1987: 374; Stewart 1993: 98-102.

¹⁰⁷ Fredricksmeyer 1979 [1980]: 1-7. Cf. Nock 1928: 28.

ciate his godhead with his military conquests, and that he saw in these the decisive justification for his worship.¹⁰⁸ In May 323, shortly before his death, sacred envoys from Greece (and Asia Minor?) presented themselves in Babylon to acknowledge Alexander as a god (Ar. 7.23.2).¹⁰⁹

In what sense, if at all, did Alexander consider himself a god? No doubt Alexander was aware that others in the Greek world had been honored as gods in their lifetime. We hear of such honors for Pythagoras in Italy, Empedocles in Sicily, Lysander on Samos, Clearchus at Heracleia on Pontus, and Alexander's own grandfather Amyntas in Pydna. There were also extravagant, some even perhaps divine, honors for Philip at Philippi, Amphipolis, Eresus, Ephesus, and Cynosarges at Athens.¹¹⁰ Most significant for Alexander was Philip's presentation of his own chryselephantine statue (normally reserved for gods) on par with those of the Twelve Gods on that momentous day at Aegae in 336.¹¹¹ No doubt by 324, Alexander had become convinced that he deserved to be recognized as a god more than any man before him.

Beyond this, it is possible that, encouraged by his flatterers, Alexander came to believe, even if not consistently, that unlike any of his predecessors he himself was divine not just in a metaphorical, but in an actual sense.¹¹² As we have noted, Olympias may have suggested that his father was a god, perhaps even Zeus, and Zeus Ammon at Siwah and Apollo at Didyma confirmed the idea. Alexander probably thought that all men before him in modern times who claimed a divine father were frauds, like the notorious Clearchus,

¹⁰⁸ The stories that Alexander was deified at Athens as *Triskaidekatos Theos* (Ael. *VH* 5.12) and as *Neos Dionysos* (D.L. 6.63) were probably made up after his death. Nock 1928: 21–3; Habicht 1970: 29, with n. 4.

¹⁰⁹ Fredricksmeyer 1979 [1980]: 3–7; Habicht 1970: 247–8; Walbank 1984: 90–1, with n. 98.

¹¹⁰ Habicht 1970: 3–16, 243–5; Fredricksmeyer 1979: 39–61; 1981: 145–56; Sanders 1991: 275–87; Hammond 1999: 109–10; Carney, "The Initiation of Cult" 2000: 22–3, 34 n. 7. Cf. Schumacher 1990: 436–8; Borza 1999: 67–8. *Contra*: Badian 1981: 33–44; 1996: 14–5.

¹¹¹ Note also Philip's commission after Chaeronea of a *tholos* building (normally reserved for gods) to house chryselephantine statues of himself, Alexander, Olympias, Amyntas, and Eurydice (Paus. 5.20.9–10). It is possible that Philip planned to found a dynastic cult. Fredricksmeyer 1979: 52–6. Cf. Borza 1992: 249–50; O'Brien 1992: 202, with n. 155. *Contra*: Schumacher 1990: 438–9.

¹¹² That Alexander was not consistent in this belief is likely and plausible. Plut. *Alex.* 28; *Mor.* 180 E = 341 B; Athen. 6.250 F–251 A; 251 C.

because they had not proven it by their deeds. But Alexander had proven his godhood by the superhuman magnitude of his achievements. Precedents above all were two other sons of Zeus by mortal women, Heracles and Dionysus. Heracles joined the gods after his death, and Dionysus was a god already on earth, but Alexander surpassed them both (e.g. Arr. 5.26.5). At the same time, all through his life Alexander endeavored to avoid hubris, which offends the gods, by his assiduous devotion to them.¹¹³ Even at the very end, no longer able to walk, he had himself carried out to perform his daily sacrifices (Arr. 7.25; Plut. *Alex.* 76). It is quite possible that Alexander came to expect that after his death on earth, he would live on as a god.

To us, Alexander's claim to divinity may seem like megalomania, even madness. But in the context of the traditions and beliefs of his own age, it could be seen by many, and it certainly was by Alexander himself, as reasonable and justified, by virtue of his divine birth, his superhuman *aretē* and achievements, and the approbation of his father Zeus.¹¹⁴ At the time of his death, many Greeks and Macedonians no doubt shared the opinion expressed by Justin (12.16.1) that Alexander was a man endowed with a greatness of spirit that went beyond the limits of human ability.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ E.g. Arr. 1.9.9; 6.27.4; 6.30.2; 7.4.2; 7.14.6; 7.19.1–2; 7.28.1; Diod. 17.113.3–4; 17.118.1; 18.4.4–5; Curt. 10.1.2–3; Plut. *Alex.* 11.12; 23.3; 34.1; *Mor.* 338 D; 342 F; 343 B, D; Polyb. 5.10.6–8. Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1415a. Mention should be made of a statement by Athenaeus, with reference to Alexander's last period, quoting Ehippus to the effect that sometimes Alexander appeared at banquets with the attributes of gods, as of Ammon, Heracles, Hermes, and even Artemis (*FGrHist* 126 F 5 = Athen. 12.537 E–F). This is extremely doubtful. Athenaeus is often careless in quoting his sources, and Ehippus is known for his hostility to Alexander. Cf. Pearson 1983: 63–5; Stewart 1991: 207, with n. 54. Even if it is true, its significance would be hard to assess. Alexander may have wished to suggest his affinity to the gods rather than somehow identify himself with them. Whatever the explanation, in face of all the evidence to the contrary, the story cannot be taken as evidence of Alexander's impiety. Cf. Wirth 1973: 123, 127.

¹¹⁴ As we should expect, there was a wide range of reaction to Alexander's deification, from cynicism and indifference, to acceptance, to strong disapproval. Consider, on the one hand, the shameless (and treasonable) deification by Harpalus of his two mistresses in the expectation that Alexander would not return from India to punish him (Berve 1926: II, 212 no. 231; 338 no. 676; Carney, "The Initiation of Cult" 2000: 30–1), and on the other, the belief that there remained an unbridgeable gulf between gods and mortals (e.g. Berve 1926: II, 50 no. 94 s.v. *Antipatros*).

¹¹⁵ I wish to thank Prof. Joseph Roisman for a close reading of the MS, and for several valuable suggestions. I also would like to thank Mrs. Sandy Adler, as always, for her expert typing of the MS. Any remaining faults are my own.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

HONOR IN ALEXANDER'S CAMPAIGN

Joseph Roisman

1. *Introduction*

The study of honor in Alexander's campaign is worth pursuing for several reasons. Honor is intimately connected with central issues of Alexander's conquest, including the power structure of his kingdom, the relationship between the king and his subjects, and their perceptions of each other. It was a resource that the king controlled and used to affect others' position, but issues of honor also problematized the king's status and rank or curbed his freedom of action and even authority. By examining their honor system we can evaluate the values and beliefs of Alexander and his contemporaries and how these values and beliefs influenced the relationship between conquerors and conquered. A study of honor, then, can contribute to our understanding of the social and cultural aspects of the campaign, aspects that do not always enjoy the benefit of a focused enquiry in Alexander studies.

An investigation of the role and significance of honor in Alexander's campaign, however, is bound to run into some difficulties.¹ To begin with, because the concept of ancient honor was very inclusive and deemed relevant to many aspects of social existence, it is stubbornly resistant to a single authoritative definition. Secondly, our sources for Alexander often use honor as an explanatory device for his and others' conduct, but since human motives are hard to decipher, though easy to attribute, the investigator has to wonder if an action under discussion was truly motivated by honor-related considerations

¹ My investigation relies heavily on the literary evidence and less on iconography. The reasons, besides this author's limitations as an art historian, are the greater wealth of information provided by the written sources and the problems of isolating claims of honor in non literary evidence from other messages. For Alexander's image in art see A. Stewart 1993 and in this volume.

or only presented as such in order to manipulate opinions about the actor. Thirdly, honor was often articulated verbally, but because our chief sources for the campaign were written long after Alexander's death, the prospects of their preserving authentic verbal manifestations of honor are not very promising. Moreover, the late sources could have projected onto Alexander's story their own values and opinions concerning what was honorable or dishonorable conduct. The following example illustrates some of the above problems. Q. Curtius Rufus reports that following the grumbling in the camp caused by the assassination of Parmenion, Alexander put dissatisfied soldiers and men against whom he had a grudge in one unit under Leonidas' command, and moved them into a separate camp as a mark of disgrace (*ignomia*). Consequently, these soldiers' eagerness to fight surpassed all other troops because they wished to erase their insult (Curt. 7.2.35–38). Diodorus (17.80.4) and Justin also (12.5.4–8) report about this unit, but neither of them mentions their disgraceful removal to a separate camp or their wish to excel in fighting to erase the stigma. According to their versions, Alexander isolated these troops in order to protect the Macedonians from their bad influence (Diodorus), or to eliminate them or exile them to colonies (Justin). The different interpretations of Alexander's disciplinary action suggest that none of these historians (or their sources) really knew what its purpose was, but that each sought to explain it in a different way, including Curtius, who used the common view of shame as a strong motivating power to account for it. It does not mean that his interpretation is wrong, but that it tells chiefly about his own attitudes, and only possibly on those of Alexander and his contemporaries.

Nevertheless, the difficulties of reconstructing the history of honor in Alexander's campaign are not insurmountable. Fortunately, the major meanings of honor and shame (see below) did not change substantially from the time of Alexander to the times of his historians, and when they did change, the changes can be detected. A cautious use of the sources as well as comparing and contrasting them can reduce the risk of anachronism and help in assessing the historical value of words or motives ascribed to characters in the campaign. Besides, there is value in observing how the later sources dealt with Alexander and his honor.

Space restrictions and the complexity of the concept of honor prohibit an exhaustive investigation of the subject and limit it to the duration of Alexander's reign. In this chapter I will focus on the

honor of Alexander and of men inferior to him in rank, and how honor articulated but also complicated relationships between them. Because the concept of honor is analyzed here by themes, I have found the diachronic approach more useful than the chronological one, though due consideration is given to changes and developments relevant to honor which took place during the campaign.

2. *Honor*

The literature about honor, and its opposite, shame, in ancient and modern times is so vast that it defies summation. The omnipresence of honor in social relationships and the lack of agreement on what honor really means or consists of have contributed to a multiplicity of studies and interpretations. Rather than enter the fray, I shall conveniently take as my point of departure the study of honor by the anthropologist Frank H. Stewart.² Stewart defines honor as a right to respect and certain worth. What entitles a person to honor are personal qualities, such as courage, truthfulness, moral character, and other characteristics, which are termed as inner honor. A person may be deserving of honor also because of rank, gender, power, office and wealth, attributes that comprise one's external honor. People may render a person honor based on her or his inner honor or outer honor or a combination of both. Stewart goes on to distinguish between two types of personal honor: horizontal and vertical honor. Horizontal honor is an egalitarian concept which sees honor as equally distributed among members of the honor group, that is, among those who follow the same standards, or code, of honor. A vertical honor is the right to special respect given to superiors chiefly by virtue of their external right to respect, namely, their rank, power, and so on.³ Stewart sees competitive honor, where honor can be diminished or increased, as a type of vertical honor, but as we shall see, there were contexts in which competitive and horizontal honors coexisted, though with evident uneasiness.

² F. Stewart 1994: esp. 9–71. The author surveys earlier studies of honor. I have not adopted all of his observations or conclusions. For ancient Greek honor and shame, see e.g., Adkins 1960; Dover 1974: 227–42; Cairns 1993.

³ F. Stewart 1994: 21–24, 54–61.

In what follows I shall deal first with Alexander's and his followers' right to respect due to their personal attributes, then with their external honor, and finally I will show how vertical and horizontal honors collided in the campaign.

3. *Alexander's Personality and Honor*

What was there in Alexander's personal qualities which gave him the right to respect? By the standards of his age a man, and especially a leader, could claim honor by virtue of his courage and valor, by virtue of his ambition to gain honor and fame, and through his personal conduct, especially his self-restraint. Except for last criterion, where Alexander's record was mixed at best, he scored high on all the other expectations.

In a reign based on war and military conquest, the chief military commander was expected both to excel in bravery and to display his personal courage. All sources, including those who do not eulogize the king, agree that Alexander showed supreme courage both on the battlefield and in his decision-making.⁴ Alexander's personal bravery was acknowledged early in the campaign. Diodorus says that following his first battle with the Persians at Granicus, Alexander was universally recognized as the winner in bravery (*andragathia*) and as chiefly responsible for the victory, with the Thessalian cavalry as runners up in courage (Diod. 17.21.4). There is no record of Alexander receiving similar accolades later in the campaign. In fact, following his next battles with the enemy, it was he who cited and rewarded warriors who excelled in fighting. The king apparently realized that it was more honorable and useful to validate, and serve as a judge of, other people's courage than to compete with them in bravery.⁵ Yet, even if his valor was not officially acknowledged, Alexander continued to display personal courage with regular frequency, and not just because of his inborn or acquired fearlessness. The expect-

⁴ E.g., Arr. 7.28.1; Curt. 10.5.26; Plut. *Alexander* (henceforth: Plut.) 58; Diod. 17.1.3-5; cf. Just. 12.15.10.

⁵ For recognizing his troops' courage, see, e.g., Diod. 17.46.6, 65.2-3, 89.3; Arr. 2.7.7, 10.2, 12.1, 23.4, 7, 27.6; 3.16.11; 7.5.4-6, 10.3; Curt. 5.2.1-5; and also Arr. 2.10.2; Plut. 24.2; Carney 1996: 25, and below. He even became the judge of the valor of the enemy, e.g., Plut. 58.3-4; Arr. 1.19.6; 5.18.4-19.3; Curt. 4.6.26 (with Baynham 1998: 158), and see his treatment of Porus: Baynham in this volume.

tation of him to show courage in battle and a contemporary tendency to regard courage in competitive terms and so to doubt or belittle it probably moved him to provide a steady supply of fresh proofs.⁶

At least once, however, the king's courage was not unanimously appreciated. In the course of his storming the Indian city of the Malli, Alexander found himself standing alone on the enemy's wall, but instead of waiting for assistance or retreating, he jumped in and paid with a life-threatening injury for his daring.⁷ We are told that following his injury, his friends were irritated with him for risking his life and acting like a soldier in stead of a general, and even his admiring historian Arrian uncharacteristically judged his action as reckless.⁸ Apparently, in the eyes of his elite, his feats of personal courage actually diminished his honor because they were irresponsible and put him on the same level as other courageous soldiers in the army. But the difference between honorable courage, and imprudent rashness was often in the eyes of beholders who did not have to agree on their interpretations of the act. Arrian himself cites Nearchus, who reports that Alexander, in reaction to his friends' criticism, approved of an old Boiotian soldier who opined that men were judged by actions which might bring them suffering (Arr. 6.13.4-5). His manly courage brought him honor because, even at worst, it was ambivalently judged.⁹

The king's courage was intimately linked to his quest of honor (*philotimia*) and fame (mostly, *doxa*). Such a quest was viewed as honorable and desirable, though there was a difference of opinion on how to fulfill it. In democratic Athens, *philotimia* stressed the cooperative ideals of public service and of sharing one's wealth with the

⁶ For competitive courage: Roisman (forthcoming). Alexander's courage was the subject of disparaging remarks attributed to Demosthenes (Aeschines 3.160) and Cleitus (Plut. 50.11; Curt. 8.1.41), and cf. Plut. 54.1. For Alexander disparaging Philip and Parmenion's courage: Curt. 8.1.23; Arr. 3.10.1-3; Curt. 4.13.3-10, Plut. 33.10-12; Hamilton 1969: 89; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 295-6, 310.

⁷ For the episode, see Arr. 6.9.5-11.8; Diod. 17.98.3-99.4; Plut. 63.2-14; Curt. 9.4.26-6.1; Just. 12.9.5-10.1. For a recent nuanced analysis of the incident, see Bosworth *Alexander and the East* 1996: 53-65. I do not discuss here Alexander's motives for risking his life. The point is that the sources dwell on the nature of his performance and much less on its causes.

⁸ Arr. 6.10.4; 13.4-5; cf. Curt. 9.5.1-2. 41.1.

⁹ Cf. O'Brein 1992: 176-7; Roisman (forthcoming), but also Bosworth *Alexander and the East* 1996: 59. Plut *Moral*. 331c claims that Alexander displayed his wounds as signs of *aretê* and *andragathia*, and cf. Arr. 7.10.1-2.

community, and so resembled Stewart's horizontal honor.¹⁰ Alexander's search for fame and honor, however, was primarily individualistic and aimed to augment his personal reputation and to display his superiority. Nevertheless, criticism of Alexander's ambition to attain personal fame is rare in his own time, while his historians reserve their disapproval only for his boastfulness or for his taking this ambition too far.¹¹

Alexander's quest for fame had as a foundation his lineage, which extended to Heracles on his father's side and Achilles on his mother's side. But this exterior right to respect was insufficient to justify his claim for unsurpassed honor. He sought to attain it by a display of personal excellence (*aretê*) in combat and by informing those Macedonians and Greeks, who comprised his honor group and who shared his appreciation for Homeric ideals, of his emulation of past heroes.¹² His Persian expedition would continue the chain of reprisals against Asians that went back as far as the Trojan war (if not earlier), only this time the leader would be the best of the Achaeans by undisputed merit. Thus, he publicly evoked memories of the Trojan war when, upon reaching Ilium, he honored the tombs of Greek and Trojan characters from the *Iliad* and took from the temple of Athena what were believed to have been Homeric weapons to use in his battles (Arr. 1.11.5–12.1; Diod. 17.17.3–18.1; Just. 11.5.12). The claims to Homeric renown continued beyond the Troad. We are told that he compared himself in India to Achilles battling a river (Diod. 17.97.3), and that in Opis in Mesopotamia he cut off his hair over the body of his friend Hephaestion in imitation of the grieving Achilles (Arr. 7.14.4–5). The historians of his expedition describe him fighting single handedly a Persian satrap at Granicus or seeking by himself to win over Darius at Issus, as if he were Homeric champion (e.g., Diod. 17.20.2–7, 33.5; Curt. 3.11.7). The idea of Alexander as a monomachist goes back to the primary sources. Aristobulus is alleged to have written about a duel between him and the Indian king Porus, and the so-called Porus medallion graphically

¹⁰ Athenian *philotimia*: Whitehead 1983; 1993; MacDowell 1990: 378–9.

¹¹ Cleitus' is said to have criticized Alexander for taking advantage of the Macedonians: Plut. 50.11, 51.8; Curt. 8.1.28–9; Arr. 4.8.5; cf. Plut. 54.1. Boasting and excessive ambition: e.g., Plut. 23.7; Arr. 7.2.2; Curt. 4.7.29–30; 9.2.8–12; cf. Arr. 6.13.4–5; Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 151–2.

¹² For Alexander's *aretê* and its reflections in art, see Stewart in this volume.

portrays Alexander attacking alone a mounted elephant, with the reverse showing Zeus accepting a crown from Nike.¹³

In addition to Alexander's Homeric quest for glory, he could legitimately expect his contemporaries to honor him because of the Greco-Macedonian agonistic ethos, which accorded honor and prestige to the victor in a contest.¹⁴ Alexander chose the most prestigious of contests, war, as his field of fame. Here, his claim to be invincible (mostly, *anikētos*), which was divinely confirmed or inspired, established his permanent status as a winner.¹⁵ Soon, he deemed neither foes nor friends worthy of competing with him, so he picked rivals from the past, persons whose glory and reputation were firmly established, and tried to surpass them. The list of his competitors included his own father, the ancient rulers Cyrus and Semiramis, and Greek heroic and divine figures such as Perseus, the Dioscuri, Heracles and Dionysus.¹⁶ The competition was in the form of meeting a challenge that his predecessors allegedly failed to overcome or by comparing the extent of his and the contestants' accomplishments. Winning in such cases entitled him to honor both by virtue of his triumph and through his demonstrating in the course of meeting a challenge the highly valued masculine attributes of perseverance, endurance, and toil. An unfavorable comparison between his competitors and him normally assured his victory.¹⁷

¹³ Aristobulus *FGrH* 139 T 4. Alexander reportedly disapproved of Aristobulus' description. "Porus medallion": Goukowski 1978–81 I: 63–5; Stewart 1993: 201–6; Lane Fox 1994; Bosworth *Alexander and the East* 1996: 6–8, 166–9; "A Tale" 2000: 26 with n. 10. For other Homeric and Achillean echoes or links: Aristobulus *FGrH* 139 F 47; Hegesias *FGrH* 142 F 5; Choerilus *FGrH* 153 F 10a; Plut. 5.8, 8.2, 26.7; 72.4; *Moral.* 327f, 331d; Strabo 13.1.26–7; Curt. 4.6.26–29; 8.4.26; Edmunds 1971: 372–4; Ameling 1988; O'Brein 1992 *passim*; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995 II: 64; Cohen 1995; Carney, "Artifice" 2000: 275–85.

¹⁴ Greek agonistic attitudes: Goulder 1965; Poliakoff 1987: 104–15. For Philip's and Alexander's competitive outlook on ruling and achievements: Plut. *Moral.* 178 e, 179d; *Alex.* 5.4; cf. Plut. 16.86.

¹⁵ Invincible Alexander, e.g., Plut. 3.9, 14.6–7; *Moral.* 782b; Diod. 17.51.3, 93.4; Curt. 4.7.27; 6.5.11; Hyperides *Against Demosthenes* 32; Pfister 1964: esp. 39–41; Hamilton 1969: 34–35; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 166–9; Whitehead 2000: 458–60.

¹⁶ Competing with Philip; Plut. 5.3–6; Diod. 16.86; Diod. 17.16; Curt. 8.1.23–26; cf. Arr. 4.8.6; Justin 12.6.2; Plut. 5.4; *Moral.* 179d; Worthington in this volume. Competing with Perseus and Heracles: Arr. 3.3.1–2; 4.28.1–4, 30.4; Diod. 17.84.2; *Metz Epit.* 46–7. Competing with Dionysus: Arr. 5.1.1–2.5; cf. 5.26.7–8; 6.28.1–2. The Dioscuri; Arr. 4.8.3–4. Semiramis and Cyrus: Nearchus *FGrH* 133 F 3b; Arr. 6.24.2; Strabo 15.2.5–7. Arr. 7.1.4 thinks that in the absence of rivals, Alexander competed with himself. For more sources and discussion: Brunt 1976–83 I: 464–6; II: 435–42; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 58, 180–1, 199–201.

¹⁷ For unfavorable comparisons, see the previous note. There were enough people

Alexander's quest for military glory and an unblemished winning record was at times triggered and at times replaced by his wish to defend his personal honor. Enemies who taunted and insulted him, mostly from an ostensibly safe distance or shelter, exposed the retaliatory aspect of his pursuit of honor when he put them to the sword, as happened to the peoples of Thebes, Tyre, the inhabitants of hard-to-approach rocks in Central Asia, and the Scythians across the Tanais River.¹⁸ Surely, the enemies' insults were not exclusively responsible for his decision to engage them in battle, but we should not discount his wish to defend his honor and prestige as a motive. Greek contemporaries and our Hellenocentric sources disapproved of his harsh treatment of Thebes, but significantly, not one of them remarks on the immense cost in human lives that his troops and enemies paid elsewhere for his wish to protect his honor and his commitment to remain invincible. His military success and its resultant honor and prestige overshadowed this modern outlook on his campaign.

What some of the sources found amiss in Alexander's personality was his going to excess. Moderation or self-control, mostly *sôphrosunê*, was a desirable Greek virtue, which brought respect to its practitioners.¹⁹ Since Alexander and the Macedonian elite were highly Hellenized, and given the importance of this notion in the moral teaching of Alexander's tutor, Aristotle, the king and his close associates were surely aware of the significance of this moral concept. What follows is an examination of how self-control or its absence affected Alexander's right to respect.

In Greek popular morality, self-restraint often meant the ability to control bodily appetites, desires and emotions. Alexander's career shows him both conforming to and violating this expectation. A contemporary would have put on the positive column of Alexander's moral balance sheet his sexual self-restraint.²⁰ Alexander's historians

in court, often called flatterers, to satisfy the king's wish for praise and victory: Tarn 1948 II: 55–62; Pearson 1960: 78. Alexander's hardihood: e.g., Arr. 7.22–26, 28.1; Curt. 8.4.14; cf. Plut. 40.2.

¹⁸ Thebes: Diod. 17.9.5–6; Plut. 11.7–8. Tyre: Arr. 2.16.8; cf. Diod. 17.42.6. Rocks: Arr. 4.18.6, 21.3–6; Curt 7.11.1–6. Scythians; Arr. 4.4.2–9, and cf. Plut. 42.4.

¹⁹ Esp. Pearson 1962: Index, s.v. "moderation," "sôphrosyne"; North 1966; Dover 1974: 66–69, 116. For the related concept of *enkrateia* and Alexander: Athen. 603 b; Due 1994: 55–8. Alexander's excess was a favorite philosophical topic: Stoneman in this volume.

²⁰ One tradition describes him as uninterested in sex; Athen. 434 f–453 a; cf. Plut.

unanimously praise this virtue any time they deal with his honorable treatment of the captive women of the royal Persian family, some of whom were noted for their beauty.²¹ Alexander showed his disapproval of yielding to passion on other occasions as well. We are told that that he angrily rejected an offer to get him handsome male slaves, that he expressed an admiration for a Theban woman who killed a commander in his service who had robbed and raped her, and that he instructed Parmenion to punish two adulterers.²² It is likely that Alexander's actions in these and similar cases were not solely motivated by his moral convictions, but influenced as well by political considerations, his wish to enforce discipline, or his desire to stop harmful gossip. But regardless of his motives, his conduct showed, or could be used to show, that he was deserving of honor through his control of his desire, his refraining from committing hubris against the weak, and his expectation that his troops behave likewise.

Besides sex, Alexander is said to have mastered other bodily appetites and needs such as sleep, thirst, and craving for food, which together set him apart from ordinary men and justified his claim to superior status and honor.²³ Yet his record of self-restrained conduct was far from perfect because he could not control his wine consumption or temper. It is true that as far as heavy drinking was concerned,

Moral. 1099 c–d. For Alexander's sexuality see Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 47, and most recently Carney *Women* 2000: 96–100, 285–6, nn. 41–2, and her discussion in this volume; cf. Green 1991: 153. I am not concerned here with the king's practices, but with how they were perceived or presented.

²¹ Arr. 4.19.5–6, 20.2–3; 7.28.2–3; Plut. 21; 30.10–11; *Moral.* 338 d; Curt. 3.12.21–22; Diod. 17.38.3–7; Just. 11.12.6–7; cf. Curt. 4.10.23–24, 10.5.33; Carney "*Women*" 2000: 93–100.

²² Rejecting slaves: Plut. 22.1–3; *Moral.* 333a. Theban woman: Aristobulus *FGH* 139 F 2; Plut. 12; *Moral.* 259 d–260; Hamilton 1969: 31–2. Punishing adulterers: Plut. 22.4–5; cf. *Moral.* 180f. Relevant here are the stories about his embracing and kissing Bagoas in public, but only under duress (Plut. 67.8; Hamilton 1969: 186); his refusal to kiss a boy or to sleep with a married woman (Athen. 603 c; Plut. *Moral.* 179 e); his resisting the attraction of a beautiful female musician (Plut. *Moral.* 180 f); and a tale in Arrian (which the historian doubts) that when a Persian governor sent Alexander women dressed like Amazons, the king sent them away because he was concerned that his soldiers would abuse them: Arr. 7.13.2–6. But see his troops' treatment of captive women: Diod. 17.35.4–36.1.

²³ Self-control regarding food: Plut. 22.6, 23.6–10; cf. *Moral.* 65 f; Polyaeus 4.3.32. Thirst: Arr. 6.26.1–3; Curt. 7.5.10–12; Plut. 42.5–10; Frontinus *Strategmata* 1.7.7; Polyaeus 4.3.25. Sleep: Plut. 22.6 (drunken sleep excepted: Arr. 4.14.2; Curt. 8.6.27); and general restraint: Plut. *Moral.* 328 a, 332 c. Plutarch commends the king's self-restraint already as a boy: Plut. 4.8; cf. Just. 11.1.9.

the Greeks and the Macedonians differed from each other in attitude, with the former seeing it as shameful, while the latter were probably more tolerant, if not boasting of massive wine consumption.²⁴ However, no source suggests that Alexander and his fellow countrymen justified losing control because of wine. Hence, we may assume that contemporaries disapproved, as did the some later ancient authors, of incidents involving the king's lack of restraint due to alcohol. Some sources criticized the conduct of the intoxicated Alexander and his companions who set Xerxes' palace in Persepolis on fire.²⁵ More incriminating in their, and surely contemporaries' eyes, was Alexander's killing of the distinguished Macedonian Cleitus under the influence of wine, anger, fear, and sensitivity about his honor (see below). It was an incident which cast a heavy shadow on any claim the king might have had to personal honor through *sôphrosunê*. Luckily for him, his responsibility for the disgraceful affair could have been somewhat mitigated by the ancients' recognition that wine and anger induced people to lose their self-control.²⁶

There was no ambivalence, however, in the minds of many of Alexander's historians that the longer the campaign lasted, the more immoderate he became. They tie his lack of restraint to his adoption of Persian customs and ways, a causal link supported by the Greeks' perception of the barbarians, and especially of the Persian king and his elite, as men given to opulence, excess and improper sensuality.²⁷ Alexander's 'barbarization,' therefore, offset much of his record as a man in control of his appetites and sense of proportion,

²⁴ Alexander's inability to control his drinking: Arr. 4.8.2–3, 9.1; Curt. 5.7.1; (but see Plut. 23.1.6–7); Hamilton 1969: 58–59; O'Brein 1992: esp. 101–228, and more sympathetically: Hammond 1980: 297–9. Attitudes toward drinking in Greece and Macedonia: Younger 1966: 109–11; O'Brein 1992: esp. 6–8; Borza 1995: 161–164; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 53–4.

²⁵ Plut. 38; Curt. 5.7 (who states that even the Macedonians were ashamed of the act); Diod. 17.72; cf. Strabo 15.3.6; Athen. 576 d–e.

²⁶ The most important sources for the murder of Cleitus are: Arr. 4.8–9; Plut. 50.1–52.2; Curt. 8. 1.20–2.12; Just. 12.6. See *infra*. Alexander's rage: Arr. 4.9.1, 7.29.1; Curt. 3.12.19. Greek attitudes toward anger: Allen (2000) *Index* "anger", and esp. 50–65, 134–5. Arrian, who tries to make Alexander the victim in the Cleitus' affair, and Curtius, who puts the blame squarely on Alexander's shoulders, show the range of possible interpretations of the incident: Arr. 8.1–9.4 with Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 65; Curt. 8.1.20–52.

²⁷ E.g., Xen. *Cyropaedia* 8.8.9–12, 15–18; Isocrates 4.149–59; Aristotle *Politics* 1252 b; Plut. 40.2; Arr. 2.7.4; Green 1991: 59–60; Hall 1989. Exceptional Persians (Flower 2000: 123) proved the rule.

and allowed people to claim that he progressively lost his grip over them. Arrian notes that while in Asia he began to drink like a barbarian, and argues that his mutilation of Bessus, the claimant to the Persian throne, was barbaric and excessive (Arr. 4.7.4, 8.2–3). Diodorus, Curtius and Justin, all state that he imitated the Persians' luxurious and self-indulgent life-style and their unbecoming pomp and ceremonies (Diod. 17.77.4–7; Curt. 6.6.1–11; Just. 12.3.8–12).²⁸ Even his sexual self-restraint appeared to have fallen victim to his long stay in the Persian land. Curtius sees his marriage to Roxane, a woman from a captive people, whom he met in a banquet, as shameful and due to his passion for her, and describes the bad consequences of his erotic desire for the Persian eunuch Bagoas. Justin detects desire behind his inheriting from Darius 365 royal concubines.²⁹ Of course, the above observations on Alexander's desire tell primarily about the men who made them because authors who insisted on the propriety of Alexander's conduct could still interpret his actions favorably. Thus, both Plutarch and Arrian denied that Alexander let passion influenced his decision to marry Roxane, and claim that the marriage was politically motivated or done legally, that is, that he treated her honorably and unhubristically (Arr. 4.19.5–6; Plut. 47.7–8, though see *Moral.* 332d; 338d). Their defense of the king, however, exposed a need to counter an unflattering opinion of his declining to be self-possessed.

In sum, some of Alexander's personal attributes gave him the right to respect from his honor group but others undermined it. In general, however, a claim for honor on the basis of character was difficult to maintain or secure, because it empowered the observers to decide if Alexander had a right to virtue. It was seemingly easier and less complicated to demand honor on the basis of external qualities such as position and rank.

²⁸ For the possibility that they used the same source: Hammond 1983: 136; Baynham 1998: 171. Plut. 40.1–3, however, makes Alexander censuring others' luxurious life-style.

²⁹ Passion for Roxane: Curt. 8.4.22–30; cf. Diod. 17 *Index*; and less critical: Arr. 4.19.5; Plut. 47.4. For Bagoas: Curt. 8.10.22–38; cf. Athen. 603 a–b. Royal Concubines: Just. 12.3.10–12; Curt. 6.6.8. For the corrupting influence of women quarters on men: Davidson 1997: 166. For the effects of Alexander's 'orientalism' on his self-control, see also Curt. 3.12.20; Arr. 7.29.1.

4. *Alexander's Official Honors*

Alexander was entitled to honor from the Macedonians by virtue of his role as a king and his Argead dynastic lineage (Hammond 1989 16–17). It is unclear if the Macedonian kings, as Curtius argues, were venerated by their countrymen, but the king's religious authority and duties certainly helped in augmenting his honor and prestige.³⁰

Alexander's unique honor and status, however, were primarily displayed through the emblems of royalty. His regalia included, besides the royal dress, a throne, a scepter, royal arms, and a signet ring (or two).³¹ It was his royal attire that caught the attention of the sources because Alexander changed it following his conquest of Asia in a way that elicited criticism of him. In his search to legitimize his rule over the Persians,³² Alexander adopted articles of the royal Persian dress which included a purple robe, a tunic with a white stripe, and a girdle. He also added the Persian purple and white diadem to his Macedonian hat (*kausia*). His choice of Persian garments was selective. He declined to wear the royal baggy trousers, the long sleeved purple cloak (*kandus*), or the conical hat (*tiara* or *kitaris* [alt. *kidaris*]) because both Greeks and Macedonians deemed them either too barbaric or deserving of ridicule.³³ His attempt at a compromise shows that, even if he had the power to decide what his royal insignia would be, he had to yield to considerations of public image and political sensitivities in his choice of symbols of his

³⁰ Curt. 3.16, 7.8.4; 10.7.15. The kings' religious status: Greenwalt 1986; Hammond 1989: 21–2, 67. For questions regarding the king's title: Errington 1974; Badian 1996: 11–12. Alexander's appellation "the Great" is probably not contemporary: Pfister 1964: 48–50; Worthington p. 69 note 2 in this volume.

³¹ Curt. 10.6.4; Diod. 18.60.6. Curtius' claim (6.6.6), that Alexander used two rings, one for Macedonia and one for Asia, is disputed by Hammond "Did Alexander" 1995. For the arms he took from Troy: Diod. 17.18.1.

³² In this paper I follow the traditional view that Alexander claimed for himself the position of the Persian king. Fredrickmeyer 2000 argues, however, that Alexander wished to be recognized as the king of Asia, a more extensive claim which superseded and even sought to deny the continuation of the Persian rule. As the author indicates (2000: 165–6), there is a room for compromise between these views.

³³ Alexander's dress (including criticism of it): Plut. 45.45.1–3, 51.5; Eratosthenes *FGH* 241 F 30; Arr. 4.7.4, 9.9; Curt. 6.6.4; Diod. 17.77.4–7; Just. 12.3.8–10; Duris *FGH* 76 F 14; Ehippus *FGH* 126 F 5 (whose report on Alexander donning various deities' articles of dress could have been inspired by his hostility toward the king). For a discussion and more references and bibliography, see Ritter 1965: 31–62; Atkinson 1994: 202–3; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 49–50, and Fredrickmeyer 1997, who denies the diadem its Persian origin, and see his 2000: 151–161.

royal status. The power of his subjects to curtail his wish to increase his honor by adding to it Asian expressions of respect was even more pronounced in the attempt to introduce *proskunesis* into the court.

I shall not deal here with this ritual and the related question of Alexander's divine aspirations in detail because they are discussed elsewhere in this volume.³⁴ Briefly, *proskunesis* was an eastern gesture made by an inferior in acknowledgement of the higher status and honor of his superior or ruler. It consisted of signaling a kiss by bringing the hand into the mouth, but it could also include, though not always, prostrating oneself before the higher up. For the Greeks both acts were associated with worshipping gods. They regarded performing them to humans, and particularly the prostration, as marks of barbaric servitude and a negation of one's liberty, if not as sacrilegious acts. Alexander's motives in trying to extend the custom to non-Asians cannot be securely ascertained, but he was surely aware of the Greek interpretation of the act as servile on the part of the performer or as suggestive of divine status for the recipient. It may be assumed, then, that he hoped both to make this expression of respect and recognition of superiority uniform among his subjects as well as to benefit from the perception that it elevated him to a godly or semi-divine position. It is also likely that his exchange of friendly kisses with guests who performed the ritual at a banquet was aimed to mitigate their self-abasement (Plut. 54.4–6, and below). But in spite of his tactful approach, and the presence of men in court who were willing to support his initiative, the experiment failed. His ambition was deemed offensive to the gods and demeaning of his Greco-Macedonian subjects. When they indicated their dissatisfaction by supporting Callisthenes, who opposed Alexander's experimentation, Alexander decided not to force the issue so as not to increase opposition to him and resentment of his *philotimia*.³⁵

³⁴ See Fredricksmeyer for sources and bibliography as well as the bibliography in Worthington 1992: 263 and Whitehead 2000: 455–6. The following interpretation of the ritual takes into account the interpretations of esp. Balsdon 1950: 376–7; Brunt 1976 I: 538–41; Badian 1981: 52–3; 1985: 457–60; 1996: 21–2; Green 1991: 372–6; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 68–90.

³⁵ Curt. 8.5.20; Arr. 4.12.1; cf. Arr. 4.11.1; Plut. 54.3 and see below. Some Macedonians showed their feeling by laughing at prostrating Asians. The sources ascribe the ridicule of the *proskunesis* to different Macedonians, but the fact that the story was recycled does not make it incredible: Plut. 74.2–3 (Cassander); Arr. 4.12.2; (Leonnatus); Curt. 8.5.22–6.1 (Polyperchon).

The hostile reaction to Alexander's policy deserves further clarification. Both Macedonians and Greeks held the conquered population in low esteem as barbarians, who were identified long before Alexander with servile attributes and unmanliness.³⁶ Alexander's campaign strengthened these stereotypes by placing the Asians in the dishonorable categories of the defeated and the unfree. In the conquerors' minds, they were the only ones who deserved honor because they had won the contest of war and because as masters of the land they were truly free as opposed to those whom they vanquished. A winning record against Asian troops and acts of pillaging and destruction confirmed these sentiments.

Such attitudes made Alexander's adoption of Persian customs and symbols in his court as well as his divine aspirations—the two issues are often combined in protests against him—and, later, his incorporation of Asian troops into the army, controversial. Many Macedonians and Greeks were both apprehensive of, and offended by, his policy, because they were concerned about losing their preferred position in the camp and empire, and insulted by what they perceived as his changing the normative order of conquest that clearly distinguished between victor and vanquished in terms of power and honor and demoted them to the Asians' status.

Complaints about Alexander's Asian practices as insulting to his men and threatening their freedom are attributed by the sources to Cleitus when he quarreled with Alexander, to Callisthenes in the debate over the introduction of the *proskunesis*, to Hermolaus, who conspired against him, and to the protesting soldiers at Opis.³⁷ Curtius makes Alexander aware of the need to justify his changing the status of the conquered on the occasions of his marriage to Roxane, in his speech in Hermolaus' trial, and in his speech to the Asian recruits in Susa (Curt. 8.4.25–30; 8.8.10–13; 10.3.11–13). The view

³⁶ See note 26 above; cf. Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 204–5; 1995 II: 54. Attributions of disdainful attitudes toward barbarians and conquered to Philip and Alexander: Plut. 10.3; 28.1, 6; 40.3; cf. *Moral.* 339b; Arr. 2.7.4–5. Typically, the Greek sources on Alexander provide little or no information about the conquered's self-esteem. For Alexander relationship with and treatment of the Persian upper class, see Brosius in this volume.

³⁷ Cleitus: Plut. 51.2, 5; cf. Arr. 4.8.4. Callisthenes: Arr. 4.11.6–9; Curt. 8.5.19–20. Hermolaus: Arr. 4.14.2; Curt. 8.7.1, 11–15. Dissatisfied soldiers: 7.6.2–5, 7.8.2 (reported not in the form of a speech or a statement). In Curtius, the commander Hegelochus defines Alexander's divine claims as insulting: Curt. 6.11.24. See also Arr. 4.11.1, 12.1, 14.2; Plut. 54.3; Curt. 8.5.20.

that elevating the conquered in honor and status was an insult to the Macedonians survived Alexander. When it was proposed to make his child from Roxane an heir to his vacant throne, Ptolemy in one version, and Meleager in another, successfully opposed it on the grounds that the mother was a captive and that it was improper for the conquerors to be ruled by the vanquished (Curt. 10.9.9–16; Just. 13.2.9). We cannot ascertain the authenticity of words put by later historians into the mouth of Alexander or others, but it can be safely assumed that the resentment toward what was seen as blurring the lines between conquered and conqueror was authentic and that it was used in people's rhetoric against the king or anyone else.

Nevertheless, Alexander did not give up, especially not on his quest for divine honors and recognition, which started at least after his visit to Ammon's temple at Siwa and gathered momentum up to the end of his reign. Contemporary artistic renditions of him present him donning Ammon's horns or wielding Zeus' thunderbolt.³⁸ According to Aristobolus, he planned to conquer Arabia and become the Arabs' third god in addition to Uranos and Dionysus.³⁹ In Greece, he surely endorsed, and perhaps pushed for, local initiatives to deify him.⁴⁰ The respects paid by the Greeks to Alexander as a god, son of god, or a ruler, show that not every individual or community saw his quest for the superhuman honor as a serious threat to their own autonomy, prestige and honor, or that they ranked considerations of self-interest and an expectation for reward above pride. Generally it can be said that the extent to which people honored, tolerated or disputed his claim to divine parenthood or status depended on how it affected their own fortunes.⁴¹

³⁸ Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 287; Price 1991: 33–4; and other renditions in Moreno 1993. For the possibility that his coinage portrayed him as Heracles; Price *ibid.*; Bosworth *Alexander and the East* 1996: 176, but see Stewart 1993: 158–61.

³⁹ Aristobolus *FGrH* 139 F 56; Arrian's attempt (7.20.1–2) to give Alexander additional 'rational' and less hubristic motives does not make Aristobolus' version less credible: Högemann 1985: 120–41; Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 169.

⁴⁰ For the controversy about the historicity of Alexander's decree requesting deification, see Badian 1981: 54–9; Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 288–9; Worthington 1992: 264. The main sources for his divine honors in Athens are Dinarchus 1.12, 94; Hyperides *Against Demosthenes* 31; Polybius 12.12b.3; Athen. 251b; Aelian *VH* 5.12; Valerius Maximus 7.2 ext. 13, and see Fredricksmeyer in this volume and the next note.

⁴¹ As in the case of the *proskunesis*, some derided Alexander's divine sonship or claims: Diod. 17.108.3; Arr. 7.8.3; Plut. 50.11; cf. Arr. 4.10.2; and in Greece, see,

So far we have discussed Alexander's inner honor and his external and vertical honor, and how the latter problematized at times the honor of his subordinates. The next section deals with less controversial honors, namely those which Alexander distributed to others and which helped him to regulate his relationship with individuals and groups in his kingdom.

5. *Alexander's Control over Honors*

As king and chief commander, Alexander had the power to influence and manipulate his subordinates' honor. His control over their status and right to respect ranged from his appointing men to military, administrative and court positions to his allowing them to be close to his person or serve him. We shall discuss each of these resources in that order.

5i. *Military Rank*

Alexander's inheritance from his father included a victorious army and veteran generals whom he largely left in commanding posts for military and political reasons.⁴² The most prominent of them, men like Antipater, Cleitus ("the Black"), and Parmenion and his sons, came from aristocratic families or were employed by the royal family in different capacities (Heckel 1992: 3–49). Alexander confirmed the status of some members of the old elite, but with the advance of the campaign into Asia, past record or influence at home became less significant than Alexander's ability to empower men with rank and authority. Consistently, friends and coevals, men like Hephaestion, Perdikkas or Ptolemy, were picked for senior military posts which became vacant following the elimination or death of veteran generals. Under normal circumstances, these posts consisted of commands over the *taxeis* of the phalanx and the largely more prestigious hipparchies of the cavalry (cf. Curt. 7.1.34). The infantry and cavalry

e.g., Plut. *Moral.* 187 e, 842 d; Diogenes Laertius 6.8, 63; Aelian *VH* 2.19, 5.12, 11.19; Plut. *Moral.* 219 e; cf. Arr. 7.23.2. For more references and discussion see Fredricksmeyer in this volume, the previous note, as well as Balsdon 1950: 199–200; Green 1991: 463–4, 562, n. 74.

⁴² For the following see Badian 1960; Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 273–7; Errington 1990: 238–48; and generally, Heckel 1992 and in this volume.

contingents, each including special elite units in the military and social sense of the word, were named after their commanders (Arr. 7.14.9), and thus partook in the prestige of their generals and vice versa. Yet Alexander also showed his appreciation, trust and honor by giving a man a special command or title. Hephaestion, for example, who got half of the companion cavalry after Philotas' execution, commanded one of the five parts of the army in Bactria in 328, half of the infantry forces when Alexander sailed down the Indus in 326, and died in 324 as the king's chiliarch or second in rank.⁴³

The king's control over rank and the honor associated with it was extended to low ranking officers. Following the arrival of large reinforcements to Babylonia in 331, Alexander made changes in the structure of the cavalry forces as well as the infantry contingents of the *hupaspistai*.⁴⁴ The sources differ in their reports on the nature of his reforms, but all agree that he split these contingents into smaller units and appointed as their commanders men who were distinguished for their military excellence (*aretê*). The sources also seem to approve of this criterion for the selection of these new officers, and Curtius especially presents the event as a competition on merit among candidates for commands in the presence of a large audience and with judges awarding eight prizes in a ranking order (Curt. 5.2.2–5). Yet even if the verdicts were pronounced by judges, it was Alexander who authorized this form of selection. Besides, Diodorus and Arrian suggest, and more reasonably in my opinion, that the final decision was his (Diod. 17.65.2–3; Arr. 3.16.11). Alexander's motives for the reorganization might not have been purely military. Diodorus' says that by giving the new appointees greater honor or rank (*axioma*), he enhanced their affection for him (Diod. 17.65.3). Indeed, it was suggested that Alexander's reforms, which introduced a second tier of

⁴³ For Hephaestion's career, see conveniently: Berve II 169–175, no. 357; Heckel 1992: 65–90. For Alexander, his friends and age-mates and the distribution of military posts, see Heckel in this volume. Nearchus' protest, (it's authenticity notwithstanding), against Alexander's intention to replace him in command of the navy, and, thus, transfer fame to another, points to the honor and prestige that could be attained through independent commands: Arr. *Ind.* 36.4–5. For doubts concerning Nearchus' report: Badian 1975: 160–65

⁴⁴ The nature of the reforms is much debated due to their different accounts in the sources. See Arr. 3.16.11; Diod. 17.65.3–4; Curt. 5.2.2–6; Milns 1971: 190–92; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 148–9, 320–1; *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 286; 1995 II: 194–6; Atkinson 1987: 413–35; 1994 II: 56–62.

command based on military distinction rather than ethnic affiliation with the troops, were meant to weaken the power of the cavalry and infantry generals over their troops (Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 268). Whatever Alexander's motives were, the principle of meritocracy, which had always enjoyed a wide appeal, increased both the popularity of the king as well as dependence on him as the arbiter of individual excellence, honor and prestige.

Even so, the importance of military excellence in Alexander's promotional considerations should not be overrated. The fact that the men who were appointed to the new commands left no indelible mark on the history of the campaign indicates that higher posts were reserved for the elite and that advancement through pure merit reached its limit at the lower echelons of the command structure. This is born out by the career of the Macedonian Peucestas.⁴⁵ Peucestas shielded Alexander, who was almost fatally wounded in the Indian town of the Malli, and was later rewarded for his heroism by a crown, an exceptional inclusion into the circle of the king's Royal Bodyguards, and the important satrapy of Persis. But Peucestas was not an ordinary soldier, as attested by his roles before the Malli episode. He commanded a ship in Alexander's fleet in India, which indicated his high economic and social status (Arr. *Ind.* 18.6). He was also honored, at least prior to Alexander's injury, with carrying the sacred shield which Alexander had taken from Troy (Arr. 6.9.3, 10.2).⁴⁶ Peucestas' promotion, then, was remarkable not because of his background but because of its sudden and dramatic nature. It illustrates the king's power to decide who deserved honor and rank, in what form, and for reasons which were clearly personal.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ For Peucestas and his rank: Berve 1928 II: 318, no. 634; Heckel 1992: 263–4.

⁴⁶ Badian 1996: 17 disputes the existence of the sacred shield, but I see no reason for any source to accord Peucestas this honor.

⁴⁷ Plutarch 70.4–7 tells about the Macedonian Antigenes, who tried to cheat Alexander out of money, and was consequently punished by expulsion from the court and a dishonorable discharge from command. To prevent the humiliated Antigenes from committing suicide, Alexander forgave him and even allowed him to keep his money. The story well illustrates Alexander's power to give and take away honor and rank, but there are problems related to the identity of the peculator: Plut. *Moral.* 339 c; Hamilton 1969: 196; Heckel 1992: 308–9, n. 2; Atkinson 1994 II: 59–60.

5iii. *The King's Person: Honor and Proximity*

Arrian's report on the honoring of Peucestas cites as his source Aristobulus, who said that Alexander included Peucestas among his bodyguards because he wanted him to experience this honor and trust before he assumed the satrapy of Persis (Arr. 6.28.3). Earlier in his narrative, Arrian reports that before Alexander, son of Aeropus, was caught conspiring against his royal namesake, he was held in honor around Alexander and was given command first in Thrace and later over the Thessalian cavalry (Arr. 1.25.2; cf. 2.15.4). What the two reports have in common is the link between close proximity to the king's body and significant honor and rank. Alexander used this spatial aspect of his royal person to accord honor and prestige to some people and to insult others.

The people closest to the king's person were his Royal Bodyguards (*sômatophulakes*).⁴⁸ In the camp and the army, different individuals and groups were called or functioned as bodyguards, but the Royal Bodyguards were a much more exclusive group whose number was limited to seven until Peucestas joined the group as an eighth member. As the king's confidants they served the king in more than one capacity, but they never relinquished their duty to watch over him, especially when he was asleep or ill (Curt. 8.6.22; 9.6.4; Plut. 76.6; Arr. 7.25.6). Early in the campaign, a Bodyguard lost his dignifying title when Alexander sent him to rule over a province or gave him a permanent senior command, but later the same person could be both a Bodyguard and a general, a combination which augmented his special status in court.

One of the chief marks of the Royal Bodyguards' position was their easy access to Alexander. It is true that the Macedonian kings lived among their people, and that the pressing military needs of Alexander's campaign were not conducive to practicing remoteness from his subjects (cf. Arr. 7.9.9). Yet Alexander's door was not an open one, and his adoption of Persian court etiquette made the approach to him in court even harder. According to Plutarch, the angry Cleitus charged Alexander that the Macedonians were being beaten by Median rods and had to supplicate Persians to get near

⁴⁸ For the institution see: Berve 1926 I: 25–30; Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 274–5; Heckel 1978: 224–8; 1992: 257–9, and in this volume. See 5.iii for the Royal Boys, who comprised another group of intimates.

their king (Plut. 51.2). The commander perhaps overstated the plight of the Macedonians, but his remark is corroborated by two different incidents. According to Curtius' account, when Cebalinus, a brother of Dimnus' confidant and lover, wished to reveal Dimnus' plot against the king, he was prohibited from entering the royal tent because he was not the king's intimate or a member of his first cohort of friends (Curt. 6.7.17; cf. Diod. 17.79.4). Similarly, when the informers of Hermolaus' later plot against the king wished to divulge it, they had to approach first his bodyguards, Ptolemy and Leonnatus, who guarded his bedroom (Curt. 8.6.22). Thus, approaching the king and sharing his private space were subjected not only to concerns about his personal safety, but also signified royal friendship, trust and honor as well as distinguishing one Macedonian from another.⁴⁹ Alexander's power to affect the honor of his confidants is shown also in his ability to change the composition of the Royal Bodyguards as he saw fit.

A larger and less exclusive circle of intimates were the king's friends, called companions (*hetairoi*), friends (*philoï*) and other terms denoting proximity to the king. They included Macedonian nobles, non Macedonian immigrants, and in fact, whoever the king wished to consult with or bestow his favors and friendship upon.⁵⁰ The favors came in the form of land grants, assorted gifts, and the right to share the king's company in his hunts, banquets, and other formal and informal occasions. Needless to say, some friends were closer to the king and enjoyed greater prestige than others. Generally, Macedonian noblemen, who might have held the title of *hetairoi* on an exclusive basis under Alexander's ancestors, ranked higher than others, though Alexander's right to choose, embrace or shun friends was never in doubt. Indeed, if he was the one responsible for calling the Macedonian phalanx "foot Companions" (*pezhetairoi*), it is possible that he extended the concept of intimacy with him in order to both

⁴⁹ Athen. 539f and Aelian *VH* 9.3 describes people's fear of Alexander, which made them reluctant to approach him. I do not discuss here customs which allowed Macedonians to approach the king to seek justice or favor, for which see Adams 1986. For the mixing of private and public spheres in court and the significance of being close to the king: Völcker-Janssen 1993: 71-9, and for the Successors' claim to legitimacy on the basis of their intimacy with Alexander: 20-4.

⁵⁰ For the king, his friends and their functions, see Stagakis 1970; Griffith in *HM* 2: 158-60; Borza 1990: 241-4; Völcker-Janssen 1993: esp. 32-49; cf. Edson 1970. See the following section for the "Royal Boys" and their closeness to the king.

honor the entire Macedonian infantry and to create a symbolic friendship with them.⁵¹

A few more examples will suffice to illustrate Alexander's use of intimacy with, or distance from, his person to affect the honor of friends and others. The first one has to do with his distribution of royal kisses. It appears that Alexander used this gesture in an attempt to play on the ambivalence created by its different interpretations by Iranians and non Iranians. Among the Persians, kissing was practiced among kin or served as a sign of respect. The Persian king, for example, honored men of merit with a kiss. For the Greeks, and presumably for the Macedonians, non erotic kissing among men expressed one's strong affections to another, a joy at his presence, and his close relationship with him.⁵² Alexander is reported to have rewarded men with a kiss on three occasions. The first one has been mentioned above and relates to his reciprocating those who performed *proskunesis* to him during a banquet with a kiss of his own. If for Iranians his kissing the guests was a show of respect, for the non Iranians his act balanced the humiliating experience of the *proskunesis* with a display of affection and friendship to them, strengthened here by sympotic camaraderie and perhaps latent eroticism. Callisthenes, however, who did not perform the *proskunesis*, was refused a royal kiss, and is said to have declared in response that he was going away short of a kiss (Arr. 4.12.3–5; Plut. 54.4–6). Alexander's refusal to kiss the historian might have denied him respect in the Persian's eyes, but it is doubtful if Callisthenes was aware of, or concerned about, their opinion of him. For him and for other European guests, the king's denial of a kiss probably meant that he was excluded from the king's affections and that he lost his place in the close circle of Alexander's associates and intimates. He responded to the king's humiliating gesture with a partly witty, partly disdain-ing remark in an attempt to save face and in the celebrated tradition of the archaic Athenian Hippocleides, who, after being proclaimed

⁵¹ Alexander calling the infantry *pezietairoi*: Hammond in *HM* 2: 705–13, but see Erskin 1989.

⁵² For Persian kissing, see Hdt. 1.134.1; Xen. *Cyropaedia* 1.4.27–8; *Agésilas* 5.4–5; Strabo 15.3.20; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 81, 87–90; Briant *Histoire* 1996: 321. Greek kissing (often in greeting): e.g., Hom. *Od.* 16.14; 17.34–5; 21.224–5; Aristophanes *Frogs* 788; Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.32–3; Arr. 4.11.3; Kroll 1931, (including Roman kissing); Dover 1989: 63–4 with n. 6, 160; Henderson 1991: 181–2; Lateiner 1995: 68, 97 (arguing for hierarchy in kissing gestures in Homer).

a loser in a contest, declared in a banquet that he did not really care (Hdt. 6.129).

The second use of a royal kiss as a reward was of a less serious nature. When Bagoas, a Persian eunuch and Alexander's lover, won a contest in singing and dancing, the audience urged Alexander to kiss him, and the king yielded, allegedly, only under pressure. Once again, a gesture which could have connoted Persian respect made perfect Hellenic sense. Kisses, especially erotic ones, are mentioned in several ancient sources as desirable (though frivolous) prizes for a victor in a contest. Bagoas was congratulated on his victory with a display of royal affections.⁵³

The last case involving the king and kisses took place at Opis, and similarly to the *proskunesis*' experiment, followed a humbling experience to the other party. After Alexander had broken the resistance of the Macedonians to the discharge of veteran soldiers and to the incorporation of Asians in the army, the humiliated, teary and frightened troops complained about his calling the Persians his kinsmen and allowing them to kiss him. In response, Alexander called them all his kinsmen and extended the privilege of kissing him to whomever among the Europeans desired to do so (Arr. 7.11.5-7).⁵⁴ Thus, a gesture that connoted kinship and honor among the Persians and intimacy and friendship among the Greeks and presumably the Macedonians was used by Alexander to symbolize his close relationship with men whom he had just forced to acknowledge their loss, inferiority, and dependence on him. The kiss compensated the soldiers with the honor of an access to the king's person, but the greater honor belonged to Alexander as the recipient of their gesture. Indeed, it might not be an accident that the sources report of no reciprocity on Alexander's part when he was kissed by the soldiers. A royal kiss was a privilege reserved to a more exclusive group.⁵⁵

As opposed to kissing which symbolically (and temporarily) broke the barriers between the king and his men, Alexander made sure to

⁵³ Alexander kissing Bagoas: Dicaearchus in Athen. 603 a-b; Plut. 67.7-8. For Tarn 1948: II: 320-2, see Badian "The Eunuch Bagoas" 1958; Hamilton 1969: 186-7. Kisses as prizes: Plato *Rep.* 468b; Xen. *Symp.* 4.20; Lucian *Vitarum Auctio* 17; Kroll 1931: 512.

⁵⁴ For Alexander's possible loss of face here and earlier on the Hyphasis in India: Carney "Macedonians" 1996: 33-42, while Mitchell 1997: 174 highlights the Macedonians' submission here.

⁵⁵ Just. 12.15.2 says that dying Alexander allowed his grieving soldiers to kiss his hand.

maintain his distance from his subjects on more formal occasions. Various sources describe a formal audience given by the king who sat on a throne in his tent surrounded by his Royal Bodyguards. Next stood 500 Macedonians called *arguraspides* (silver shields), ahead of 500 Persian *melophoroi* ("apple bearers"); both units functioned as bodyguards. Around them stood 1,000 archers. Outside the tent stood the elephant corps with 1,000 Macedonians and 500 purple-clothed residents of Susa. All were surrounded by 10,000 Persian soldiers.⁵⁶ The occasion of this arrangement is unclear, but it is likely that it was related to the marriages at Susa in 324, in which Alexander and ninety one of his companions wedded royal and noble Persian women.⁵⁷ We are fortunate to have a description of the wedding reception based on Chares, the court chamberlain, a man whose official post gives credence to his account of the event.⁵⁸ Of particular interest to our discussion is the seating arrangement. Alexander invited into the wedding tent his *idioxenoi*, that is, men who were his personal contacts and friends in various communities in the empire. They sat facing the bridegrooms, who according to Arrian (7.4.7) were themselves seated in an order of one after the other. The other guests, namely troops, ambassadors and other visitors, were put in the court outside. Herodotus says that the Persians, who regard themselves as the best and the greatest, honor the most those who live around them, and least those who live the farthest away (Hdt. 1.134). It is unclear if this and the former arrangement were inspired by this spatial principle, but it is fairly certain that Alexander and his courtiers knew how to manipulate skillfully the distance from his person in order to put people in their places.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Athen. 539e; Polyæn. 4.3.24; Aelian *VH* 9.3; Bosworth "Alexander and the Iranians" 1980: 4–8.

⁵⁷ So Bosworth "Alexander and the Iranians" 1980: 8. Polyæn. 4.3.24 claims that Alexander used this arrangement whenever he sat in judgement of barbarians, but this is highly unlikely.

⁵⁸ Chares *FGH*. 125 F 4. Other accounts of the weddings: Arr. 7.4.4–8; Diod. 17.107.6; Plut. 70.3; Curt. 10.3.10–11; Just. 12.10.9–10; Aelian *VH* 8.7. Pearson 1960: 52–4, argues, though his evidence is not particularly strong, that Chares was Diodorus' ultimate source.

⁵⁹ In a festival which Alexander celebrated eleven years earlier at Dium in Macedonia, the people who were invited inside the royal tent included friends, commanders and ambassadors (Diod. 17.16.3–4). At Susa, the latter were demoted to the courtyard.

5iii. *Honor in Service*

Personal service rendered the king, which was often intermingled with proximity to his person, affected also one's honor and status in the camp. Such service honored both the monarch, whose entitlement to be served by his subjects set him above them, and the free men who served him, because their royal duties set them apart from other subjects. Conspicuous among the latter were the Royal Boys (*paides*) who were distinguished by their closeness to, as well as service of, the king.⁶⁰ The youth who belonged to this group came from noble families and formed a part of the royal retinue from puberty till manhood, around the age of eighteen. Their duties mainly included attending to the king's personal needs and keeping him company. They guarded his chamber when he was asleep and handed him his horse and helped him to mount it when he went to the hunt or to battle. They took part in the royal hunts; prepared his meals, drinks, and bath; lighted up his quarters; and dined with him, a privilege which Curtius notes as special (Curt. 8.6.5). Curtius' comment that their duties were not much different from those of slaves is noteworthy (Curt. 8.6.2; cf. 5.142). The *paides*, a word which means both "boys" and "slaves," at times, with little to differentiate between the two, performed servile duties in spite of their prominent background.⁶¹ Their status, then, was marked by ambiguity. On the one hand, they were distinguished by virtue of their prominent background and their intimacy with the king. They shared his hunts, were privy to his quarters, and in the case of Alexander's predecessors, some of whom became the king's homosexual partners.⁶² On the other hand, they were not yet full adults, acted as servants, and, hence, could be treated accordingly. When Hermolaus, one of the Royal Boys, killed

⁶⁰ The most important sources for Alexander's Royal *paides* are Arr. 4.13.1; Curt. 5.1.42; 8.6.2–6; Diod. 17.36.5; Cf. Just. 12.14.6, 9; Aelian *VH* 14.48. The institution and its history are discussed by Berve 1925–6 I: 37; Griffith *HM* II: 401–3; Hammond 1989: 56–7; 1990; Heckel 1992: esp. 237–53, and in this volume; Hatzopoulos 1994: 87–111; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 90–3.

⁶¹ For the meanings of *paides*: Golden 1985, and see Hammond 1990: 263 and Hatzopoulos 1994: 95–6, 110. Hence, I prefer "boys" to the more medieval "pages" as their designation. I cannot agree with the premise behind Scholl's dichotomy 1987: 110–1 between the *paides* and ordinary servants. Curtius' remark (8.6.3) that the Royal Boys sneaked women into Alexander's chamber is uncorroborated.

⁶² Macedonian kings and their male lovers: Heckel 1992: 238; Hatzopoulos 1994: 96–7; Carney "Artifice" 2000: 277–8. Scholars' emphasis on their sexual passivity is not warranted by the evidence, and see generally Davidson 1997: 167–78.

a boar which Alexander intended to kill, Alexander punished him by taking his horse away—no more hunting for this young man—and ordered him to be flogged, a punishment, which at least at Athens, was meted out to children and slaves.⁶³ The duality of the Boys' position and their transitional age from youth to adulthood makes it tempting to see their presence in court as part of a rite of passage for young noblemen, which the Macedonian kings institutionalized by converting it into a royal service.⁶⁴ In a typical rite of passage, a youth experiences roles which are opposite to the ones he will fulfill as an adult, and indeed, Curtius called this institution a *seminarium* of future generals and governors (Curt. 8.6.6; cf. 5.1.42). In sum, the Royal Boys were simultaneously honored for their closeness to, and service of, the king, and degraded, because of their youth and servile duties. In either case, Alexander controlled their right to respect.

The axis of honor, service, and proximity to Alexander recurs in relation to other men in the court, and can be observed even before he ascended the throne. Plutarch reports a hierarchy among the people who were in charge of Alexander's upbringing. At the top stood Leonidas who, thanks to his kinship to Olympias and his rank, was known, not by the somewhat plebeian or servile title "*paidagôgos*," (which Leonidas did not reject), but as Alexander's "tutor" (*tropheos*) and "guide" (*katêgêlês*). Second place was held by the teacher Lysimachus who called himself Phoenix, Alexander Achilles and Philip Peleus.⁶⁵ Leonidas' titles and Lysimachus' Homerization of the court dignified their services to the prince, who was their ultimate source of honor and distinction.

Personal service to the king continued to be a venue for honor in Asia too. Diodorus says that after Philip of Acarnania, Alexander's physician, had cured him of a serious illness in Cilicia, the king honored him magnificently and included him among his most loyal or well wishing (*eunoustatoi*) friends (Diod. 17.31.6). It surely helped that Philip was a boyhood physician of Alexander and that the king

⁶³ Hermolaus' punishment: Arr. 4.13.2; Curt. 8.6.7–8; cf. Aelian *VH* 14.48, and see below. Disciplining children: Golden 1990: 64. Hitting slaves: Dem. 8.51; 21.180.

⁶⁴ The classic study of rites of passage is still Gennep 1960. For the Royal Boys and rites of passage, see Hammond and esp. Hatzopoulos in the previous notes, though the evidence does not always support a full reconstruction of this phase.

⁶⁵ Plut. 5.7–8; Berve II: 235–6 no. 469 (Leonidas); II: 241 no. 481 (Lysimachus). Hamilton 1969: 14; Green 1991: 41–3; O'Brein 1992: 17–9.

regarded him as a father figure (Curt. 3.6.1). Aristander the diviner is another example of a professional who enjoyed a special status for providing personal as well as public services.⁶⁶ Other men who joined the campaign in a non military capacity owed their status and honor in camp to less specific services. Among them were those who made their intellects available to Alexander (and other men in court) in the form of literary, philosophical or colloquial skills. The most conspicuous among these sophists, at least in our sources, were Callisthenes and Anaxarchus.

Callisthenes was a reputed historian and author even before he joined the campaign, and it is likely that Anaxarchus joined the king's entourage also on the basis of his distinction as a philosopher. Callisthenes edited Alexander's copy of the *Iliad* and served as the historian of the campaign and, occasionally, as Alexander's adviser, while Anaxarchus also helped in the revision of Homer and was a rival adviser.⁶⁷ The sources do not elaborate on how they were compensated for their talents, but it is a fair assumption that they depended on Alexander for their livelihood. A royal patronage put a man in a uncomfortable position. It was not undignified to be rewarded by the king for one's services, but in the case of the court's 'intellectuals' the dependence on the king as a paymaster could open the door to slanderous charges of subservience or flattery (see below). It appears that Callisthenes tried to counter this image of dependency through his austere and reserved conduct, which could easily be interpreted as haughty, or his reported claim that he joined the campaign in order to obtain the resettlement of his native city Olynthus, which had been destroyed by Philip (Plut. 52.7, 53.1–2; cf. Curt. 7.5.13).⁶⁸ The claim indicated also a wish to separate himself from other literary and educated men of the court who, unlike the patriotic historian, allegedly attached themselves to Alexander for mercenary reasons. Anaxarchus dealt with his dependent status differently. His

⁶⁶ The story of Parmenion's warning of Alexander of a Philip's plot against him is probably false: Berve 1926 II: 388; Badian 2000: 60–63. But it does not mean that Diodorus' report is an invention as well. Aristander: Greenwalt 1982.

⁶⁷ For Anaxarchus see, esp. Bernard 1984. For Callisthenes and his conflict with Anaxarchus see conveniently the bibliography in Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 72. For their work on Homer: Strabo 13.1.27. Völcker-Janssen 1993: 79–84 and Borza 1995: 173–188 are especially relevant here.

⁶⁸ Unlike Callisthenes' boastful and incriminating comments in Arr. 4.10.1–2, there was nothing offensive to Alexander in this claim. For its likelihood, see Brown 1949: 233, n. 42.

philosophy, which mixed skepticism, vigorous pursuit of personal happiness, and borderline nihilism, made him a unique figure and freed him from the need to justify his presence in the court or the type of advice he rendered the king. Yet, it would be inaccurate to characterize Alexander's relationship with the people he rewarded for their services as strictly based on a *quid pro quo* formula. The services and their compensation created also affective ties which could be described as friendship and whose intensity changed from person to person and over time. Consciously and unconsciously, Alexander intensified the competition for his attention and the status that came with it by inviting people to give their advice on a continuing but irregular basis.⁶⁹ It is against the background of competition within the court's (all Greek) "intelligentsia" in influencing the king and gaining his friendship that Callisthenes and Anaxarchus rivaled each other in on the role of Alexander's ethicist or "doctor feel-good" in the wake of Cleitus' murder.⁷⁰

The sources call or depict Anaxarchus, some poets, and other anonymous sophists and members of the court as flatterers who nurtured Alexander's vanity and poisoned his mind, especially in regard to his quest for a superhuman status. Callisthenes, on the other hand, who opposed Alexander's divine claims, is described as standing for traditional honors and as setting limits on the king's ambition.⁷¹ Without disputing the sycophancy of the former and the sincerity of the latter, I would like to suggest that the sources' labeling people as flatterers goes back to attempts of competitors at Alexander's court to discredit and insult their rivals. The dilemma was clear. Men who were dependent on the king did not wish to lose the competition over his attention and friendship, but did want to maintain their right to self- and public respect (cf. Plut. 23.7). Libeling another as a flatterer helped a person to dignify by contrast his own position as well as to deligitimize a competitor's view and undermine his standing with the king and in the camp. What facilitated the denigration of the "flatterers" was the presence among them of men who

⁶⁹ For Alexander's consulting methods: Hammond 1989: 53

⁷⁰ See Note 26 above and Plut. 52.3-7; *Moral.* 781 a-b; Arr. 4.9.7-9; Just. 12.6.17.

⁷¹ For flatterers in Alexander court: Arr. 4.8.2-3, 9.9; 7.29.1; Plut. 23.7; *Moral.* 65 d (where five flatterers are named); Curt. 8.5.6-8; Satyrus in Athen. 6.250 f-251 a (Anaxarchus); cf. Arr. 2.6.4; Athen. 249 d. Völcker-Janssen 1993: 81-4; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 55; Baynham 1998: 136-7. Callisthenes' position: Arr. 4.10-11; Curt. 7.5.13-24.

were largely non combatants or of no social prominence and who were therefore lacking in prestige, marking them an easy target for slanders and resentment.⁷² The fact, that they competed at times with Macedonian generals in influencing the king added to the animosity against them (Arr. 4.8.4). At the same time, the resentment toward them indicated the Macedonians' impotence regarding Alexander's right and power to befriend, honor and reward whomever he wished.

5iv. Controlling Honor: Material and Symbolic assets and Their Distribution

Alexander's power to affect the honor of others in the kingdom extended beyond allowing them to serve him in various capacities. His ample material and symbolic resources and his having the final say about their distribution enabled him to show his appreciation or displeasure of individuals and groups in the realm and, thus, to establish, confirm or change their honor and position in relation to himself and to each other. I shall examine here three manifestations of this exercise of royal power, namely, gift-giving, distribution of crowns, and supervising death rites.

The exchange of gifts in the ancient world had several cultural and political meanings.⁷³ A gift could symbolize the friendly relationship between the giver and the recipient, mark their rank in relation to each other, or create mutual or one-sided obligations on the part of the participants in this social transaction. Gifts also functioned as tokens of honor, which the partners used to accord or show respect to each other.⁷⁴ All these elements can be recognized in Alexander's giving practices. He was probably generous by nature, and Plutarch comments that his gift-giving was tactful and done with

⁷² Warriors' resentment of, and disdain for, non-combatants is expressed toward flute players and actors (Plut. *Eumenes* 2.1–2), and men in secretarial jobs: Plut. *Eumenes* 1.3; Curt. 7.1.15, 17, 35. Plut. *Moral.* 180 a quotes Alexander's disapproving of athletes who were not fighters.

⁷³ For gifts and gift-exchange in the Greece and Macedonia, see von Reden 1995: esp. 79–104; and Mitchell 1997: esp. Chapter 9 on gifts and Alexander. All are indebted to Mauss 1960. I do not discuss here gifts given as payment or as a reward for a good service and political loyalty.

⁷⁴ For our sources linking honor with gifts, see, e.g., Arr. 1.5.4; 2.12.1; 7.5.4–6; Diod. 17.31.6; 40.1; 77.3; Curt. 4.8.14 with Duris *FGGrH* 76 F 4; 5.2.18.

a true friendly spirit (Plut. 39.1).⁷⁵ But Alexander was clearly looking for more than kind affections or not to discomfort the recipients of his magnanimity. His prodigious spending on friends and other men had political ramifications as well.⁷⁶ Gifts in the form of money, possessions or kind, established or strengthened loyalty and gratitude toward him, marked his superior position as a giver over the recipients, confirmed the latter's neediness of him, and made them morally in his debt. There were also considerations of image. A king was not supposed to be niggardly (Just. 12.3.11), but to dispense money generously, especially to his friends. In his biography of the Athenian general Phocion, Plutarch states that Alexander's agents were upset with the Athenian for refusing to accept large gifts from Alexander on the grounds that poverty was unbecoming to the king's friends. Alexander is also said to have threatened Phocion with his royal anger if he refuses to take one of four cities in Asia.⁷⁷ Evidently, the economic standing of men known as Alexander's friends told on him. Conversely, being recognized as the king's friend might be a liability because it connoted a dependence on his favors and a suspicion of his corruptibility. That is why Phocion, and maybe even Perdicas and other friends on the eve of the Asian invasion, are reported to have declined Alexander's generosity, or why Alexander is said to have been annoyed with people who refused or did not need his gifts.⁷⁸

It can be safely assumed, however, that those who rejected his gifts were fewer than those who gladly took them. Indeed, we hear of men who begged for gifts, complained that they received nothing

⁷⁵ For Alexander's "greatness of spirit," an attribute related to his generosity, see Pfister 1964: 69–70.

⁷⁶ His grants to friends are said to have almost depleted the resources of the crown before he left for Asia (Plut. 15.3–4; *Moral.* 342 d; Just. 11.5.5), and in Asia, for example, he is reported to have given them and other men all that he had taken from the rich city of Persepolis (Curt. 5.6.20); cf. Plut. *Moral.* 333 e.

⁷⁷ Phocion refusal to take gifts; Plut. *Phocion* 18.1–2, and see *Moral.* 188 c; Aelian *VH* 1.25; 11.9. The offer of a city: Plut. *Phocion* 18.7–8; Aelian *VH* 1.25; Corsten 1994. I am less convinced of a link between Alexander's generosity and his divine claims; cf. Bosworth *Alexander and the East* 1996: 130–131.

⁷⁸ Tritle 1988: 44, 115 credits Phocion with personal integrity. Perdicas: Plut. 15.4–5; *Moral.* 342 d–e, where his refusal is attributed to a concern about Alexander's financial straits, but this should not have been the only motive. The philosophers Xenocrates and Diogenes also declined Alexander's gift: Plut. *Moral.* 181 e, 333 b; Arr. 7.2.1; Hamilton 1969: 22. Alexander's annoyance with reluctant recipients: Plut. 39.4.

from the king, or that he misdirected his generosity to undeserving recipients, that is, to people other than themselves.⁷⁹ Now, not all the people who wished to partake in Alexander's distribution of wealth looked for simple self-enrichment. Members of the elite used wealth to mark their status, and some probably redistributed the money and possessions they got, or were allowed to appropriate, in order to display generosity and gain popularity, honor, prestige, and friends of their own.⁸⁰ Plutarch reports that Alexander was warned by his mother that his excessive honoring of people with gifts could make them equal to him in power and magnets to his own friends (Plut. 39.7–8). But Alexander could take the risk because his resources allowed him to outspend anyone else. Two examples illustrate Alexander's ability to prevail over others with gifts. When the Sogdianian Sisimithris brought supplies to Alexander's frozen and starving army, Alexander repaid him with a larger gift (Curt. 8.4.19–20). Later in the campaign, he is said to have entered a quasi-Homeric contest in gifts with the ruler of Taxila and to have won it by a thousand-talents knockout.⁸¹ Both in his relationships with subjects or with fellow Macedonians, the king hated to lose or to concede superiority or to be in debt to any one.

Thus, gift-giving demonstrated Alexander's advantage and superior standing and enabled him to establish or confirm the standing of persons lower than him in status. That is why his generosity was not indiscriminate and supported the hierarchy in the camp. On different occasions he is reported to have given gifts according to the recipients rank or merit.⁸² Indeed, while Paremion got a house

⁷⁹ Plut. 39.5; 59.5; *Moral.* 334 e; Curt. 8.12.18; cf. Plut. 28.5; *Moral.* 179 f–180 a. This evidence, and Alexander's gifts in Macedonia before he went to Asia (above), challenge Mitchell's 1997: 171–2 argument that Alexander's excessive generosity was in imitation of the Persian royal tradition of unequal gift-exchange and putting people in debt, as opposed to the Macedonian more egalitarian perception of the practice. The Macedonians did not resent his changing the cultural meaning of gifts but that others received them; cf. Diod. 17.78.1.

⁸⁰ For ostentatious wealth among Alexander's companions: Plut. 40.1–2; Diod. 17.108.4–6; Athen. 539 c; 534 f; Aelian *VH* 9.3; Arr. *Successors* 12; Suida, *s.v.* Leonnatus; cf. Curt. 6.11.3. Attalus (Diod. 17.2.4) and Philotas (Plut. 48.1–2) were commanders known for their generosity; cf. Völcker-Janssen 1993: 180–211.

⁸¹ Plut. 59.1–5; *Moral.* 181 c; Curt. 8.12.15–18; Metz *Epit.* 5–52; Strabo 15.1.28; cf. Arr. 5.3.5; Price 1982: 84; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 220–1. For Homeric duels in gifts: Donlan 1993.

⁸² After Issus: Diod. 17.40.1; Arr. 2.12.1; at Tyre: Diod. 17.46.6; at Persepolis: Curt. 5.6.20; in India: Diod. 89.3; Curt. 9.1.6; at Opis: Arr. 7.5.4–6. For giving out purple cloths to his friends: Diod. 17.77.5; Fredricksmeeyer 1994: 154–5.

in Susa with 1,000 talents worth of contents, the rank-and-file were the occasional recipients of a crown, or a cart full of possessions, and on isolated occasions had their debts paid by the king or given gifts upon discharge.⁸³

Needless to say, it was the conquered population that paid the price of Alexander's generosity.⁸⁴ Yet not all Asians lost their property to the king, and many even participated in his gift exchange. Indeed, just as gifts signaled the honor and status of men in Alexander's camp, they also symbolized the position of the vanquished, only here Alexander was not so much the giver as the recipient of gifts, with the presents serving as tokens of friendship, respect, loyalty and submission.⁸⁵ A few examples will suffice to demonstrate the link between gifts to the king, acknowledging his superior position, and surrendering to him. In 332 the people of Tyre sent an embassy to Alexander which brought him a golden crown and supplies. Curtius states that they wished to be Alexander's allies rather than subjects and that Alexander ordered the gifts to be accepted as a sign of friendship (Curt. 4.2.2; cf. Just. 11.10.10; Diod. 17.96.2). As it happened, when the Tyrians later refused to allow Alexander to sacrifice to their god inside their island, the king regarded their decision as an affront to him and a sign of unwarranted independence and proceeded to capture and destroy their city. This outcome was not inevitable, but it showed that Alexander, unlike the Tyrians, saw friendly gifts as a gesture made by an inferior to a superior and equated them with total obedience to his will. Later in the campaign, he received gifts as symbols of submission, inferiority and respect paid to the new master from various people. In 330, he was showered with gifts in Babylon and Susa by the local Persian administrators who proclaimed in this manner their loyalty and surrender to him if not their recognition of him as the new Persian king.⁸⁶ In the following year, the Iranian commander Nabarzanes surrendered himself to Alexander and brought with him lavish gifts, including Alexander's soon-to-be-lover, the eunuch Bagoas (Curt. 6.5.23). Finally, when the Indian

⁸³ Plut. 39.3, 10; 71.8; Arr. 7.5.1-3, 12.1; Curt. 10.2.9-11; Just. 12.11.1-3; cf. Plut. 34.1; Diod. 17.94; Mitchell 1997: 169.

⁸⁴ Relevant here is Schachermeyer 1976: esp. 68-79.

⁸⁵ With allies gifts usually symbolized friendship, e.g., Arr. 1.5.2-4; 4.15.2,4-5; Diod. 17.49.2-3; Curt. 4.7.9.

⁸⁶ Curt. 5.1.20-3, 2.9-10; cf. Arr. 3.16.3; Atkinson 1994 II: 35.

ruler Musicanus refused to surrender to Alexander and did not send him envoys or gifts befitting a great king, Alexander threatened to fight him till the Indian changed his mind.⁸⁷ In short, in both his roles as a giver and recipient of gifts, Alexander often sought to control the status and honor of those under his rule.⁸⁸

Crowns, especially golden ones, resembled gifts in their material and symbolic meaning, and were at times included among the presents (e.g., Chares *FGrH* 125 F 4). As we have seen above, Alexander honored both his commanders and the ordinary soldiers with golden crowns when he wished to show his appreciation of their courage, friendship and accomplishments.⁸⁹ It also confirmed or established rank within the camp and so supported a hierarchy topped by the king (Curt. 9.1.6; cf. Arr. 7.5.4). The fact that many testimonies on crowning combatants belonged to the later phase of the campaign indicates that the decoration of warriors was meant also to raise moral in the worn-out army. All in all, the handing out of crowns made Alexander a benefactor and a judge of other people's worth and honor.

The record on crowns in the campaign also mentions Alexander as their recipient. He was offered crowns by his own men as well as by Greek envoys in recognition of his victories and his status as a leader, king, and even as a god.⁹⁰ Allies, subjects of the empire, or soon to be ones, gave him crowns as tokens of friendship as well as submission (Diod. 17.24.3, 49.2; Arr. 1.24.5–6, 2.13.7; Curt. 4.2.2;

⁸⁷ Arr. 6.15.5–6. Musicanus and his people later changed their minds again and paid dearly for it: Arr. 6.17.1–2. For other cases of gifts and surrender: Arr. 4.21.10; 5.20.5, 29.4; 6.14.1; Curt. 6.5.19; 9.8.1; Diod. 17.84.1, 91.7–92.1, 93.1, 102.3–4; cf. Arr. 5.3.5, 8.3. That the size and qualities of the gifts to Alexander were expected to correspond to his lofty stature is suggested by the receptions he got in Babylon and Susa (above) as well as by Chares *FGrH* 125 F 4.

⁸⁸ See Mitchell 1997: 174–177. Curtius' moralizing story (Curt. 10.1.22–38) about the Persian satrap Orxines (Curtius: Orsines), who honored Alexander and his friends with lavish gifts, but refused to give Bagoas gifts and paid for it with his life, is not entirely believable, but it does show Alexander's friends benefiting too from the locals' "generosity" and that a failure to recognize another's rank through gifts was perceived as an insult.

⁸⁹ Curt. 9.1.6; Arr. 7.5.4–6, 23.5; *Ind.* 42.9; Plut. 79.1; cf. Arr. 2.24.3; 7.10.3. He used crowns to show his respects to Achilles and Cyrus, too: Arr. 1.12.1; Curt. 10.1.32.

⁹⁰ Honored by his pilot in Troy: Arr. 1.12.1; by Greeks after Issus: Diod. 117.48.6; Curt. 4.5.11; by Libyan envoys as a king of Asia: Arr. 7.15.4; by Greek envoys as a god: Arr. 7.23.2 with Brunt 1983 II: 495–7. Crowns whose meaning is unspecified or surmised: Diod. 17.113.1; Arr. 78.19.1–2.

8.12.15). Some individuals and communities honored him with crowns in gratitude for services done to them (Curt. 8.12.15; *SIG*³ 312; Ehippus *FGrH* 126 F 5). Alexander might reciprocate with honors of his own (e.g., Arr. 7.19.2), but in many cases this exchanged confirmed more than alleviated the inferior position of the honored in relation to him.⁹¹

In a speech attributed by Arrian to Alexander, the king reminds his rebellious soldiers at Opis in a consecutive order of his generosity toward them, the golden crowns they received from him for their courage, and the splendid honors given to the fallen soldiers in the campaign (Arr. 17.10.3–4). The authenticity of the speech has been questioned, but there is little doubt about the existence of a strong link among these three types of honor.⁹² All involved significant expenditures and thus allowed Alexander to control them through his vast resources. His authority over the last rites encompassed even the conquered, with a clear preference toward their elite. After the battle of Issus, he buried distinguished Persians and gave the Persian Queen Mother both permission and means to bury Persians of her choice (Plut. 21.4; Curt. 3.12.13–14; Diod. 17.40.1). When Darius' wife died, he provided for her a lavish funeral, and later he sent the body of her murdered husband to be buried in Persepolis (Plut. 30.1, 43.5–7; Curt. 4.10.23–4; Arr. 3.22.1, 6; Just. 11.15.15). He was less discriminatory in burying his own dead warriors, whom he honored even in defeat, but especially in triumph as he did after each of his major battles. The honors included military funerals, burials and sermons, with the king using the occasion also to motivate the soldiers, reward military valor, and to commemorate his victories.⁹³ Yet these

⁹¹ Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1980, I: 226 is preferable here to Atkinson 1980 I: 294.

⁹² Questioning the authenticity of the speech: Bosworth *From Arrian to Alexander* 1988: 101–13, esp. 108, n. 64. It is significant that the stories about Harpalus, who might have entertained royal ambitions, included reports of him receiving crowns, spending and giving money, and giving sumptuous burials: Diod. 17.108.4–7; Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 248, 253; Badian 1961; Jaschinski 1981: 18–22; Bosworth *Conquest and Empire* 1988: 159–60; Worthington 1992: 41.

⁹³ After Granicus: Arr. 1.16.4–5; Plut. 16.15; Diod. 17.21.6; after Issus: Arr. 2.12.1; Diod. 17.40.1; Curt. 3.12.13; after Tyre: Diod. 17.46.6; after Gaugamela: Just. 12.1.9; after the battle with Porus: Arr. 5.20.1; Diod. 17.89.3; following a defeat: Curt. 7.9.21; Metz *Épilogue* 13. Space constraints prevent me from discussing the Vergina tombs or the respects paid to Alexander after his death. For Macedonian death rituals, especially for the kings: Hammond 1989: 24–6; 1999: 103–5, 113–4.

were common burials which tended to blur individual distinction and honor. Dead men of prominent status were accorded individual funerals and the privilege of the king's personal attendance. Thus, Parmenion's sons Hector and Nicanor, and Erigyius, son of Larichus, were all given splendid funerals, and it was only the chase of Bessus which prevented Alexander from attending Nicanor's funeral (Curt. 4.8.7–9; 6.6.18–19; 8.2.40). We are uninformed about Alexander's relationship with the latter, but it is significant that he greatly liked Hector, and that Erigyius was his loyal companion since youth (Curt. 4.8.7; Arr. 3.6.5). He gave also a splendid funeral and great honors to Philip, the younger brother of the Bodyguard Lysimachus, following his display of unflinching endurance in protecting the king (Curt. 8.2.33–40), and Plutarch reports that he honored the musician Aristonicus with a statue at Delphi after the brave musician died in a battle against the Scythians, trying to assist the king (Plut. *Moral.* 334 e–f; cf. Arr. 4.16.16). It appears, then, that the king's personal favorites or men who rendered service to his person were distinguished by individual funerals whose scale and lavishness often corresponded to the intensity of the king's affections toward them.

The giving of grand funerals and burials not only honored the dead but also made them a stage for a display of royal grief and the king's power to accord extraordinary honors. Thus, when an old family friend, Demaratus of Corinth, died, Alexander gave him a magnificent funeral, built a huge mound on his grave, and sent his ashes home in a splendid chariot pulled by four horses (Plut. 56.2). The self-immolation of the Indian sage Calanus is said to have been accompanied by the burning or distribution of expensive incense, cups and garments; a big procession, and battle cries from both men and elephants.⁹⁴ Alexander also planned to build for his father a pyramid-shape tomb (Diod. 18.4.5). But the record for scale and expenses was set on behalf of Alexander's dearest friend, Hephaestion. The king planned to spend between 10,000 to 12,000 talents on commemorating Hephaestion's memory. He breached the wall of Babylon to accommodate a six-level inflammable structure all richly decorated and adorned with precious material. According to a late source, the pyre also consumed gold and silver cups (Aelian *VH* 7.8).

⁹⁴ Arr. 7.3; Diod. 17.107.2–5; Plut. 69.6–7; Chares *FGrH* 125 F19 a; Strabo 15.1.68; Aelian *VH* 5.6.

The project of building a monument for Hephaestion was cancelled after the king's death (Diod. 18.4.1–2), but Alexander succeeded in getting for his friend heroic status and corresponding honors, showing thus his power to extend the attainment of superhuman honors from himself to his favorites too. According to the sources, some more reliable than others, additional honors included Alexander imitating Achilles' grief over Patrocles; his self-abasement by driving the cart carrying the corpse; preserving Hephaestion's name as the commander of the companions cavalry; and giving his friend the distinction reserved for Persian royalty by extinguishing the holy Persian fire for the duration of the mourning. Few historians, ancient or modern, have contested that Alexander's grief and tributes to his friend were excessive.⁹⁵ He was able to make such gestures, however, because he did not distinguish between the personal and the public spheres in exercising his largely unrestricted power over the assets of his realm.

Thus, Alexander's control over the honor and status of men in his camp spanned the time they joined his campaign to their deaths. Yet, there was a limit to his ability to shape others' honor or make them pay respect to him. There were circumstances and environments whose nature resisted regulation and whose ambivalent characteristics could induce people to show him disrespect, intentionally or unintentionally. Two such environments, that of the hunt and of the symposium, are the focus of the last section of this chapter.

6. *Honor in Ambivalent Environments: Royal Hunts and Banquets*

Both sport hunting and banquets were social occasions which had the potential for creating clashes between the king and his men. We shall deal with hunting first.

The extant iconographic and literary evidence for Alexander's royal hunts suggest that they were inspired by the practices of the Persian royalty and the Asian elite, though they were surely not alien

⁹⁵ The main sources for Hephaestion's death and honors paid to him, are: Diod. 17.114–115; Arr. 7.14.1–15.1, 23.6; Plut. 72.2–5; Just. 12.12.11–12; Lucian *De calumniae* 17; and see recently Völcker-Janssen 1993: 100–16; McKechnie 1995; Palagia 2000: 167–75; and Reames-Zimmerman 2001, who, nevertheless, observes in his bereavement a familiar psychological pattern.

to the Macedonian or Greek hunting practices and culture.⁹⁶ The Persian, and surely the Macedonian, version of sport hunting was a social affair. The king hunted with friends and attendants whose company signaled their privileged friendship with, and immediacy to, him. Yet hunting with the king was an experience marked by ambivalence. On the one hand, sport hunting promoted egalitarian values and attitudes in the form of companionship among fellow hunters, the shared joy of the sport, and cooperation in pursuing and even killing the quarry. On the other hand, hunting could provide a stage for an individualistic show of worth, and was associated with competitive martial values such as courage in facing risk, endurance, skills in overcoming a challenge, and similar honor-producing traits.⁹⁷ The coexistence of these attitudes could problematize the honor of the participants in the royal hunts, because the hunt's egalitarian features could collide with the participants' wishes or inclinations to demonstrate personal excellence as well as with the hierarchical position of the king, who, in the case of Alexander, saw himself first in worth too. One solution to this problem was to designate an animal which only the king could kill, or to give him the right of first strike. This was apparently the practice in the Persian royal hunts, although worthy rulers are said to have revoked the prerogative.⁹⁸ The sources do not report whether Alexander adopted or rejected this right, but they do show him trying to display individualistic and heroic distinction, though not without a challenge. In one incident, which took place in a game reserve in Sogdiana, Alexander was attacked by a very large lion. His companion, and

⁹⁶ See Briant "Chasses royales" 1991; "Les chasses" 1993; Hatzopoulos 1994: 87–111, and most recently Palagia 2000: 175–206, who argues that, following Alexander's death, different leaders tried to legitimize their positions through depictions of themselves as Alexander's intimate friends in the royal hunts. I do not discuss here the hunting fresco in Vergina Tomb II because of the problems related to its reconstruction and dating; see conveniently Palagia 2000: 189–200, and Stewart in this volume.

⁹⁷ For the hunt as collective and cooperative enterprise, and individualistic performance in it, see Schnapp 1997: esp. 298–317; 355–402; cf. Anderson 1985: 30–2. Hunting as a contest frames the famous Calydonian boar myth. Hunting and sport; Sansone 1988; Golden 1998: 17–18. Alexander and competitive hunting; Plut. 9.11; 40.4. Hunting and martial values: Plato *Laws* 7.823 b–824 b; Xen. *Cynegeticus* 12.2–9; *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* 4.7; Anderson 1985: 27–32.

⁹⁸ Xen. *Cyropaedia* 1.4.14; Plut. *Moral.* 173 d; cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 6.4.3–4. Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F 40), tells about a Persian king who punished a man who killed his quarry, but see the other sources mentioned here.

the future king, Lysimachus, aimed his spear at the lion, but the angry Alexander shoved him aside and told him to get out of his way, adding that he could kill a lion single-handedly just like Lysimachus had. The king's reference was to a large lion killed by Lysimachus earlier in Syria, though Lysimachus was severely wounded by the beast. Alexander succeeded in killing his lion in a single strike, but the worried Macedonians decreed that in future hunts he should protect himself by avoiding hunting on foot or unaccompanied by a select group of friends (Curt. 8.1.12–18).

In the east the lion symbolized royalty, and Persian kings and local Asian rulers are known to have engaged in lion hunts or to have depicted themselves hunting lions in their official art.⁹⁹ Yet the episode just described should be seen not just against the background of Alexander's appropriation of Persian institutions and customs, but also as an event inspired by the Greco-Macedonian agonistic ethos. It is unclear what moved Lysimachus to try to forestall Alexander. He might have been caught in the excitement of the hunt, and perhaps he tried to save the king, to strengthen his own reputation as a lion-killer, or to outperform Alexander. Whatever his motives were, Alexander's competitive nature and the equal opportunities provided by the hunt for an individualistic show of merit, led Alexander to regard his move as a threat to his own honor and as an attempt to rob him of a chance to prove that he could outdo his companion, whom he clearly envied for his Syrian feat. This he accomplished, firstly, by physically and verbally barring Lysimachus from displaying his worth, and then by showing that he could do better than him by dispatching the lion in one strike and without injury to himself.

Even though the prudent Macedonians took precautionary measures to protect the king from his own competitiveness, they could not stop him, or others, from seeing the hunt as providing a stage for the display of individual worth. Not long after the above incident, Alexander went out for another hunt around Bactra in the company of, at least, his Royal Boys. As mentioned above, one of his attendants, Hermolaus, speared a wild boar which charged the king and which Alexander had intended to kill. Alexander's anger

⁹⁹ Briant 1991: 217–22; 1993; 1996: 244; Palagia 2000: 181–3. For Lysimachus and his use of the lion on his coinage: Lund 1992: 160–1; Baynham 2000: 257–8. For other unreliable stories involving Alexander, Lysimachus and lions: Heckel 1992: 268–71; Lund 1992: 6–8.

rose again and he ordered Hermolaus to be deprived of his horse and be whipped in front of his peers. The young nobleman was greatly incensed and went on to plot (unsuccessfully) his revenge upon the king (Arr. 4.13.2; Curt. 8.6.7).

As in Lysimachus' case, it is hard to tell whether Hermolaus tried to protect the king or if his wish to display excellence got the better of him. He was, after all, both young in age and noble in origin and so likely to be ambitious to prove his courage and worth or to gain fame even in the face of the royal monopolistic claim to the quarry. Whatever his motives were, he was facing a conflict between his own right to respect as a fellow hunter—Arrian describes the Royal Boys as “the king’s partners (*koinônoi*) in the *philotimia* (pursuit of honor) of the hunt” (Arr. 4.13.1)—and that of Alexander, who played the dual role of a fellow hunter (though a privileged one) and a king. Hence, here or in the Sogdianian hunt, Alexander had to firmly assert his right to win or to not be treated as an equal. He did so by publicly whipping Hermolaus, a humiliation which demoted the latter to the status of a child and a slave. It should be noted that even though according to Curtius Alexander was within his rights as a king to flog the young man, Hermolaus and some of his friends saw his punishment as an act of hubris, possibly because of the corporal punishment but also because he could be perceived as a man unfairly disgraced for merely trying to excel in the hunt.¹⁰⁰

Of course, not all royal hunts were harmful to the welfare of the participants, and post-Alexanderian depictions of his hunts strove to show men helping him and even saving him from wild beasts.¹⁰¹ But by then Alexander was in no position to protest. As the above incidents show, helping the king was not always appreciated and could be perceived as an attempt to gain honor at his expense.

Royal symposia and meals could equally problematize the honor of the participants, because, like hunts, they were comprised of con-

¹⁰⁰ For Alexander’s right to flog Hermolaus: Curt. 8.6.5, 8.3; cf. Aelian *VH* 14.48; Aristotle *Politics* 5.1311b 30–5; Carney “The Conspiracy” 1981: 230; Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 94. The hubris committed: Arr.13.3–4, 14.2; Curt. 8.6.7–8, cf. 8.8.4. See Heckel in this volume for Hermolaus’ conspiracy.

¹⁰¹ The most famous is the scene of Craterus’ saving Alexander in a Syrian hunt: Plut. 40.5; Pliny *NH* 34.64; Völcker-Janssen 1993: 117–32; Palagia 2000: 183–5. For other depictions of hunts: Palagia (2000) 183–96. Damage-free hunts for the participants: e.g., Arr. 4.30.8; Plut. 23.3–4. Pace Palagia 171, the sources do not say that Hephaestion was depicted in the hunting scene on his pyre.

tradictory elements.¹⁰² On the one hand, fellow symposiasts enjoyed a camaraderie and an illusion of equality when they shared food, wine, entertainment and each other's company. These sentiments and the informal surroundings allowed the participants a considerable measure of free speech which they used to put each other down or make statements critical of men higher than them in rank, the king included.¹⁰³ On the other hand, guests in royal banquets did not check their respective honors or status at the door, especially not the king, who stood above all in rank, and his golden-legged couch (as opposed to his guests' silver-legged ones), his distribution of food and drinks, and his hosting meals and banquets at great expense, all displayed his power, wealth and superior honor.¹⁰⁴ The potential for clashes within this combination was increased by the consumption of great quantities of wine, which heightened emotions and sensitivities. In short, royal symposia in which Alexander played the double role of a king and symposiast could be convivial affairs but could also lead to disaster.

The discussion of royal symposia is handicapped by the fact that our sources are more informative on unruly banquets than on peaceful ones and that they often report words said or heard in wine and in a relatively exclusive circle. Hence, I shall avoid a detailed analysis of statements attributed to the banquetteers. But the sources' accounts sufficiently demonstrate that conflicts in banquets were honor-related, and that they attained this character even before Alexander ascended the throne. In a wedding banquet celebrating the marriage of Philip to his new wife, Cleopatra, the Macedonian Attalus questioned Alexander's legitimacy when he expressed the wish for the birth of a legitimate heir. This insult commenced a quarrel which drew Philip

¹⁰² I do not discuss here official dinners or incident-free symposia, but only elements in Macedonian banquets which are relevant to issues of honor. On the institution, see Tomlinson 1970; O'Brein 1992: *Index s.v.* "Symposion"; Borza 1995 159–71; Völcker-Janssen 1993: 78–81, 184–96; Davidson 1997: esp. 286–8, 301, n. 9. For the culture of Greek symposia see Lissargue 1990; Murray 1990; Schmitt Pantel 1992.

¹⁰³ The Macedonians were known on occasions to speak their minds freely (Adams 1986), but the symposium was even more liberating; cf. Bosworth *Alexander and the East* 1996: 117.

¹⁰⁴ Davidson, Note 102 above. The reclining couches: Chares *FGrH* 125 F 14; Plut. 54.4; Arr. 7.24.2; Athen. 17 f, 538 c, but also Curt. 9.7.15. The tradition might have been Persian: Arr. 6.29.5. Alexander's costly entertainment: Ehippus *FGrH* 126 F 2; Plut. 23.10; Just. 12.3.10–11; Hamilton 1969: 60–1; Völcker-Janssen 1993: 189–91.

into it and which ended with Alexander disparaging Philip as a drunk and leaving Macedonia for a temporary exile. Here and elsewhere, the affronts and responses to them articulated the participants' rivalry and jockeying for positions of power and influence.¹⁰⁵ Yet what shaped and contributed to the conflict were the symposion's uneasy coexistence of egalitarian and hierarchical features and the Macedonian sympotic discourse of insults, challenges and put downs.

The most famous of the quarrelsome banquets under Alexander was the one that led to Cleitus' death.¹⁰⁶ The sources are divided about what exactly triggered the conflict between the king and his general, but are significantly unanimous that it started with an affront, either to commanders who were recently defeated by the enemy (Plut. 50.8), or to ancient Greek heroes who were unfavorably compared to Alexander (Arr. 4.8.2-3), or to Philip, who was belittled in comparison to his son (Curt. 8.2.23-5; Just. 12.6.2). When Cleitus vigorously protested the insult, a quarrel ensued in which Cleitus insulted Alexander personally, mocked his divine sonship, and complained against his exploiting the Macedonians and the barbarization of the court. Alexander countered by disparaging both Cleitus and the Macedonians. Some guests tried unsuccessfully to quell the dispute, and the mutual dishonoring contest ended with Alexander stabbing Cleitus to death.

Cleitus' conduct is intelligible in light of the liberating context of the banquet, which allowed guests to say things they would normally refrain from saying and to cross the apparently ill-defined boundaries between the permissible and the non permissible in dealing with the king.¹⁰⁷ It was up to Alexander, then, to draw the line clearly and reassert his right to respect as a man and king. In the case of Cleitus, the affront to his honor (esp., Plut. *Moral.* 71 c), a fear of treason, and temper inflamed by wine, all moved him to respond with deadly violence. Yet the murder of Cleitus did not repair Alexander's honor, but added to his disgrace. In a display of inability to control his anger and wine, he killed his guest, the brother

¹⁰⁵ For the banquet and the feud between Alexander, Attalus and Philip: Plut. 9.4-11; Athen. 557 d-e; Badian 1963; and Worthington in this volume. I do not share the view that Alexander was behind Philip's assassination.

¹⁰⁶ See above with note 26, and Heckel in this volume.

¹⁰⁷ Contrast the formal gesture of taking off the helmet when addressing the king in the assembly: Curt. 9.3.4.

of his nurse, a distinguished commander, and the man who saved his life in battle. His reported statement in the feud with Cleitus that the Greeks look like demi-gods in comparison to the animal-like Macedonians, now recoiled on him (Plut. 51.4). Measures had to be taken to restore his honor and to resolve a host of legal, political and moral issues such as, can a king kill a man with impunity? Is this the fate of whoever insults the king? Is there a difference between insults and treason? And will the Macedonians' collective honor suffer from their being ruled by an acknowledged murderer? Alexander, in collaboration with men who worked to cleanse him from shame, solved these problems in several ways. First, he displayed remorse (probably sincere) through a failed suicide attempt (maybe less sincere), mourning, fasting and excluding himself from the community when he refused to leave his tent.¹⁰⁸ Then, the army and friends cooperated in attributing the killing to a divine predestination and legitimize it as a warranted act of justice on legal and philosophical grounds.¹⁰⁹ What contributed to the successful recovery of Alexander's honor were the extenuating circumstances of sympotic wine and insult.

Curtius' claim (7.4.30), that freedom of speech was suppressed following Cleitus' death, is, at least, inaccurate. In fact, it was Alexander himself who had to curb his reactions in symposia so as not to reopen the wound. He chose an indirect approach to punish men who strongly opposed him in the banquet, as he had done in the case of Callisthenes.

Callisthenes is said to have shown himself disagreeable by declining invitations to dinners, but he was more a selective guest than unsociable (Plut. 53.2). Different anecdotes in Plutarch show him quite adept in sympotic ridicule as when he mocked Anaxarchus in one banquet, or made undercutting remarks regarding Alexander exiting others (Plut. 52.8–9, 54.1). He also showed his skills in exploiting the sympotic freedom of speech (and after Cleitus' death) when he opposed in a debate the rendering of divine honors to Alexander.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Alexander's reaction after the killing of Cleitus: Arr. 9.1–4; Plut. 52.11–53.1; Curt. 8.2.1–12; Just. 12.6.5–15. Carney "Artifice" 2000: 278–82 thinks that his seclusion was done in an Achillean fashion.

¹⁰⁹ Arr. 4.8.1–2, 9.5–8; Plut. 50.2–7; 52.1–7; Curt. 8.2.11–12; Just. 12.6.15–17.

¹¹⁰ On Callisthenes' opposition, see the note 70 above. For the historicity of the debate and the possible absence of Alexander from it: Bosworth *Historical Commentary* 1995, II: 77–8, 86.

He was less skilled, however, in avoiding Alexander's trap. In a symposion which probably took place after Alexander's failed attempt to introduce the *proskunesis*, Callisthenes was asked to speak in praise of the Macedonians. A show of eloquence was a legitimate entertainment in a symposion, and Callisthenes was applauded for his performance. Alexander, however, challenged him to speak well against the Macedonians. The request was done in an apparent symptotic frame of mind which found displays of skills, challenges, denigrations, and reactions to them a source of amusement. Callisthenes excelled himself in disparaging the Macedonians, but his performance offended the Macedonians who, though used to giving insults in banquets, did not care to be on their receiving end. Thus Alexander succeeded in alienating Callisthenes from Macedonians who formerly supported him on his stand against Alexander's divine ambitions. He was later found guilty of involvement in Hermolaus' conspiracy on the basis of flimsy evidence.¹¹¹

The egalitarian ethos of the banquet was stronger than any lesson people might have learnt from Callisthenes' fall. About a year later, we find the Macedonian commander Meleager making sarcastic remarks in a banquet in India concerning Alexander's lavish gifts to the ruler of Taxila (Curt. 8.12.17–18; cf., Plut. 59.5). Curtius, our source for the episode, adds that Alexander held his anger in check remembering his repentance on Cleitus' death. It should be noted, however, that Meleager's freedom of speech was not on the same scale exercised by Cleitus or Callisthenes and that Curtius let Alexander have the last word when he decried Meleager's envious attitude. The last known symposion that ended in a conflict did not involve the king directly, but confirmed the banquet's potential for belligerency and its providing opportunities for insults. It occasioned a challenge to a duel between the Greek athlete Dioxippus and the Macedonian warrior Corragus, an event which inflamed ethnic rivalry in the camp and ended in the Greek's convincing victory. Alexander is said to have been disappointed with the result, and to have shown his resentment of the victor. Unknown Macedonians, quick to sense a royal mood, humiliated Dioxippus in another banquet by falsely accusing him of stealing a cup. Dioxippus retired to his quarters and

¹¹¹ Callisthenes' show of eloquence and Alexander's trap: Plut. 53.3–6; Brown 1949: 245–7; Hamilton 1969: 147–8. His implication in Hermolaus' conspiracy: Curt. 8.6.15–19; Arr. 4.13.5–6; Badian 2000: 71–2.

in his suicide note charged his accusers of foul play. The king, we are told, was quite upset by his death, though there is no indication that he punished the culprits.¹¹²

The symposion made honor volatile because it confused, in F. Stewart's terminology, horizontal honor due to an equal with vertical honor due to a superior. But the history of Alexander is not rich in providing similar ambivalent situations. This has much to do with Alexander's striving to erase any sense of equality between himself and others in his camp or empire. He did it by claiming superior honor and rank on the basis of his personal worth, his office, and his ultimate control over the resources and symbols of his empire.

¹¹² Diodorus 17.100–101; Curt. 9.7.116–26 (calling the Macedonian fighter Horratus); cf. Aelian *VH* 10.22. Bosworth *Alexander and the East* 1996: 116–7 argues for a deeper royal involvement in Dioxippus' fate.

PART FIVE

ALEXANDER'S LEGACY

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE LEGACY OF ALEXANDER IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

Richard Stoneman

1. *The Memory of Alexander*

The history of the Greek world assumes a different complexion following the death of Alexander. Within the space of a few years, its subject changes from that of the Greek homeland and its neighbours to that of the whole near east including Egypt and the lands west of the Indus. This change in geographical focus was the result of the driving ambition of a single man, Alexander, and his power to control an army of conquest and occupation; and yet, it is more than doubtful whether Alexander envisaged a result anything like that which actually occurred. His impact was felt in all areas of political and cultural life. In politics, he rapidly became a model for emulation by the hellenistic kings, and, to a much greater extent, the Roman commanders of the last days of the Republic.¹ The extension of Greek models to the near east and Central Asia influenced the art of those regions, including Afghanistan.² In literature, Alexander became a subject not only of historians but of contemporary writers of epic and, as the hero of the *Alexander Romance*, of the most influential work of historical fiction ever composed.³ An impact as wide-ranging as this prompted speculation, and accordingly Alexander became a frequent and prominent *topos* in philosophic writing of all kinds, from the simplest collections of exempla to the subtlest political discussions. This paper will consider the different forms of Alexander's legacy in philosophical discourse.

One must begin from the specific kind of *topos* which is the *exemplum*. Ancient education, which was founded on rhetorical training,

¹ Bohm 1989; Weippert 1972.

² Colledge 1987; Ozols and Thewalt 1984; Craven 1976.

³ Pearson 1983; Stoneman 1996; Stoneman 1999.

gave its pupils wide experience of the use of *exempla*, and this was deepened by philosophers and other intellectuals who used the *exemplum* for purposes of moral analysis and speculation. What is it that makes an *exemplum*, and what in turn makes that *exemplum* a fit subject for philosophical analysis and talk? Weippert (1972: 28) provides a good definition of the *exemplum*: “Exempla sind gleichsam Massquantitäten, mit denen man, abgelöst von jeder konkreten historischen Situation, operieren und die man deshalb, quer durch Zeiten und Räume, einander gegenüberstellen kann.” (“Exempla are measurable quantities with which one can operate independently of any concrete historical situation and which can be placed in opposition to one another obliquely across both space and time”). This definition presents the *exemplum* essentially as a tool for thinking with, something that might be used by a historian, a rhetor or a philosopher for their particular purposes.

The rhetorical emphasis of education in antiquity and the Middle Ages has as much to do with the adoption of *exempla*, whether Alexander or any other, than any profound identification with the character in question. Nevertheless, we must still ask, Why Alexander rather than another? Is it simply the volume of material available about his career? The diversity of his actions? Or is there something truly Protean about his nature which makes him more widely usable than any other historical figure? An answer to this will become to emerge in Section 2 when we consider the complex reactions of thinkers (philosophers, orators, and poets) to Alexander. But first we should mention briefly the way in which he was used as an *exemplum* by hellenistic writers and by some Roman rhetoricians.

If we consider the relatively few references to Alexander in hellenistic writers it appears that he is in general regarded as an example of virtue, at least in the old military sense.⁴ The rather numerous quotations from Alexander-historians and related authors (Diogenes, Cleitarchus) that focus on Alexander in the *Loci Communes* of Pseudo-Maximus Confessor⁵ generally represent Alexander as an *exemplum*

⁴ Bohm 1989: 29–31. Compare the use of Alexander in Menander Rhetor, where he stands for the ideal world-conqueror and city-founder: II.iii.187, 191, 219 and 113.

⁵ Ps-Maximus Confessor, *Loci Communes*, Migne PG xci 721–1018 is a florilegium of *exempla* to illustrate sermons on various moral topics, taken about half and half from Christian fathers and from earlier Greek writers, including Euripides, Menander,

of positive qualities: continence, liberality, praise of Diogenes, valuing his friends, meditations on death. There is no sign of the hostile *topoi* that we shall discuss below. Again, in the well-known passage (9.18) in which Livy polemicises against *levissimi ex Graecis*, who took the view that Alexander would have defeated Rome if he had chosen to make war on that city, it is clear that his Greek source had treated Alexander as an example of military virtue: Livy's aim is to show that the Romans had greater virtue, and that it was Alexander's *Fortuna* that had given him his victories. We shall return to this long-running debate shortly.

In Valerius Maximus, the small number of exempla involving Alexander do not present him in a hostile light. Many are morally neutral: he is the addressee of clever remarks (7.3. ext. 1), or the object of advice from Aristotle to Callisthenes (7.2. ext. 11), where the implication is that Callisthenes is stupid rather than that Alexander is cruel. His vanity is the subject of 8.14. ext. 2, his generosity of 5.1. ext. 1, his *pietas* of 5.6. ext. 5. Other occurrences include remarks on strategy: 6.4 ext. 3, 9.3. ext. 1, etc. Valerius seems not to have used any Greek writers, and his exempla are all drawn from Roman sources.⁶

The same variety of tone can be observed in other Roman writers. In Aulus Gellius 9.3.4, moral points are various, and often positive.⁷ The exemplum is really an excuse for telling a story. Even Athenaeus (who is in many ways a rather Roman writer)⁸ uses his anecdotes for their own sake, not to prove any consistent point. If his anecdotes about Alexander are all about luxury and drunkenness (10.44–49, 12.50–55), that is because that is what his whole book is about.

Diogenes, Epictetus (the pre-existing florilegium), Plutarch etc. A treatment of the Plutarch quotations in the work (van Deun 1993) has shown that most of them can be identified and that the compiler is a reliable witness; the Plutarch quotations that are not attributable may therefore be genuine fragments of lost works. In view of this, it is reasonable to suppose that the many quotations from Diogenes for which we have no other source do in fact derive from a reliable collection and may be used (with caution) as witnesses for the Diogenean tradition. A full edition and study of this neglected work would be of extreme value to the historian of Greek thought. Such an edition had now appeared: Ihm 2001.

⁶ Bloomer 1992; Skidmore 1996.

⁷ Cf. Holford-Strevens 1988: 30.

2. *Thinking about Alexander*

a. *A 'philosophic opposition'?*

Many discussions of the issue of the attitudes of ancient philosophers to Alexander have been couched in terms of 'pro' and 'anti'. W. W. Tarn argued for a characteristic Peripatetic attitude to Alexander,⁹ deriving from the unhappy circumstances of the death of Callisthenes; others have sought to extrapolate the views of the Stoic philosophers on the conqueror,¹⁰ or those of the Christian fathers. I think that this may be a kind of category mistake, like searching the works of Wittgenstein for his attitudes to Henry VIII. Philosophers do indeed discuss historical figures, but their aim is to do philosophy with them and it should not be taken as self-evident that their aim is that of moralists.¹¹ To put it another way, Alexander (and many other historical figures) became *exempla* in education, and their role may be the rhetorical one of forming a piece of an argument, rather than a historical judgment. If the judgments of the philosophers seem sometimes inconsistent, or hard to disentangle, it may be because we are looking for the wrong sort of answers. The point is that people in antiquity (and later) were unable to get him out of their imaginations, and thus could use him as examples both of vice and virtue and, ultimately, as a vehicle of timeless wisdom.

Alexander associated with a number of philosophers, including Anaxarchus¹² and Pyrrho,¹³ as well as the obscure figures Psammon and Leon. But the most important was Callisthenes, the nephew of Aristotle, who has been regarded as the central link between Alexander and his master. His falling-out with Alexander over the issue of *proskynesis*, which led to the philosopher's death, has been seen as the foundation stone of the later philosophical 'hostility' to Alexander.

⁸ Stoneman 2000.

⁹ Tarn 1939, responding to Fisch 1937. Mensching 1963 argues against a unitary peripatetic view, not least because of the slightness of the evidence.

¹⁰ Hoffmann 1907; Eicke 1909; Stroux 1933; Fears 1974; Wardman 1955.

¹¹ Cf. Williams 1981: 22: 'Let us take first an outline example of the creative artist . . . Without feeling that we are limited by any historical facts, let us call him *Gauguin*'.

¹² Borza 1981.

¹³ Flintoff 1980.

Tarn 1939 saw it as the beginning of a Peripatetic view of Alexander;¹⁴ however, this has not won acceptance, and indeed it is difficult to see any qualitative difference between Peripatetic hostility to tyranny and pride, and Stoic (or other) hostility to the same qualities.¹⁵ There is no doubt that the death of a philosopher at the hands of a king is an event likely to impress other philosophers. Ever after, the event would be a handy exemplum for tyrannical behaviour, and it is not surprising that philosophers like Cicero and Seneca made a good deal of it. But it would be wrong to categorise all the other exempla based on Alexander to fit this single supposed division of opinion between Peripatetics and Stoics. Not least because there are other philosophical traditions that make even more of Alexander, and explore issues more deeply through his personality than the Stoic moralists could do. I am thinking here of the Cynics.

b. *Cosmocrator and Cosmopolites*

From the first, the sheer magnitude of Alexander's achievement had stimulated thinkers of all kinds to new efforts to find a place for him in their world views, efforts which went far beyond the simple employment of *exempla*. Where could achievements of this kind be fitted into the traditional moral categories of Greek thought, with their emphasis on the divine punishment of excessive ambition, hostility to 'tyrannical' behaviour and approval of the man who is content with little? One of the most familiar anecdotes about ancient philosophy is that relating the encounter of Alexander the Great and the Cynic philosopher Diogenes at Corinth. When Alexander espied Diogenes sitting in his barrel, he was so impressed by the man's example that he offered him whatever gift he would like: Diogenes, famously, replied, 'Please stand out of my sunshine.'¹⁶ The moment,

¹⁴ This was exploded by Badian "Alexander the Great" 1958: 144–7; cf. Mensching 1963.

¹⁵ More recently, Luisa Prandi 1985 has developed an argument that one can distinguish a Peripatetic and a Stoic view of *Callisthenes* in the sources: the Peripatetic view is to be associated with the authors who refer to him as a *philosophos*, while the Stoics are those who refer to him as *sophistes*. However, it does not seem easy to maintain this distinction, particularly as Prandi herself admits that both views co-exist in Trogus. Callisthenes' output was of a varied nature (Pearson 1983: 25) and both terms might be suitable for different works. For Alexander and his contemporary Greek intellectuals see Faraguna in this volume.

¹⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 7.2; Diog. *Ep.* 33.

whether historical or not, caught the imagination and formed the starting point for a very varied development of philosophical anecdotes, examples and fictional conversations, all building on the extreme contrast of the man who conquered the whole world and the one who was content to own nothing, the ruler of the world (*kosmokrator*) and the citizen of the world (*kosmopolites*).

Alexander's encounter with Diogenes became a defining moment for the nature of Alexander's rule and the contrast of the two ways of life.¹⁷ The two protagonists are made to appear similar as well as different: for Maximus of Tyre (*Or.* 29.2) the key to understanding both is that they are seeking 'happiness'. Yet it would be a mistake to say that there is one single meaning that attaches to the meeting. In fact, the essence of a good story is that it can be used in many contexts, can bear multiple meanings. The encounter of the philosopher and the king is a story-pattern as much as it is a philosophical debate.¹⁸ Another form of the Diogenes-Alexander meeting appears at D.L. 6.68, where Diogenes shows his lack of fear: 'Why should I be afraid of you if you are to be admired?' Craterus also had an encounter with Diogenes (D.L. 6.587). Alexander's frequent appearance in such anecdotes about Diogenes (and occasionally others) is an index of the proportionate size with which he loomed on the intellectual horizon of antiquity, rather than of the enormity of his acts. Agatharchides fr 17 has Alexander as chief exemplar of the man 'ensnared by praise'—but he also cites Cassander, Lysimachus and the nations of the Medes, Assyrians and Persians for the same failing. Similarly, Alexander's appearance in Val. Max. 8.14 ext. 2 (the regrets about the infinite worlds) is one of an entire section

¹⁷ On the later history of the encounter, see the treatments by Dio Chrysostom, Maximus of Tyre, John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* iii.14, v. 17 (where the moral is *pecuniam contempnendam esse pro sapientia*); Frederick the Great's encounter with St Francis was made to recall that of Alexander with Diogenes (Kantorowicz 1927: 151). The most thorough survey for antiquity is Buora 1973–4; see also Goulet-Caze and Goulet 1993: 38 n. 30, with further bibliography, and Servais 1958; for later traditions see Niehues-Pröbsting 1989; Largier 1997.

¹⁸ Buora 1973–4 lists a number of parallel encounters of philosophers and kings from antiquity, including that of the Cynic Isidore with Nero (Suet Nero 39.5) and that of Diogenes with Vespasian (Dio *Epit.* 66.15.5). To these one could easily add such classics as Solon and Croesus (Hdt 1.29ff.), Apollonius of Tyana and Domitian (Philostr. *Vit.* Ap. Ty. 7.32–35), Secundus the Silent Philosopher and Hadrian,¹⁹ Anaxarchus and Nicocreon (where it was the philosopher's job to make a witty reply even while being tortured to death (D.L. 9.59, and Val. Max. 3.3. ext. 4, cf. D.L. 9.27 on Zeno of Elea).

devoted to ambition, with many other historical characters exemplifying the same trait. Maximus of Tyre 32.9 contrasts Alexander and Diogenes in their search for pleasure, but his examples also include Xerxes, Cambyeses, Sardanapallus, Smindyrides and Croesus. Alexander was not singled out by the ancient moralists as a unique target of hostility.

His importance was rather in having made this kind of speculation possible. One may think of the hellenistic world as continuing to hold the sort of view of character that Aristotle expresses in the *Poetics*:¹⁹ the character is there for the sake of the action, not the action to express the character. Polybius, to take one example, looks at actions and moments, and does not try to develop a rounded portrait of his characters, still less of Alexander in his rare mentions of him. Character only comes in with Plutarch.²⁰ An important dynamic of Greek moral thinking is the judgment of individuals as types, as instantiations of a set of (often homogeneous) traits. This remains fundamental not just in fifth century literature, but even in Plutarch.²¹ Similarly in the moralistic tradition the character is there to make the point that is required for a particular argument: the arguments are not to be collected and assembled into a cohesive view of the 'character' in question.

Alexander's historical importance in such debates is, from this perspective, rather different. Alexander created the hellenistic world in which the sense of citizenship was lost and it was possible for Cynics to develop a sense of cosmopolitanism, the corollary of alienation and individualism.²² Alexander represents that alienation in his own person. Instead of A. E. Housman's speaker, 'I a stranger and afraid, In a world I never made'²³ Alexander, in being bested by Cynics, is a stranger and afraid in a world of his own creation.

It is easy to assemble examples from the Cynic writers where Alexander is presented in a hostile light. Among these one may note

¹⁹ Arist. *Poetics* 1459a20–21.

²⁰ Bohm 1989: 29–31: 'kein eigenständiges Alexander-bild . . . die Gestalt Alexanders bleibt ohne spezifische Kontur'. One may compare Diogenes Laertius' interest in what his philosophers do, rather than in their arguments: their actions express their philosophy, not their character. This anecdotal view of philosophy rather appealed to Nietzsche: cf. Niehues-Pröbsting 1989: 320–4.

²¹ Pelling 1990: 255–6.

²² Freud in *Civilization and its Discontents* called it 'das ozeanische Gefühl': Niehues-Pröbsting 236.

²³ *Last Poems* xii.

Teles, who attacked Alexander for his desire for deification, and this view was shared by another Cynic, Crates.²⁴ This objection, however, did not stand the test of time—perhaps because under the Roman Empire it became so easy to become a god—and the moral criticisms proved the more enduring. Among these were condemnation of Alexander's lust: Dicaearchus and Theopompus²⁵ both attacked him on this count, and one of the pseudonymous 'Letters of Diogenes' (no. 24)²⁶ described him as having been 'conquered by Hephaestion's thighs'.

In fact this trait is so consistent that Tarn (1939), observing that the Cynic Onesicritus represented his king in a generally favourable light, went so far as to say that Onesicritus was not a genuine Cynic but a hypocrite, whose life did not match his precepts. At the very least it must be true to say that there are two strands of Cynic thought on Alexander;²⁷ but even this may be too simple. John Moles²⁸ has developed the useful distinction of 'hard' and 'soft' Cynicism, which sets those Cynics who reject the whole of civilized life (such as Diogenes) against those who take from their philosophy a set of ideals by which to live without rejecting the world around them in its entirety. Onesicritus would thus be a 'soft' Cynic, who accepts kingship as a given but strives for improvement of the king. If Onesicritus, as is highly likely, is the ultimate source of the accounts of Alexander's meeting with the gymnosophists in the *Alexander Romance* and other works, then he is surely the source of the particular thrust of that encounter (see below), which represents him as ready to learn from the austere Gymnosophists. In addition, Alexander is quite often represented as admiring Diogenes (D.L. 6.32) as well as having similar aspirations (Max. Tyr. 29.2). They are parallels as well as opposites: for example, both were born on the same day (Goulet-Cazé and Goulet 1993: 8).

In this context it is of interest that the popular tradition on Alexander, as represented by the *Alexander Romance*, represents him as notably chaste, and love interest is excluded even where one might

²⁴ Teles ap Stobaeus *Ecl.* 97.31; Paquet 1992: 172–201 assembles the data; Crates: D.L. 6.2.23.

²⁵ Dicaearchus: Athen. 13.603 a; Theophrastus: Athen. 10.435 a.

²⁶ Malherbe 1977.

²⁷ Brown 1949: 47–8; Höistad 1948, 204–13; Stoneman 1995: 113.

²⁸ Moles 1995.

expect it, in the episode (III.18) where Alexander visits the Queen of Meroe, Candace, in disguise. (In fact he finds in her a mother-figure rather than a lover).²⁹

But the real importance of Alexander as an exemplum in Cynic circles crystallised around two complexes of ideas: those concerning the ideal ruler and the question 'Who is the true king, the conqueror or the good man?' The theme became a commonplace, as for example in Musonius Rufus' discourse, 'That kings also should study philosophy (8), which suggests that the virtues of both are in important ways the same. The question is the object of a detailed study by Ragnar Höistad (1948) which demonstrates the central importance of Alexander—as well as one or two other Cynic heroes, such as Heracles and Cyrus—in the Cynic definition of the good for man. It is this which lies behind the regular contrast drawn between Alexander and one or other Cynic hero. Diogenes, already noted, is the most obvious example. Another is Crates, in Plutarch's *de tranquillitate animi* (466 D)

Alexander wept when he heard Anaxarchus discourse about an infinite number of worlds. . . . But Crates, though he had but a wallet and a threadbare cloak, went through his whole life jesting and laughing as though at a festival.

Similar contrasts are seen in Lucian's *Dialogues of the Dead*, where Alexander is variously contrasted with Hannibal (12) who accuses Alexander of having achieved what he did purely through good fortune and of having become a degenerate Persian monarch; with Diogenes (13) who mocks his desire to become a god and points out that the fact that he is dead proves that he was only the son of Philip after all³⁰ (the teasing attitude of Diogenes is notable throughout this dialogue and was surely a hallmark of the Cynic style); and with Philip (14) who accuses him of lust, vanity and foolhardiness. It is worth comparing also Dialogue 24, between Diogenes and Maussollus, where again the vanity of human ambition is mocked and Diogenes' achievement is stated to be more enduring than Maussollus' contribution.³¹ But in these dialogues of Lucian we are

²⁹ See Carney in this volume.

³⁰ Compare the anecdote about Diogenes saying 'If Alexander is Zeus, then let me be Sarapis'.

³¹ The idea of the comparative longevity of words against monuments is found as early as Cleoboulos of Lindos, Simonides 581 *PMG*.

already seeing some of the *topoi* that characterise the discussion of Alexander in Plutarch and Dio Chrysostom, to be considered below.

c. *L'Allegro e il Penseroso*

This ambiguity of the Cynic Alexander is best seen in the anecdotes about his encounter with the Brahmins and in particular his interview with Dandamis their leader.³² This takes its starting point from Onesicritus' meeting with the philosophers of Taxila, and is transformed by hellenistic writers into a face-to-face interview between Alexander and the philosophers. The earliest witness is a fragmentary papyrus (Berlin pap. 13044) containing a series of questions put by Alexander to the philosophers, the content of which appears as part of a more substantial narrative in the *Alexander Romance* (III.6) and in Plutarch's *Alexander* (64). A further development of the encounter, where the leader of the philosophers lectures Alexander at length on their way of life, appears in the later part of the same chapter of the *Alexander Romance*, but at much greater length in a work partially preserved on a papyrus of the mid-second century AD, in which it appears as one of a collection of Cynic diatribes.³³ This dialogue was reworked by the author of the work *On the Brahmins* attributed by Palladius, which may indeed be by the fifth century bishop of Helenopolis.³⁴ At some length Dandamis gets the better of the argument, extolling the way of life of the Brahmins to the disadvantage of the anxiety-ridden career of the great conqueror. The Cynic work falls into a pattern of hellenistic Utopian writing exemplified by Theopompus' Land of Meropis, the Happy Land of Iambulus located in India, and the novel of Euhemerus.³⁵

³² For the sources and analysis of this episode see Stoneman 1995. See also Stoneman 1994b for translations of the various texts.

³³ The Cynic diatribe is edited by Victor Martin 1959 and discussed by P. Photiades 1959. See further Claire Muckensturm 1993. Cynic interest in Gymnosophists is further indicated by the enthusiasm Cynics showed for the teachings of Democritus, who alone among ancient philosophers is said to have visited the sages of India: Stewart 1958.

³⁴ The text of Palladius is edited by Derrett 1960 and by Berghoff 1987. Both these editions are based on MSS of the freestanding work. I shall include a re-edition of the text that appears in the A-MS of Pseudo-Callisthenes in my forthcoming edition and commentary on the *Alexander Romance* (Mondadori). On the work see Berg 1970, Stoneman 1994a).

³⁵ Theopompus: *FGrH* 115; Iambulus: Diod. 2.57 f; Euhemerus: *ibid.* 5.41–46 =

The parallels with anecdotes about Diogenes and other Cynic works include the following. In a fictitious letter of Diogenes,³⁶ the philosopher, on hearing that Alexander wishes to see him, insists that Alexander come to him, and not vice versa; just so does Dindimus/Dandamis await the attendance of the king in the Brahman texts. Also interesting is the regular implication in the Diogenes story that Alexander *admired* the philosopher;³⁷ just so in the Geneva Papyrus and in Palladius ii.36 (and in the *Alexander Romance* III.6) Alexander is impressed by Dandamis and gives him gifts. Another feature is their adoption of a 'life according to nature' (Pall. ii.38, cf. Musonius Rufus xi (p. 59.4–6 Hense), and in particular of a vegetarian diet (Pall. ii.45–7, cf. 24).³⁸ Then there is their emphasis on freedom (Pall. ii.23, 'free because free *of desire*, 44 'slaves to anything': Dio Or 15 has the cynic claim to be freer than a king (cf. also Max Tyr Or. 36.6). The elimination of need is a way to virtue in many moralists: cf. Musonius Rufus xxxiv). The traits of Alexander which Dandamis disparages are (though not named as such) his *typhos* (ii.26, 28) and *tryphe* (ii.44), namely overweening pride and luxuriousness: both these traits become leitmotifs of the later Stoic moralisation of Alexander, but here they begin as part of the confrontation of opposites whose purpose is to define the nature of true kingship. In this episode Alexander may be seen as 'tempting' Dandamis (so Buora), though to little effect, just as he 'tempts' Diogenes in a number of anecdotes by offering him gifts. In a later development of the Dandamis story, the *Collatio Alexandri et Dindimi*, the two characters become a kind of Allegro and Penseroso, and one gets a distinct sense that Alexander, who gets the last word, has in fact won the argument on this occasion. If both Alexander and Diogenes are seeking "happiness" (Max Tyr Or. 29.2), it is a matter worth debating which of them has the better method.

The conclusion I draw is that Cynic treatments use Alexander as a 'tool for thinking with', not simply as an object of praise or blame.

T33–35, 36–39, 50 in Winiarczyk's Teubner edition. On the Utopian literature of the hellenistic period see Graf 1993; Baldry 1956; Ferguson 1975; Frank and Fritzie P. Manuel 1975; and my forthcoming 'Cynic Utopias and Christian asceticism'.

³⁶ Diog Ep 23; cf. Julian Or. 7.212c, citing Dio Chr. Or. 4.12.

³⁷ Dio Chr. Or. 4.7; Plut *Moral.* 33 F.

³⁸ Haussleiter 1935; Stoneman 1994 for further references. Cynics were not necessarily vegetarians, but the practice is an aspect of a Utopian lifestyle.

d. *Stoics and the use of exemplum*

Stoic attitudes in many respects continued Cynic ones, and built on the moral teaching of Cynicism while removing the more anti-social elements, and indeed insisting that the wise man is not only a king in his own right but also a citizen of the world-community.³⁹ Several important studies of Stoic attitudes to Alexander have gathered the evidence that the Stoics regularly opposed Alexander as a tyrannical ruler, characterised by vanity, lust, foolhardiness, anger and arrogance.⁴⁰ However, this picture was vigorously challenged by Rufus Fears,⁴¹ who pointed out that the evidence for a hostile attitude all comes from Roman Stoic writers, not from Greeks. Panaetius generally takes a favourable view of Alexander (*de Off.* 2.15.16).⁴² An opposite view seem to have been taken by Carneades, from whom Cicero took the anecdote of Alexander's encounter in which the pirate remarked that he could see little difference in the moral quality of their respective careers.⁴³ Plainly, not all Stoic thinkers thought identically; but the idea of a systematic hostile Stoic portrait of Alexander cannot be sustained.

In later Roman philosophical writers we find, besides the topoi that have already been enumerated, and a higher proportion of negative topoi in general, that of cruelty. This becomes particularly prominent in Lucan and Seneca. The view of the Neronian writers was no doubt coloured by the hated Nero's presentation of himself as an Alexander. They adopted, as 'philosophic opposition', the exemplary role of Callisthenes. For Lucan, Alexander was a murderous tyrant, an 'insane king', who filled the world with slaughter and was at last brought down by fate the Avenger.⁴⁴ The horrified emphasis on slaughter was shared also by Lucan's uncle the philosopher Seneca.⁴⁵ Tacitus explicitly compared Germanicus on his death with

³⁹ Dawson 1992: 160 ff.; Erskine 1990: 27–33, 73 f, 133.

⁴⁰ Hoffmann 1907; Eicke 1909; Stroux 1933.

⁴¹ Fears 1974.

⁴² One Stoic passage in Cic. *de Off.* (1.90 cf. 2.53) which compares him unfavourably with his father Philip as a bad ruler is argued by Fears to be Cicero's own invention and not to be derived from Panaetius, who is in general the source of the arguments in the *De Officiis*. (The passage is not included in the authoritative collection of the fragments of Panaetius).

⁴³ Cic. *Rep.* 3.14.24; taken up by Jewish writers: see J. ben Gorion *Der Born Judas* (Leipzig n.d.): 183.

⁴⁴ *Phars.* 10.20–46.

⁴⁵ Seneca *Ep.* 94.62.

Alexander,⁴⁶ yet the terms in which he did so drew attention to Germanicus' superiority in his 'kindness to his friends, moderation in pleasures, singleness of marriage and lack of bastard progeny.' By implication Tacitus attributes to Alexander the usual vices of anger, luxury, lust and incontinence (but not cruelty), as well as the *temeritas* which, he has to admit, characterised Germanicus also.

Seneca went beyond mere condemnation to a more complex philosophical position on Alexander's career. It is still based on the Cynic idea of the contrast of the two lives. In one passage he writes:

There are some men who, withdrawn beyond the reach of every lust, are scarcely touched at all by any human desires: upon whom Fortune herself has nothing that she can bestow. In benefits I must of necessity be outdone by Socrates, of necessity by Diogenes, who marched naked through the midst of the treasures of the Macedonians, treading under foot the wealth of kings. O! in very truth, how rightly did he seem then, both to himself and to all others who had not been rendered blind to the perception of truth, to tower above the man beneath whose feet lay the whole world! Far more powerful, far richer was he than Alexander, who then was master of the whole world; for what Diogenes refused to receive was even more than Alexander was able to give.⁴⁷

This passage plays on three leitmotifs of ancient thinking about Alexander simultaneously: his liberality, his insatiable desire or ambition (*pothos*) and his Fortune. Liberality is a prominent theme, not only in the *Loci Communes* but in the *Alexander Romance*, where it is the theme of the exchange of letters between Alexander's teacher Zeuxis and his parents.⁴⁸ Though liberality is in general a favourably regarded trait in antiquity, Alexander is represented in these letters as taking it to excess—thoughtless extravagance rather than considered generosity. The theme also appears quite frequently in Cicero (*Tusc.* 5.32.91; *de Off.* 2.53), though the construction placed on it by Cicero is more equivocal.

Alexander's insatiability, what the historian Arrian termed his *pothos*, 'longing'⁴⁹ became a standard element of the characterisation

⁴⁶ Tac. *Ann.* 2.73.

⁴⁷ Seneca *de Beni.* 5.4 (Loeb translation).

⁴⁸ The passage has dropped out of A, but is preserved in the Armenian translation and in Julius Valerius I.16. It is not included in the later recensions of the Greek Romance.

⁴⁹ Brunt in the Loeb Arrian I, appendix V.a (469–70), conveniently collects

of Alexander, so much so that it was regularly used as a school exercise for training in rhetoric. The *Suasoriae* of the Elder Seneca contain one exercise (1.1) devoted to the theme, 'Alexander debates whether to sail the Ocean'. The elements of the debate are the greatness of the ambition as commensurate with Alexander's achievements so far, versus the idea that Alexander should be content with what he has already done.

Another debate that focuses on Alexander's ambition which seeks to overleap all boundaries is *Suasoriae* 4, 'Alexander the Great, warned of danger by an augur, deliberates whether to enter Babylon.' Here Alexander's debate with himself concludes 'Shall there be one place in the whole world that has not seen you victorious? Is Babylon closed for the man to whom Ocean stood open?' Understood is the historical conclusion, in which Alexander did indeed enter Babylon, only to meet his death there.

Such exercises found their way even into the historians, such as Arrian who also allows Alexander a debate on whether to sail onto the Ocean beyond the borders of the world.⁵⁰ They represented very clearly the image of the overweening conqueror, who in the *Romance* has repeatedly to be warned by talking birds and other creatures to turn back from travelling beyond the world and from seeking to know the hour of his death. That motif too was taken up by the Elder Seneca (*Controversiae* 7.7.19), who refers to the voice heard by Alexander when he debated whether to cross the Ocean, which said, 'How much longer, O unconquered one?' Alexander is regularly used as an exemplum of excessive ambition in the philosophical letters of the Younger Seneca.⁵¹

e. *Plutarch, Arrian, and Dio: the 'Fortune' of Alexander*

The question that Alexander's success raised in the minds of many thinkers was, How did it come about in the first place? What was the reason for Alexander's extraordinary good fortune which made him so puffed up? The question could then be redefined, Was Fortune

instances of *pothos*. The expression may have been one much used by Alexander himself, as was argued by V. Ehrenberg 1938: ch. 2.

⁵⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 5.26; discussion in Bosworth. *From Arrian to Alexander* 1988: 125, 130-2.

⁵¹ Seneca *Ep.* 53.10; 59.12; 83.19.

on Alexander's side or not?⁵² The earlier panegyrical historians certainly represented Alexander as a conqueror with the gods on his side. This in itself could be used to belittle Alexander, as it was by Livy, who implied that Alexander made his conquests not by his own abilities but by the favour of Fortune: and 'no man was less able to bear good fortune than Alexander' (Livy 9.18.1). This idea of the corrupting influence of Fortune is the leitmotif of the entire *History* of Q. Curtius Rufus (e.g. 3.16.17–20).⁵³ For many thinkers he thus became a type of the tyrant, puffed up by his own good fortune and losing all self-control.⁵⁴ Those who admired Alexander had to deal with this objection and attribute his success to his own virtues rather than simply to Fortune.

Plutarch and Dio both pick up on the Cynic debate about the good king, almost as if the Roman moralizing strain had never intervened. Here for the first time in the Roman Empire we can perhaps speak of genuine philosophical discussion of Alexander, rather than the purveying of *topoi*. In this we see how frequently the Greek and Roman writers of the early Empire run along parallel tracks, representing entirely different concerns, and only rarely converging on to a shared complex of concerns.⁵⁵ I prefer this divide along linguistic lines to the conventional view (in Eicke, for example) that sees a straightforward linear progression in which second century Greeks represent a change of direction from first century Romans.

Plutarch's two essays, *On the Fortune and Virtue of Alexander* are complex. Various arguments are presented: Alexander in fact had a great deal of bad fortune too, so surely Fortune was against him much of the time (342 C), and his achievements were made in spite of Fortune (328, 341); Fortune gave him his throne, but it is what he did with his position that determines our moral judgment on him (329 D); by

⁵² The same debate was conducted about Scipio: Polyb 10.2.5–13.

⁵³ Cf. R. Stoneman 1999: esp. 171; W. Heckel, "Introduction to the Penguin Curtius," 12–13; Baynham 1998: ch. 4.

⁵⁴ For Timaeus' view of Alexander, see Hoffmann 1907, ch. 2; Menander fr 924.

⁵⁵ In a stimulating and subtle discussion, Sulochana Asirvatham, 'The Macedonians in the historical imagination of the second sophistic' (paper presented to the APA meeting in Dallas, Dec. 30, 1999), considers Aelius Aristides' presentation of the figure of Alexander and other Macedonians, arguing that the second sophistic hellenized Alexander in order to reconcile their Greek past with the Roman present, making Alexander in effect a precursor of the Roman Empire which now held Greece in subjection. This paper has been influential on my thinking about the different ways that Greek and Roman writers present Alexander.

his virtue he deserved his Fortune (340 A). His rash behaviour at the Malli town is presented as a contest of Fortune and Virtue (344 E).

Integral to Plutarch's discussion is Alexander's own philosophical position. The king is represented as an admirer of Diogenes (331 F: 'if I were not Alexander, I should like to be Diogenes'), and even as asking for forgiveness for his mission to conquer the world. One is reminded of his half-apology to Dandamis in the *Alexander Romance* for his career of conquest, which is forced on him by the necessity of his own nature, or of his expressed desire to learn wisdom from Dandamis in Palladius 2.20.⁵⁶ The antithesis Plutarch is exploring in this essay is that of the tyrant and the philosopher-king. For the Stoic the true philosopher was in fact a king because he possessed all that he could require, and in Plutarch's view Alexander has been instrumental in creating a world-state of the kind envisaged by the early Stoic thinker Zeno (329 AB).

There has been some debate as to the reliability of Plutarch's report here—both as to whether Zeno did describe a 'world-state' in his *Republic*⁵⁷ and as to whether Alexander was in any way regarded as an exemplar by Zeno. In general it is impossible to know for certain any views of the Old Stoa. However, Malcolm Schofield's arguments seem to me sound:⁵⁸ Plutarch is here unreliable: Zeno did not describe that world state in his *Republic*, which seems to have been more of a description of a particular *politeia*, like that of Plato in the *Republic* or the *Laws*. However, Plutarch does refer here to the Stoic world state, mistakenly attributing it to the work of Zeno cited;⁵⁹ but the involvement of Alexander with the theme is Plutarch's own invention.

Plutarch's hostility as an Academic to the Stoics and their 'self-contradictions'⁶⁰ would certainly allow him to distort reports of Zeno's views without compunction to support his argument. His sources in this work are eclectic and highly various. But the question remains

⁵⁶ This may have been present also in the Cynic discourse of the Geneva papyrus, though this is preserved only from a point corresponding to 2.22.

⁵⁷ Cf. Dudley 1937: 96–99; accepted by Sorabji 1993: 122, cf. 159, and by Erskine 1990: 27–33—'a positive proposal', and an attack on Plato.

⁵⁸ Schofield 1993: 104–111, appendix, "Zeno and Alexander." Schofield in the main follows Baldry's view (1965: 158–63), that Plutarch's testimony on Zeno here is incorrect.

⁵⁹ Tarn 1939.

⁶⁰ Tarn 1939:53.

whether Plutarch is advancing a serious philosophical argument in these essays, or whether he is simply carrying out a piece of epideictic display rhetoric. Tarn thought that these speeches represented a serious defence against attacks by Stoic philosophers. He is not the only scholar to have taken these essays seriously: Alan Wardman (1955) saw them as a discourse on the contrast of *logos* and *ergon*, and of *tyche* and *arete*. He sees Plutarch as viewing the whole course of world history as a trend towards world unity. Even Cynics—being sceptical about the claims of nation-states—had tended to a cosmopolitan outlook, which became more philosophically developed in Stoic thought in which any accommodation to the unity of the universe was an aspect of virtue. J. R. Hamilton (1969: xxiii–xxxiii) takes a more sceptical view of the essays, remarking that Alexander is simply too perfect in these works, and contrasting the treatment with Plutarch's in his *Life of Alexander* with its emphasis on character. While Wardman's view may be overstated, one should allow in the case of the *Life*, as well as in the case of the essays, for the exigencies of genre: the fact that the two genres support different attitudes does not mean that one attitude need have no validity. At the very least Plutarch has demonstrated the possibility of reimporting a philosophic content into what had been merely rhetorical *exempla*.⁶¹

It is no accident that the most favourable historical account of Alexander was composed by Arrian, who had held high military office under Trajan, an admirer of the Macedonian (Dio 68.29–30). Arrian had been a pupil of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus, and showed a particular interest in Alexander's adventures in India and his meeting with the Brahmans, composing a work devoted exclusively to India (the *Indica*), and promising also a monograph on the Brahmans (which does not survive, unless Palladius' monograph, as it states but as seems unlikely, incorporates this work of Arrian).

Arrian drew on the prevailing Stoic-Cynic tradition in his presentation of the Brahman episode, which is told not in the course of the narrative but in the context of an analysis of Alexander's character, where it is placed in immediate collocation with the Diogenes anecdote. But there is no hint in Arrian of all the regular Cynic objections to Alexander's rule and character, and Arrian is explicit in his admiration of the conqueror for the magnitude of his achievement.

⁶¹ Cf. Bosworth *From Arrian to Alexander* 1988: 73–4.

The positive evaluation of Alexander's kingship is even more obvious in the speeches devoted by Dio of Prusa to Alexander and his meeting with Diogenes.⁶² Fortune has deprived us of the eight books of Dio's work *On the Virtues of Alexander*, but two of the *Discourses on Kingship* are devoted to Alexander. Oration 4 is a treatment of the interview with Diogenes which presents Alexander as a lover of glory (4) but yet an admirer of the philosopher (7) (cf. D.L. 6.32). Alexander is presented as regretting the fate that compels him to arms (9), a position which recalls his apology to Dandamis for his career of conquest in the *Alexander Romance*. He only smiles at Diogenes' insults (19–20). (Again, in Palladius Alexander (II.31) is pleased and not angry at Dandamis' criticisms). Most of the rest of the discourse is devoted to Alexander's inquiry of Diogenes how to be a good king, and Diogenes' advice:⁶³ the true king is by definition a good man, and that means achieving self-knowledge, avoiding wealth, pleasure and ambition, and not allowing oneself to be conquered by women. (Alexander's sexual continence was a common theme, based on his chivalrous treatment of the women of Darius' family. Hephaestion's thighs seem now to have been forgotten!). The first part of this oration finds a parallel in Max. Tyr. *Or.* 36, where Diogenes' life is presented as a philosophic one, superior to that of the politician. The topos is not unusual.⁶⁴

Dio's Oration 2 develops the idea of Alexander as a philosophic king in the course of a discussion between himself and his father Philip about the value of Homer, his character Achilles as a moral model, and the characteristics of the humane king (77). One is reminded here of discussions like Philodemus' *On the Good King according to Homer*, a rare moment in which Cynic and Epicurean interests seem to converge. Alexander is represented by Dio as having learnt the lessons of kingship from Aristotle (79—a motif which points the way forward to the extensive development in late antiquity and especially in the medieval and Arabic traditions of Aristotle's advice to Alexander on kingship). Like Plutarch, Dio insists (*Oration* 64)

⁶² Jones 1978: 117–121. Some scholars, such as John Moles (1990), believe that all four discourses were written for presentation to, or delivery before, the Emperor Trajan himself.

⁶³ Cf also Diog. *Ep.* 40 on how to rule: self-knowledge and the keeping of good company.

⁶⁴ Dio *Or.* 6.5–7, 35 ff., Epict. *Disc.* 3.22.60.

that Fortune did as much to bring Alexander down as she did to raise him.⁶⁵

The theme of Fortune continues to infect writing on Alexander in the next generation, in the *Florida* of Apuleius (no. vii). Here Apuleius describes, in an encomiastic approach to Alexander, describes the king as greater than his fortune: he was not dominated by fortune but overcame it even when it was against him. This is a marked difference from the view that saw him as a victim of Fortune, and recalls Plutarch's emphasis on the use that Alexander made of his fortune. Apuleius continues with a discussion of Alexander's insistence that his image should only be reproduced by certain carefully selected artists, and contrasts this with the free-for-all that allows anyone who wishes to make their own image of philosophy. In this rather surprising comparison, Alexander is in a way equated with philosophy itself. His role as a character to provoke thought on important issues has turned him into a kind of emblem of philosophy.

The Later Empire

The figure of Alexander as at once a philosopher and a king is the one that now gradually comes to the fore in writing about his career. Perhaps this is a result of the influence of Stoic ideas on the discussions of what a ruler should be. It is a big jump from Dio and Apuleius to the Emperor Julian, author of the next substantial body of original writing about Alexander. That gap of 200 years is punctuated only by the appearance of Julius Valerius' translation of the *Alexander Romance* (about 272 CE) and of the *Itinerarium Alexandri* addressed to Constans.⁶⁶ Julian, both a soldier and a philosopher, regarded Alexander as a model. He was a strong admirer of Cynic philosophy, though not of its more unwashed adherents, who reminded him too much of his betes noirs, the Christian monks. For him, Alexander was a great military hero (2.203), ensnared by Fortune (2.211); and in his curious carnivalesque comedy, *The Caesars*, Julian represents Alexander in debate with Roman conquerors such as

⁶⁵ Høistad 1948: 219 argues that the different tone is to be explained by a difference in date. I would say it is just the argument that differs—and the difference is not so great anyway.

⁶⁶ See Stoneman 1999: esp. 173–182; Lane Fox 1997; Tabacco 2000.

Caesar and Trajan. Here, while not perfect, his anger and cruelty are tempered by remorse (325 B), though his indulgence in pleasure is unfavourably compared with Trajan's austerity. Alexander chooses Heracles as his patron god (335 D), as indeed in life he had aimed to follow in the drunken muscle-man's footsteps.

It is difficult to extract a coherent view from Julian's writings on Alexander. They may simply be muddled and immature. Eicke (1909, ch. iii) proposes a solution by suggesting that Julian admired Alexander as an emperor but disapproved of him when he was being a philosopher. It may be better to view his writings in the light of the dominance of the exemplum and the topos. Alexander is brought in to represent the things that in the rhetorical tradition he usually represented, without any particular wish to construct a systematic portrait. Julian's work, for all its Cynic affinities (and the appearance of Heracles, a Cynic hero), may be less philosophic than he liked to think. But he is a good argument against the view that the Cynic view of Alexander was a uniformly hostile one, except in the case of Onesicritus. He thus takes his place alongside Palladius and the Geneva papyrus as a purveyor of an often sympathetic view of the conqueror.

It would take us too far from our theme to collect the late scraps of exempla featuring Alexander as they appear in the Church Fathers.⁶⁷ Nor shall I pursue here the development in which the medieval tradition achieved a more thoroughgoing transvaluation of Alexander—in which, in K. Mitsakis' neat phrase, Alexander was 'born an antique pagan, died a Byzantine Christian.'⁶⁸

The conclusion of this survey must be that philosophers, on the whole, did not spend their time endeavouring to construct a moral evaluation of Alexander. The purposes of philosophers are different: they discuss moral issues, and they use examples to make their points. Alexander was a fertile source of exempla because he had made

⁶⁷ A good handful are collected by the works cited in note 10. For example: Tatian, *Or. ad Graecos* 2 calls him an insane youth, and regards him as corrupted by Aristotle's flattery; Clement *Protr.* p. 24 objects to his arrogance; Augustine *CD* 18.42 picks up the Ciceronian hostility (4.44, 18.44); and his friend Orosius (3.16–20) also castigated Alexander in terms which recall those of Seneca. Some of the Greek fathers were less severe: Basil (*de legend libr gentil* 5, *de tempo et incontinent* 19, *epist.* 1.24, 2.94, 2.272), even proposed him as an example for imitation. Jerome, with his deep respect for classical culture, was pulled both ways, condemning his vices but admiring his achievement (*ep.* 107.682, *apol. Adv. Libr. Rufini* 567; *vit. Hilar.*)

⁶⁸ Mitsakis 1967: 18.

such an impact on the hellenistic world. The cases in which we find a consistent view of the conqueror being developed are those cases where an author used him to develop an extended argument (Plutarch, Dio); other writers often merely reacted to his image (Lucan, Seneca); but the most consistent exposition of Alexander's significance in the 'choice of lives' comes in the works that employ him to explore just that, the Geneva papyrus and its descendant Palladius (see 2c above); and also the portions of the *Alexander Romance* that explore the same topic. We are far from Tarn's supposition of a uniformly hostile Cynic view of Alexander; in fact, it is in Cynic writings on Alexander that we seem to see them developing a philosophical argument with most consistency and subtlety.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND THE MACEDONIAN CONFLICT

Loring M. Danforth

Alexander the Great is without a doubt the most famous Macedonian who ever lived. No discussion of Macedonia, ancient or modern, is possible without at least some reference to this brilliant general, powerful king, and conqueror of the known world. A 1996 *National Geographic* article on the newly independent Republic of Macedonia describes Macedonia as “the homeland of Alexander the Great,” adding that “today’s Macedonians . . . trace their name to the empire of Alexander the Great in the fourth century BC” (Vesilind 1996: 124).

Comments like these raise the very issue that lies at the heart of the Macedonian conflict, the “global cultural war” (Featherstone 1990: 10) that since the late 1980s has been waged by Greeks and Macedonians in the Balkans and in the diaspora over which group has the right to identify themselves as Macedonians. The Macedonian conflict is a dispute over the name “Macedonia,” the glorious legacy of Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians, and ultimately the territory of Macedonia itself. For in the crowded Balkan landscape geography and history are bitterly contested, as Greece and Macedonia both assert their mutually exclusive claims over the same places, the same symbols, and the same famous ancestors.¹

I begin this essay with a brief account of the history of the Macedonian conflict and a summary of both the Greek and the Macedonian positions on the issues involved. Drawing on recent theoretical work on nationalism and the construction of national identities and cultures, I then examine the role of classical archaeology in creating the “symbolic capital” (Bourdieu 1977) with which Greeks and Macedonians each seek to legitimate their own national narratives of historical continuity with ancient Macedonia. Finally, I show how both

¹ For a more detailed discussion of the Macedonian conflict see Danforth 1995.

groups attempt to promote their national interests in the worlds of academia, public opinion, and international affairs by attempting to appropriate for their own exclusive use two of the most important symbols in the Macedonian conflict—the sun or star of Vergina and Alexander the Great himself.

The Macedonian Question in Balkan History

The Macedonian Question has dominated Balkan history and politics for over a hundred years. During the Ottoman period the population of Macedonia included an amazing diversity of linguistic, religious, and ethnic groups. Toward the end of the nineteenth century Greece, Bulgaria, and to a lesser extent Serbia, became involved in the “Macedonian Struggle,” in which each state asserted its irredentist claims over the people and the territory of Macedonia. At the end of the Balkan Wars (1912–13) Macedonia was divided among Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia, and the inhabitants of the area were subject to policies of forced assimilation, whose goals were to transform the diverse population of the area into ethnically pure and homogeneous populations consisting exclusively of Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbs.

Under the Metaxas dictatorship of 1936–40 the Slavic-speaking population of Greek Macedonia, some of whom by this time had begun to develop a Macedonian national identity, experienced severe repression. After the Greek Civil War (1946–49), in which many Macedonians supported the unsuccessful Communist cause, some 35,000 Macedonians fled to Yugoslavia and other countries in eastern Europe under extremely difficult circumstances. In the decades that followed, conservative Greek governments continued the policy of forced Hellenization. In the mid 1980s a small group of people from northern Greece asserted their existence as a Macedonian minority and began to demand increased linguistic and cultural rights.

Until World War II the official Serbian (and later Yugoslav) position on the Macedonian Question was that the Slavs of Macedonia did not constitute a distinct ethnic or national group, but were actually all “South Serbs.” In 1944, however, Tito and the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia established the People’s Republic of Macedonia with its capital of Skopje as one of the states of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At this time the existence of a

Macedonian nation was officially recognized. By 1950 a standard literary Macedonian language had been developed, and in 1967 an autonomous Macedonian Orthodox Church was established. In this way Macedonians achieved a significant degree of cultural autonomy, even though they did not achieve complete national independence.

After the death of Tito and the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Macedonia declared its independence in September, 1991. Three months later at the insistence of Greece, the European Community announced that it would only recognize those former Yugoslav republics which guaranteed that they would not engage in hostile acts against neighboring EC states, acts which specifically included the use of a name that implied territorial claims against any such state. Even though an EC arbitration committee ruled that the use of the name "Macedonia" did not imply territorial claims against Greece, the EC in January, 1991, announced that it would recognize Slovenia and Croatia, but not Macedonia.

Then, in April, 1993, the Security Council voted to admit Macedonia to the United Nations under the temporary name of "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (usually abbreviated as FYROM). Macedonia, however, was not allowed to fly its flag (the sixteen-ray sun or star of Vergina) at UN headquarters, again at the insistence of Greece. In December what was now the European Union voted to recognize "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" and to establish full diplomatic relations with it. Greece responded by imposing a devastating economic blockade against Macedonia, which lasted until September, 1995, when the two countries signed an Interim Accord in which Greece agreed to end its blockade and Macedonia agreed to adopt a new flag. A permanent official name for the country, which will be mutually acceptable to both Greece and Macedonia, is the subject of continuing negotiations.

Conflicting Claims to Macedonian Identity

In early 1992, in Thessaloniki, New York, Toronto, and Melbourne, thousands of Greeks demonstrated against the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia by the European Community. They carried blue and white signs proclaiming the Greekness of Macedonia: "Macedonia is, was, and always will be Greek!" "Macedonian History is Greek History!" and "Macedonia = Greece." Several Greek politicians

have forcefully articulated the Greek position on the Macedonian conflict. Christos Sartzetakis on a visit to Australia in 1988, when he was president of Greece, said "We Macedonians are Greek precisely because we are Macedonians," while according to Stelios Papathemelis, former Minister of Northern Greece, Greece and Macedonia constitute such a perfect historical and cultural union that the name "Macedonia" is "an inalienable and eternal possession of Hellenism, a piece of its soul."² In the early 1990s the National Tourist Organization of Greece invited travelers to "Come to Greece and Visit Macedonia!" and an exhibition of antiquities from ancient Macedonia was presented in Montreal under the name "Greek Civilization—Macedonia, Kingdom of Alexander the Great" (Weaver 1997: 591).

According to the Greek nationalist position on the Macedonian Question, because Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians were Greeks, and because ancient and modern Greece are bound in an unbroken line of racial and cultural continuity, it is only Greeks who have the right to identify themselves as Macedonians. *Macedonia: 4000 Years of Greek History and Civilization*, written by a group of well-known historians and archaeologists, published in a lavish "coffee-table" format, and donated by a Greek-Macedonian organization to college and university libraries throughout North America, affirms Macedonia's "Hellenic character in ancient times," follows "Macedonian Hellenism's" struggle "for survival and national emancipation," and concludes with "the national liberation [of Macedonia] within the unified independent Greek state" (Sakellariou 1983: 9).³

From a Greek nationalist perspective, then, the Slavs of southern Yugoslavia, who are descended from the Slavic tribes that settled in Macedonia in the sixth century AD, a thousand years after the death of Alexander the Great, and who until 1944 called themselves "Bulgarians," have no right to identify themselves now as "Macedonians." They are usually referred to by Greeks as "Skopians" or "so-called Macedonians." From the Greek perspective a Macedonian nation does not exist; it is an "artificial creation," an "invention," of Tito, who "baptized" a "mosaic of nationalities" with the Greek name

² *Makedhoniki Phoni* [a publication of the Pan-Macedonian Association of Melbourne and Victoria] 2 [16] 1992: 9.

³ On the ethnicity of the ancient Macedonians see Badian 1982 and Borza 1996, who both conclude that in their own time the ancient Macedonians were generally perceived by the Greeks and by themselves not to be Greek.

"Macedonia" for his own political purposes. Similarly, because the language spoken by the ancient Macedonians was Greek (according to this perspective), the Slavic language spoken by the "Skopians" should not be called "the Macedonian language." It is generally referred to in Greek sources as "the linguistic idiom of Skopje" and described as a corrupt and impoverished dialect of Bulgarian. Finally, the Greek government denies the existence of a Macedonian minority in northern Greece, claiming that there exists only a small group of "Slavophone Hellenes" or "bilingual Greeks," who speak Greek and "a local Slavic dialect," but nevertheless have a "Greek national consciousness" (Kofos 1964: 226).⁴

For many Greeks, therefore, use of the name "Macedonia" by the "Slavs of Skopje" constitutes a "felony," an "act of plagiarism" against the Greek people. By calling themselves "Macedonians" the Slavs are "stealing" a Greek name and "falsifying" Greek history. As Evangelos Kofos, a historian formerly employed by the Greek Foreign Ministry, told a reporter: "It is as if a robber came into my house and stole my most precious jewels—my history, my culture, my identity."⁵

Macedonians, on the other hand, are committed to affirming their existence as a unique people with a unique history, culture, and identity, and to gaining recognition of this fact from the academic community, international political organizations, and world public opinion. In asserting what they sometimes call their "ethnospecificity," Macedonians insist that they are not Serbs, Yugoslavs, Bulgarians, or Greeks. Extreme Macedonian nationalists assert the existence of an unbroken line of racial and cultural continuity between ancient and modern Macedonians. They deny that they are Slavs and claim to be direct descendants of Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians. The more moderate Macedonian position is that modern Macedonians have no relationship to Alexander the Great, but are a Slavic people whose ancestors arrived in Macedonia in the sixth century AD. Proponents of this more moderate position, however, often go on to assert that the ancient Macedonians were a distinct non-Greek people and argue that the Greek claim to continuity with the ancient Macedonians is no more valid than the Macedonian

⁴ The existence of a Macedonian minority in northern Greece is attested to by a variety of sources. See for example United States Department of State 1994, Human Rights Watch 1994, and Danforth 1995: 108–41.

⁵ *The Boston Globe* January 5, 1993: 9.

claim. They also frequently refer to the empire of Alexander the Great as "the first Macedonian state," clearly implying some form of continuity between "the ancient Macedonian state" and the modern Macedonian state.

In addition to affirming the existence of the Macedonian nation, Macedonians are committed to affirming the existence of a unique Macedonian language as well. While acknowledging the similarities between Macedonian and other South Slavic languages, they point to the distinctions that set Macedonian apart as a separate language. They also claim that although standard literary Macedonian was only formally created and recognized in 1944, the Macedonian language has a history of over a thousand years dating back to the Old Church Slavonic used by Sts. Cyril and Methodius in the ninth century.

All Macedonians agree that Macedonian minorities exist in Bulgaria and Greece and that these minorities have been subject at times to harsh policies of forced assimilation. More extreme Macedonian nationalists hope to create a "free, united, and independent Macedonia" by "liberating" the parts of Macedonia "temporarily occupied" by Bulgaria and Greece. More moderate Macedonians, however, recognize the inviolability of international borders and explicitly renounce any territorial claims against the two countries. They do, however, demand that Bulgaria and Greece recognize the existence of Macedonian minorities in their countries and grant them the basic human rights they deserve.

The Construction of National Identities, Cultures, and Histories

Nationalism is an ideology whose goal is to create territorially bounded political units, or states, out of homogeneous cultural communities, or nations. From a nationalist perspective nations are regarded as communities of people who share a common culture, identity, and origin; they are considered natural phenomena of great antiquity. Benedict Anderson's well-known definition of a nation as "an imagined political community," however, emphasizes the fact that nations are socially and culturally constructed through complex historical and political processes (Anderson 1983: 15).

The greatest challenge facing the anthropology of nationalism is to avoid being taken in or coopted by the persuasiveness of nationalist myths. The anthropologists' task is to dereify the nation, to

deconstruct national cultures and identities, by analyzing the process of nation formation, the process by which nations, national cultures and identities, are constructed from preexisting cultural forms. These preexisting cultural forms, which include conceptions of shared blood, race, language, descent, and religion, are what Clifford Geertz has called "primordial attachments . . . the 'givens'—or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed 'givens'—of social existence" (Geertz 1973: 259).

In nationalist discourse a national culture is considered to be a territorially based and mutually exclusive entity characterized by homogeneity, boundedness, and continuity. A national culture is something a nation possesses, a nation's property; its existence according to Richard Handler is constitutive of the national identity and "proves the existence of the nation itself." Just as nationalists lay claim to a clearly bounded territory, they "construct an account of the unique culture and history that attaches to and emanates from the people who occupy it. It is at this point that disputes about the ownership of cultural property come into play" (Handler 1988: 51 and 154).

In their extreme form these disputes involve metaphorical or even literal attempts to treat some aspect of a nation's culture or history as a trademark, as something on which a copyright can be placed, marking it as belonging to one and only one nation. According to a nationalist perspective, therefore, a nation has a responsibility to defend its patrimony, its national cultural property, against efforts by another nation to appropriate it. Threats to a nation's cultural property are often treated as seriously as threats to a nation's territorial integrity, for culture, like territory, is an objective manifestations of a nation's existence.

Intellectuals and scholars from disciplines such as archaeology, history, folklore, and linguistics create the "symbolic capital" from which a national culture is formed. This national culture is then disseminated by the state to its citizens through various institutions, such as the mass media and the educational system. In this way a national canon is created in a variety of fields. The material culture of national ancestors is excavated, a national history is written, a national folklore is collected, and a national language is standardized. The construction of a national past is a particularly important component of the nation building process, an essential act of national self-definition. Nationalist myths of shared descent from a common ancestor with

their imagery of kinship, blood ties, and racial continuity constitute one of the most powerful tools with which to “imagine” a national community, particularly if the ancestor involved happens to be a world-famous historical figure like Alexander the Great.

Greek Archaeology and the Macedonian Conflict

Some archaeologists have recently begun to subject their discipline to a reflexive or critical gaze in order to draw attention to the ideological contexts in which archaeology is practiced. They have called for an increased awareness of the many ways their interpretations of the past are influenced by the political frameworks within which they work in order to confront directly the distortions and abuse these influences may cause.⁶ Caution is particularly warranted in the case of nationalist archaeology, whose task is to document the antiquity, continuity, and homogeneity of the nation in order to legitimate its claims to a national homeland, justify its existence as an independent state, and glorify its national history and culture (Kohl and Fawcett 1995: 5–6).

Archaeology as a discipline is well-suited to play a leading role in constructing a nation's past for a variety of reasons. The practice of archaeology, with excavations conducted by national archaeological services and schools, renders the discipline especially vulnerable to the ideological influence of the state. More importantly, however, the artifacts archaeologists excavate are often the very objects that constitute a nation's heritage. The fact that these artifacts were excavated from the earth means that they are literally “grounded” or “rooted” in the nation's territory. In addition, the act of excavation decontextualizes these objects spatially and temporally so that when they are placed in a new context—put on display in national archaeological museums—they can easily be invested with new meanings and become powerful national symbols (Hamilakis and Yalouri 1999).

Classical archaeology in Greece has a long history of association with the Greek state. As Ian Morris has argued, Greek archaeology “has appropriated the past for political ends in a most extreme form” (Morris 1994: 11). This act of appropriation took literal form when

⁶ See Fowler 1987: 241 and Kohl and Fawcett 1995: 16.

shortly after Greek independence all antiquities were declared by the Greek parliament to be the property of the Greek state (Hamilakis and Yalouri 1996: 119). In this way these antiquities also became the cultural property of the nation. The dominant ideology pervading the field of archaeology in Greece has been that of Greek nationalism. Its primary ideological purpose has been to construct a romanticized image of ancient Hellenism as the origin, not only of Greek national culture, but of all Western civilization as well.

Many scholars of nationalism have drawn attention to the close ties that exist between nationalist and religious ideologies and to the status of nationalism as a kind of civic or secular religion.⁷ It is not surprising, therefore, that Greek archaeology and the world of classical antiquity are frequently invested with religious imagery. Archaeological museums and ancient monuments are the shrines and pilgrimage sites of the religion of nationalism. As Hamilakis and Yalouri have shown, "classical antiquities are very often assigned the role of icons in the worship of the secular religion of Hellenism" (Hamilakis and Yalouri 1999).

The archaeology of Greek Macedonia offers clear confirmation of the politicization of archaeology that has taken place in Greece more generally. Until recently Macedonia was largely ignored by classical archaeologists, who preferred to work at famous sites in southern Greece such as Delphi, Olympia, and Mycenae. This situation changed dramatically in 1977 when Manolis Andronikos discovered the royal cemetery of Vergina and what he claimed to be the tomb of Philip of Macedon, father of Alexander the Great. Soon archaeological excavations in Greek Macedonia began to receive additional government funding, wider press coverage, and increased public attention.

When the Macedonian conflict began to emerge as an important "national issue" in the late 1980s, it was clear that archaeology in Macedonia had the potential "to offer material evidence concerning the ethnic identity of the ancient Macedonians and the Hellenic character of their culture" (Kotsakis 1998: 56). As a booklet expressing the Greek position on the Macedonian conflict put it, "The unity of Macedonians and the rest of the Greeks is proved once more every year, with the finds brought to light at the major archaeological sites of Pella, Vergina, Dion and Sindos" (*Macedonia History and Politics*

⁷ See, for example, Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983, and Hobsbawm 1990.

nd: 9). Given the power of the ideology of continuity in Greek culture, this archaeological evidence is cited in order to prove the Greekness of Macedonia today and to contribute to the integration of modern Macedonia into the Greek state and the Greek nation. Announcing an exhibit of Macedonian antiquities that was to be displayed in cities in Europe and North America in 1992, the Greek Minister of Culture and Science made this point in diplomatic and even military terms when he referred to the exhibit as a "cultural counterattack" against "Skopian propaganda." He went on to describe "Macedonian archaeological treasures" as "perhaps the best ambassadors [that can be] mobilized in the great battle for the defense of our national issues."⁸

The public acclaim accorded Manolis Andronikos shortly before his death in 1992 illustrates the political significance archaeology in Macedonia enjoyed during the controversy over the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia. Andronikos was awarded the Great Cross of the Order of the Phoenix, the highest civilian honor bestowed by the Greek government. In presenting him this medal on behalf of the president of Greece, the Minister of Macedonia-Thrace referred to Andronikos as Greece's "national archaeologist" and praised him for "arming the quiver of Hellenism, the quiver of the Greek nation, the quiver of Greece, with arguments that refute the false claims [of those who] misrepresent, falsify, and distort [Greek] civilization and history."⁹

*Alexander the Great and the Sun or Star of Vergina:
Contested Symbols of Macedonian Identity*

After the name "Macedonia" the two most bitterly contested symbols in the Macedonian conflict are the sun or star of Vergina and Alexander the Great himself.¹⁰ Both Greeks and Macedonians seek to gain exclusive rights over these symbols in order to legitimate their claims to Macedonian identity, to continuity with ancient Macedonian civilization, and to the modern territory of Macedonia itself.

⁸ *Nea Elladha* [a Greek newspaper published in Melbourne] February 15, 1992: 1.

⁹ *Makedhoniki Zoi* [a Greek periodical published in Thessaloniki] April, 1992: 10.

¹⁰ On the controversy over the use of the name "Macedonia" see Danforth 1995: 153–163.

The sixteen-ray sun or star of Vergina was virtually unknown to the public and had no political or national significance at all until it was discovered in 1977 adorning a gold chest in an ancient Macedonian tomb at Vergina, a small village forty miles southwest of Thessaloniki. According to Manolis Andronikos this gold chest, or larnax, contained the bones of Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander. In his publications describing the royal tombs Andronikos has referred to this emblem in a variety of ways: as a "star," a "star-burst," and even as a "sunburst" (Andronikos 1978: 55, 67, 75-6 and 1980: pl. 30). Despite these inconsistencies in his description of this emblem, Andronikos has been very consistent in his assertions that it is a symbol of the Macedonian royal family.¹¹

By the late 1980s, when the Macedonian conflict was intensifying, both Macedonian and Greek nationalists, particularly those in the diaspora in Canada and Australia, eagerly seized on the sun or star of Vergina as a powerful national symbol that expressed their competing claims to Macedonian identity. In the early 1990s both Macedonians and Greeks carried flags depicting the gold sun or star of Vergina (against red and blue backgrounds respectively) during demonstrations for or against the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia. The sun or star of Vergina could be found on T-shirts, pins, key chains, medals, and plaques distributed by Macedonian organizations like the United Macedonians and by Greek organizations like the Pan-Macedonian Association. At this time the Greek government also began using this symbol of ancient Macedonia in more official contexts; it issued a postage stamp of the sun or star of Vergina, as well as a 100-drachma coin depicting the head of Alexander the Great on one side and the sun or star of Vergina on the other. In Greece the sun or star of Vergina was placed on the walls of airports, banks, and other public buildings. It could even be found on receipts handed out at toll booths on the National Highway.

The controversy over this symbol reached its peak in August, 1992, when the Macedonian parliament selected "the Macedonian sun" as the "state symbol" of the newly independent Republic of Macedonia and voted to place it against a bright red background in the center of the Republic's new flag. The Greek government, with the

¹¹ For other perspectives on the archaeological significance of the sun or star of Vergina see Borza 1981: 82 and Adams 1983: 4.

support of Greeks throughout the world, expressed outrage at what it considered to be the misappropriation of a symbol of Macedonian Hellenism by a group of Slavs. A spokesman for the Greek Foreign Ministry called this "the outright theft of a Greek historical symbol," while a Greek newspaper in Melbourne wrote that "the government of Skopje has rudely insulted Greek history and the political inheritance of Macedonian Hellenism by selecting as its national flag the well-known sixteen-ray sun of Vergina."¹²

Because the sun or star of Vergina was found on Greek soil, the Greek government claimed that its use by the Republic of Macedonia constituted proof of the Republic's irredentist designs on Greek territory. The Greek government, therefore, demanded that Macedonia adopt a new flag and prevented it from flying its flag at the United Nations and at the Olympic Games. In a final attempt to assert the Greek claim to this symbol—what could almost be called a campaign of "heritage restitution" comparable to the Greek attempt to regain possession of the Elgin Marbles from Great Britain (Lowenthal 1988: 727)—the Greek parliament in February, 1993, designated the star of Vergina an official symbol of Greece. The Macedonian government finally abandoned its claim to the sun or star of Vergina when it signed an Interim Accord with Greece in September, 1995. In exchange for an agreement by Greece to end its economic blockade, Macedonia agreed to adopt a new flag, which proved to be a stylized image of a gold sun with sixteen triangular rays in red and gold extending out to the edges of the flag.

To many Greeks and Macedonians Alexander the Great is a famous national ancestor, a powerful symbol of their national identity, and a crucial component of their national history and culture. Since the late 1980s he has been a common figure in the floats and parades that Greek and Macedonian organizations in Canada and Australia contribute to festivals celebrating multiculturalism and ethnic diversity. Demonstrations held throughout the world in the early 1990s by Greeks and Macedonians in opposition to or in support of international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia were often led by men dressed as Alexander wearing a crested helmet, breast plate, and greaves and holding a shield and a spear. Each group was outraged that the other had appropriated its own famous ancestor for such obviously political purposes.

¹² *Makedhoniki Phoni* 2 [16] 1992: 4.

The Greek government has been very active in using the figure of Alexander to promote its position on the Macedonian conflict. Consider, for example, "The Search for Alexander," a well-publicized art exhibit that toured major cities in the United States in the late 1980s. When the exhibit opened in Thessaloniki in July, 1980, Constantine Karamanlis, then president of Greece, described Alexander as a "representative of all the Greeks" and "a symbol of indissoluble unity and continuity between ancient and modern Hellenism" (Green 1989: 155). In his review of the exhibition Peter Green described several ways in which historical accuracy was subordinated to "the interests of national pride and publicity" when the Greek government realized the enormous political capital that could be made by using the exhibit as a vehicle for asserting the Greekness of Macedonia. Most significantly Green documented "the complaints, among non-Greek participants in the organization of the exhibition, that various Greek officials, including some from the Ministry of Culture and Sciences, had been putting pressure on them to tone down, or omit, statements that did not accord with the official Greek line" (Green 1989: 151 and 158).

Sensitivity on the part of the Greek government to the image of Alexander the Great presented to the public in the mass media is indicated by two more recent incidents. In 1997 during preparations for filming "In the Footsteps of Alexander," which has appeared on the BBC and on PBS, Michael Wood submitted a request to the Greek Ministry of Culture and Sciences to interview Eugene Borza, a well-respected historian of ancient Macedonia at Vergina and Pella. The Ministry turned down Wood's request and forbid him to film an interview with Borza at any archaeological site or museum in Greece. Borza is well-known for his view that in antiquity the ancient Macedonians and the Greeks did not regard each other as the same people.¹³ Similarly, in 1998 the Greek government announced that it might withdraw its support for Hollywood director Oliver Stone's planned feature film on Alexander because of reports that his "version of the life of Alexander the Great would differ significantly from the historical version."¹⁴

¹³ See, for example, Borza 1996.

¹⁴ *Hellas Letter* [the monthly bulletin of the consulate general of Greece in Boston] December 10, 1998.

In many respects Alexander the Great as a symbol means the same thing to both Greeks and Macedonians. He is a famous ancestor, a military genius, a mighty emperor, and conqueror of the known world. In the Macedonian conflict, however, he also means different things to Greeks and Macedonians. He has different names, stands for different sets of values, and is incorporated into different canons of national heroes.

In 1990 the Pan-Macedonian Association of Ontario and the Greek Community of Metro Toronto donated a bust of Alexander the Great to the city of Toronto. Controversy immediately arose over the wording of the plaque that was to be placed on the base of the statue. The Macedonian community of Toronto objected to the planned description of Alexander as "King of the Greeks," arguing instead that the plaque should read "Alexander, King of the Macedonians." In a performance of Greek folklore and folkdance presented in Melbourne in 1991, Alexander was pointedly referred to as "Alexander, the Greek, the Great." Macedonians, however, generally refer to Alexander as "Alexander the Macedonian," occasionally describing him as "the father of the Macedonians." At soccer matches between Greek and Macedonian teams in Melbourne, Macedonian fans taunt their rivals shouting "Alexander's Maso! Alexander's Maso!" (i.e. "Alexander is Macedonian").

From the Greek perspective Alexander is one of the most powerful symbols of the Greekness of Macedonia, both ancient and modern. Not only was he Greek, but he was a great Hellenizer, the person who united the Greek city-states under one rule and spread Greek civilization throughout the known world. In the following passage from a poem that appeared in a Greek-American periodical, the ghost of Alexander is called upon to defend Macedonia against the "Slavs of Skopje," who are attempting to "steal" it from the Greeks:

Alexander's troops [shall] rise from Hades . . .
 And armour-clad descend upon the pests that dare lay claim
 to Grecian earth and history. . . .
 The Slavs shall tremble at the sight, to barb'rous lands retreat.
 Their Slavic tongues will then be ceased, and Greece not be defiled.¹⁵

¹⁵ Panagiotes Terpendrou-Zachariou, "Macedonia," *Makedonia* [a publication of the Pan-Macedonian Association of America and Canada] 39 [2] Summer-Fall, 1992: 17.

From the Macedonian perspective Alexander was a Macedonian (not a Greek), and he fought against the Greeks, conquering (not uniting) the Greek city-states. In Macedonian nationalist historiography Alexander is not an advocate of Hellenism, but an advocate of a cosmopolitan ideology promoting universal brotherhood, racial harmony, and the unity of mankind. According to Pribichevich (1982: 58), for example, in the administration of his empire Alexander put "into practice his idea of racial integration;" according to Stardelov (1993: 13), Alexander abandoned "the dogma of the 'difference' between Greeks and barbarians" and introduced instead "a new spirit of the equality of all peoples."

While this image of Alexander as the founder of a multiethnic empire inspired by dreams of different groups of people living peacefully together has some scholarly support,¹⁶ it must be understood in the context of two important issues in contemporary Macedonian political discourse—the campaign for the human rights of the Macedonian minorities in Greece and Bulgaria, and the commitment on the part of the Republic of Macedonia to remain a multinational state where Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Serbs and Roma (Gypsies) live together as equal citizens. The image of Alexander as a "champion of multiculturalism" serves to legitimate the policies of cultural pluralism of the present Macedonian state on these two issues by projecting them into the past and identifying them with "the first Macedonian state" of Alexander the Great.

Alexander is often incorporated into the canon of Greek national heroes, particularly those associated with the struggle to defend the Greekness of Macedonia. One figure in particular with whom Alexander the Great is frequently linked is Pavlos Melas, perhaps the most famous of the "Macedonian fighters," who died in 1904 attempting to liberate Macedonia from the Ottoman Empire and incorporate it into the Greek state. A well-known painting by the Greek artist Nikos Engonopoulos, entitled "The Two Macedonians," depicts Alexander the Great and Pavlos Melas both standing in the full military dress of their respective historical periods.¹⁷ And leading

¹⁶ See, for example, the selection from Tarn 1948 cited in Borza 1974: 79–85. Note also *The Oxford English dictionary's* statement that the expression "macédoiné," a salad of mixed fruits and vegetables, refers to "the diversity of peoples in the Macedonian empire of Alexander the Great."

¹⁷ See Plate 1 in Ninou 1980: 94.

a Greek demonstration against the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia held in Melbourne in February, 1992, were two men, one dressed as Alexander the Great, the other as Pavlos Melas, accompanied by the Greek flag, the Australian flag, and a blue flag emblazoned with the sun or star of Vergina. Another instance of the juxtaposition of Alexander the Great and a more recent Greek national hero is the cover of the 1993 reprint of Evangelos Kofos' *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*. Here Alexander the Great and Constantine Karamanlis (president of Greece in the early 1990s and himself a Macedonian), two defenders of the Greekness of Macedonia, are depicted together with Marshal Tito and Joseph Stalin—two Slavs, two communists, whose forces fought to detach Greek Macedonia from the Greek state during the Greek Civil War.

In an identical manner Alexander is also incorporated into the canon of Macedonian national heroes, linking him in a continuous historical narrative with more recent Macedonian national heroes. The most important of these is Gotse Delchev, leader of the Ilinden Uprising in 1903, an event Macedonians generally consider to have been their first war of national independence. In the early 1990s a small nationalist newspaper, *Republika*, appeared in Skopje; its masthead depicted the two Macedonian heroes, Alexander the Great and Gotse Delchev. During the same period a group of Macedonian nationalists established the "Alexander and Delchev Library" in a northern suburb of Melbourne where many Macedonian immigrants live.

And in a striking example of the construction of a canon of national heroes, a poem that appeared in a Macedonian newspaper published in Melbourne in 1990 invoked "the spear of Alexander the Macedonian, the sword of Samuel [an eleventh century czar claimed as a national hero by Bulgarians as well as by Macedonians], the gun of Gotse Delchev, and the machine-gun of Metodija Andonov Cento [a Macedonian nationalist imprisoned by Tito in the 1940s]" to unite in the fight for an independent Macedonia.¹⁸ These historical figures, who lived in very different historical periods and were motivated by extremely different political ideologies, have little in common except for the fact that they were seized upon by Macedonian nationalists in the 1990s as national heroes and linked together in a direct line to prove the historical continuity of the Macedonian nation.

¹⁸ *The Australian Macedonian Weekly* 162 August 28, 1990: 8.

Given the similarities that exist between nationalist and religious ideologies in cultures throughout the world, it is not at all surprising that Alexander the Great is a figure of almost religious significance in the context of the Macedonian conflict. Just as Alexander was deified and worshipped as a god in antiquity, so he has been incorporated into the pantheon of the secular religion of nationalism in the late twentieth century. In modern Greek popular culture Alexander the Great has been explicitly identified with Christian heroes and regarded almost as a Saint. For example, in the shadow puppet theater play, *Karagiozis and the Seven Beasts*, Alexander assumes the legendary role of Saint George, the dragon-slayer. The sanctity with which Alexander the Great is regarded in the context of the Macedonian conflict is also suggested by the comment of a young Greek elementary school teacher in Melbourne explaining why she was so infuriated when Macedonians claimed to be the descendants of Alexander. "To the Greeks," she said, "Alexander the Great is a Saint."

The force of this comment is confirmed by an incident that took place after the celebration of Greek Independence Day in Toronto in March, 1991. The Macedonian community of Toronto marked the day by placing a coffin in front of the Greek consulate to protest the Greek government's failure to recognize the Macedonian minority of northern Greece. The Greek community of Toronto marked the day with parades, speeches, and wreath laying ceremonies at the Cenotaph, a memorial to Canadian war dead, in front of the old Toronto city hall. On their way home after the celebration, three young Greek men passed the statue of Alexander the Great that stands in a small square at the center of Toronto's Greek community. One young man abruptly stopped, turned to the statue, and with his hands outstretched in front of him palms down bowed at the waist three times, saying "Bow. Bow. Bow." as he did.

This gesture, a parody of a Muslim act of prayer, mocks the Greek veneration of Alexander as a sacred ancestor. Simultaneously and paradoxically, however, it also offers persuasive testimony to the power Alexander the Great continues to hold for both Greeks and Macedonians as a bitterly contested symbol of Macedonian identity in the complex world of contemporary Balkan politics.

Conclusion

There is a possible alternative to this conflict between Greeks and Macedonians over which group is the true heir to the glorious legacy of Alexander the Great. A commitment to the principles of pluralism and multiculturalism is growing in both Greece and Macedonia, as Greece begins to deal with an increasingly diverse population of immigrants from Albania and other Eastern European countries, and as Macedonia struggles to ensure full rights as citizens to its large Albanian minority. A decline in the traditional ethnic nationalism that has, for so long, characterized political discourse in Greece and Macedonia should bring about a corresponding de-emphasis on the production of national cultures and histories understood as the mutually exclusive properties of specific nations. This could, in turn, lead to a kind of “denationalization” or “transnationalization” of the “symbolic capital” that constitutes the national culture and history of both Greece and Macedonia. In this way, what are now national communities could be imagined in new ways, so that more than one community could identify itself with the same name, use the same symbols, and claim descent from the same famous ancestor.

In such a transnational or post-national world, there could be two kinds of Macedonians, Macedonians who are Greeks and Macedonians who are not Greeks. In such a world, both Greeks and Macedonians—and other peoples of the Balkans as well—could draw inspiration from the ancient Macedonians and construct overlapping and interlocking, not mutually exclusive, identities based on shared descent from Alexander the Great. For to carry the genealogical metaphor one step further, two groups of people who trace their descent from a common ancestor could regard each other as relatives rather than as enemies.¹⁹

¹⁹ My research on the Macedonian Question has been supported financially by a Fulbright Scholar Award, a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, and a Roger C. Schumtz Faculty Research Grant from Bates College. Many Greeks and Macedonians from Florina, some now living in Melbourne and Toronto, generously shared their lives and experiences with me. Finally, I would like to thank three colleagues whose expertise in very different aspects of the Macedonian conflict I hold in great respect: Eugene Borza, Victor Friedman, and Riki van Boeschoten.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abd el-Raziq, M. 1984. *Die Darstellungen und Texte des Sanktuars Alexanders des Grossen im Tempel von Luxor*. Mainz.
- Abel, A. A. 1966. "La figure d'Alexandre en Iran." In: *La Persia e il mondo greco-romano*. Rome: 119–34.
- Abramenko, A. 1992. "Die Verschwörung des Alexander Lyncestes und die [TOU BASILEWS METHR]": Zu Diodor XVIII 32, 1." *Tyche*. 7: 1–8.
- . 2000. "Der Fremde auf dem Thron. Die letzte Verschwörung gegen Alexander d. Gr." *Klio*. 82: 361–78.
- Adams, J. P. 1983. "The Larnakes from Tomb II at Vergina." *Archaeological News*. 12: 1–7.
- . 1986. "Macedonian Kingship and the Right of Petitions." *Ancient Macedonia*. 4: 43–56.
- Adams, W. L. 1979. "Cassander and the Crossing of the Hellespont: Diod. 17. 17. 4." *Ancient World*. 2: 111–15.
- Adock, F. E. 1957. *The Greek and Macedonian Art of War*. Berkeley.
- Adkins, A. W. H. 1960. *Merit and Responsibility: A Study of Greek Values*. Chicago and London.
- Afnan, S. M. 1964. *Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian*. Leiden.
- Alexander, B. 1993. *How Great Generals Win*. New York.
- Alföldi, A. and E. 1976 and 1990. *Die Kontorniat-Medallions*. Berlin and New York.
- Allen, D. S. 2000. *The World of Prometheus: the Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens*. Princeton.
- Ameling, W. 1988. "Alexander und Achilleus: Eine Bestandsaufnahme." In W. Will and J. Heinrichs, eds., *Zu Alexander d. Gr. Festschrift G. Wirth zum 60. Geburtstag am 9.12.86*. Amsterdam: 657–92.
- Ampolo, C. 1990. "La 'Wirtschaftsgeschichte Athens.'" In L. Polverini, ed., *Aspetti della storiografia di Giulio Beloch*. Napoli: 79–104.
- Anderson, A. R. 1930. "Bucephalas and his Legend." *American Journal of Philology*. 51: 1–21.
- Anderson, B. 1983. *Imagined Communities*. London.
- Anderson, J. K. 1970. *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon*. Berkeley.
- Andreae, B. 1977. *Das Alexandermosaik aus Pompeji*. Recklinghausen, Bongers.
- Andronikos, M. 1978. "Regal Treasures from a Macedonian Tomb." *National Geographic*. 154: 54–77.
- . 1980. Andronikos, M., K. Rhomiopoulou, and N. Yalouris. *The Search for Alexander: An Exhibition*. New York and Boston.
- . 1984. *Vergina: The Royal Tombs*. Athens.
- Ashley, J. R. 1997. *The Macedonian Empire: The Era of Warfare under Philip II and Alexander the Great, 359–323 B.C.* Jefferson, N.C.
- Ashton, N. G. 1984. "The Lamian War—stat magni nominis umbra." *Journal of Hellenic Studies*. 104: 152–57.
- Atkinson, J. E. 1980–1994. *A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni*. 2 vols. Amsterdam.
- . 1987. "The Infantry Commissions Awarded by Alexander at the End of 331." In W. Will, ed., *Zu Alexander d. Gr. Festschrift G. Wirth zum 60. Geburtstag am 9.12.86*. Vol. I: Amsterdam: 413–35.
- . 1997. "Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni." *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt*. Vol. II. 34. 4: 3447–83.

- . 1998–2000. Q. Curzio Rufo *Storie Di Alessandro Magno*. 2 vols. Rome.
- . 2000. "Originality and its Limits in the Alexander Sources of the Early Empire." In A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham, eds., *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford: 307–26.
- Badian, E. 1958. "Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind." *Historia*. 7: 425–44.
- . 1958. "The Eunuch Bagoas." *Classical Quarterly*. 8: 144–57.
- . 1960. "The Death of Parmenio." *Transactions of the American Philological Association*. 91: 324–38.
- . 1961. "Harpalus." *Journal of Hellenic Studies*. 81: 16–43.
- . 1963. "The Death of Philip II." *Phoenix*. 17: 244–50.
- . 1965. "The Date of Cleitarchus." *Proceedings of the African Classical Association*. 8: 5–11.
- . 1966. "Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia." In *Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies Presented to Victor Ehrenberg on his 75th Birthday*. Oxford: 37–69.
- . 1967. "Agis III." *Hermes*. 95: 170–92.
- . 1975. "Nearchus the Cretan." *Yale Classical Studies*. 24: 147–70.
- . 1976. "A Comma in the History of Samos." *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*. 23: 289–94.
- . 1976. "Some Recent Interpretations of Alexander." In E. Badian, ed., *Alexandre le Grand, image et réalité*. Fondation Hardt, Entretiens 22. Geneva: 289–94.
- . 1981. "The Deification of Alexander the Great." In H. Dell and E. N. Borza, eds., *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honour of Charles F. Edson*. Thessaloniki: 27–71.
- . 1982. "Greeks and Macedonians." In Beryl Barr-Sharrar and Eugene N. Borza, eds., *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times: Studies in the History of Art*. Vol. 10. Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art: 33–51.
- . 1985. "Alexander in Iran." In I. Gershevitch, ed., *Cambridge History of Iran*. Vol. II. Cambridge: 420–501.
- . 1987. "Alexander at Peucelaotis." *Classical Quarterly*. 37: 117–28.
- . 1988. "The Ring and the Book." In W. Will, ed., *Alexander der Grosse*. Amsterdam: 605–25.
- . 1993. "Alexander and Philippi." *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*. 95: 131–39.
- . 1994. "Agis III: Revisions and Reflections." In I. Worthington, ed., *Ventures into Greek History*. Oxford: 258–92.
- . 1996. "Alexander the Great between Two Thrones and Heaven: Variations on an Old Theme." In A. Small, ed., *Subject and Ruler: The Cult of the Ruling Power in Classical Antiquity*. Ann Arbor: 11–26.
- . 1999. "A Note on the 'Alexander Mosaic'." In F. B. Titchener and R. F. Moorton, Jr., eds., *The Eye Expanded: Life and the Arts in Greco-Roman Antiquity*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 73–92.
- . 2000. "Conspiracies." In A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham, eds., *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford: 50–95.
- Baegel, W. 1913. *De Macedonum Sacris*. Dissertationes Halenses 22. Halle.
- Baharal, D. 1994. "Caracalla and Alexander: A Reappraisal." *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History*. (Collection Latomus 227) 7: 524–67.
- Bailey, H. W. 1971.² *Ninth Century Zoroastrian Books*. Oxford.
- Balcer, J. M. 1987. *Herodotus and Bisitun: Problems in Ancient Persian Historiography*. Historia Einzelschriften 49. Stuttgart.
- Baldry, H. C. 1956. *Ancient Utopias*. Southampton: Inaugural Lecture.
- . 1965. *The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought*. Cambridge.
- Balsdon, J. P. V. D. 1950. "The Divinity of Alexander." *Historia* 1: 363–88.
- Bastien, P. 1993. *Le Buste monétaire des empereurs romains*. Wetteren, Editions numismatiques romaines.

- Baynham, E. J. 1994. "Antipater: Manager of Kings." In I. Worthington, ed., *Ventures into Greek History*. Oxford: 331–56.
- . 1994. "The Question of Macedonian Divine Honors for Philip II." *Mediterranean Archaeology*. 7: 35–43.
- . 1995. "Who Put the 'Romance' in the Alexander Romance? The Alexander Romances Within Alexander Historiography." *Ancient History Bulletin*. 9: 1–13.
- . 1995. "An Introduction to the *Metz Épitome*, its Traditions and Value." *Antichthon*. 29: 60–77.
- . 1998. *Alexander the Great: The Unique History of Quintus Curtius*. Ann Arbor.
- . 2000. "A Baleful Birth in Babylon. The Significance of the Prodigy in the *Liber de Morte*.—An Investigation." In A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham, eds., *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford: 242–62.
- Bellen, H. 1974. "Der Rachegedanke in der griechisch-persischen Auseinandersetzung." *Chiron*. 4: 43–67.
- Bellinger, A. R. 1963. *Essays on the Coinage of Alexander the Great*. New York.
- Beloch, K. J. 1925. *Griechische Geschichte*. Vol. IV.1. Berlin and Leipzig.
- Bengtson, H. 1937. *Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit*. Vol. I. Munich.
- Berg, Beverly. 1970. "Dandamis: an Early Christian Portrait of Indian Asceticism." *Classica et Mediaevalia*. 31: 269–305.
- Berger, E. 1971. "Ein neues Porträt Alexanders des Grossen." *Antike Kunst*. 14: 139–44.
- Berger, P. R. 1975. "Der Kyros-Zylinder mit dem Zusatzfragment BIN II Nr.32 und die akkadischen Namen im Danielbuch." *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*. 64: 192–234.
- Berghoff, W. 1987. *Palladius: de gentibus Indiae et Bragmanibus*. Meisenheim am Glan.
- Bergmann, M. 1998. *Die Strahlen der Herrscher. Theomorphes Herrscherbild und politische Symbolik im Hellenismus und in der römischen Kaiserzeit*. Mainz.
- Bernard, P. 1967. "Ai Khanoum." *Proceedings of the British Academy*. 71–100.
- . 1980. "Heracles, les grottes de Karafto et le sanctuaire du mont Sambulos en Iran." *Studia Iranica* 9: 301–24.
- Bernoulli, J. J. 1905. *Die erhaltenen Darstellungen Alexanders des Grossen*. Munich.
- Berve, H. 1926. *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*. 2 vols. Munich.
- Bickermann, E. 1934. "Alexandre le Grand and les villes d'Asie." *Revue des études grecques*. 47: 346–74.
- Bickerman, E. J. and Tadmor, H. 1978. "Darius I, Pseudo-Smerdis and the Magi." *Athenaeum*. 56: 239–61.
- Bieber, M. 1964. *Alexander the Great in Greek and Roman Art*. Chicago.
- Bielawski, J. and Plezia, M. 1970. *Lettre d'Aristote à Alexandre sur la politique envers les cités*. Wrocław, Warsaw, and Krakow.
- Bielman, A. 1994. *Retour à la liberté. Libération et sauvetage des prisonniers en Grèce ancienne*. Athens and Lausanne.
- Billows, R. A. 1990. *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*. Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- . 2000. "Polybius and Alexander Historiography." In A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham, eds., *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford: 286–306.
- Bing, J. D. 1991. "Alexander's Sacrifice dis praesidibus loci before the Battle of Issus." *Journal of Hellenic Studies*. 111: 161–5.
- Blackwell, C. W. 1999. *In the Absence of Alexander: Harpalus and the Failure of Macedonian Authority*. New York.
- Bloedow, E. F. 1995. "'That Great Puzzle in the History of Alexander': Back into 'the Primal Pit of Historical Murk.'" In Ch. Schubert and K. Brodersen, eds., *Rom und der Griechische Osten*. Stuttgart: 23–41.
- Bloomer, W. M. 1992. *Valerius Maximus and the Rhetoric of the New Nobility*. Chapel Hill and London.
- Bohm, C. 1989. *Imitatio Alexandri im Hellenismus*. Munich.

- Borza, Eugene N., ed., 1974. *The Impact of Alexander the Great*. Hinsdale.
- . 1981 [1995]. "Anaxarchus and Callisthenes: Academic Intrigue at Alexander's Court." In *Ancient Macedonian Studies in honour of Charles F. Edson* (1981), 73–86; reprinted in E. N. Borza, *Makedonika*. Carol G. Thomas, ed., Claremont. 1995: 173–88.
- . 1981. "The Macedonian Royal Tombs at Vergina: Some Cautionary Notes." *Archaeological News*. 10 [4]: 73–87.
- . 1982. "The Natural Resources of Early Macedonia." In W. L. Adams and E. N. Borza, eds., *Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Macedonian Heritage*. Lanham: 1–20.
- . 1990. *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon*. Princeton.
- . 1995 *Makedonika: Essays by Eugene N. Borza*. C. Thomas, ed., Claremont, CA.
- . 1996. "Greeks and Macedonians in the Age of Alexander: The Source Traditions." In R. W. Wallace and E. M. Harris, eds., *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 B.C., in honor of E. Badian*. Norman, OK: 122–39.
- . 1999. *Before Alexander: Constructing Early Macedonia*. Publications of the Association of Ancient Historians, 6. Claremont, CA.
- Bosworth, A. B. 1971. "Philip II and Upper Macedonia." *Classical Quarterly*. 21: 93–105.
- . 1971. "The Death of Alexander the Great: Rumour and Propaganda." *Classical Quarterly*. 21: 112–36.
- . 1975. "The Mission of Amphoterus and the Outbreak of Agis' War." *Phoenix*. 29: 27–43.
- . 1976. "Early Relations between Aetolia and Macedon." *American Journal of Ancient History*. 1: 164–81.
- . 1976. "Errors in Arrian." *Classical Quarterly*. 26: 117–39.
- . 1977. "Alexander and Ammon." In K. H. Kinzl, ed., *Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory. Festschrift F. Schachermeyr*. Berlin and New York: 51–75.
- . 1980. "Alexander and the Iranians." *Journal of Hellenic Studies*. 100: 1–21.
- . 1980–1995. *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander*. 2 vols. Oxford.
- . 1988. *From Arrian to Alexander: Studies in Historical Interpretation*. Oxford.
- . 1988. *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great*. Cambridge.
- . 1988. "Nearchus in Susiana." In W. Will, ed., *Zu Alexander dem Grossen*. Amsterdam: 541–67.
- . 1992. "Autonomia: the Use and Abuse of Political Terminology." *Studi italiani di filologia classica*. 85: 122–52.
- . 1994. "Alexander the Great." In D. M. Lewis, J. Boardman, S. Hornblower and M. Ostwald, eds., *The Cambridge Ancient History*², Vol. VI. Cambridge: 791–875.
- . 1996. *Alexander and the East: The Tragedy of Triumph*. Oxford.
- . 1996. "Alexander, Euripides, and Dionysus." In R. W. Wallace and E. M. Harris, eds., *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 B.C. in Honor of E. Badian*. Norman, OK: 140–66.
- . 1998. "Calanus and the Brahman Opposition." In W. Will, ed., *Alexander der Grosse: Eine Welteroberung und ihr Hintergrund*. Antiquitas, Reihe 1. Abhandlungen zur alten Geschichte, 46. Bonn: 5–58.
- . 1998. "Alessandro, l'impero universale e le città greche." In *I Greci*. Turin: 47–80.
- . 2000. "Introduction." In A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham, eds., *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford: 1–22.
- . 2000. "A Tale of Two Empires: Hernán Cortés and Alexander the Great." In A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham, eds., *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford: 23–49.

- . 2000. "Ptolemy and the Will of Alexander." In A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham, eds., *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford: 207–41.
- . 2002. *The Legacy of Alexander*. Oxford.
- Bosworth, A. B. and E. J. Baynham. 2000. Eds., *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge.
- Bowersock, G. W. 1994. *Fiction as History*. Berkeley.
- Braccesi, L. 1975. *Alessandro e i Romani*. Bologna.
- Briant, P. 1972–1973. "D'Alexandre le Grand aux Diadoques: Le cas d'Eumene de Kardia." *Revue des Études Anciennes* 74: 32–73; 75: 43–81 (repr. in *Rois, tributs et paysans*. 1982. Paris: 13–93).
- . 1978. "Colonisation hellénistique et populations indigènes." *Klio*. 60: 57–92 (repr. in: *Rois tributs et paysans*. Paris: 227–62).
- . "Conquête territoriale et stratégie idéologique: Alexandre le Grand et idéologie monarchique achéménide." In: *Actes du Colloque international sur l'idéologie monarchique dans l'Antiquité*. Varsovie, Krako: 37–83 (repr. in *Rois, tributs et paysans*. Paris: 357–403).
- . 1991. "Chasses royales macédoniennes et chasses royales perses: L thème de la chasse au lion sur la chasse de Vergina." *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne*. 17: 211–55.
- . 1991. "Le roi est mort: vive le roi." In Kellens, J., ed., *La religion iranienne à l'époque achéménide*. Ghent: 1–11 (*Acta Iranica* Suppl. 5)
- . 1993. "Alexandre à Sardes." In J. Carlsen, et al., eds., *Alexander the Great: Reality and Myth*. Rome: 13–27.
- . 1993. "Les chasses d'Alexandré." *Ancient Macedonia*. 5: 267–77.
- . 1994. "Sources gréco-hellénistiques, institutions perses et institutions macédonien: continuités, changements et bricolages." *Achaemenid History*. 8: 283–310.
- . 1996. *Alexander the Great: Man of Action, Man of Spirit*. Trans. J. Leggatt. New York.
- . 1996. *Histoire de l'empire perse: de Cyrus à Alexandre*. Paris.
- . 1999. "The Achaemenid Empire," in K. Raaflaub and N. Rosenstein, eds., *War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds. Asia, the Mediterranean, Europe, and Mesoamerica*. Center for Hellenic Studies Colloquia 3. Cambridge, MA.: 105–28.
- Bridges, M., and J. C. Bürgel. 1996. Eds., *The Problematics of Power: Eastern and Western Representations of Alexander*. Bern and New York.
- Brixhe, C. 1976. *Le dialect grec de Pamphylie*. Paris.
- Brosius, M. 1996. *Women in Ancient Persia (559–331 B.C.)*. Oxford.
- . 1998. "Artemis Persike and Artemis Anaitis." *Achaemenid History*. 11: 227–38.
- Brown, T. S. 1949. "Callisthenes and Alexander." *American Journal of Philology*. 70: 225–48.
- . 1949. *Onesicritus: A Study in Hellenistic Historiography*. Berkeley.
- . 1967. "Alexander's Book Order (Plut. Alex. 8)." *Historia*. 16: 359–68.
- Brunt, P.A. 1965. "The Aims of Alexander." *Greece & Rome*. 12: 205–15.
- . 1974. "Notes on Aristobulus of Cassandria." *Classical Quarterly*. 24: 65–9.
- . 1975. "Alexander, Barsine, and Heracles." *Rivista di filologia e d'istruzione classica*. 103: 22–34.
- . 1980. "On Historical Fragments and Epitomes." *Classical Quarterly*. 30: 477–94.
- . 1976–1983. *Arrian: History of Alexander and Indica*. (LCL). 2 vols. Cambridge, MA.
- Buckler, J. 1980. *The Theban Hegemony, 371–362 B.C.* Cambridge, MA.
- . 1989. *Philip II and the Sacred War*. Leiden.
- . 2000. "Demosthenes and Aeschines." In I. Worthington, ed., *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator*. London: 114–58.
- Buora, M. 1973–4. "L'incontro tra Alessandro e Diogene: tradizione e significato." *Atti dell' istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti*. 132: 243–64.

- Burckhardt, L. A. 1996. *Bürger und Soldaten. Aspekte der politischen und militärischen Rolle athenischer Bürger im Kriegswesen des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* Stuttgart.
- Burke, E. M. 1977. "Contra Leocratem and De Corona: Political Collaboration?" *Phoenix*. 31: 330-40.
- . 1985. "Lycurgan Finances." *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*. 26: 251-64.
- Burnett, A. M. 1992. *Roman Provincial Coinage*. Vol. I. London.
- Burstein, S. 1991. "Pharaoh Alexander: A Scholarly Myth." *Ancient Society*. 22: 139-45.
- Cabanes, P. 1980. "Société et institutions dans les monarchies de Grèce septentrionale au IV siècle." *Revue des Études Grecques*. 113: 324-51.
- Cairns, D. L. 1993. *Aidōs. The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature*. Oxford.
- Calcani, G. 1989. *Cavaliere di Bronzo*. Rome.
- Cameron, G. G. 1973. "The Persian Satrapies and Related Matters." *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*. 32: 47-56.
- Cargill, J. 1981. *The Second Athenian League*. Berkeley.
- . 1995. *Athenian Settlements of the Fourth Century B.C.* Leiden.
- Carlier, P. 1980. "Étude sur la prétendue lettre d'Aristote à Alexandre transmise par plusieurs manuscrits arabes (I)." *Klèma*. 5: 277-88.
- . 1996. "À propos de Chéronée." In P. Carlier, ed., *Le IV^e siècle av. J.-C. Approches historiographiques*. Nancy and Paris: 111-20.
- Carlsen, J., B. Due, et al. 1993. Eds. *Alexander the Great: Reality and Myth*. *Analecta Romana Instituti Danici, Supplementum* 20. Rome.
- Carney, E. D. 1980. "Alexander the Lyncestian: The Disloyal Opposition." *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*. 21: 23-33.
- . 1981. "The Conspiracy of Hermolaus." *Classical Journal*. 76: 223-31.
- . 1981. "The Death of Clitus." *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*. 22: 149-60.
- . 1983. "Olympias." *Ancient Society*. 18: 35-62.
- . 1983. "Regicide in Macedonia." *La Parola del Passato*. 221: 260-72.
- . 1988. "Eponymous Women: Royal Women and City Names." *The Ancient History Bulletin*. 2.6: 134-42.
- . 1992. "The Politics of Polygamy: Olympias, Alexander, and the Death of Philip II." *Historia*. 41: 169-89.
- . 1993. "Olympias and the Image of the Virago." *Phoenix*. 47: 29-53.
- . 1995. "Women and *Basileia*: Legitimacy and Female Political Action in Macedonia." *Classical Journal*. 90.4: 367-91.
- . 1996. "Alexander and Persian Women." *American Journal of Philology*. 117: 563-83.
- . 1996. "Macedonians and Mutiny: Discipline and Indiscipline in the Army of Philip and Alexander." *Classical Philology*. 91: 19-44.
- . 2000. "Artifice and Alexander History." In A. B. Bosworth and E. Baynham, eds., *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford: 263-85.
- . 2000. *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia*. Norman, OK.
- . 2000. "The Initiation of Cult for Royal Macedonian Women." *Classical Philology*. 95: 21-43.
- . 2001. "The Trouble with Philip Arrhidaeus." *Ancient History Bulletin*. 15: 63-80.
- Cartledge, P. and A. Spawforth. 1989. *Hellenistic and Roman Sparta*. London and New York.
- Castritius, H. 1988. "Caracalla, Augustus, und Alexander." In W. Will, ed., *zu Alexander d. Gr. Festschrift G. Wirth zum 60. Geburtstag am 9.12.86*. Amsterdam: 879-84.
- Cauer, F. 1894. "Philotas, Kleitos, Kallisthenes: Beiträge zur Alexandergeschichte." *Neue Jahrbücher für klassische Philologie*. Supplbd. 20.
- Caven, B. 1990. *Dionysius I, Warlord of Sicily*. New Haven.
- Cawkwell, G. L. 1961. "A Note on Ps. Demosthenes 17.20." *Phoenix*. 15: 74-8.

- . 1969. "The Crowning of Demosthenes." *Classical Quarterly*. 19: 163–80.
- . 1978. *Philip of Macedon*. London.
- . 1994. "The Deification of Alexander the Great: A Note." In I. Worthington, ed., *Ventures into Greek History: Essays in Honour of N. G. L. Hammond*. Oxford: 293–306.
- . 1996. "The End of Greek Liberty." In R. W. Wallace and E. M. Harris, eds., *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Honor of E. Badian*. Norman, OK: 98–121.
- Charneux, P. 1966. "Liste Argienne de Théaradoques." *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*. 90: 156–239.
- Clarysse, W. and G. Schepens. 1985. "A Ptolemaic Fragment of an Alexander History." *Chronique d'Égypte*. 60: 30–47.
- Classen, C. J. 1959. "The Libyan God Ammon in Greece before 331 B.C." *Historia*. 8: 349–55.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Indexed Edition. M. Howard and P. Paret, ed. and trans. Princeton.
- Clavaud, R. 1974. *Démosthène. Discours d'apparat (Épitaφios, Éroticos)*. Paris.
- Cohen, A. 1995. "Alexander and Achilles—Macedonians and Myceneans." In J. B. Carter and S. P. Morris, eds., *The Ages of Homer: A Tribute to Emily Townsend Vermeule*. Austin: 483–505.
- . 1997. *The Alexander Mosaic: Stories of Victory and Defeat*. Cambridge.
- Colledge, M. 1987. "Greek and non-Greek Interaction in the Art and Architecture of the Hellenistic East." In A. Kuhrt and S. Sherwin-White, eds., *Hellenism in the East*. London: 134–162.
- Corsten, T. 1994. "Zum Angebot einer Schenkung Alexanders an Phokion." *Historia*. 43: 112–18.
- Crowther, C. V. 1996. "I. Priene 8 and the History of Priene in the Early Hellenistic Period." *Chiron*. 26: 195–250.
- Culasso Gastaldi, E. 1984. *Sul trattato con Alessandro*. Padova.
- Dandamaev, M. A. 1989. *A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire*. Leiden.
- Dandamaev, M. A. and V. G. Lukonin. 1989. *The Culture and Social Institutions of Ancient Iran*. Cambridge.
- Danforth, L. M. 1995. *The Macedonian Conflict*. Princeton.
- Davidson, J. 1997. *Courtesans and Fishcakes: The Consuming Passions of Classical Athens*. New York.
- . 2001. "Bonkers About Boys." Review of A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham, eds., *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. *London Review of Books*, 1 November: 7–10.
- Davies, J. K. 1995. "The Fourth Century Crisis: What Crisis?" In W. Eder, ed., *Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* Stuttgart: 29–36.
- Dawson, Doyne. 1992. *Cities of the Gods*. Oxford.
- Demandt, A. 1972. "Politische Aspekte im Alexanderbild der Neuzeit." *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*. 54, 2: 325–363.
- Derrett, J. D. M. 1960. "Palladius de vita Bragmanorum narratio." *Classica et Mediaevalia*. 21: 64–135.
- de Ste. Croix, G. E. M. 1963. "The Alleged Secret Pact between Athens and Philip II Concerning Amphipolis and Pydna." *Classical Quarterly*. 13: 110–19.
- Develin, R. 1989. *Athenian Officials, 684–321 B.C.* Cambridge.
- Devauchelle, D. 1995. "Les sentiments chez les anciens Égyptiens." *Transeuphratène*. 9: 67–80.
- Dobesch, G. 1975. "Alexander der Große und der Korinthische Bund." *Gräzer Beiträge*. 3: 73–149.
- Donderer, M. 1990. "Das pompejanische Alexandermosaik: ein östliches Importstück?" In C. Börker and M. Donderer, eds., *Das antike Rom und der Osten. Festschrift für Klaus Parlasca zum 65. Geburtstag*. Erlangen: 19–31.
- Donlan, W. 1993. "The Suitors' Take; Manners and Power in Ithaka." *Colby Quarterly*. 29.3: 173–96.

- Dover, K. J. 1973. *Greek Popular Morality in the Age of Plato and Aristotle*. Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- Dudley, D. R. 1937. *A History of Cynicism*. London.
- Due, B. 1993. "Alexander's Inspiration and Ideas." In J. Carlsen et al., eds., *Alexander the Great. Reality and Myth*. Rome: 53–60.
- Dunbabin, K. M. 1999. *Mosaics of the Greek and Roman World*. Cambridge.
- Düring, I. 1957. *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*. Göteborg.
- Eddy, S. K. 1961. *The King is Dead: Studies in Near Eastern Resistance to Hellenism*. Lincoln, NE.
- Edmunds, L. 1971. "The Religiosity of Alexander." *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*. 12: 363–91.
- Edson, C. F. 1970. "Early Macedonia." *Ancient Macedonia*. 1: 17–44.
- Edson, C. F., and S. R. F. Price. 1996. "Ruler Cult." *Oxford Classical Dictionary*³: 1337–8.
- Eggermont, P. H. L. 1970. "Alexander Campaign in Gandhâra and Ptolemy's List of Indo-Scythian Towns." *Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica*. 1: 63–123.
- . 1985. "Ptolemy the Geographer and the People of the Dards." *Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica*. 15: 191–233.
- Ehrenberg, V. 1939. *Alexander and the Greeks*. London.
- Eicke, L. 1909. *Veterum philosophorum qualia fuerint de Alexandro magno iudicia*. Dissertation. Rostock.
- Ellis, J. R. 1969. "Population-transplants by Philip II." *Makedonika*. 9: 9–17.
- . 1971. "Amyntas Perdikka, Philip II and Alexander the Great: A Study in Conspiracy." *Journal of Hellenic Studies*. 91: 15–24.
- . 1976. *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism*. London.
- . 1981. "The Assassination of Philip II." In H. J. Dell, ed., *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honour of C. F. Edson*. Thessaloniki: 99–137.
- . 1982. "The First Months of Alexander's Reign." In B. Barr-Sharrar and E. N. Borza, eds., *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times*. Washington: 69–73.
- . 1994. "Macedon and North-West Greece" and "Macedonian Hegemony Created." In D. M. Lewis, J. Boardman, S. Hornblower and M. Ostwald, eds., *The Cambridge Ancient History*², Vol. VI. Cambridge: 791–875.
- Engels, D. 1978. *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*. Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- Engels, J. 1989. *Studien zur politischen Biographie des Hypereides. Athen in der Epoche der lykurgischen Reformen und des makedonischen Universalreiches*. Munich.
- Errington, R. M. 1969. "Bias in Ptolemy's History of Alexander." *Classical Quarterly*. 19: 233–42.
- . 1974. "Macedonian 'Royal Style' and its Historical Significance." *Journal of Hellenic Studies*. 94: 20–37.
- . 1975. "Samos and the Lamian War." *Chiron*. 5: 51–7.
- . 1978. "The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy." *Chiron*. 8: 86–90.
- . 1981. "Four Interpretations of Philip II." *American Journal of Ancient History*. 6: 69–88.
- . 1990. *A History of Macedonia*. Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- . 1998. "Neue epigraphische Belege für Makedonien zur Zeit Alexanders des Großen." In W. Will, ed., *Alexander der Große: eine Welteroberung und ihr Hintergrund*. Bonn: 77–90.
- Erskine, A. 1989. "The 'Pezôtairoi' of Philip II and Alexander III." *Historia*. 38: 385–94.
- . 1990. *The Hellenistic Stoa*. London.

- Faraguna, M. 1992. "Atene nell'età di Alessandro. Problemi politici, economici, finanziari." *Atti dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei. Memorie*. s. IX, vol. II 2: 165-447.
- . 1998. "Aspetti amministrativi e finanziari della monarchia macedone tra IV e III secolo a.C." *Athenaeum*. 86: 349-95.
- Fears, J. R. 1974. "The Stoic View of the Career and Character of Alexander the Great." *Philologus*. 118: 113-30.
- . 1975. "Pausanias, the Assassin of Philip II." *Athenaeum*. 53: 111-35.
- . 2001. Book review, *Alexander the Great: the Unique History of Quintus Curtius*. *American Journal of Philology*. 122: 447-51.
- Featherstone, M. 1990. Ed., *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization, and Modernity*. London.
- Ferguson, J. 1975. *Utopias of the Classical World*. London.
- Ferrill, A. 1985. *The Origins of War: From the Stone Age to Alexander the Great*. London.
- Fisch, M. H. 1937. "Alexander and the Stoics." *American Journal of Philology*. 58: 129-51.
- Fischer, D. 1970. *Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought*. New York.
- Flintoff, E. 1980. "Pyrrho and India." *Phronesis*. 25: 88-108.
- Flower, M. 2000. "Alexander the Great and Panhellenism." In A. B. Bosworth and E. Baynham, eds., *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford: 96-135.
- Fowler, Don D. 1987. "Uses of the Past: Archaeology in the Service of the State." *American Antiquity*. 52 [2]: 229-48.
- Fraser, P. A. 1980. "The son of Aristonaz at Kandahar." *Afghan Studies*. 2: 9-21.
- . 1994. "The World of Theophrastus." In S. Hornblower, ed., *Greek Historiography*. Oxford: 167-192.
- . 1996. *Cities of Alexander the Great*. Oxford.
- Fredrickmeyer, E. 1961. "Alexander, Midas, and the Oracle at Gordium." *Classical Philology*. 56: 160-8.
- . 1966. "The Ancestral Rites of Alexander the Great." *Classical Philology*. 61: 179-82.
- . 1979. "Divine Honors for Philip II." *Transactions of the American Philological Association*. 109: 39-61.
- . 1979 [1980]. "Three Notes on Alexander's Deification." *American Journal of Ancient History*. 4: 1-9.
- . 1981. "On the Background of the Ruler Cult." In H. J. Dell, ed., *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honour of C. F. Edson*. Thessaloniki: 145-56.
- . 1982. "On the Final Aims of Philip II." In W. L. Adams and E. N. Borza, eds., *Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Macedonian Heritage*. Lanham: 85-98.
- . 1990. "Alexander and Philip: Emulation and Resentment." *Classical Journal*. 85: 300-15.
- . 1991. "Alexander, Zeus Ammon, and the Conquest of Asia." *Transactions of the American Philological Association*. 121: 199-214.
- . 1994. "The Kausia: Macedonian or Indian?" In I. Worthington, ed., *Ventures into Greek History*. Oxford: 134-58.
- . 1997. "The Origin of Alexander's Royal Insignia." *Transactions of the American Philological Association*. 127: 97-109.
- . 2000. "Alexander the Great and the Kingship of Asia." In A. B. Bosworth and E. J. Baynham, eds., *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford: 136-66.
- Friedman, F. D. 1989. Ed., *Beyond the Pharaohs: Egypt and the Copts in the 2nd to 7th Centuries A.D.* Providence, RI.
- Frye, R. 1984. *A History of Ancient Iran*. Vol. 1. Munich.
- Fugmann, J. 1995. "Zum Problem der Datierung der 'Historiae Alexandri Magni' des Curtius Rufus." *Hermes*. 123 (1995) 233-43.
- Fuller, J. F. C. 1960. *The Generalship of Alexander the Great*. New York.

- Gabrielsen, V. 1994. *Financing the Athenian Fleet: Public Taxation and Social Relations*. Baltimore and London.
- Gaebler, H. 1935. *Die antiken Münzen von Makedonia und Paionia*. Berlin.
- Garlan, Y. 1974. *Recherches de Poliorcétique Grecque*. Paris.
- Garnsey, P. 1988. *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and Crisis*. Cambridge.
- Gebauer, K. 1938–39. "Alexanderbildnis und Alexandertypus." *Athenische Mitteilungen*. 63–64: 1–106.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1973. "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States." In *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: 255–310.
- Gehrke, H.-J. 1985. *Stasis. Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen in den griechischen Staaten des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* Munich.
- . 1996. *Alexander der Grosse*. Munich.
- Gellner, E. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford.
- Gennep, A. van 1960. *The Rites of Passage*. M. B. Vizedom and G. L. Caffee, trans. Chicago.
- Göbl, R. 1978. *Antike Numismatik*. Munich.
- Golden, M. 1985. "'Pais,' 'Child' and 'Slave.'" *L'Antiquité classique*. 54: 91–104.
- . 1990. *Children and Childhood in Classical Athens*. Baltimore and London.
- . 1998. *Sport and Society in Ancient Greece*. Cambridge.
- Goukowsky, R. 1976. Ed., *Diodore de Sicilie. Livre XVII*. Collections des Universités de France. Paris.
- . 1978–1981. *Essai sur les origines du mythe d'Alexandre*. 2 vols. Nancy.
- Gouldner, A. 1965. *Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Theory*. New York.
- Goulet-Caze, O. and R. Goulet. 1993. *Le cynisme ancien et ses prolongements*. Paris.
- Graf, D. F. 1993. "Early Hellenistic Travel Tales and Arabian Utopias." *Graeco-Arabica*. 5: 111–117.
- Grainger, J. D. 1990. *Seleukos Nikator: Constructing a Hellenistic Kingdom*. London.
- . 1999. *The League of the Aetolians*. Leiden.
- Grayson, A. K. 1975. *Babylonian Historical-Literary Texts*, Toronto. (Toronto Semitic Texts and Studies 3).
- . 1975. *Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles*. Locust Valley, NY.
- Green, P. 1978. "Caesar and Alexander: Aemulatio, Imitatio, Comparatio." *American Journal of Ancient History*. 3: 1–26.
- . 1989. "The Macedonian Connection." In *Classical Bearings: Interpreting Ancient History and Culture*. New York: 154–64.
- . 1991. *Alexander of Macedon*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford.
- . 1996. "The Metamorphosis of the Barbarian: Athenian Panhellenism in a Changing World." In R. W. Wallace and E. M. Harris eds., *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 B.C., in Honor of E. Badian*. Norman, OK and London: 5–36.
- Greenwalt, W. 1982. "A Macedonian Mantis." *The Ancient World*. 5: 17–25.
- . 1986. "Macedonian Kings and the Political Usefulness of the Medical Arts." *Ancient Macedonia*. 4: 213–22.
- . 1989. "Polygamy and Succession in Argead Macedonia." *Arethusa*. 22: 19–45.
- Griesshammer, R. 1996. "Apis." *Der Neue Pauly*. Vol. 1: 847.
- Griffith, G. T. 1965. "The Macedonian Background." *Greece & Rome*. 12: 125–139.
- . 1978. "Athens in the Fourth Century." In P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whitaker, eds., *Imperialism in the Ancient World*. Cambridge: 127–144.
- Grimm, G. 1998. *Alexandria: Die erste Königstadt der hellenistischen Welt*. Mainz.
- Gruen, E. S. 1998. "Rome and the Myth of Alexander." In T. W. Hilliard et al., eds., *Ancient History in a Modern University*. Vol. 1: *The Ancient Near East, Greece, and Rome*. Grand Rapids, MI: 178–91.

- Gschnitzer, F. 1986. "Eine persische Kultstiftung in Sardeis und die 'Sippengötter' Vorderasiens." In W. Meid and H. Trenkwalder, eds., *Im Bannkreis des Alten Orients: Studien zur Sprach- und Kulturgeschichte des Alten Orients und seines Ausstrahlungsraumes. Festschrift Karl Oberhuber*. Innsbruck: 45–54.
- Gullath, B. 1982. *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Boiotiens in der Zeit Alexanders und der Diadochen*. Frankfurt am Main.
- Gunderson, L. L. 1981. "Alexander and the Attic Orators." In H. J. Dell, ed., *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honour of C. F. Edson*. Thessaloniki: 183–91.
- Gutas, D. 1988. *Greek Thought, Arabic Culture*. London.
- Habicht, Chr. 1957. "Samische Volksbeschlüsse der hellenistischen Zeit." *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts. Athenische Abteilung*. 72: 152–274.
- . 1970. *Gottmenschen und griechische Städte*. Munich.
- . 1977. "Zwei Angehörige des Lynkestischen Königshauses." *Ancient Macedonia*. 2: 511–16.
- . 1996. "Athens, Samos, and Alexander the Great." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*. 140: 397–405.
- . 1997. *Athens from Alexander to Antony*. Cambridge, MA.
- Hall, E. 1989. *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition Through Tragedy*. Oxford.
- Hallof, K. and Chr. Habicht. 1995. "Buleuten und Beamte der athenischen Kleruchie in Samos." *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts. Athenische Abteilung*. 110: 273–304.
- Hamilakis, Y. and E. Yalouri. 1996. "Antiquities as Symbolic Capital in Modern Greek Society." *Antiquity*. 70: 117–29.
- . 1999. "Sacred Pasts, Profane Policies: The Cults of Archaeology in Modern Greece." *Archaeological Dialogues*. 6.2.
- Hamilton, J. R. 1953. "Alexander and his 'So-Called' Father." *Classical Quarterly*. 3: 151–7.
- . 1956. "The Cavalry Battle at the Hydaspes." *Journal of Hellenic Studies*. 76: 26–31.
- . 1961. "The Letters in Plutarch's Alexander." *Proceedings of the African Classical Association*. 4: 9–20.
- . 1965. "Alexander's Early Life." *Greece & Rome*. 12: 117–24.
- . 1969 (1999 repr.). *Plutarch, Alexander: A Commentary*. Oxford.
- . 1973. *Alexander the Great*. London.
- . 1977. "Cleitarchus and Diodorus 17." In K. Kinzl, ed., *Greece and the Ancient Mediterranean in History and Prehistory. Studies Presented to Fritz Schachermeyr*. Berlin: 126–46.
- . 1984. "The Origins of the Ruler Cult." *Prudentia*. 16: 3–15.
- Hammond, N. G. L. 1978. "'Philip's Tomb' in Historical Context." *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*. 19: 331–50.
- . 1980. *Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman*. Park Ridge, NJ.
- . 1980. "Some Passages in Arrian concerning Alexander." *Classical Quarterly*. 30: 471–6.
- . 1982. "The Evidence for the Identity of the Royal Tombs at Vergina." In W. L. Adams and E. N. Borza, eds., *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*. Washington: 111–27.
- . 1983. *Three Historians of Alexander the Great: The So-called Vulgate Authors, Diodorus, Justin and Curtius*. Cambridge.
- . 1986. "The Kingdom of Asia and the Persian Throne." *Antichthon*. 20: 73–85.
- . 1987. "Papyrus British Library 3085 verso." *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies*. 28: 331–47.
- . 1988. "The Royal Journals of Alexander the Great." *Historia*. 37: 129–50.
- . 1988. "The King and the Land in the Macedonian Kingdom." *Classical Quarterly*. 38: 382–91.

- . 1989. *The Macedonian State: Origins, Institutions, and History*. Oxford.
- . 1990. "Royal Pages, Personal Pages and Boys Trained in the Macedonian Manner during the Period of the Temenid Monarchy." *Historia*. 39: 261–90.
- . 1991. *The Miracle that was Macedonia*. New York.
- . 1991. "A Note on Royal Journals." *Historia*. 40: 382–4.
- . 1992. "The Archaeological and Literary Evidence for the Burning of the Persepolis Palace." *Classical Quarterly*. 42: 358–64.
- . 1993. "The Macedonian Imprint on the Hellenistic World." In P. Green, ed., *Hellenistic History and Culture*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 12–23.
- . 1993. *Sources for Alexander the Great: An Analysis of Plutarch's Life and Arrian's Anabasis Alexandrou*. Cambridge.
- . 1994. *Philip of Macedon*. London.
- . 1995. "Did Alexander Use Two or One Seals?" *Chiron*. 25: 199–203.
- . 1995. "Philip's Innovations in the Macedonian Economy." *Symbolae Osloenses*. 70: 22–9.
- . 1997. *The Genius of Alexander the Great*. London.
- . 1997. "The Lake on the Lower Strymon and Mt. Dionysus." *The Ancient World*. 28: 41–5.
- . 1998. "The Branchidae at Didyma and in Sogdiana." *Classical Quarterly*. 48: 339–44.
- . 1999. "Heroic and Divine Honors in Macedonia before the Successors." *Ancient World*. 30: 103–15.
- Hammond, N. G. L., G. T. Griffith and F. W. Walbank. 1972–1988. *A History of Macedonia*. 3 vols. Oxford.
- Hamza al Isfahānī. 1961. *Ta'rih sinī mulūk al-ard wa-l-anbiyā*. Beirut.
- Handler, R. 1988. *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec*. Madison.
- Hannestad, N. 1993. "Imitatio Alexandri in Roman Art." In J. Carlsen et al., eds., *Alexander the Great: Reality and Myth*. Rome: 61–70.
- Hansen, M. H. 1990. "The Size of the Council of the Areopagus and its Social Composition in the Fourth Century B.C." *Classica et Mediaevalia*. 41: 73–78.
- . 1997. "One Hundred and Sixty Theses about Athenian Democracy." *Classica et Mediaevalia*. 48: 205–65.
- Hanson, V. 1988. "Epameinondas, the Battle of Leuktra and the 'Revolution' in Greek Battle Tactics." *Classical Antiquity*. 7: 190–207.
- . 1999. *The Wars of the Ancient Greeks*. London.
- . 2000. *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece*. 2nd ed. Berkeley.
- . 2001. *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power*. New York.
- Harl, K. W. 1987. *Civic Coins and Civic Politics in the Roman East, A.D. 180–275*. Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- . 1997. "Alexander's Cavalry Battle at the Granicus." In C. Hamilton and P. Krentz, eds., *Polis and Polemos*. Claremont, CA: 303–26.
- Harris, E. M. 1995. *Aeschines and Athenian Policy*. New York and Oxford.
- Hartman, S. S. 1965. "Dionysos and Heracles in India according to Megasthenes: A Counter-argument." *Temenos*. 1: 55–64.
- Hatzopoulos, M. B. and L. D. Loukopoulos, 1981. Eds. *Philip II of Macedon*. London.
- Hatzopoulos, M. B. 1982. "The Oleveni Inscription and the Dates of Philip II's Reign." In W. L. Adams and E. N. Borza, eds., *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*. Lanham: 21–42.
- . 1982. "A Reconsideration of the Pixodarus Affair." In B. Barr-Sharrar and E. N. Borza, eds., *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times*. Washington: 59–66.
- . 1994. *Cultes et rites de passage en Macedoine*. Athens.
- . 1995. "La lettre royale d'Oleveni." *Chiron*. 25: 163–85.

- . 1996. *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*. 2 vols. MELETHMATA 22. Athens.
- . 1997. "Alexandre en Perse: La revanche et l'empire." *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*. 116: 41–52.
- Haussleiter, J. 1935. *Der Vegetarismus in der Antike*. Berlin.
- Heckel, W. 1977. "The Conspiracy against Philotas." *Phoenix*. 31: 9–21.
- . 1978. "The Somatophylakes of Alexander the Great: Some Thoughts." *Historia*. 27: 224–8.
- . 1979. "Philip II, Kleopatra and Karanos." *Rivista di filologia e d'istruzione classica*. 107: 385–93.
- . 1980. "Marsyas of Pella, Historian of Macedon." *Hermes*. 108: 444–62.
- . 1981. "Philip and Olympias 337/6 B.C." In G. S. Shrimpton and D. J. McCargar, eds., *Classical Contributions: Studies in Honour of Malcolm Francis McGregor*. Locust Valley, NY: 51–7.
- . 1982. "Who was Hegelochos?" *Rheinische Museum*. 125: 78–87.
- . 1983. "Alexander Lynkestes and Orontas." *Eranos*. 81: 139–42.
- . 1983–84. "Kynanne the Illyrian." *Rivista storica dell'antichità*. 13–14: 193–200.
- . 1986. "Factions and Politics in the Reign of Alexander the Great." *Ancient Macedonia*. 4: 293–305.
- . 1987. "A Grandson of Antipatros at Delos." *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*. 70: 161–2.
- . 1988. *The Last Days and Testament of Alexander the Great*. Historia. Einzelschriften 56. Stuttgart.
- . 1989. "The Granddaughters of Iolaus." *Classicum*. 15: 32–9.
- . 1992. *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire*. London and New York.
- . 1994. "Notes on Q. Curtius Rufus' *History of Alexander*." *Acta Classica*. 37: 67–78.
- Heisserer, A. J. 1980. *Alexander and the Greeks: The Epigraphic Evidence*. Norman, OK.
- Henderson, J. 1991. *The Maculate Muse: Obscene Language in Attic Comedy*. Oxford and New York.
- Henig, M. 1970. "The Veneration of Heroes in the Roman Army." *Britannia*. 1: 249–65.
- Herma van Voss, M. 1993 (Repr. 1997). "Alexander und die ägyptische Religion. Einige ägyptologische Bemerkungen." In J. Carlsen et al., eds., *Alexander the Great: Reality and Myth*. Rome: 71–3.
- Herman, G. 1980–81. "The 'Friends' of Early Hellenistic Rulers: Servants or Officials?" *Talanta*. 12–13: 103–49.
- Higgins, W. E. 1980. "Aspects of Alexander's Imperial Administration: Some Modern Methods and Views Reviewed." *Athenaeum*. 58: 129–52.
- Hintzen-Bohlen, B. 1997. *Die Kulturpolitik des Eubulos und des Lykurg: Die Denkmäler- und Bauprojekte in Athen zwischen 355 und 322 v. Chr.* Berlin.
- Hobsbawm, E. 1990. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge.
- Hoffmann, O. 1906. *Die Makedonen. Ihre Sprache und ihr Volkstum*. Göttingen.
- Hoffmann, P. 2000. [1979]. *Hitler's Personal Security: Protecting the Führer, 1921–1945*. Updated, with a new introduction. New York.
- Hoffmann, W. 1907. *Das literarische Porträt Alexanders des Grossen*. Leipzig.
- Högemann, P. 1985. *Alexander der Grosse und Arabien*. Zetemata, 82. Munich.
- Höistad, R. 1948. *Cynic Hero and Cynic King*. Uppsala.
- Holford-Strevens, L. 1988. *Aulus Gellius*. London.
- Holt, F. H. 1984. "The So-Called 'Pedigree Coins' of the Bactrian Greeks." In W. Heckel and R. Sullivan, eds., *Ancient Coins of the Graeco-Roman World: The Nickle Numismatic Papers*. Waterloo, Ont.: 69–91.
- . 1988. *Alexander the Great and Bactria: The Formation of a Greek Frontier in Central Asia*. Mnemosyne Suppl., 104. Leiden.

- . 1999. *Thundering Zeus: The Making of Hellenistic Bactria*. Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- . 1999. "Alexander the Great Today: In the Interests of Historical Accuracy?" *Ancient History Bulletin*. 13.3: 111–17.
- Hornblower, J. 1981. *Hieronymus of Cardia*. Oxford.
- Hornblower, S. 1982. *Mausolus*. Oxford.
- . 1994. Ed., *Greek Historiography*. Oxford.
- . 1994. "Persia." *CAH* VI: 45–96.
- Houghton, A. and A. Stewart. 1999. "Alexander the Great on a Tetradrachm of Seleucus I." *Swiss Numismatic Review*. 78: 27–35.
- Human Rights Watch. 1994. *Denying Ethnic Identity: The Macedonians of Greece*. New York.
- Humphreys, S. 1985. "Lycurgus of Butadae: An Athenian Aristocrat." In J. W. Eadie and J. Ober, eds., *The Craft of the Ancient Historian: Essays in Honor of C. G. Starr*. Lanham: 199–252.
- Huttner, U. 1997. *Die politische Rolle der Heraklesgestalt im griechischen Herrschertum*. Historia Einzelschriften, 112. Stuttgart.
- Ihm, S. 2001. *Maximus Confessor. Erste kritische Edition einer Redaktion des sacro-profanen Florilegiums*. Stuttgart.
- Imhoof-Blumer, F. 1885. *Porträtköpfe auf griechischen Münzen hellenistischer Zeit*. Leipzig.
- Inan, J. 1994. *Boubon Sebasteionu*. Istanbul.
- Instinsky, H. U. 1949. *Alexander der Grosse am Hellespont*. Bad Godesberg.
- . 1962. *Die Siegel des Kaisers Augustus*. Baden-Baden.
- Isager, J. 1993. "Alexander the Great in Roman Literature from Pompey to Vespasian." In J. Carlsen et al., eds., *Alexander the Great: Reality and Myth*. Rome: 75–84.
- Jacoby, F. 1919. "Kallisthenes." *RE*. 10: 1674–7.
- Jaschinski, S. 1981. *Alexander und Griechenland unter dem Eindruck der Flucht des Harpalos*. Bonn.
- Jehne, M. 1994. *Koine Eirene. Untersuchungen zu den Befriedungs- und Stabilisierungsbemühungen in der griechischen Poliswelt des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* Stuttgart.
- Joannès, F. 1973. "Les successeurs d'Alexandre le Grand en Babylonie. Essai de détermination chronologique d'après les documents cunéiformes." *Anatolica*. 7: 99–115.
- Jones, C. P. 1978. *The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom*. Harvard.
- Kaiser-Raiss, M. R. 1984. "Philip II. und Kyzikos." *Schweizerische Numismatische Rundschau*. 63: 27–43.
- Keegan, J. 1987. *The Mask of Command*. New York.
- Kees, H. 1931. "Memphis." *RE*. 15: 660–88.
- Kern, O. 1963. *Die Religion des Griechen*. III². Berlin.
- Kern, P. B. 1999. *Ancient Siege Warfare*. Bloomington, IN.
- Kienast, D. 1965. "Alexander und der Ganges." *Historia*. 14: 180–88.
- . 1973. *Philipp II. von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden*. Abhandlungen der Marburger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, Jahrgang 1971. Munich.
- . 1988. "Alexander, Zeus, and Ammon." In W. Will and J. Heinrichs, eds., *Zu Alexander d. Gr. Festschrift G. Würth*. Vol. I. Amsterdam: 309–34.
- Kienitz, F. K. 1953. *Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jahrdt. vor der Zeitwende*. Berlin.
- King, K. C. 1987. *Achilles: Paradigms of the War Hero from Homer to the Middle Ages*. Los Angeles and London.
- Kingsley, B. M. 1986. "Harpalos in the Megarid (333–331 B.C.) and the Grain Shipments from Cyrene." *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*. 66: 165–77.
- Knell, H. 1995. "Überlegungen zur öffentlichen Architektur des IV. Jahrhunderts in Athen." In W. Eder, ed., *Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* Stuttgart: 475–514.

- Knoepfler, D. 1993. "Adolf Wilhelm et la *pentétéris* des Amphiararaia d'Oropos. Réexamen de A.P. LIV 7 à la lumière du catalogue IG VII 414 + SEG I 126." In M. Piérart, ed., *Aristote et Athènes*. Fribourg: 279–302.
- Koch, H. 1999. "Review-Discussion of E. Baynham: Alexander the Great. The Unique History of Quintus Curtius." *Histos*. <http://www.dur.ac.uk/classics/histos/1999/koch.html>
- . 2000. *Hundert Jahre Curtius-Forschung (1899–1999)*. *Ein Arbeitsbibliographie*. Subsidia Classica 4. St. Katharinen: Scripta Mercaturae.
- Koenen, L. 1977. *Eine agonistische Inschrift aus Ägypten und frühptolemäische Königsfeste*. Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie, 56. Meisenheim am Glan.
- Kofos, E. 1964. [repr. 1993 by Caratzas]. *Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies.
- Kohl, P. L. and C. Fawcett. 1995. Eds. *Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archaeology*. Cambridge.
- Kornemann, E. 1935. *Die Alexandergeschichte des Königs Ptolemaios I. von Aegypten*. Leipzig.
- Kotsakis, K. 1998. "The Past is Ours: Images of Greek Macedonia." In L. Meskell, ed., *Archaeology under Fire*. London: 44–67.
- Kraus, C. S. and A. J. Woodman. 1997. *Latin Historians*. Oxford.
- Kroll, W. 1931. "Kuss." *RE*. Suppl. 5: 511–20.
- Kuhlmann, K. P. 1988. *Das Ammoneion. Archäologie, Geschichte und Kultpraxis des Orakels von Siwa*. Archäologische Veröffentlichungen, 75. Deutsches Archäologisches Institut. Abt. Cairo.
- Kuhr, A. 1990. "Alexander and Babylon." *Achaemenid History*. 5: 121–30.
- Kuhr, A. and S. Sherwin-White. 1987. *Hellenism in the East: the Interaction of Greek and non-Greek Civilizations from Syria to Central Asia after Alexander*. London.
- . 1993. *From Samarkand to Sardis: A New Approach to the Seleucid Empire*. London.
- . 1994. "The Transition from Achaemenid to Seleucid Rule in Babylonia: Revolution or Evolution?" *Achaemenid History*. 8: 311–27.
- Lalonde, G.V., M. K. Langdon, and M. B. Walbank. 1991. *The Athenian Agora, XIX*. Princeton.
- Lambert, S. D. 1997. *'Rationes Centesimarum': Sales of Public Land in Lykourgan Athens*. Amsterdam.
- Lambert, W. G. 1978. *The Background of Jewish Apocalyptic*. London.
- Landucci, G. F. 1994. "I mercenari nella politica dell'età di Alessandro. I." *Ancient Society*. 25: 33–61.
- . 1995. "I mercenari nella politica dell'età di Alessandro. II." *Ancient Society*. 26: 59–91.
- Lane Fox, R. 1973. *Alexander the Great*. London.
- . 1996. "Text and Image: Alexander the Great, Coins and Elephants." *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*. 41: 87–108.
- . 1997. "The Itinerary of Alexander: Constantius to Julian." *Classical Quarterly*. 47: 239–52.
- Lapatin, K. D. S. 2001. *Chryselephantine Statuary in the Ancient Mediterranean World*. Oxford.
- Largier, N. 1997. *Diogenes der Kyniker: Exempel, Erzählung Geschichte im Mittelalter und frühe Neuzeit*. Tübingen.
- Larsen, J. A. O. 1955. *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History*. Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- Lateiner, D. 1995. *Sardonic Smile: Nonverbal Behavior in Homeric Epic*. Ann Arbor.
- Lauffer, S. 1993. *Alexander der Grosse*. Munich.
- Le Bohec, S. 1993. "Les reines de Macédoine de la mort d'Alexandre à celle de Persée." *Cahiers du Centre Glotz*. 4: 229–45.
- Lefèvre, F. 1998. *L'Amphictionie pyléo-delphique: histoire et institutions*. Athens.

- Le Rider, G. 1977. *Le monnayage d'argent et d'or de Philippe II frappé en Macédoine de 359 à 294*. Paris.
- Lewis, D. M. 1977. *Sparta and Persia*. Leiden.
- . 1997. "On the Financial Offices of Eubulus and Lycurgus." In P. J. Rhodes, ed., *Selected Papers in Greek and Near Eastern History*. Cambridge: 212–29.
- Lissarague, F. 1990. *The Aesthetics of the Greek Banquet: Images of Wine and Ritual*. A. Szegedy-Maszak, trans. Princeton.
- Loewe, B. 1936. *Griechische theophore Ortsnamen*. Dissertation. Tübingen.
- L'Orange, H. P. 1982. *Apotheosis in Ancient Portraiture*. New Rochelle, NY.
- Loroux, N. 1981. *L'invention d'Athènes: Histoire de l'oraison funèbre dans la "cité classique"*. Paris.
- Lowenthal, D. 1988. "Classical Antiquities as National and Global Heritage." *Antiquity*. 62: 726–35.
- Luce, T. J. 1965. "The Dating of Livy's First Decade." *Transactions of the American Philological Association*. 96: 209–40.
- Lund, A. A. 1987. "Lexikalische und kritische Bemerkungen zu Tacitus und Curtius Rufus." *Gymnasium*. 94: 50–6.
- Lund, H. 1992. *Lysimachus: A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship*. London and New York.
- MacDowell, D.M. 1990. *Demosthenes Against Meidias (Oration 21)*. Oxford.
- Macedonia: History and Politics*. Athens: Center for Macedonians Abroad and Society for Macedonian Studies
- Macurdy, G. H. 1932. *Hellenistic Queens*. Baltimore.
- Maffi, A. 1994. "Regole matrimoniali e successorie nell'iscrizione di Tegea sul rientro degli esuli." In H.-J. Gehrke, ed., *Rechtskodifizierung und soziale Normen im interkulturellen Vergleich*. Tübingen: 113–33.
- Magnetto, A. 1994. "L'intervento di Filippo II nel Peloponneso e l'iscrizione Syll.³ 665." In S. Alessandri, ed., *Historie. Studi offerti dagli allievi a Giuseppe Nenci in occasione del suo settantesimo compleanno*. Galatina: 283–308.
- . 1997. *Gli arbitrati interstatali greci*. Vol. II. Pisa.
- Malherbe, A. 1977. *The Cynic Epistles*. Atlanta.
- Manuel, F. and P. M. Fritzie. 1975. *A History of Utopian Thought*. Oxford.
- Marcus, R. 1937 (repr. 1956). "Alexander the Great and the Jews." In R. Marcus, ed., *Josephus: Jewish Antiquities, Books IX–XI*. App. C. (LCL). London: 512–32.
- Marin, L. 1988. *Portrait of the King*. Minneapolis.
- Marsden, E. W. 1969. *Greek and Roman Artillery*. Oxford.
- Martin, V. 1959. "Un recueil de diatribes cyniques: Pap. Genev. Inv. 271." *Museum Helveticum*. 16: 7–115.
- Mathiesen, I., E. Bettles, S. Davies and H. S. Smith. 1995. "A Stela of the Persian Period from Saqqara." *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*. 81: 23–41.
- Mauss, M. 1966. *The Gift*. Trans. I. Cunnison. London.
- McKechnie, P. 1995. "Diodorus Siculus and Hephæstion's Pyre." *Classical Quarterly*. 45: 418–32.
- . 1999. "Manipulation of Themes in Quintus Curtius Rufus Book 10." *Historia*. 48: 44–60.
- McQueen, E. I. 1978. "Some Notes on the Anti-Macedonian Movement in the Peloponnese in 331 B.C." *Historia*. 27: 40–64.
- Mederer, E. 1936. *Die Alexanderlegenden bei den ältesten Alexanderhistorikern*. Würzburger Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft, 8. Stuttgart.
- Megow, W.-R. 1988. *Kameen von Augustus bis Alexander Severus*. Berlin.
- Meister, K. 1990. *Die griechische Geschichtsschreibung von den Anfängen bis zum Ende des Hellenismus*. Stuttgart.
- Mendels, D. 1984. "Aetolia 331–301: Frustration, Political Power, and Survival." *Historia*. 33: 129–80.
- Mensing, E. 1963. "Die Peripatetiker über Alexander." *Historia*. 2: 274–82.

- Merker, I. L. 1979. "Lysimachus. Thessalian or Macedonian?" *Chiron*. 9: 31-6.
- Merlan, Ph. 1954-1955. "Isocrates, Aristotle, and Alexander the Great." *Historia*. 3: 60-81.
- Meritt, B. D. 1935. "Inscriptions of Colophon." *American Journal of Philology*. 56: 358-97.
- Meyer, E. 1927. "Alexander und der Ganges." *Klio*. 21: 183-91.
- Michel, D. 1967. *Alexander als Vorbild für Pompeius, Caesar, und Marcus Antonius. Archäologische Untersuchungen*. Collection Latomus 94. Brussels.
- Mikalson, J. D. 1998. *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*. Berkeley.
- Millar, F. G. B. 1964. *A Study of Cassius Dio*. Oxford.
- Mitchel, F. W. 1970. *Lykourgan Athens: 338-322*. Cincinnati.
- Mitsakis, K. 1967. *Der Byzantinische Alexanderroman nach dem Codex Vindob. Theol. Gr. 244*. Munich.
- Moles, J. 1990. "The Kingship Orations of Dio Chrysostom." *Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar*. 6: 297-375.
- . 1995. "The Cynics and Politics." In A. Laks and M. Schofield, eds., *Justice and Generosity*. Cambridge: 129-58.
- . 1993. "Truth and Untruth in Herodotus and Thucydides." In C. Gill and T. P. Wiseman, eds., *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*. Exeter: 88-121.
- Montgomery, H. 1985. "The Economic Revolution of Philip II—Myth or Reality." *Symbolae Osloenses*. 60: 37-47.
- Moore, P. 1995. *Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni: a Study in Rhetorical Historiography*. Dissertation. Oxford.
- Moreno, P. 1993. "L'immagine di Alessandro magno nell'opera di Lisippo e di altri artisti contemporanei." In J. Carlsen et al., eds., *Alexander the Great: Reality and Myth*. Rome: 101-36.
- . 2001. *Apelles: The Alexander Mosaic*. Milan.
- Moretti, L. 1975. *Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche*. II. Bibl. di studi sup., 62. Florence.
- Morris, I. 1994. "Archaeologies of Greece." In *Classical Greece: Ancient Histories and Modern Archaeologies*. Cambridge.
- Mortensen, C. 1992. "Eurydice: Demonic or Devoted Mother." *Ancient History Bulletin*. 6: 155-69.
- . 1997. *Olympias: Royal Wife and Mother at the Macedonian Court*. Dissertation. University of Queensland.
- Muckensturm, C. 1993. "Les Gymnosophistes etaient-ils des cyniques modeles?" In Goulet-Caze and Goulet. *Le cynisme ancien*. Paris: 193.
- Murray, O. 1990. *Symptotica: A Symposium on the Symposium*. Oxford.
- Niehues-Pröbsting, H. 1989. *Der Kynismus des Diogenes und der Begriff des Zynismus*. Munich.
- Ninou, K. 1980. Ed., *Alexander the Great: History and Legend in Art*. Athens: Archaeological Museum of Thessaloniki.
- Nock, A. D. 1928. "Notes on Ruler Cult." *Journal of Hellenic Studies*. 48: 21-43.
- North, H. 1966. *Sophrosyne; Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature*. Ithaca, NY.
- Ober, J. 1987. "Early Artillery Towers: Messenia, Boeotia, Attica, Megarid." *American Journal of Archaeology*. 91: 569-604.
- . 1998. *Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule*. Princeton.
- O'Brien, J. M. 1992. *Alexander the Great: The Invisible Enemy. A Biography*. London and New York.
- Ogden, D. 1999. *Polygamy, Prostitutes and Death: the Hellenistic Dynasties*. London.
- Oikonomides, A. N. 1981. *The Coins of Alexander the Great*. Chicago.
- O'Neil, J. 1999. "Political Trials under Alexander the Great and his Successors." *Antichthon*. 33: 28-47.

- Oppermann, M. 1996. "Macedonia. Cults." *Oxford Classical Dictionary*³, 905.
- Ostwald, M. 1955. "The Athenian Legislation against Tyranny and Subversion." *Transactions of the American Philological Association*. 86: 103-28.
- Ozols, J. and V. Thewalt. 1984. *Aus dem Osten des Alexanderreichs*. Cologne.
- Palagia, O. 2000. "Hephaestion's Pyre and the Royal Hunt of Alexander." In A. B. Bosworth and E. Baynham, eds., *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*. Oxford: 167-206.
- Palagio, O. and S. Tracy. 2003. Eds., *The Macedonians in Athens 323-229 B.C.* Oxford.
- Paquet, L. 1992. *Les cyniques grecs*. Paris.
- Pasinli, A. 1997. *The Book of Alexander Sarcophagus*. Istanbul.
- Pearson, L. 1954-5. "The Diary and Letters of Alexander the Great." *Historia*. 3: 429-39.
- . 1960. *The Lost Historians of Alexander the Great*. London.
- . 1962. *Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece*. Berkeley.
- Pédech, P. 1984. *Historiens compagnons d'Alexandre*. Paris.
- Perlman, S. 1985. "Greek Diplomatic Tradition and the Corinthian League of Philip of Macedon." *Historia*. 34: 153-74.
- . 1986. "Fourth Century Treaties and the League of Corinth of Philip of Macedon." *Ancient Macedonia*. 4. Thessaloniki: 437-42.
- Perrin, B. 1895. "The Genesis and Growth of an Alexander Myth." *Transactions of the American Philological Association*. 26: 56-68.
- . 1971. *Plutarch's Lives*. Vol. VII. *Demosthenes and Cicero, Alexander and Caesar*. Cambridge, MA.
- Perry, B. E. 1964. *Secundus the Silent Philosopher*. American Philological Association.
- Pfister, F. 1961. "Das Alexander-Archiv und die hellenistisch-römische Wissenschaft." *Historia*. 10: 30-67.
- . 1964. "Alexander der Grosse. Die Geschichte seines Ruhmes im Lichte seiner Beinamen." *Historia*. 13: 37-79.
- Pfrommer, M. 1998. *Untersuchungen zur Chronologie und Komposition des Alexandermosaiks auf antiquarischer Grundlage*. Aegyptiaca Treverensia 8. Mainz.
- Photiades, P. 1959. "Les diatribes cyniques du papyrus de Geneve 271, leurs traductions et elaborations successives." *Museum Helveticum*. 16: 225-39.
- Piejko, F. 1985. "The 'Second Letter' of Alexander the Great to Chios." *Phoenix*. 39: 238-49.
- Pietschmann, R. 1894. "Apis." *RE*. 1: 2807-9.
- Plantzos, D. 1996. *Hellenistic Engraved Gems*. Oxford.
- Poliakoff, M. B. 1987. *Combat Sports in the Ancient World: Competition, Violence, and Culture*. New Haven and London.
- Pope, A. U. 1957. "Persepolis as a Ritual City." *Archaeology*. 10: 123-30.
- . 1969. *Persepolis and Archaeological Sites in Fars*, with an Introduction by W. F. Dutz and Foreword by A. U. Pope. The Asia Institute, Shiraz.
- Potter, D. S. 1999. *Literary Texts and the Roman Historian*. London.
- Poulsen, B. 1993. "Alexander the Great in Italy during the Hellenistic Period." In J. Carlsen et al., eds., *Alexander the Great: Reality and Myth*. Rome: 161-70.
- Prandi, L. 1983. "Alessandro Magno e Chio: considerazioni su *Syll.*³ 283 e *SEG* XXII, 506." *Aevum*. 57: 24-32.
- . 1984. "La lettera di Aristotele ad Alessandro: il problema di Callistene." In M. Sordi, ed., *Alessandro Magno tra storia e mito*. Milan: 31-45.
- . 1985. *Callistene: uno storico tra Aristotele e re Macedoni*. Milan.
- . 1990. "Gli oraculi sulla spedizione asiatica di Alessandro." *Chiron*. 20: 345-69.
- . 1996. *Fortuna e realtà dell'opera di Clitarco*. *Historia*. Einzelschriften 104. Stuttgart.
- Prestiaanni Gialombardo, A. M. 1975. "Philippika I: Sul 'Culto' di Filippo II di Macedonia." *Siculorum Gymnasium*. 28: 1-57.
- Pribichevich, S. 1982. *Macedonia: Its People and History*. University Park, PA.

- Price, M. J. 1974. *Coins of the Macedonians*. Edinburgh and London.
- . 1982. "The 'Porus' Coinage of Alexander the Great. A Symbol of Concord and Community." In S. Scheers, ed., *Studia Paulo Naster Oblata*. Leuven: 75–85.
- . 1991. *The Coinage in the Name of Alexander the Great and Philip Arrhidaeus*. Vol. I. Zürich and London.
- Price, S. R. F. 1984. *Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor*. Cambridge.
- Pugliese Carratelli, G. 1994. Ed., *Pompeii, pitture e mosaici*. Rome.
- Queyrel, F. 1990. "Portraits princiers hellénistiques: chronique bibliographique." *Revue Archéologique*: 97–172.
- Radet, G. "Les colonies macédoniennes de l'Hydaspe." *Revue des Études Anciennes*. 43: 33–40.
- Rapin, C. 1987. "Le tresories hellenistique d'Ai Khanoum." *Revue Archéologique*: 41–70.
- Reames-Zimmerman, J. 1998. *Hephaistion Amyntoros: Éminence Grise at the Court of Alexander the Great*. Dissertation. The Pennsylvania State University.
- . 1999. "An Atypical Affair? Alexander the Great, Hephaistion Amyntoros and the Nature of Their Relationship." *Ancient History Bulletin*. 13: 81–96.
- . 2001. "The Mourning of Alexander the Great." *Syllecta Classica*. 12: 98–145.
- Reinmuth, O. W. 1971. *The Ephebic Inscriptions of the Fourth Century B.C.* Leiden.
- Rice, E. E. 1983. *The Grand Procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus*. Oxford.
- Ridgway, B. S. 1990. *Hellenistic Sculpture I: The Styles of ca. 331–200 B.C.* Madison, WI.
- Robertson, M. 1975. *A History of Greek Art*. Cambridge.
- Robinson, C. A. Jr. 1953. *The History of Alexander the Great*. Vol. I. Rhode Island.
- Robinson, H. R. 1975. *The Armour of Imperial Rome*. New York.
- Rodriguez, C. J. 1975. *Aspectos del vocabulario de Q. Curtius Rufus estudio semantico-lexicologico contribución al problema de su datación*. Dissertation. Salamanca.
- Roebuck, C. 1948. "The Settlement of Philip II with the Greek States in 338 B.C." *Classical Philology*. 43: 73–92.
- Roisman, J. 1984. "Ptolemy and his Rivals in his History of Alexander." *Classical Quarterly*. 34: 373–85.
- . 1995. Ed., *Alexander the Great: Ancient and Modern Perspectives*. Lexington, MA and Toronto.
- . (Forthcoming). "The Rhetoric of Courage." In R. Rosen and I. Sluiter, eds., *Andreia. The Penn-Leiden Colloquia on Ancient Social Values*. I.
- Rolley, C. 1999. *La Sculpture grecque*. 2. *La période classique*. Paris.
- Romm, J. S. 1989. "Aristotle's Elephant and the Myth of Alexander's Scientific Patronage." *American Journal of Philology*. 110: 566–75.
- Rosen, K. 1978. "Der 'göttliche' Alexander, Athen und Samos." *Historia*. 27: 20–39.
- Rosenthal-Heginbottom, R. 1999. "Bleibilder—Zauberbilder." *Dielheimer Blätter zur Archäologie und Textüberlieferung der Antike und Spätantike*. 30: 157–73.
- Rösger, A. 1988. "Severus Alexander und Alexander der Grosse." In W. Will, ed., *Zu Alexander d. Gr. Festschrift G. Wirth zum 60. Geburtstag am 9.12.86*. Amsterdam: 885–906.
- Ross, D. J. A. 1963. "Olympias and the Serpent." *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*. 26: 1–23.
- Roth, J. forthcoming 2004. "War in the Hellenistic World and Roman Republic." In P. Sabin, H. Van Wees, and M. Whitby, eds., *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare*. 2 vols. Cambridge.
- Ruzicka, S. 1988. "War in the Aegean, 333–331 B.C.: A Reconsideration." *Phoenix*. 42: 131–51.
- . 1992. *Politics of a Persian Dynasty: The Hecatomnids in the Fourth Century B.C.* Tulsa.

- Ryder, T. T. B. 1965. *Koine Eirene*. Oxford.
- . 1994. "The Diplomatic Skills of Philip II." In I. Worthington, ed., *Ventures Into Greek History: Essays in Honour of N. G. L. Hammond*. Oxford: 228–57.
- . 2000. "Demosthenes and Philip II." In I. Worthington, ed., *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator*. London: 45–89.
- Sachs, A. J. 1977. "Achaemenid Royal Names in Babylonian Astronomical Texts." *American Journal of Ancient History* 2: 129–47.
- Sachs, A. J. and H. Hunger. 1988. *Astronomical Diaries and Related Texts from Babylonia*. Vol.1: *Diaries from 652 B.C. to 262 B.C.* Vienna (ÖAW Phil.-hist.kl. Denkschrift 195).
- Sacks, K. S. 1990. *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century*. Princeton.
- . 1994. "Diodorus and his Sources: Conformity and Creativity." In S. Hornblower, ed., *Greek Historiography*. Oxford: 213–32.
- Sakellariou, M. B. 1983. Ed., *Macedonia: 4000 Years of Greek History and Culture*. Athens.
- Sancisi-Weerdenberg, H. 1983. "Exit Atossa: Images of Women in Greek Historiography on Persia." In A. Cameron and A. Kuhrt, eds., *Images of Women in Antiquity*. Detroit: 20–33.
- . 1993. "Alexander and Persepolis." In J. Carlsen et al., eds., *Alexander the Great: Reality and Myth*. Rome: 177–88.
- Sanders, D. H. 1996. Ed., *Nemrud Dagi: The Hierothiesion of Antiochus I of Commagene*. Winona Lake, IN.
- Sanders, L. J. 1991. "Dionysius I of Syracuse and the Origins of the Ruler Cult." *Historia*. 40: 275–87.
- Sansone, D. 1988. *Greek Athletics and the Genesis of Sport*. Berkeley.
- Sawada, N. 1996. "Athenian Politics in the Age of Alexander the Great: A Reconsideration of the Trial of Ctesiphon." *Chiron*. 26: 57–84.
- Schachermeyr, F. 1949. *Alexander der Grosse. Ingenium und Macht*. Graz.
- . 1955. "Alexander und die Ganges-Länder." *Innsbrucker Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte*. 3: 123–35.
- . 1970. *Alexander in Babylon und die Reichsordnung nach seinem Tode*. Sitzungsberichte der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, 268. 3. Vienna.
- . 1973. *Alexander der Große. Das Problem seiner Persönlichkeit und seines Wirkens*. Vienna.
- . 1976. "Alexander und die unterworfenen Nationen." *Entretiens Hardt*. 22: 46–79.
- Schmitt, H. H. 1969. *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*. Vol. III. Munich.
- Schmitt, O. 1992. *Der Lamische Krieg*. Bonn.
- Schmitt, R. 1985. "Amestris." *Enchr*. 1: 936–7.
- Schmitt Pantel, P. 1992. *La cité au banquet*. Rome.
- Schnapp, A. 1997. *Le chasseur et la cité. Chasse et érotique dans la Grèce ancienne*. Paris.
- Schofield, M. 1993. *The Stoic Idea of the City*. Cambridge.
- Scholl, R. 1987. "Alexander der Grosse and die Skaleverei am Hofe." *Klio*. 69: 108–21.
- Schottky, M. 1989. *Media Atropatene und Gross-Armenien in hellenistischer Zeit*. Bonn. (Dissertationsdrucke: Alte Geschichte, Heft 27).
- Schubert, R. 1898. "Der Tod des Kleitos." *Rheinische Museum*. 53: 98–117.
- Schumacher, L. 1990. "Zum Herrschaftsverständnis Philipps II von Makedonien." *Historia*. 39: 426–43.
- Schwenk, C. J. 1985. *Athens in the Age of Alexander: The Dated Laws and Decrees of the Lykourgan Era, 338–322 B.C.* Chicago.
- Seager, R. 1981. "The Freedom of the Greeks of Asia: from Alexander to Antiochus." *Classical Quarterly*. 31: 106–12.
- Sealey, R. 1993. *Demosthenes and his Time*. Oxford: 50–73.

- Sekunda, N. V. 1992. *The Persian Army, 500–330 B.C.* London.
- . 2001. "The Sarissa." *Acta Universitatis Lodzensis. Folia Archaeologica*. 23: 13–41.
- Seibert, J. 1969. *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Ptolemaios' I.* Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, Heft 56. Munich.
- . 1972 (repr. 1994). *Alexander der Grosse*. Erträge der Forschung, 10. Darmstadt.
- . 1985. *Die Eroberung des Perserreiches durch Alexander den Grossen auf kartographischer Grundlage*. Wiesbaden.
- . 1998. "'Panhellenischer' Kreuzzug, Nationalkrieg, Rachefeldzug oder makedonischer Eroberungskrieg? Überlegungen zu den Ursachen des Krieges gegen Persien." In W. Will, ed., *Alexander der Grosse: Eine Welteroberung und ihr Hintergrund*. Antiquitas, Reihe 1. Abhandlungen zur alten Geschichte, 46. Bonn: 5–58.
- Shaki, M. 1981. "The Denkard Account of the History of the Zoroastrian Scriptures." *Archiv Orientalni*. 49: 114–25.
- Shepherd, D. G. 1971. "Alexander. The Victorious Emperor." *Bulletin of the Cleveland Museum of Art*. 58: 244–50.
- Sherwin-White, S. M. 1985. "Ancient Archives: the Edict of Alexander to Priene, a Reappraisal." *Journal of Hellenic Studies*. 105: 69–89.
- Shipley, G. 1987. *A History of Samos, 800–188 B.C.* Oxford.
- Skidmore, C. 1996. *Practical Ethics for Roman Gentlemen*. Exeter.
- Smith, R. R. R. 1988. *Hellenistic Royal Portraits*. Oxford.
- Sorabji, R. 1993. *Animal Minds and Human Morals*. London.
- Sordi, M. 1958. *La Lega Tessala fino ad Alessandro Magno*. Rome.
- . 1984. "La lettera di Aristotele ad Alessandro e i rapporti tra Greci e barbari." *Aevum*. 58: 3–12.
- Southgate, M. S. 1977. "Portrait of Alexander in Persian Alexander-Romances of the Islamic Era." *Journal of the American Oriental Society*. 97: 278–84.
- Spann, P. O. 1999. "Alexander at the Beas: A Fox in Lion's Skin." In F. B. Titchene and R. F. Moorton, Jr., eds., *The Eye Expanded: Life and The Arts in Greco-Roman Antiquity*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: 62–74.
- Spencer, D. 2002. *The Roman Alexander: Readings in a Cultural Myth*. Exeter.
- Spiegel, F. 1851. *Die Alexandersage bei den Orientalen*. Leipzig.
- Squillace, G. 1992–94. "Alessandro e l'offerta ad Atena di trecento panoplie." *Miscellanea di Studi Storici*. 9: 9–20.
- Stadter, P. 1980. *Arrian of Nicomedia*. Chapel Hill.
- Stagakis, G. S. 1970. "Observations on the *Hetairoi* of Alexander the Great." *Ancient Macedonia*. 1: 86–102.
- Stardelov, G. 1993. Ed., *Macedonia and its Relations with Greece*. Skopje.
- Stein, A. 1929. *On Alexander's Track to the Indus*. London.
- Stern, E. 2000. *Dor: Ruler of the Seas*. Jerusalem. 2nd ed.
- Stewart, A. 1990. *Greek Sculpture: An Exploration*. New Haven.
- . 1993. *Faces of Power: Alexander's Image and Hellenistic Politics*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Oxford.
- . 1997. *Art, Desire, and the Body in Ancient Greece*. Cambridge.
- . 1998. "Nuggets: Mining the Texts Again." *American Journal of Archaeology*. 102: 271–82.
- Stewart, F. H. 1994. *Honor*. Chicago and London.
- Stewart, Z. 1958. "Democritus and the Cynics." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*. 63: 179–91.
- Stoneman, R. 1991. *The Greek Alexander Romance*. London and New York.
- . 1994. "Who are the Brahmins?" *Classical Quarterly*. 44: 500–10.
- . 1994. *Legends of Alexander the Great*. London.
- . 1995. "Naked Philosophers." *Journal of Hellenic Studies*. 115: 99–114.
- . 1996. "The Metamorphoses of the Alexander Romance." In G. Schmeling, ed., *The Novel in Antiquity*. Leiden.

- . 1999. "The Latin Alexander." In H. Hofmann, ed., *Latin Fiction*. London: 167–86.
- . 2000. "You are What you Eat: Diet and Philosophical Diata in Athenaeus." In D. Braund and J. Wilkins, eds., *Athenaeus and His World*. Exeter: 413–22.
- Strauss, B. S. and J. Ober. 1990 *The Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and their Lessons for Modern Strategists*. New York.
- Stroux, J. 1933. "Die stoische Beurteilung Alexanders des Grossen." *Philologus*. 88: 222–40.
- Svenson, D. 1995. *Darstellungen hellenistischer Könige mit Götterattributen*. Archäologische Studien 10. Frankfurt am Main.
- Tabacco, R. 2000. *Itinerarium Alexandri. Testo, apparato critico, introduzione, traduzione e commento*. Citta di Castello.
- Taeger, F. 1957. *Charisma: Studien zur Geschichte des antiken Herrscherkultes*. Vol. I. Stuttgart.
- Tarn, W. W. 1927. "Greece: 335 to 321 B.C." *Cambridge Ancient History*. Vol. VI. Cambridge: 438–60.
- . 1939. "Alexander Cynics and Stoics." *American Journal of Philology*. 60: 46.
- . 1948. *Alexander the Great*. 2 vols. Cambridge.
- . 1951. *The Greeks in Bactria and India*. Cambridge.
- Tataki, A. B. 1998. *Macedonians Abroad: A Contribution to the Prosopography of Ancient Macedonia*. Athens.
- Thomas, R. 1995. "Hellenistische Wurzeln römischer Herrscherikonographie. Zur Alexanderangleichung des Augustus." *Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts*. 110: 367–403.
- Thür, G. and H. Taeuber. 1994. *Prozessrechtliche Inschriften der griechischen Poleis: Arkadien*. Vienna.
- Tod, M. N. 1948. *Greek Historical Inscriptions*. Oxford.
- Tomlinson, R. A. 1970. "Ancient Macedonian Symposia." *Ancient Macedonia*. 1: 308–15.
- Tracy, S. V. 1995. *Athenian Democracy in Transition: Attic Letter-Cutters of 340 to 290 B.C.* Berkeley.
- Tritle, L. A. 1988. *Phocion the Good*. London and New York.
- Unger, E. 1928. "Babylon." *Reallexikon der Assyriologie*. Vol. I: 330–69.
- . 1970. *Babylon: Die heilige Stadt*². Berlin.
- United States Department of State. 1994. *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993*. Washington.
- Van der Spek, R. 1998. "The Chronology of the Wars of Artaxerxes II in the Babylonian Astronomical Diaries." *Achaemenid History*. 11: 239–56.
- van Deun, P. 1993. "Les fragments de Plutarque contenus dans le florilège byzantin des *loci communes*." *Byzantion*. 63: 328–56.
- Vermeule, C. C. 1980. "The late Antonine and Severan Bronze Portraits from Southwest Asia Minor." In R. A. Stucky and I. Jucker, eds., *Eikones: Studien von griechischer und römischer Bildnis, Hans Jucker vom sechzigsten Geburtstag gewidmet*. Bern: 185–90.
- . 1982. "Alexander the Great, the Emperor Severus Alexander, and the Aboukir Medallions." *Schweizerische Numismatische Rundschau*. 61: 61–79.
- Vesilind, P. J. 1996. "Macedonia." *National Geographic*. 183 [3]: 118–39.
- di Vita, A., and C. Alfano 1995. Eds., *Alessandro Magno, Storia e Mito*. Rome.
- Völcker-Janssen, W. 1993. *Kunst und Gesellschaft an den Höfen Alexanders d. Gr. und seiner Nachfolger*. Munich.
- von Graeve, V. 1970. *Das Alexandersarkophag und seiner Werkstatt*. Istanbul Forschungen 28. Berlin.
- von Reden, S. 1995. *Exchange in Ancient Greece*. London.
- Walbank, F. W. 1951. "The Problem of Greek Nationality." *Phoenix*. 5: 41–60.

- . 1984. "Ruler-Cult." *Cambridge Ancient History*². Vol. VII. 1. Cambridge: 87–96.
- . 1987. "Könige als Götter. Überlegungen zum Herrscherkult von Alexander bis Augustus." *Chiron*. 17: 365–82.
- Wallace, R. W. 1989. *The Areopagus Council to 307 B.C.* Baltimore and London.
- Wardman, A. E. 1955. "Plutarch and Alexander." *Classical Quarterly*. 5: 96–107.
- Weaver, S. M. 1997. "Ancient and Modern Macedonia: Roots of the Macedonian Question" [& lit]. *Choice*. 34 [4]: 589–99.
- Weil, R. 1960. *Aristote et l'histoire: Essai sur la «Politique»*. Paris.
- Weippert, O. 1972. *Alexander-imitatio und römische Politik in republikanischer Zeit*. Dissertation. Augsburg.
- Weitzmann, K. 1979. Ed. *Age of Spirituality*. New York.
- Welles, C. B. 1963. Trans. *Diodorus of Sicily*. Loeb Classical Library vol. 7. Cambridge, MA.
- . 1965. "Alexander's Historical Achievement." *Greece & Rome*. 12: 216–28.
- Wheeler, E. L. 1991. "The General as Hoplite." In V. D. Hanson, ed., *Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience*. London and New York: 121–70.
- Wheeler, M. 1968. *Flames over Persepolis: Turning-Point in History*. New York.
- Whitehead, D. 1983. "Competitive Outlay and Community Profit: [PHILOTIMIA] in Democratic Athens." *Classica et Mediaevalia*. 34: 55–74.
- . 1993. "Cardinal Values: the Language of Public Approbation in Democratic Athens." *Classica et Mediaevalia*. 44: 37–75.
- . 2000. *Hypereides: The Forensic Speeches*. Oxford.
- Wieschöfer, J. 1980. "Die 'Freunde' and 'Wohltäter' des Großkönigs." *Studia Iranica* 9: 17–21.
- . 1994. *Die 'dunklen Jahrhunderte' der Persis. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Kultur von Fars in frühhellenistischer Zeit (330–140 v. Chr.)*. Munich.
- . 1994. "Zum Nachleben von Achaimeniden und Alexander in Iran." *Achaemenid History*. 8: 389–97.
- . 1996. *Ancient Persia from 550 B.C. to 650 A.D.* trans. Azizeh Azodi, London and New York.
- Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, U. von. 1932. *Der Glaube der Hellenen*. Vol. II. Berlin.
- Wilcken, U. 1917. "Beiträge zur Geschichte des korinthischen Bundes." *Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*. (Philosoph.-philol. u. hist. Kl.): 1–40.
- . 1922. "Alexander der Große und der korinthische Bund." *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*. (Philosoph.-philol. u. hist. Kl.): 97–118.
- . 1923. "Alexander der Grosse und die indischen Gymnosophisten." *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*. 150–83.
- . 1929. "Philip II. von Makedonien und die panhellenische Idee." *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*. (Philosoph.-philol. u. hist. Kl.): 291–315.
- . 1967. *Alexander the Great*, trans. G. C. Richards, New York and London.
- Will, W. 1982. "Zur Datierung der Rede Ps. Demosthenes XVII." *Rheinisches Museum*. 125: 202–12.
- . 1986. *Alexander der Grosse*. Stuttgart.
- Will, W. and J. Heinrichs 1988. Eds., *Zu Alexander d. Gr.: Festschrift G. Wirth zum 60. Geburtstag am 9.12.86*. 2 Vols. Amsterdam.
- Williams, B. 1981. *Moral Luck*. Cambridge.
- Wirth, G. 1973. *Alexander der Grosse*. Reinbek bei Hamburg.
- . 1976. "Alexander und Rom." In *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité*. Fondation Hardt: *Entretiens* 22. Geneva: 181–221.
- Wiseman, T. P. 1993. "Lying Historians: Seven Types of Mendacity." In C. Gill, and T. P. Wiseman, eds., *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*. Exeter.
- Wolohojian, A. M. 1969. *The Romance of Alexander the Great by Pseudo-Callisthenes*. New York.

- Wood, M. 1997. *In the Footsteps of Alexander the Great*. Berkeley.
- Woodman A. J. 1988. *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography*. London.
- Worthington, I. 1986. "Hyper. 5 Dem. 18 and Alexander's Second Directive to the Greeks." *Classica et Mediaevalia*. 37: 115-21.
- . 1986. "The Chronology of the Harpalus Affair." *Symbolae Osloenses*. 61: 63-76.
- . 1992. *A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus: Rhetoric and Conspiracy in Later Fourth-Century Athens*. Ann Arbor.
- . 1994. "The Harpalus Affair and the Greek Response to the Macedonian Hegemony." In I. Worthington, ed., *Ventures into Greek History*. Oxford: 307-30.
- . 1994. "IG II² 370 and the Date of the Athenian Alliance with Aetolia." *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*. 57: 139-44.
- . 1999. "How 'Great' was Alexander?" *Ancient History Bulletin*. 13.2: 39-55.
- . 1999. *Greek Orators 2. Dinarchus and Hyperides*. Warminster.
- . 2000. "Demosthenes' (In)activity in the Reign of Alexander." In I. Worthington, ed., *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator*. London: 90-113.
- Yardley J. 1984. *Quintus Curtius Rufus. The History of Alexander*. Introduction and notes by W. Heckel. Harmondsworth.
- Yardley, J. C. and Heckel, W. 1997. *Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus*. Vol. I. Oxford.
- Younger, W. 1966. *Gods, Men, and Wine*. Cleveland.
- Zahrnt, M. 1996. "Alexanders Übergang über den Hellespont." *Chiron*. 26: 129-47.

INDEX

- Abdalonymus of Sidon, 49
 Abisaras, 162
 Abulites, 40, 186–187, 189, 190
 Achaea, 83, 105, 107, 127, 284
 Achaemenids, *see* Persia, Persians
 Achilles, 262, and *see* Alexander III,
 his personality: inspired by Homer
 and Achilles
 Ada, 215, 230, 248–250
 Adea, 231, 232, 236
 Aegae (Macedonia), *see* Vergina
 Aegae (Syria), 57, 70, 87
 Aeropus of Lyncestis and his sons, *see*
 Arrhabaeus; Heromenes; Alexander,
 son of Aeropus
 Aeschines, 16, 121
 Aesillas, 56
 Aetion (an artist), 40–41, 60
 Actolia, 102, 125, 127, 129–130
 Agatharchides, 330
 Agathocles, Philip II's Companion, 207
 Agathocles the Just, 54
 Agis III, King of Sparta, 105–107,
 115, 119, 126, 127
 Ahura-Mazda, 6, 173, 179–181,
 259–260
 Aias, 255, 257
 Alcetas, son of Orontes, 204
 Alcibiades, 64
 Alexander II, King of Macedon, 72–73
 Alexander III, the Great,
 – in ancient history and art: early
 lost accounts of, 3–13; his archive,
 5; extant accounts of, 13–29,
 340–341; modern treatments of the
 literary evidence, 19–21, 26–29;
 contemporary portraits of, 32,
 34–44, 49, 265; Successors' use of
 his image, 43, 43–51; Hellenistic
 images of, 51–55; Roman images
 of, 14–15, 19, 31–32; 55–66; as
 depicted in Pompeian frescoes and
 Mosaic, 39, 41–44, 47, 49, 56, 60;
 and on coinage and medallions,
 17–18, 40, 46, 48–51, 54, 62–63,
 109, 111, 164, 254, 261, 272–273,
 284–285; *see also Ephemerides*
 – his appearance, 31, 33–34, 37, 43,
 89
 – his family: his relationship with his
 father, 88–94, 97, 254–255,
 273–274, 285, 317–318; relationship
 with his mother, 90–93, 233–242,
 251, 255; relationship with his sisters
 and half sisters, 230–233; his wives
 and mistresses, 230, 242–247, 250,
 289
 – his youth and education, 73–74, 83,
 88–92, 94–96, 198, 206, 214, 239,
 254–256, 303
 – accession and securing his rule, 69,
 87–88, 198–199, 235–237
 – his aims, 93–96, 107–108, 113, 118,
 139, 175
 – the Asian campaign: avenging
 Xerxes' invasion and panhellenism,
 11, 104, 107–115, 121, 173, 174,
 182, 185, 250, 254, 260, 262, 263,
 266, 284; his generalship and
 strategy, 43–44, 133–142, 147–153;
 his Thracian campaign, 17; his
 campaign in Asia Minor, 135–136,
 145, 147–150, 154, 191–192, 201,
 249; siege of Tyre, 21–22, 141, 145,
 151–152, 256, 263–264, 266, 286,
 309; the campaigns in Central Asia
 and India, 25, 133, 136–137,
 139–140, 142, 152–153, 159–168,
 175, 220–221, 261, 262, 264, 265,
 272–273, 275–276, 284, 296;
 wounds of, 10, 24, 33, 167–168
 – as a conqueror, 175, 182–187,
 192–193, 261, 265–266, 293,
 309–310, 333, 334, 338–339; his
 brutal treatment of defeated enemies,
 22, 140–142, 161, 167–168, 183,
 225, 263, 266, 286
 – as King of Asia and a world-ruler,
 53, 168, 171–179, 184, 185, 191,
 192, 247, 248, 250, 260–261, 265,
 271, 275, 290, 329–331, 337, 338,
 340
 – as a ruler of an empire: his use of
 Macedonian and Asian revenues and

- assets, 86, 96, 112–113, 173, 181, 183, 193, 306–313; the administration of the empire, 111–113, 117–118, 170, 181–193; city foundations, 176, 178–179, 259
- and the Greeks, 16, 17, 39, 52–53, 88–89, 102–130, 148–149, 239, 276–277; and Athens, 39, 104, 106, 108–109, 118–130, 238, 273, 276–277; and the “Exile Decree,” 124–130
- and Egypt, 5, 40–41, 62, 215, 258–259, 261, 264, 270, 271–272, 325
- and the Iranians: his treatment of Darius III’s family, 246–249, 251, 287, 311, 342; and the Iranian elite, 141–142, 171–182, 188–193, 220–221, 244–245, 309–310, 311; adopting Iranian customs and integration of Iranians, 147, 173–181, 188–193, 214–216, 246, 247, 248, 251, 269, 274–276, 288–289, 290–293, 297–298, 301, 313–315, 319
- and the Macedonian elite, 139, 197–225, 239, 241, 283, 294–299, 302–303, 308, 312–313; his “kinsmen,” 203, 205–206, 219, 300; his friends, 297–321
- his court, 221–222, 227–251, 275, 290–291, 297–298, 300–306; his council and advisers, 205, 212–213, 304–306; his attire and royal emblems, 37, 174, 215, 265, 268, 290–291, 357; his official honors, 290–294; his distribution of honors and gifts, 231, 240, 294–313, 320, 329, 335, 337; services rendered to him, 297–306; games and banquets, 186–187, 291, 298, 299–300, 316–321; royal hunts, 44–45, 89, 223, 298, 302–303, 313–316; and funerals, 257, 273, 311–313; and freedom of speech in court, 317–320
- his autocratic or tyrannical rule, 197–198, 269, 275, 328–329, 336, 339, 340
- conspiracies against his life, 12–13, 197–198, 202, 210–225, 231
- his religious practices and beliefs, 180–181, 185–186, 253–270, 290; and Zeus, 34, 36, 269, 270–274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 285, 293, 318, 319, 363; and Heracles, 32–33, 40, 46, 47, 54, 57, 60, 90, 140, 159, 161, 254, 255, 256, 257, 261, 262–264, 265, 266, 270, 271, 272, 273, 275, 278, 284, 285, 333, 344; and Dionysus, 11, 34, 48, 50, 52–53, 57, 159, 257, 261, 264–265, 272, 275–276, 278, 285, 293; and Nike, 38–39, 49, 51–53, 58, 60, 63, 164, 261, 273, 285; and other Greek divinities, 44, 51–52, 108–109; *see also* Ammon; Apollo; Artemis; Athena; Dioscuri
- his divine claims and attributes, 16, 22–23, 37–39, 40–41, 48, 50–53, 63, 93–94, 128–129, 255, 266, 270–278, 291, 292, 293, 305, 310, 332, 333; and *proskynesis* 93, 118, 224, 274–275, 291, 292, 299–300, 319–320, 328
- his personality and character’s traits, 56, 135, 138–139, 142, 198, 243, 249, 264, 269, 275, 278, 282–289, 306–307, 308, 314–316, 327, 335, 336, 337, 339, 340, 341, 344; inspired by Homer and Achilles, 22, 32–33, 34, 37–38, 61, 64, 74, 90, 108, 204, 251, 254, 255–256, 257, 284–285, 303, 304, 308, 313, 342; his *aretē*, 32–33, 38, 43, 52, 90, 253, 255–256, 278, 284, 295–296, 314, 341; his courage, 90–91, 135, 282–283; his search for honor, 337–338, 342; his manliness and sexuality, 33–34, 53, 228, 242–243, 245, 247, 248, 283, 286–289, 332–333, 342; his drinking, 146, 287–289, 317–319, 327; his *hubris* and lack of moderation, 278, 286–289, 316
- his death, burial, and succession, 5–6, 44–45, 48, 58, 69, 97, 134, 230, 242, 246, 250, 273, 338; and *see* Philip Arrhidaeus; Perdiccas
- ancient and modern assessments of him: attributing his success and conduct to Fortune, 25, 100, 327, 333, 337, 338–341, 343; as depicted in ancient philosophy and rhetoric, 328–345; as a philosopher king, 340–342, 343; used as an example, 14–15, 18–19, 34, 325–327, 328, 329, 336, 338, 340–341, 343, 344; perceived as a Christian Saint, 363;

- claimed by both modern Greeks and Macedonians, *see* Macedonia, modern; his "greatness," 96–98, 278; *see also* Army; Companions (*hetairoi*); Corinth, League of; Gaugamela; Granicus; Issus; *Paides basilikoi*; Persepolis
 Alexander IV, 245, 250
 Alexander, son of Aeropus, 88–89, 199, 200, 210–213, 218, 240, 241, 297
 Alexander, son of Cassander, 47
 Alexander, of Epirus, 229, 231, 232, 234, 239
 Alexander Helios, 53
Alexander Romance, 16, 59, 66, 325, 332, 334, 337, 340, 342, 343, 345
 "Alexander Vulgate," *see* Cleitarchus; Curtius Rufus; Diodorus of Sicily; Justin; *Metz Epitome*
 Alexandria, Egypt, 48, 51, 61, 178, 257, 259
 Alexandria Eschata, 178
 Alexandria, in Caucaso, 161
 Alexandropolis, 74, 198
 Alinda, 249
 Amastris, 177
 Amazons, 59–60
 Ambracia, 100
 Ammon, Ammon-Ra, Zeus Ammon, 41, 93, 257, 261, 262, 267, 270, 271, and *see* Alexander III, divine claims, and Egypt
 Amminapes, 189
 Amphicytonic League, 78–81, 103
 Amphilocheus, 257
 Amphipolis, 74–75, 78, 277
 Amphoterus, 202, 212, 213
 Amyntas III, king of Macedonia, 71, 228, 229, 277
 Amyntas, son of Andromenos, 202, 209, 216, 219, 240, 241
 Amyntas, son of Arrhabaeus, 200, 213
 Amyntas, son of Perdiccas III, 72, 88, 199, 229, 231, 236, 238
 Amyntas, (a Macedonian deserter), 155
 Anatolia, *see* Alexander III, and his campaign in Asia Minor
 Anaxarchus of Abdera, 117, 304–305, 319, 328, 333
 Anaxippus, 190
 Andrisus, 55
 Andromache, 251
 Andromenes' sons, 202, 219, 240
 Andronikos, Manolis, 46, 355–356, 357
 Anticles, son of Theocritus, 223
 Antigone, Philotas' mistress, 217
 Antigonus Monophthalmus, son of Philip, 7, 49–50, 201, 207, 210, 217, 220
 Antigonus, son of Ptolemaeus, 207
 Antileon of Chacis, 129
 Antiochus I, Soter of Syria, 177
 Antiochus I of Commagene, 54–55
 Antipater, son of Asclepiodorus, 223
 Antipater, son of Iolaus, 45–46, 81, 89, 105–106, 107, 111, 119, 149, 177, 198–201, 202, 204, 207, 210, 217, 231, 233, 237, 238–241, 270, 294
 Antiphon, 82
 Antonius, Marcus, 53
 Aornus, Rock of, 140, 161–162, 264
 Apame, 177
 Apelles of Cos, 31–32, 34–35, 38–39, 42, 58, 60, 272–273
 Aphrodisias, 64
 Apis, 258, 259
 Apollo, 254, 255, 257, 261, 265–267, 271, 272, 277
 Apollodorus, a Macedonian general, 186
 Apolonius of Tyana, 64
 Apolonia Moriaion, 63
 Apuleius, 31–33, 34, 40, 59, 343
 Arabia, Arabs, 133, 153, 276, 293
 Arbela, *see* Gaugamela
 Arcadia, 100, 102–103, 105, 107, 125, 126–127, 257
 Archaeology, *see* Nationalism, and archaeology
 Archelaus, king of Macedonia, 71
 Archelaus, Macedonain commander, 187
 Arcia, 190
 Arcopagus, 119–120
Aretê, *see* Alexander III, and *aretê*
 Argeads, *see* Macedonia, Macedonian kingship
 Argaeus, pretender to the Macedonian throne, 74–75
 Argos, 85, 100, 102–103, 105, 256, 257
*Arguraspidae*s, 301
 Ariaspian, 175
 Ariobarzanes, 189
 Aristander, 262, 263, 267, 269, 270, 304

- Aristobulus, 4, 7, 8–10, 20–22, 33, 64, 118, 272, 273, 276, 284, 293, 297
 Aristonucus (a musician), 312
 Aristonous, the Bodyguard, 207
 Aristotle, 7, 64, 74, 90, 116–118, 255–256, 275, 286, 327, 328, 331, 342
 Army, before Philip II, 71; under Philip II, 75–77, 85–86, 94–96, 138, 142, 144–145; under Alexander, 95–96, 142–147, 175–176, 197, 200, 225, 280, 282, 287, 294–296, 298–299, 310; Macedonian cavalry, 38, 44, 60, 138, 143–146, 202, 203, 220, 294–296, 313; Macedonian infantry, 75, 143–144, 146, 167–168, 200, 202, 294–296, 298–299; non Macedonian units, 144–145, 176, 292, 300, 301; military commanders, 200–205, 207–210, 213, 219–222, 280, 294–296, 297, 313; weapons, 143–145; logistics, 146, 149–150, 152; Alexander's fleet, 147, 149–150, 165, 167–168, 202, 296; *see also* Gaugamela; Granicus; Issus
 Arrhabaeus, son of Aeropus, 88–89, 199
 Arrhidacus, *see* Philip Arrhidacus
 Arrian, 3, 5, 7–8, 11–13, 15, 17, 18, 20–27, 28, 29, 59, 212–213, 216–217, 240, 241, 253, 272, 273–274, 283, 288, 289, 295, 297, 316, 338–339, 341
 Arsaces, 190
 Artabazus, 177, 190–191, 221, 242, 243–245
 Artacama, 177
 Artemis, 38, 257, 263
 Artashata, *see* Darius III
 Artaxerxes III, 170, 177, 212, 243, 246
 Artonis, 177
 Arybbas, ruler of Epirus, 81
 Arybbas, the Bodyguard, 203–204, 207, 209
 Asander, son of Agathon, 201
 Asander, son of Philotas, 201
 Asclepiodorus, son of Eunicus, 223
 Asclepiodorus, son of Philon, 186
 Asclepius, 257
 Aspendus, 112
 Assaceni, 161
 Assyrians, 330
 Astaspes, 190
 Atarrhias, son of Deinomens, 210
 Atheas, a Scythian king, 215
 Athena, 48, 52–53, 108–109, 257, 261, 262, 269, 284
 Athenaeus, 15, 327
 Athenais (a prophetess), 272
 Athens, 232, 237, 270, 283–284; and *see* Philip II, and Athens; Alexander III, and the Greeks, and Athens
 Atizyes, 211
 Atropates, Atropatene, 187, 189
 Attalus, Cleopatra's uncle, 87–88, 91–92, 198–199, 202, 215, 218, 228, 234, 236, 317
 Attalus, son of Andromenes, 219
 Audata, 74
 Augustus, 58
 Aulus Gellius, 327
 Autophradates, 190
Autonomia, *see* Alexander III, and the Greeks
 Avesta, 172
 Baalbeck, 66
 Babylon, Babylonia, 5, 28, 45, 59, 127, 146, 164, 165, 171, 174, 185–186, 193, 246, 257, 258–259, 262, 266, 268, 269, 272, 277, 309, 312, 338
 Bactria, Bactrians, 93, 141, 152–153, 164, 190, 192, 245, 264, 274, 295, 313; *see* Alexander III, and campaigns in Central Asia and India
 Baeton, 4
 Bagoas, 242, 289, 300, 309
 Balacrus, son of Nicanor, 200–201, 207, 210
 Balkan wars, 348
 Barsine, daughter of Artabazus, 215, 227, 242–245, 246, 250, 251, 264
 Baryaxes, 187
 Bazira, 161
 Behistun, 6
 Bel-Marduk, 186, 259, 268
 Bematists, 4
 Beroea, 62
 Bessus, 22, 152–153, 221, 289, 312
 Betis, 22
 Bodyguards (*sômatophulakes*), 200–201, 202, 203–206, 209, 296, 297–298, 301
 Boeotia, *see* Thebes
 Borza, Eugene, 359

- Brahmans, 168, 334, 335, 341
 Bucephalus, Bucephala (city of), 26,
 47, 50, 89–90, 165, 167
 Bulgaria, Bulgarians, 348, 350, 351,
 352, 361, 362
 Byzantium, 82
- Cadusians, 170
 Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, 55
 Calanus, 312
 Calas, son of Harpalus, 200–201, 210
 Callisthenes of Olynthus, 4, 6–10,
 23, 118, 223–224, 225, 291–292,
 299–300, 304–305, 319–320, 327,
 328–329, 336
 Callixenus, 52
 Cambyses, 197, 331
 Candace, 333
 Caracalla, 61–63
 Carneades, 336
 Caria, *see* Ada; Halicarnassus;
 Hecatomnids; Pixodarus
 Carmania, 190, 261, 266
 Carthage, 31, 145, 266
 Cassander, 11, 42, 44, 46–47, 330
 Catanes, 220
 Cebalinus, 13, 215, 216, 298
 Cento, Metodija Andonov, 362
 Cersebleptes, 81, 95
 Chaeroneia, battle of, 35, 74, 75,
 83–84, 99, 119, 120, 122, 126,
 135, 199, 200, 254
 Chalcis, 100
 Chalcidice, 71, 78–79, 81
 Chandragupta, 50
 Chares of Athens, 121
 Chares of Mytilene, 4, 118, 301
 Charidemus of Athens, 121, 151
 Chios, 113–115, 150
 Church Fathers, 328, 344
 Claudius Caesar, 58
 Claudius II Gothicus, 63
 Clausewitz, Carl von, 133, 135
 Cleades of Thebes, 263
 Cleander, son of Polemocrates, 202,
 219
 Clearchus, 277
 Cleitarchus of Alexandria, 4, 8, 10–12,
 18, 21, 24, 29, 59, 166, 211, 214,
 326
 Cleitus, son of Dropides (“the Black”),
 11, 23, 92–93, 117, 138, 139, 203,
 214, 220–223, 273, 288, 292, 294,
 297, 305, 318–319, 320
 Cleitus, “the White,” 209
 Cleopatra, Philip II’s wife, 87–88,
 91–92, 198–199, 215, 228, 229,
 236, 317
 Cleopatra, daughter of Philip II, 227,
 229, 231–233, 234, 237, 238, 239,
 242, 243, 250
 Cleopatra VII, Queen of Egypt, 53
 Coenus, son of Polemocrates, 13,
 138, 165, 166–167, 202, 209, 217,
 219–220
 Coins, *see* Alexander III, in ancient
 history and art
 Common Peace, *see* League of Corinth
 Companions (*hetairoi*) and Friends
 (*philoï*), 174, 197, 205–208, 212,
 221, 298, 301, and *see* Alexander III,
 his court: his friends
 Companions (cavalry), *see* Army,
 Macedonian cavalry
 Constans, 343
 Contrianetes, 65–66
 Corinth, 100, 101, 102, 105, 232,
 329
 – League of Corinth, 83–85, 88–89,
 95, 100–104, 106–107, 108, 110,
 113–116, 117, 118, 121, 124,
 126–127, 129–130, 200, 262
 Corrhagus, 105, 320
 Cossaeans, 153
 Crates, 332, 333
 Craterus, son of Alexander, 13, 38,
 45–46, 138, 165, 167, 177, 204,
 209, 212, 217, 225, 241, 330
 Craterus, son of Craterus, 45
 Crenides, *see* Philippi
 Critobulus of Cos, 168
 Crocus Field, battle of, 79
 Croesus, 331
 Cornelius Macer, 65
 Q. Curtius Rufus, 3, 9–10, 12–13, 15,
 18, 21–28, 59, 211–212, 214, 225,
 241, 247, 280, 289, 291, 295, 298,
 302, 303, 316, 319, 320, 339
 Cynics, 329, 331–338, 339, 341, 342,
 343–345
 Cynnane, daughter of Philip II, 199,
 227, 229, 231, 236
 Cynosarges, 277
 Cyrene, 233, 237
 Cyropolis, 141
 Cyrus II, the Great, 174–175,
 179–180, 185–186, 188, 285, 333
 Cyzicus, 171

- Damascus, 5, 45, 244
 Dandamis, 334, 335, 340, 342
 Dardanians, 141
 Darius I, 6, 159, 184
 Darius II, 170
 Darius III, 42–44, 113, 136–138, 140, 141, 147, 149–153, 164, 170–171, 177, 183, 186, 190, 210, 215, 230, 244, 245, 246, 247, 251, 260, 266, 270, 284, 289, 311; *see* Gaugamela; Issus; Persia, Royal ideology; Alexander III, and the Iranians
 Dataphernes, 220
 Delchev, Gotse, 362
 Delos, 41, 267, 272
 Delphi, Delphic Amphictyony, 38, 45, 78, 81, 102–103, 237, 254, 256–257, 265, 266, 267, 271, 312, 355
 Demades, 39, 69, 106, 128
 Demaratus of Corinth, 312
 Demetrius, the Bodyguard, 202–203, 207, 216, 220
 Demetrius, son of Althaemenes, 203, 223
 Demetrius, son of Antigonos, 49
 Demetrius, the Besieger, 207
 Demosthenes, 16, 75, 79, 81–84, 99–100, 103, 104, 106, 119–122, 125–128
 Dexippus, 28
 Dicaearchus, 332
 Didyma, 266, 272, 277
 Dimnus, 216, 298
 Dio of Prusa, 334, 338, 342–343, 345
 Diodorus of Sicily, 3, 10, 12–13, 14, 15, 21, 23, 24–25, 27–28, 84, 98, 124, 211–212, 240, 247, 254, 280, 282, 289, 295, 303
 Diogenes (the philosopher), 326, 327, 329–333, 335, 337, 340, 341, 342
 Dionysius of Heracleia, 231
 Dionysus, *see* Alexander III, and Dionysus
 Dioscuri, 38, 257, 285
 Dioxippus, 320–321
 Dinarchus, 16
 Dium, 38, 55, 56, 254, 257, 262, 355
 Diyllus, 20, 29
 Dodona, 262
 Drangiana, 190
 Drypetis, 177
 Ecbatana, 50, 115, 171, 187, 193, 217
 Egypt, *see* Alexander III, and Egypt
 Elagabalus, 63
 Elephantine, 114
 Elis, 102–103, 105, 107, 262, 267
 Empedocles, 277
 Engonopoulos, Nikos, 361
 Epaminondas, 73–74
Ephebeia, 122–123
Ephemerides (Royal journals), 5–6, 29
 Ephesus, 38–39, 109, 112–113, 256, 257, 263, 277
 Ephialtes, 121
 Ehippus, 4
 Epicrates of Athens, 122
 Epictetus, 341
 Epicurus, Epicureans, 59, 342
 Epidauros, 257
Epigoni, 247
 Epimenes, son of Arseus, 223
 Epirus, 74, 78, 81, 92, 229, 232, 233, 234, 237, 238, 239
 Eratosthenes, 272
 Eresus, 277
 Erigyius, 190, 312
 Erythrae (in Ionia), 272
 Esagila, 259
 Etemenanki, 259
 Euboea, 82, 100
 Euclates of Piraeus, 119–120
 Eudemus of Plataea, 123
 Euhemerus, 334
 Eumenes of Cardia, 5–6, 45, 177, 241, 245
 Euphranor, 34
 European Community, European Union, 349
 Eurydice, Philip II's mother, 204, 228, 229, 230
 Eurydice, daughter of Amyntas and Cynane, 46
 Eurydice, daughter of Antipater, 177
 Eurylochus, 81
Exemplum, 325–326, and *see* Alexander III, ancient and modern assessments of him
 "Exiles' Decree," *see* Alexander III, and the Greeks
 Fabius Aemiliani, 56
Fortuna, *see* Alexander III, ancient and modern assessments of him
 Freedom of the Greeks, *see* Alexander III, and the Greeks
 Gabiene, battle of, 143
 Gades, 56–57

- Gandhara, *see* Alexander III, and the Indian campaign
 Ganges River, *see* Alexander III, and the Indian campaign
 Gaugamela, battle of, 60, 135, 141, 144, 152, 153, 155–156, 159, 164, 202, 216, 254, 257, 260, 261, 265, 272
 Gaza, 22, 140, 145, 269–270
 Ge, 257
 Gedrosian Desert, 140, 175, 265
 Gela, 266
 Geneva papyrus inv. 271, 335, 344
 Gerasa, 63
 Germanicus, 336–337
 Gifts, *see* Alexander III, and his distribution of honors and gifts
 Gordian III, 62
 Gordium, Gordian Knot, 261, 271
 Gorgos of Iasos, 125
 Gortys, 257
 Granicus, battle of, 38, 108, 109, 114, 135, 139, 141, 150, 153–154, 220, 222, 282, 284
 Greece, Greeks, ancient, *see* Philip II; Alexander III, and the Greeks
 Greece, Greeks, modern, *see* Macedonia, modern
 Gymnosophists, 332

 Hadrian, 23
 Hani, 172
 Hannibal, 333
 Halicarnassus, 145, 149, 150, 154, 200, 249
 Harpagus, 187
 Harpalus, son of Machatas, 90, 92, 127–128, 220, 238
 Hecataeus, Alexander's emissary, 88
 Hecatomnids, 230, 249
 Hector, son of Parmenion, 219, 312
 Hegelochus, son of Hippostratus, 202, 215–216, 219
Hegemon, *see* League of Corinth;
 Antipater, son of Iolaus
 Hegesistratus, 191
 Helena (an artist), 58
 Helenopolis, 334
 Helios, 34, 53–54, 63, 257
 Hellespont, 257, 261
 Hephaestion, son of Amyntor, 13, 41, 47, 49, 138, 161–162, 167, 177, 181, 203, 204, 209, 210, 217, 220–221, 240–241, 243, 247, 257–258, 284, 294–295, 312–313, 332, 342
 Heracleia Pontica, 277
 Heracleia (in Central Asia), 264
 Heracles, 262, and *see* Alexander III and Heracles; Philip II, and religious practices
 Heracles, son of Alexander III, 243, 244, 264
 Herculaneum, 59
 Hermolaus, son of Sopolis, 23, 223–224, 292, 297, 302–303, 315–316, 320
 Herodian, 61
 Herodotus, 28, 70, 159, 301
 Heromenes, son of Acropus, 88–89, 199
 Hindu Kush, *see* Alexander III, and the campaigns in Central Asia and India
 Hippocleides of Athens, 299
Historia Augusta, 64
 Homer, *see* Alexander III, and Homer and Achilles
 Homer, *see* Alexander III, his personality and character's traits: Homer and Achilles
 Honor, 281, and *see* Alexander III, his personality and character, his distribution of honors and gifts
 Horus, 272
 Hunts, *see* Alexander III, his court: royal hunts
 Hydaspes, and the battle of, 4, 137, 156, 162–165, 167, 261
 Hydraotes, *see* Alexander III, and the Indian campaign
 Hygeia, 237
 Hypaspists, *see* Army, Macedonian infantry
 Hyperides, 16, 25, 121, 127, 141, 237–238
 Hyphasis, and the mutiny at, 96, 136, 142, 166–167, 208, 225, 257, 264, 265, 267–268

 Iambulus, 334
 Idrieus of Caria, 249
 Ilium, *see* Troy
 Illyria, Illyrians, 70–72, 74–75, 77, 81, 88, 92, 95, 103, 236
 India, *see* Alexander III, Indian campaign
 Ipsus, battle of, 49
 Isis, 259
 Isocrates, 85, 108, 254, 255
 Issus, battle of, 49, 136–137, 141, 144,

- 151, 153, 154–155, 201, 211, 212, 213, 244, 261, 266, 284
Itinerarium Alexandri, 343
- Jaxartes, 264, 265, 267–268
- Jenghiz Khan, 134
- Julian (“the Apostate”), 343–344
- C. Julius Caesar, 57, 116, 134, 344
- Julius Valerius, 343
- Justin, 3, 10, 12, 14, 18, 21, 24, 28, 198, 234, 247, 248, 263, 278, 280, 289
- Kabul valley, *see* Alexander III, and the Indian campaign
- Karamanlis, Constantine, 359, 361
- Khonsu, 41
- King’s peace, 113
- Kisses, 299–301
- Kofos, Evangelos, 351, 362
- Lamian War, 97, 104, 119, 129–130
- Lanice, 203
- Laurion, silver mines, 121
- Leochares, 34–35, 45
- Leonidas, Alexander’s tutor, 89, 91, 204, 234, 255, 303
- Leonidas (a commander), 280
- Leonnatus, the Bodyguard, 204, 209, 217, 219, 220, 298
- Leosthenes of Athens, 129–130
- Lesbos, 150
- Leuctra, battle of, 73, 79
- Liber de Morte Testamentumque Alexandri*, 16
- Livy, 9, 327, 339
- Lucan, 336, 345
- Lucian, 15, 41, 333
- Lycia, 269, 270
- Lycurgus, son of Lycophron, 16, 99, 104, 106, 120–124
- Lysander, 277
- Lysippus of Sicyon, 31, 32, 34–38, 45, 55, 57, 58, 262
- Lysimachus, son of Agathocles, 40, 50–51, 109, 207, 312, 315–316, 330
- Lysimachus, Alexander’s teacher, 204, 255, 303
- Macedon, son of Zeus, 256
- Macedonia, Macedonians, ancient: ethnic identity, 70–72, 85; resources, 71, 85–86; history before Philip II, 70–72; under Philip II, 72–87; under Alexander III, 87–96; Macedonian kingship and other political institutions, 72–73, 77, 197–225, 227, 229, 233, 238–239, 242, 250, 251–252, 256, 273, 290, 307, 316; royal women and polygamy, 227–242; Macedonian religious beliefs and practices, 256, 260, 264, 267–270, 272, 275, 290; their social values and practices, 228, 242–243, 284–287, 299, 302–303, 314, 315, 317–318; their attitudes toward Iranians and Asians, 244–245, 248, 250, 251, 275–276, 288, 290–293, 318; *see also* Alexander III; army; Philip II
- Macedonia, Macedonians, modern: conflicts with Greece and Greek nationalism, 347–348, 349–350, 355, 357, 360; Republic of Macedonia, 349, 356, 357, 358, 361; Macedonian diaspora, 347, 357; Macedonian and Greek claims to Alexander, 347, 350, 354, 356–364; claims of continuity with ancient Macedonia, 347, 351–352, 354, 356, 359; and archaeology and exhibits, 347, 353–357, 359; nationalism and contested national identity, 347–350, 351, 352–354, 360–361, 362, 363; and multiculturalism, 358, 361, 364
- Macrianus Titus, 64
- Maedi, 198
- Magi, 260
- Mallus, 263
- Malli, 10, 24, 139, 142, 167–168, 283, 296, 340
- Mantineia, battle of, 76–77
- Maracanda, *see* Samarcand
- Marsyas of Pella, 4, 6–7
- Massaga, 161
- Maussolus, 333
- Maximus of Tyre, 330, 331, 335, 342
- Mazaeus, 186, 189
- Mazarus, 187
- Medes, *see* Persia, Persians
- Medius, 4
- Megalopolis, 105–106, 107
- Megara, 47, 83, 263
- Melas, Pavlos, 361–362
- Melcart, 263
- Meleager, son of Neoptolemus, 220, 293, 320
- Melophoroi*, 174, 301

- Memnon of Rhodes, 145, 149–152,
 153, 171, 243–244
 Memphism, 258, 261
 Mentor of Rhodes, 243–244
 Menander, Satrap of Lydia, 210
 Menes, son of Dionysius, 208
 Meroes, 25
 Meropis, 334
 Messenia, 100, 105
 Metaxas, 348
 Methone, 74, 78, 91
Metz Epitome, 15–16, 18, 27
 Mieza, 116
 Miletus, 109–110, 113, 145, 149, 150,
 154, 191–192, 266, 269
 Mithrenes, 191
 Mithridates VI, 57
 Molossia, *see* Epirus
 Muses, 257
 Mut, 40
 Musicanus, 168, 310
 Mycene, 355

 Nabarzanes, 309
 Nandas, 166
 Napoleon, 134, 137
 Nationalism, *see* Macedonia, modern
 Naulochum, *see* Priene
 Nearchus, son of Androtimus, 3, 10,
 20, 167, 177, 210, 262, 266, 283
 Neoptolemus, son of Achilles, 257
 Neoptolemus, the Aeacid, 203–204,
 209, 220
 Neoptolemus, son of Harpalus, 200
 Nero Caesar, 58–59, 336
 Nicaea, 165, 167
 Nicanor, son of Parmenion, 202, 203,
 209, 219, 312
 Nicanor of Stageira, 124–127
 Nicias (artist), 34, 57
 Nicobule, 4
 Nicomachus (Cebalinus' brother), 13,
 216
 Nicomachus (artist), 42
 Nike, *see* Alexander III and Nike

 Oceanus, Ocean, 257, 338
 Ochus, son of Darius III, 171
 Oeniadaï, 125
 Olympia, 35, 55, 124–126, 127, 128,
 129, 229, 262, 353
 Olympias, 35, 46, 62, 63, 65, 73, 78,
 81, 87, 88, 203, 204, 207, 211,
 227, 228–229, 230, 231, 232–234,
 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240,
 241, 242, 245, 250, 254–255,
 257–258, 264, 272, 274, 277, 303,
 308; *see also* Alexander III, and
 his family
 Olynthus, 254, 304
 Omphis, *see* Taxila
 Onesicritus of Astypalaea, 4, 8, 10,
 167, 332, 334, 344
 Onomarchus, 79, 95
 Orontobates, 249
 Opis, and mutiny at, 23, 93, 96, 186,
 208, 225, 247, 260, 273, 275, 284,
 292, 300, 311
 Ora, 161
 Oracle, *see* Ammon; Delphi; Didyma,
 Orontas, 212
 Orphic mysteries, 272
 Orxines, 189, 190
 Osiris, 272
 Oxathres, 186, 189
 Oxus, 270
 Oxyartes, 245
 Oxyathres, 171
 Oxycanus, 168
 Oxydates, 187, 189
 Oxydracae, 167–168

 Paconians, 70–71, 74, 77, 95, 145
 Pages, *see* *Paides basilikoi*
Paides basilikoi (Royal Boys, Pages), 118,
 205–206, 207, 223–224, 302–303,
 315–316
 Palladius, 334, 335, 340, 341, 342,
 344, 345
 Pallene, 105
 Panaetus, 336
 Panhellenism, *see* Philip II, and the
 invasion of Asia; Alexander III, and
 the Asian campaign
 Pantaleon, 54
 Papatthemelis, Stelios, 350
 Paraliputra, 166
 Parapamisadae, 161
 Paraetacene, 189
 Parmenion, son of Philotas, 81, 84, 88,
 135, 138, 139, 155, 182, 187, 199,
 202–203, 204, 209, 211, 212, 213,
 214, 215–220, 241, 269, 280, 287,
 294, 308–309
 Parysatis, daughter of Artaxerxes III,
 177, 227, 246, 247, 250
 Pasargadae, 174, 179–180
 Patalene, 168

- Patrocles, 313
 Pausanias, pretender to the Macedonian throne, 74
 Pausanias, the assassin of Philip II, 87, 199, 235
 Pausanias, the Spartan regent, 211
 Peithagoras (a seer), 268
 Peithon, son of Agenor, 168, 187, 207
 Peleus, 255, 303
 Pella, 43, 70, 80, 86, 355
 Perdiccas III, King of Macedon, 72, 238
 Perdiccas, son of Orontes, 5, 44–49, 161–162, 187, 204, 209, 217, 219, 220, 246, 294, 307
 Pergamum, 63
 Perge, 64
 Pericles, 121
 Perinthus, 62
 Peripatetics, 328–329
 Persepolis, 11, 22, 115, 182–185, 193, 248, 259–260, 265, 288, 311
 Perseus, 270–272, 274, 285
 Persia, Persians: depictions in ancient and modern accounts, 169–171, 330; royal ideology and practices, 179–182, 184–185, 191, 197, 244, 248, 251, 259–260, 274, 313–315; royal cities, 181–187, 191; “Royal Judges,” 197; political structure and administration, 170–171, 184, 188–193; navy and army, 136, 147, 150–153; strategy against Alexander, 138, 147, 148–153, 170–171; view of Alexander, 171–172, 191; rituals and social practices, 299, 301, 313–314, 315; influence on the Macedonian court, 205; *see also* Ahura-Mazda; Gaugamela; Granicus; Issus; Alexander III, and the Iranians, *proskynesis*; Macedonia, ancient: attitudes toward Iranians and Asians
 Persian Gates, 270
 Persis, 296, 297
 Peucelaotis, 162
 Peucestas, 166, 177–178, 296–297
 Phalaecus, 80
 Pharaoh, *see* Alexander III, and Egypt
 Pharismenes, 189
 Pharnuches, 141
 Phaselis, 210, 213
 Phila, 77, 200–201
 Philinna, 77
 Philip II, 16, 35, 39, 63, 69, 99, 198–199, 212, 238, 243, 244, 266, 304, 312, 317–318, 333; his court, 205, 207, 227–229, 234–235; his wives, 91, 215, 227–229, 230, 234–235, 245, 246, 272, 317; his use of state revenues, 85–86; his religious practices and divinity, 229, 254–255, 277; and Athens, 70–71, 74–75, 78–84, 94–95, 100, 148–149, 277; and Central Greece, 78–80; and the unification of Macedonia and attaining hegemony in Greece, 73–87, 96, 214–215; and post-Chaeroneia settlements of Greek affairs, 100–102, 124, 126; and the invasion of Asia, 84–87, 95–96, 102, 107–108, 138, 173, 254–255, 260–261; his assassination, 87, 91–92, 139, 228, 229, 235–236, 254, 269; his (?) tomb, 355, 357; *see also* Alexander III, and his family; Army; Macedonia, ancient; Philippi; Phocis; Thessaly
 Philip III Arrhidaeus, 5, 46, 87–88, 92, 229, 249, 256
 Philip, son of Agathocles, 312
 Philip, son of Machatas, 168, 220
 Philip of Acarnania, 204, 212, 214, 303–304
 Philip the Arab, 63
 Philippeum, 35, 229, 234
 Philippi, 86, 111–112, 277
 Philistus (historian), 90
 Philocrates, and peace of, *see* Philip II, and Athens
 Philodemus, 342
Philo, *see* Companions (*hetairoi*)
 Philostratus, 15
 Philotas, son of Carsis, 223
 Philotas, son of Parmenion, 12–13, 23, 138, 139, 202, 209, 214, 215–219, 295
 Philoxenus, satrap of Caria, 238
 Philoxenus (a poet), 90
 Philoxenus of Eretria (a painter), 34, 42, 47
 Phobos, 257
 Phocion of Athens, 120, 307
 Phocis, 78–81, 95, 104, 215, 254, 266
 Phoenix, 255, 303
Phoros (tribute), 109, 110–114, 115
 Photius, 28
 Phrasaortes, 189

- Phrataphernes, 189
 Pinarus River, *see* Issus, battle of
 Pindar, 64, 263
 Pisidia, 63
 Pixodarus of Caria, 90, 92, 235, 249
 Plato, 340
 Plutarch, 3, 4, 13, 15, 18, 21, 23–26, 33–34, 59, 150, 233, 237, 240–241, 245, 246, 247, 270, 272, 289, 297, 303, 307, 308, 312, 331, 333, 334, 339–341, 342, 343, 345
 Pliny the Elder, 35, 38, 47
 Polybius, 13–14, 263, 331
 Polyclitus, 4, 31–32, 85
 Polyperchon, 202, 209
 Pompeius Trogus, *see* Justin
 Gn. Pompey, the Great, 57
 Porus, 25–26, 39–40, 137, 153, 156, 162–166, 284–285
 Porus (“the Bad”), 165–166
 Posidon, 257, 261
 Priam of Troy, 257
 Priene, 109–111, 112
Proskynesis, *see* Alexander III, and *proskynesis*
 Protesialus, 257
 Protomachus, 213
 Proexes, 190
 Psammon, 328
 Pseudo-Callisthenes, *see* Alexander Romance
 Pseudo-Maximus Confessor, 326–327
 Pthah, 258
 Ptolemaeus, son of Ptolemaeus (?), 201, 207, 209
 Ptolemaeus, son of Seleucus, 209
 Ptolemaeus, father of Antigonos, 207
 Ptolemy I Soter, son of Lagus, 4–5, 7–8, 10–13, 20–24, 29, 45, 47–49, 51–52, 92, 177, 205, 210, 211, 220, 272, 273, 293, 294, 298
 Ptolemy II Philadelphus, 52–53
 Ptolemies, 252
 Punjab, *see* Alexander III, and the Indian campaign
 Pydna, 46, 277
 Pyrgoteles, 31–32, 34–35, 39–40
 Pyrrho, 328
 Pythagoras, 64, 277
 Python of Byzantium, 82
 Rome, Romans, 14–15, 18, 31, 32, 39, 55–66, 326, 327, 332, 336, 339, 343–344; *see* Alexander III, in ancient history and art
 Roxane, 40–41, 46, 177, 222, 227, 245–246, 250, 251, 289, 292, 293
 Royal Boys, *see* *Paides basilikoi*
 Royal Journals, *see* *Ephemerides*
 Saca, 164
 Sacred Wars, *see* Phocis
 Sagalassos, 63, 213
 Samarcand, 23, 141, 192, 203
 Sambus, 168
 Samos, 125–126, 128–129, 277
 Samuel, Czar, 362
 Sangala, 166
 Sardanapallus, 331
 Sardis, 113, 191
 Sartezakis, Christos, 350
 Satibarzanes, 190
 Satraps, *see* Persia, political structure and administration
 Scythians, 286, 312
 Selene, 257
 Seleucus I Nicanor, Seleucids, 50, 177, 252
 Selymbria, 82
 Semiramis, 159, 285
 Seneca the Elder, 33
 Seneca the Younger, 15, 329, 336, 337, 338, 345
 Severus Alexander, 61–63
 Sexuality, *see* Alexander III, and his sexuality
 Simmias, son of Andromenes, 209, 219
 Sindos, 355
 Sisimithris, 308
 Sisines, 210–212
 Sisiscottus, 159
 Sisygambis, Darius III’s mother, 230, 248–250, 311
 Sittacene, 210
 Siwah, *see* Ammon
 Skopje, Skopians, 348, 350–351, 356, 358, 360, 362
 Smindyrdes, 331
 Smyrna, 63
 Socrates, 64, 337
 Sogdiana, 137, 141, 152–153, 159, 161, 162, 190, 192, 264–266, 273, 314, 316; *see* Alexander III, and campaigns in Central Asia and India
 Soli, 257
Somatophylax/kes, *see* Bodyguards

- Sopolis, son of Hermodorus, 223
 Sostratus, son of Amyntas, 223
 Sparta, 80, 85, 100–101, 105–107, 108–109, 116, 148, 200
 Speusippus, 254
 Spitamenes, 141, 153, 177, 220, 270
 Stalin, 362
 Stamenes, 189
 Stasanor, 190
 Stateira, the wife of Darius III, 247–248, 251, 311
 Stateira, daughter of Darius III, 177, 227, 230, 246–247, 248, 250, 251
 Stoa, Stoics, 329, 336–338, 340–341
 Stone, Oliver, 359
 Strabo, 3, 8, 14
Strategos, see Antipter, son of Iolaus
Strategos autokrator, see League of Corinth
Sunedrion (council), see League of Corinth
Suntaxis (war contribution), 110
Suntrophoi, see Alexander III, and the Macedonian elite: “kinsmen”
 Susa, 50, 124, 151, 183, 186–187, 189, 193, 272, 292, 301, 309
 Susa marriages, see Alexander III, and the Iranians
Symposion, see Alexander III, his court: games and banquets

 Taenarum, 127, 129
 Tacitus, 9, 18, 336–337
 Tajikistan, 134
 Tanais River, 286
 Tapurians, 190
 Tarsus, 62–63
 Tauron, son of Machatas, 220
 Taxila, Taxiles, 25, 159, 162, 165, 308, 320, 334
 Tegea, see Arcadia
 Teles, 332
 Telestes, 90
 Temenus of Argos, 256
 Teres, 81
 Termessus, 145
 Thais, 11
 Thebes, Thebans, Boeotians, 73–74, 76–77, 79, 83–84, 88–89, 99, 100, 102–104, 107, 109, 116, 121, 127, 137, 141, 148, 236, 263, 264–265, 269, 283, 286, 287
 Thebes (Egypt), 270
 Theophanes, 57
 Theophrastus, 10
 Theopompus, 10, 332, 334
 Thermopylae, 79–80
 Thessalonice, daughter of Philip II, 227, 229, 231
 Thessalus, 90
 Thessaly, Thessalians, 75, 77–79, 81–82, 102, 130, 145, 155, 200, 215, 263, 282, 297
 Thetis, 254
 Thrace, Thracians, 17, 74, 78, 80–83, 88, 92, 95, 105, 111–112, 137, 145, 200, 215
 Thrasybulus, 121
 Thucydides, 70
 Tiberius Caesar, 23
 Timagenes, 20, 24
 Tiridates, 183
 Tito, 348, 349, 350, 362
 Trajan, 59, 341, 343
 Triballi, see Thrace
 Troy, 257, 262, 269, 284, 296
 M. Tullius Cicero, 18, 116, 329, 336, 337
 Tyre, see Alexander III, siege of Tyre

 Ugbaru, 186
 Uranus, 276, 293

 Valerian, 64
 Valerius Maximus, 15, 327, 330
 Vespasian Caesar, 58
 Vergina, 5, 43, 46, 228, 235, 255, 277, 355–356, 357; Star or sun of, 348, 349, 356–358, 362

 Wood, Michael, 359

 Xenophilus, 40, 175
 Xenophon, 205, 212
 Xerxes, 107, 108, 115, 138, 173, 174, 184–185, 211, 266, 288, 331

 Yugoslavia, Slavs, 348, 349, 350, 351, 358, 360

 Zagros Mountains, 133
 Zelca, 112
 Zeno, 340
 Zeus, see Alexander III, and Zeus; Philip II, and religious practices
 Zeuxis, 337



Fig. 1. Head of Alexander. Bronze, perhaps from the Sebasteion at Bubon;
ca. AD 200-250. Basel.



Fig. 2. The "Nelidow" Alexander. Bronze; Hellenistic or Roman version of a portrait of ca. 325 BC. Cambridge (Mass.).



Fig. 3. The "Schwarzenberg" Alexander. Marble. Roman copy of a portrait of ca. 330 BC. Munich.




Fig. 4. Alexander with thunderbolt and aegis. Red carnelian gemstone signed by Neisos (cast); ca. 300-250 BC. St. Petersburg.



Fig. 5. Alexander with Ammon-Ra Khamutef (left); Monthu introduces Alexander to Ammon (right). Sandstone relief from the Shrine of the Bark at Luxor; ca. 330-325 BC. Luxor, in situ.



Fig. 6. Alexander and Roxane. Fresco from the Insula Occidentalis at Pompeii; Roman copy or version of a painting of ca. 325-300 BC. Pompeii.



Fig. 7. Alexander fighting Darius. Mosaic from the Casa del Fauno at Pompeii; Roman version of a painting of ca. 325-300 BC. Naples.



Fig. 8. Alexander with elephant-skin headdress, Ammon's horns, *mitra*, and aegis. Silver tetradrachm of Ptolemy I Soter of Egypt, ca. 305 BC. Formerly on the Swiss Market.



Fig. 9. Alexander fighting at Issos. Marble relief from the so-called Alexander Sarcophagus from Sidon; ca. 320-310 BC. Istanbul.



Fig. 10. Alexander with horned helmet, wearing Macedonian-Persian dress and riding Bucephalus. Silver tetradrachm of Seleucus I of Syria; ca. 295-290 BC. Formerly on the Swiss Market.



Fig. 11. Alexander with diadem and Ammon's horns. Silver tetradrachm of Lysimachus of Thrace; ca. 297-281 BC. London.




Fig. 12. Alexander-Helios. Alabaster bust from Egypt; ca. 150 BC-AD 100.
Brooklyn.



Fig. 13. Alexander with lionskin cap. Silver tetradrachm of Agathocles of Bactria; ca. 190-170 BC. London.




Fig. 14. Europe and Asia at an altar, holding a shield depicting the Battle of Arbela (Gaugamela). Marble relief from Porcigliano; ca. AD 50? Rome.



Fig. 15. Caracalla-Alexander with aegis and Palladion. Cameo, set into a medieval cross; AD 211-216. Formerly in Cammin, destroyed or stolen in World War II.



Fig. 16. Alexander with shield and breastplate bearing astral symbols.
Gold medallion from Aboukir in Egypt, ca. AD 230-250. Baltimore.



Fig. 17. Alexander taking Sagalassos, with Zeus and a fleeing barbarian. Bronze coin of Sagalassos, minted under Claudius II Gothicus; ca. AD 268-70. London.



Fig. 18. Busts of (from the left) Pythagoras, Socrates, Alcibiades, Pindar, Alexander, and a nameless philosopher. Marble; ca. AD 400-450. Aphrodisias.